Soul Catcher

Java's Fiery Prince Mangkunagara I, 1726–95

M.C. Ricklefs

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M.C. Ricklefs

ASIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA

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For Margaret,
with love and gratitude for 50 years together;
for Norman, Charles and Thérèse
and our grandchildren Samuel, Claudia and Hannah;
and in memory of Deborah

EXPLICATION DES SIGNES
Provinces appartenant exclusivement au Gouvernement.
Etats de l'Empereur de Souraharta (avant la guerre)
Etats du Sultan de Djokjaharta (avant la guerre)
Terres appartenant en commun aux Souverains indi-
gènes avant la guerre
Grande route (Chaussée).
Grand chemin.
Chemin de communication
Sentier.
Kanting ou Redoute.
Corps de garde ou Blockhaus.
Troupes et corps auxiliaires.
Combat.
Antiquité.
M. Gantie
M. Sumbing
M. Telamoejo
M. Joko-pekik
M. Merbabue
M. Merapie
MAGELANG
Malangan
Tiedar
Menoreh
Soemberan
Borro-boedo
Kalie-bawang
Kalie-loewang
Kalie-Progo
Pengasih
Sentolo
Wates
Wadas
Kamgero
Pakis
DJOK-DJAKARTA
Bantoel
Kalassan
Pogo River
Merdtouaux
Monts
GOENONG
Tjiamboeng
Tjimanoek

SOERAKARTA
BOYOLALIE
Banjoedamo
Kalietan
Ladjoor
KLATTEN
Taman
Mt. Madjestic
Mt. Lawoo
Mt. Kadoe-san
Mt. Banjoe-ocrip
Mt. Gamber
Mt. Prédjo
Mt. Sewoo
Pass. Moeras
Pass. Penang
Pass. Tjangkring
Pass. Tjandie
Pass. Tjoeroeg
Pass. Tjoeroeg-redjo
Pass. Tjoeroeg-tawang-redjo
Pass. Tjoeroeg-tawang-redjo
KEDOE
KADOEWANG
LAROH
SEMBOEKAN
DOLO
TJIEREBON
RADE DE PATJITAN
Mendalian
Blimbing
Tedjo-koelon
Bompoel
Tjenawas
Soeno
Walen
Sarwo
Karang-wuroe
Tjemara
Ngemplak
Malang-jiwan
Kobondalan
Getassan
Mangis
Slambie
Low-Gender
Pangking
Soeko
Tjandie
Kopat
Madjo
Mariawan
Ladjoor
Wonge
Gebung
Karangwoenie
Tjeloran
Modal
Karang-redjo
Karang-soeren
Tjandie
Pangong ngan
Soengie
Kahim-bago
Kawanghin
Medjoin
Sieonan
Plalar
Bakoong-ngan
Karang-soeren
Pagoetan
Kallok
Tjandie
Balak
Baroong
Watoo-baroong
Bakapang
Kaloo-Kanangan
Kebon-ronie
Kamoning
Kedangan
Woban
Keron
Ban-njah
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Tjangel
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Kalitoh
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Kedjoran
Sebrek
Tjandie
Tjangal
Sangel
Kramat
Tjoemok
Karang-anjar
Kesterjan
Pakoer
Tjoeroek

Contents

Transcription, Orthography, Toponyms and Personal Names		xi
Dating Systems		xiii
List of Maps		xiv
List of Illustrations		xiv
Abbreviations		xvi
Introduction	Background to This Study and Brief Overview of Primary Sources	1
Part I	**Youth and War**	
Chapter 1	A Child at Court, Briefly Glimpsed, 1726–42	7
Chapter 2	Into Rebellion, 1743–46: Early Skirmishes	42
Chapter 3	The Third Javanese War of Succession, Phase 1: Together with Mangkubumi, 1746–51	61
Chapter 4	The Third Javanese War of Succession, Phase 2: The Collapse of the Rebel Alliance and Internal Warfare, 1752–53	110
Chapter 5	The Third Javanese War of Succession, Phase 3: Mangkunagara Fights Alone and Mangkubumi Becomes Sultan, 1753–55	143
Chapter 6	The Third Javanese War of Succession's Final Phase: Mangkunagara's Concluding Battles to Senior Princedom, 1755–57	173

Part II War by Other Means

Chapter 7 Becoming Established in Surakarta and the Defeat of Marriage Diplomacy, 1757–68 203

Chapter 8 Dealing with Marginalisation as the Courts Faced a New Century, 1768–78 236

Chapter 9 Mangkunagara's Later Years: Piety, the Arts, Illness and Loss, c. 1779–88 265

Chapter 10 Religion, the Crisis in Surakarta and Mangkunagara's Final Victory with His New European Allies, 1787–95 282

Chapter 11 Mangkunagaran Legacies 321

Genealogy of Principal Members of the Mataram Dynasty 342

Appendix 1: Detailed Discussion of Principal Primary Sources 344

Appendix 2: Who Was Seh Ibrahim? 360

Appendix 3: Site of the Battle at Tugu, October 1754 368

Appendix 4: A Glimpse of Yasadipura I in 1788 370

Appendix 5: Senior Officers of the VOC in Java during Mangkunagara I's Life 372

Acknowledgements 374

Illustration Credits 376

Glossary 378

Bibliography 381

Index 394

Transcription, Orthography, Toponyms and Personal Names

The transcription system used here for Javanese script is that commonly used in Indonesia, with the addition of *ĕ* for /ə/ (like the *e* in "fallen") to distinguish it from the character *taling*, which is written *e* and pronounced as either /e/ or /ɛ/ (like either the *a* in "fate" or the *e* in "set"). For the rest, vowels are generally pronounced as they are in English except for *a* when it appears in penultimate and final syllables, when it is pronounced rather like the *au* in "caught". In an earlier transcription system, this was normally written with "å"; thus, using that antiquated system, "Mangkunagara" is pronounced Mangkunagårå but "Mangkunagaran" is pronounced just as it is written. Consonants generally have the same value as in English with the following exceptions: *c* is pronounced like *ch* in English "chair'; *dh* and *th* are retroflexes. In Javanese, as in Indonesian, emphasis is normally on the penultimate syllable.

Javanese sources of the time often used spellings no longer regarded as standard: *watĕn* for *wontĕn*, for example. These are left as they are in the original MSS, unless I felt that readers might need some help in understanding what was written.

To indicate the pronunciation of foreign—mainly Arabic—sounds in Javanese script, writers adopted one of three strategies. They placed three dots in a triangle over the nearest-sounding Javanese character, they employed one of the rarely used "capital characters" (*aksara gĕdhe*), or they invented a hybrid character of their own. In this book, when such characters appear I have transcribed them as the foreign character that was meant. Thus, when Arabic *hamzah* is intended, it appears as a left-facing apostrophe (’). When *‘ayn* is meant, it appears as a right-facing apostrophe (‘).

Arabic words are transcribed with a simplified version of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (3rd edition) system. Old Javanese words are presented in the currently conventional system of transliteration.

Javanese does not distinguish between singular and plural nouns. To make the distinction clear to readers, I have added "s" or "es" to the Javanese words when they are used in a plural sense.

Toponyms are in current standard Indonesian orthography to make it easier for readers to locate places. Thus, Ponorogo is used here instead of the 18th-century usage *Pranaraga*; Bagelen instead of *Pagĕlen*; Ambarawa instead of *Bahrawa*, *Rawi* or *Sitirawi*; Kediri instead of *Kĕdhiri*; and so on. I have regarded local government websites as the authoritative sources for modern orthographies, which leads to some linguistic inconsistencies (e.g., Jepara vs. Ponorogo, even though the final two vowels are the same in both). If I have been unable to identify a modern version of a place name, I have left it as in the 18th-century sources, including using scholarly diacritics where applicable.

Personal names are a considerable challenge. Javanese changed names at different stages of their lives. Among nobility, there were always princes with certain names—Pugĕr, Blitar, Ngabei, Purbaya, etc.—and one holder of such a name is easily confused with another. In this book, I select one name for each person and use that name consistently, albeit at times anachronistically, throughout. Where there is more than one actor with the same name, I have tried to add further identifier information at each reference. The index will enable readers to locate alternate names.

Europeans also spelled their own and others' names inconsistently in this period. Again, I select one spelling and use that throughout.

Dating Systems

There were three calendrical systems coexisting in Java in this period. The Europeans used what we now call the Common Era (CE), in accordance with the Gregorian calendar. In this book, all dates are in the Common Era unless identified as belonging to another calendrical system.

The main system used by the Javanese was a hybrid quasi-lunar calendar (*Anno Javano*, AJ) in use since the time of Sultan Agung in the 1630s. It was a complex system, with five- and seven-day (and other) weeks, a 35-day cycle, lunar months, an eight-year cycle, and several other complications. There are standard tables available to translate a date in the Javanese system to the Common Era, but there were evidently local versions of the dating system in use which varied by one or more days from the "correct" usage found in the tables.

The Islamic lunar calendar, the *Anno Hijrae* (AH), was also in use, with years calculated from the Prophet's moving (*hijrah*) from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE.

List of Maps

The Indonesian Archipelago 339

Central and East Java 340

Key sites of Mangkunagara I's life 341

List of Illustrations

Opening folio of Mangkunagara's autobiographical *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* (BL Add. MS 12318, f. 1v.) xx

Javanese "warlike weapons" from Crawfurd, *History of the Indian Archipelago* (1820) 9

Grave of Mangkunagara's mother, R. Ay. Wulan, at Keblokan 14

Gamĕlan orchestra, Yogyakarta, 1888 27

Bĕdhaya dancers, Yogyakarta, 1884 28

Wayang kulit performance, with *gamĕlan* performers in the foreground, Yogyakarta, 2016 28

Wayang topeng, Yogyakarta, 1888 29

Wayang wong, Yogyakarta, 1899 30

A modern *Garĕbĕg*: *Garĕbĕg Puasa*, Yogyakarta, 1992 31

Engraving of Batavia c. 1750 by Giuseppe Filosi 34

Engraving of Governor General G.W. van Imhoff in 1744 62

The *wayang* character Buta Terong 150

The Mangkunagaran palace, 1996 204

Inside the Mangkunagaran palace, 1996 204

Grave of Mangkunagara I's wife Kusumapatahati at Gunung Wijil 281

Mangkunagara I's grave at Mangadeg 318

View from Mangadeg, 1996 318

Bronze bust of Mangkunagara IV (1853–81) 325

Al-Wustha mosque, Mangkunagaran, today 326

Sample page of VOC documentation, from VOC 2825 (OB 1754) 359

Tughra of the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa II (d. 1703) 367

Abbreviations

/0/	beginning of a new stanza in Javanese passages quoted in footnotes
Ad.	Adipati, high princely title
AH	*Anno Hijrae*, the Islamic era
AJ	*Anno Javano*, the Javanese era
Aj.	Ajĕng, female aristocratic title
AN	Arsip Nasional, Jakarta
Ar.	Arya, high princely title
Ay.	Ayu, female aristocratic title
b.	born
Batavia	As sender or recipient of a VOC letter cited in the footnotes: governor general and Council of the Indies, Batavia
BG	Yasadipura I [ascribed to]. *Babad Giyanti*. 21 vols. Batawi Sentrum: Bale Pustaka, 1937–39
BK	*Babad Kraton*. BL Add. MS 12320. Written in Yogyakarta in AJ 1703–4 (1777–78 CE) by R. Tg. Jayengrat. References to the published edition are to the transliteration in I.W. Pantja Sunjata, Ignatius Supriyanto and J.J. Ras, ed. and translit., *Babad Kraton*, 2 vols. [Jakarta:] Djambatan, 1992.
BKI	*Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*
BL	British Library, London
BMang	*Babad Mangkubumi.* LOr 2191. Written in Yogyakarta in AH 1187 [1773 CE], apparently produced by the Crown Prince (later Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana II).

BT	*Babad Tutur* (KITLV Or. 231), one of the MSS containing the Mangkunagaran palace chronicle-diary. Author(s) unknown.
BTJ(BP)	Bale Pustaka. *Babad Tanah Jawi*. 31 vols. Batawi Sentrum: Bale Pustaka, 1939–41. The Surakarta Major *Babad*.
c.	*circa*
CE	Common Era
d.	died
dJ	J.K.J. de Jonge and M.L. van Deventer, eds. *De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië: Verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het oud-koloniaal archief.* 16 vols. 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1862–1909.
Dm.	Dĕmang, a Javanese title
f., ff.	folio, folios
Gen.miss.	W. Ph. Coolhaas et al., eds. *Generale missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 13 vols. 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff; Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1960–2007. Also at http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/retroboeken/generalemissiven/#page=0&accessor=toc&source=1&view=)
GG	governor general of the Dutch East India Company, Batavia
H.	Haji, one who has completed the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca
H.XVII	The Heren XVII, governors of the VOC in Amsterdam
HB I, II	Hamĕngkubuwana I (Sultan Mangkubumi, r. 1749–92), II (r. 1792–1810, 1811–12, 1826–28) of Yogyakarta
Kg.	Kangjĕng, high title for lords and sacred regalia
KITLV	Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde. The MS collection of this institute is housed in Leiden University Library.
KS	Kraton Surakarta MS

KV	"Kort verhaal van de Javasche oorlogen welke met onderscheidene prinsen gevoerd zijn sedert den jare 1741 tot den algemeenen vrede gesloten in den jare 1757", in *VBG*, Vol. 12 (1830), pp. 75–254. Evidently authored by Nicolaas Hartingh.
Ky.	Kyai, title for esteemed figures, learned clerics and sacred regalia
LOr	Leiden University Oriental MS
M.	Mas, lower aristocratic title
MB	Prince Mangkubumi, later Sultan HB I (b. c. 1717, d. 1792; r. 1749–92)
MN, MN I	Mangkunagara I (1726–95, r. 1757–95)
MS, MSS	manuscript, manuscripts
Ng.	Ngabei or Ingabei, a non-royal title (also usually the name of one of the princes, Png. Ngabei, but that is not abbreviated in this book)
Ny.	Female title equivalent to male Kyai
PB II, III, IV	Pakubuwana II (r. 1726–49), III (r. 1749–88), IV (r. 1788–1820) of Surakarta
Png.	Pangeran, prince
R.	Raden, mid-range aristocratic title
r.	reigned
R.M.	Raden Mas, a high aristocratic title below that of a prince
Rds. Sp.	Spanish *rijksdaalders* (or *reals*)
Rds.	*rijksdaalders*
RP	Radya Pustaka museum, Surakarta
SBPn	*Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, BL Add. MS 12318. MN I's autobiographical account of his years in rebellion, in a copy dated September 1779
Semarang	As sender or recipient of a letter cited in footnotes: chief VOC officer and council, Semarang

TBG	*Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*
Tg.	Tumĕnggung, title for officials
VBG	*Verhandelingen van het (Koninklijk) Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*
VKI	Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
VOC	Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, the Dutch East India Company
VOC … (OB …)	Used to cite documents from the Netherlands National Archives: "VOC" gives the number of the volume in the VOC series; "OB" gives the year of the same volume in the series *Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren.*

Opening folio of Mangkunagara's autobiographical *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* (BL Add. MS 12318, f. 1v.)

Introduction

Background to This Study and Brief Overview of Primary Sources

Background to This Study

It has been a remarkable half-century or so. When I began my professional academic studies of Indonesia in 1965, it was inconceivable that one could write a serious biography of a major Javanese figure such as is offered here. We had a significant and growing number of studies of Indonesia in the 20th century and a vast library of philological work on Javanese literature, the latter focussed particularly on pre-Islamic literature and almost exclusively written in Dutch. What happened between the first evidence of the coming of Islam to Java in the 14th century and the colonial period was largely *terra incognita*. There was a good deal of work on the Dutch East India Company (VOC), but the Javanese barely featured in such publications.

How could one then write a biography of someone like the flamboyant Prince Mangkunagara I? Our state of ignorance was such that one could hardly pick out a subject to study, unless it were a King—which is what I did in writing my doctoral thesis, "Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749–1792", published in 1974 and a study of the times more than a biography of the person. Most of the Javanese sources that might support such a biography lay untouched in library collections that, for the most part, had not yet been properly catalogued. The massive archives of the VOC and the subsequent colonial government—taking up kilometres of shelving in the national archives of the Netherlands and Indonesia—seemed an insuperable challenge, less an ocean for historians to sail (which would have been a nicely Indonesian metaphor) than an Everest for historians to climb.

Now our knowledge of the pre-20th-century history of Indonesia, particularly Java, has grown dramatically. Led by the Dutch pioneers, notably the historian H.J. de Graaf (1899–1984) and the lexicographer and cataloguer Th. G. Th. Pigeaud (1899–1988), scholars have catalogued library collections, penetrated the archives and opened our eyes to so much more of the historical riches of Java's past. I hope that my publications have played a role in this progress.

I should, however, enter an important caveat. With our greater knowledge of the sources and the times, there remains, I think, no other Javanese character from the 18th century or before whose life is as richly documented or (at least to me) as fascinating as Mangkunagara I. There is not another such until Prince Dipanagara (1785–1855), the messianic leader of the Java War (1825–30) and the subject of Peter Carey's magisterial book *The Power of Prophecy* (2008).

It is no longer necessary to remind readers that Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation and the largest archipelago, as well as the largest Muslim-majority nation, of the world. Nor that the Javanese, with a current population of about 100 million, are the largest ethnic group in the nation. Nor that the nation's history, including the history of Islam there, is a subject of major global significance. Rather, the time has come to offer a biography of one of the most flamboyant figures of the 18th century, the storied Prince Mangkunagara I. He was known to his followers, and is most commonly known today, as Prince *Samběr Nyawa*, the Soul Catcher, the name of his battle standard. That became his appellation in death and now the title of this book.

Brief Overview of Primary Sources

In this book I hope to give readers not only a life of this flamboyant man, but also an insight into the principal primary sources upon which this biography rests. There is a detailed discussion of those materials in Appendix 1. Below is a brief account for easy reference, organised by the abbreviations used in the footnotes.

BG: *Babad Giyanti*, one of the two main Javanese chronicles (*babad*) for Mangkunagara I's time at war. It is a remarkably detailed work, printed in 21 small volumes (over 1,500 pp.). Wherever it is possible to compare it with other sources, it proves accurate as an account of events (within the usual limitations that attend all historical

records) and, above all, an invaluable source for contemporary Javanese recordings and understandings. It is also one of the finest works of Javanese literature.

BK: *Babad Kraton*, a chronicle account of the generic *Babad Tanah Jawi* [Chronicle of the Land of Java] family, beginning with Adam and mythical times and ending with the fall of Kartasura in 1742. This copy was written in Yogyakarta in 1777–78.

BMang: *Babad Mangkubumi*, a chronicle of Sultan Mangkubumi's reign written by the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta (later Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana II). The first, and larger, part was written in 1773, the remainder after 1792.

BT: *Babad Tutur*, the usually cited version of a hybrid chronicle-diary kept in the Mangkunagaran palace covering the years 1780–91. It is not known who originally compiled this record of Mangkunagara I's later years—indeed there may have been several compilers—but the extant MS was clearly copied in the female soldiers' quarters in his palace. A different copy of the work extends the coverage to 1793.

BTJ(BP): The so-called Surakarta Major *Babad*, a chronicle of the generic *Babad Tanah Jawi* [Chronicle of the Land of Java] family, compiled in 1836 and partially published by the government printing house Balai Pustaka (hence the abbreviation) in 31 volumes (1939–41). It extends from Adam and mythical times to 1768, the period after 1745–46 being in the portions of the 18-volume (9,094 pp.) MS LOr 1786 not included in the printed edition.

dJ: The invaluable collection of VOC documents published by De Jonge and Van Deventer, titled *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië* [The Rise of Dutch Authority in the East Indies], 16 volumes.

KV: "Kort verhaal van de Javasche oorlogen welke met onderscheidene prinsen gevoerd zijn sedert den jare 1741 tot den algemeenen vrede gesloten in den jare 1757" [Short Account of the Javanese Wars Conducted with Various Princes from the Year 1741 to the General Peace Concluded in the Year 1757]. This is an account giving the views of Nicolaas Hartingh, a major actor in these events, published in 1830. There has been some discussion about its authorship, addressed in Appendix 1.

It is remarkably like many a Javanese *babad*: sparsely dated, sometimes getting events out of order, but nevertheless an invaluable insider account from a senior Dutch participant.

SBPn: *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, the jewel among sources here. This is Mangkunagara I's autobiographical account of his war years down to the peace settlement of 1757. He seems to have written the final version shortly after settling in Surakarta in 1757, but its content must have been originally recorded as events happened over previous years. The copy available to us was done in the female soldiers' scriptorium in his palace on the occasion of Mangkunagara I's birthday in 1779. Wherever it is possible to compare it with other sources, it is confirmed as an accurate account of events (within the usual limitations that attend all historical records) and is, above all, a source for Mangkunagara I's own understandings and self-presentations. It is highly detailed in 418 ff. (that is, 836 pp.), candid and non-stereotyped.

VOC … (OB …): The VOC correspondence from the Netherlands National Archives, a necessary backbone for any historical study of Java. The Europeans who authored this correspondence were mostly distanced from Javanese society by culture, often by suspicion, fear, dislike or distrust and quite commonly by lack of language competency. Nevertheless, it would not be possible to write a serious account of the times without these voluminous records.

PART I

Youth and War

1

A Child at Court, Briefly Glimpsed, 1726–42

In 1726, the future Prince Mangkunagara I was born in the Javanese court of Kartasura, then enjoying a rare period of peace after a half-century of civil war. The areas around the court had been cleared of rebels since about 1720. By 1721 the last major campaigns in East Java had come to an end. These conflicts had exacerbated dynastic, regional and religious antagonisms and had brought into Javanese life a disruptive new force, the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The Company first intervened militarily in 1677 and soon found itself in a quagmire that proved more difficult and costly, both in wealth and in personnel, than it had anticipated. With the wars evidently over, one could almost hear the VOC Europeans' collective sigh of relief. Newly invigorated were the powerful lords of West Madura, the Cakraningrat line, who saw intervention in Java in support of the VOC as a means to greater freedom of action and, with a bit of luck, control over parts of East Java as well.

The decades of fighting saw the rapid transfer to the Javanese side of new military technology from Europe, where wars of the 17th and early 18th centuries improved ways of killing. Warfare in Java thereby became more intractable, deadlier and costlier for all parties.[1] The Scots sea captain Alexander Hamilton was in Semarang in 1704, when the stage of the civil wars known as the First Javanese

[1] On these Javanese conflicts, see M.C. Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy in Java, 1677–1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period* (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1993). For broader background, see M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200*, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

War of Succession (1704–8) was beginning. He commented that the internecine fighting in Java "lasted 20 Years longer than at first the Dutch imagined. It taught the Javans the Art of War."[2] He was not quite right, for the wars lasted longer than 20 years. And they brought together two of the most professional warrior nations of the time, the Dutch and the Javanese. The Javanese needed no instruction in such matters as fortress building, siege-craft or artillery. But they did immediately embrace new infantry weapons such as the early flintlock muskets[3] to replace matchlocks (which were spectacularly ill suited to a damp tropical climate), paper cartridges, handheld Coehoorn mortars and bayonets, while retaining also their own pikes, *krisses* (daggers), sabres and bows.

Kartasura was dominated by three people, none of them being the new ruler, Pakubuwana II. It must be said that since the death of Sultan Agung in 1646, the Mataram dynasty had not been blessed with another great or even moderately competent King. Susuhunan (King) Amangkurat IV (r. 1719–26), who died in April 1726, had a miserable time as monarch, facing rebellions seemingly from all quarters. At the start of his reign a Dutch report depicted him as "an emperor who was deserted by all his people and had acquired virtually the whole of the Javanese world as his enemy".[4] He died miserably, too, suffering from bloating, vomiting and cardiac arrhythmia, covered in red and blue spots and pustules, believing that evil spirits were waking him in the night, and unable to decide whether he was the victim of black magic or poisoning.[5] We may suppose that the latter was more likely. The 16-year-old son who now succeeded as Pakubuwana II (r. 1726–49) was to prove one of the most incompetent of all the Mataram line, presiding over perhaps the most disastrous of all dynastic disasters. In such a context, the extraordinary abilities of the central character of this book, Prince Mangkunagara I, would stand out even more dramatically. So would the achievements of Mangkunagara's uncle Prince Mangkubumi, later to be Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana I of Yogyakarta (r. 1749–92), one of the greatest of the Mataram dynastic house. Both princes will

[2] Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, New ed. William Foster, Vol. ii, 2 vols (London: The Argonaut Press, 1930 [First published 1727]), p. 71.
[3] Dutch *snaphaan*, English snaphance or snaphaunce, Javanese *sĕnapan*, the origin of the modern Indonesian *senapan* for rifle.
[4] Batavia to H.XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ ix, p. 54.
[5] Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, pp. 218–20.



Javanese "warlike weapons" from Crawfurd, *History of the Indian Archipelago* (1820)

loom large in this book. Both were masters of the sanguinary arts of war. It is unfortunate for non-specialist readers that the first two syllables of their longish names (Mangku—) were the same; I suggest that readers who find this bothersome might wish to concentrate on the last two or three syllables (—nagara vs. —bumi) to keep them separate in their minds.

Of the dominant characters in the court, one was Pakubuwana II's formidable blind grandmother, Ratu Pakubuwana (b. c. 1657; d. 1732). She was a master of occult knowledge, a major litterateur and a Sufi aficionado who was determined to make of her teenage royal grandson—a blank slate, it seems, on which anything might be inscribed—an ideal Sufi monarch. Such a monarch would devote himself to the contemplation of God and of God's revelation, support the most faithful, and promote greater piety among all his subjects. Ratu Pakubuwana had been a major figure in the court since the reign of her husband, Pakubuwana I (r. 1704–19). The young King's mother, Ratu Amangkurat, also dominated him. And then there was the *patih* (chief administrative officer, a kind of prime minister) Danurĕja, who had been a decisive actor in court affairs since the time of Pakubuwana I. He had survived multiple intrigues and challenges for two decades, had led royal armies in the field, and dealt on a regular basis with officials of the Company. He often visited the VOC's headquarters for Java's northeast coast at Semarang and twice led royal embassies to Batavia. It was evidently his influence that delivered the throne to the young and feckless Pakubuwana II rather than to the latter's older and more popular brother Png. Ar. Mangkunagara—whom we need to distinguish from his son, whose biography this is, by calling him Mangkunagara the Elder.[6] The Surakarta Major *Babad* ascribes to two of Danurĕja's opponents the observation that "old Danurĕja … ran into obstacles setting up the young prince as King: he even went so far as to choose a young one, the inner meaning of which was that he became King himself, for the young King could be waved back and forth [i.e., manipulated]".[7]

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[6] For a summary of Danurĕja's career before 1726, see M.C. Ricklefs, *The Seen and Unseen Worlds in Java, 1726–1749: History, Literature and Islam in the Court of Pakubuwana II* (St. Leonards: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin; Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), p. 3.

[7] *BT(BP)* Vol. xxi, p. 25 (Sinom): *… lah iku ki Danurĕja, … kasandhung tĕki, gawe ratu putraji, tĕka amilih kang timur, tĕgĕse batin uga, pan dadi ratu pribadi, ratu timur denobat-abitkĕn….*

Mangkunagara the Elder's adventures are fundamental to our understanding of his son Mangkunagara I's story.[8] The Elder was Amangkurat IV's son by a secondary wife, born c. 1702. At the start of Amangkurat IV's reign, the new ruler named him a *pangeran* (prince) with the name Mangkunagara. That name is significant, for it was normally given to the Crown Prince. It is not clear, however, whether Amangkurat IV intended to bestow that status upon Mangkunagara the Elder. In June 1719 Amangkurat IV's new reign collapsed into a rebellion led by his younger brothers Purbaya and Blitar, commencing what is known to historians as the Second Javanese War of Succession (1719–23). Mangkunagara the Elder had been raised since infancy in the household of Purbaya and was married to a daughter of Blitar, named Rd. Ay. Wulan. He joined them in their rebellion, taking with him an infant brother. Many a family in any society has faced teenage rebellion, but the version exemplified by Mangkunagara the Elder, and to be emulated by his son, was of a bloodier version than most.

Amangkurat IV failed to get his two sons to surrender. They remained with the rebels to the end. Prince Blitar died of illness in 1721. The rebellion collapsed, and the rest of the rebels surrendered in 1723. Most were exiled by the VOC to Sri Lanka or the Cape of Good Hope, but Purbaya was retained near Batavia until his death in late 1726. At that point his body was sent for burial at the royal graves at Imogiri and his surviving family members were allowed to return to Kartasura. One of them, R. Dm. Urawan, became a principal intriguer, supported by his sister Ratu Kĕncana, who married the new ruler Pakubuwana II upon his accession in 1726.

Mangkunagara the Elder was granted his father's forgiveness and returned to Kartasura in mid-1723. It is of interest that in his letters seeking Amangkurat IV's forgiveness, he used the title *Pangeran Adipati Anom*, the title given to a Crown Prince, suggesting that he did indeed understand that to be his position. He was grandly received by his father and given a substantial appanage and the former residence of Prince Purbaya (where he had been raised) to live in. When he visited the VOC's senior officer at the court in November 1723, he wore a Dutch-style costume of velvet and gold. The following year he accompanied the Susuhunan and Ratu Pakubuwana

[8] The account of the elder Mangkunagara's life here rests upon Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, pp. 185–6, 197, 199–201, 209, 213, 218–20, 389n32.

on a grand progress to the Mataram area (where present-day Yogyakarta is located) to visit dynastic holy sites and to commune with the most powerful—and definitely pre-Islamic—deity there, Ratu Kidul, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean.[9] Yet when Amangkurat IV was approaching the end of his days, as we saw above, he did not choose Mangkunagara the Elder as his successor; but rather a younger son succeeded as Pakubuwana II, under the influence of the veteran intriguer Danuréja.

Mangkunagara the Elder's son who would become Mangkunagara I was born during Amangkurat IV's final illness, on 7 April 1726.[10] His mother being the late rebel Blitar's daughter R. Ay. Wulan,[11] we might say that the boy inherited rebellious traditions from both sides of his family. Over his lifetime Mangkunagara had several names, in keeping with standard Javanese practice. We will consistently call him Mangkunagara here to minimise confusion.

Much was immediately expected of the child. According to the Surakarta Major *Babad*, as Amangkurat IV lay dying, the *wahyu* (supernatural radiance attending those divinely chosen to govern, from Arabic *waḥy*, inspiration, revelation) deserted him and instead descended on R. Ay. Wulan as she gave birth. This led many in the court to prophesy that the newborn would be a great warrior.[12] We need not believe in *wahyu* to recognise an expression of the high expectations attached to the boy and of his future potential to attract followers. Nor do we need to be so sceptical as to presume that such prophecies in Javanese chronicles are always ex post facto insertions, for some can be shown to precede the events they depict and others are obviously ex ante, for their predictions proved to be wrong.[13]

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[9] For an overview of the Javanese traditions about Ratu Kidul, see Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 8–13.

[10] The full Javanese date was Sunday-Lĕgi, Warigagung, 4 Ruwah, Jimakir 1650, which is consistent in all particulars; *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxi, p. 29. Mangkunagara I's autobiographical *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* confirms this; see the discussion in M.C. Ricklefs, "The Origin of Prince Mangkunagara I's Appellation as the Catcher of Souls", *BKI* 171, 4 (2015): 545.

[11] Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm pangiwa lan panĕngĕn, wiwit saka Kangjĕng Nabi Adam tuměka karaton Surakarta lan Ngayogyakarta Adiningrat* (Sĕmarang – Surakarta: Ge Se Te Pan Dhorĕp en Ko [G.C.T. van Dorp en Co.], 1902), p. 266.

[12] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxi, p. 29.

[13] For further discussion, with examples, see Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, index s.v. prophecies.

The first two years of Mangkunagara's life decisively shaped his future. In September 1727 his mother, R. Ay. Wulan, died.[14] This greatly grieved both her husband, Mangkunagara the Elder, and the dynastic matriarch Ratu Pakubuwana, grandmother both to the dead woman and to Mangkunagara the Elder and, in fact, to almost everyone of royal blood in the court at that time. Thus was Mangkunagara left motherless before he was aged two. His father seems, in his distress, to have sought solace in other female companionship, but in the *kraton* of Kartasura—as in other such courts around the world—one needed to pick the object of one's amour carefully.

Animosity between Danurĕja and Mangkunagara the Elder grew through 1726 and 1727.[15] As intrigues proliferated, "Only Pangeran Arya [Mangkunagara the Elder] remained the acknowledged leader of all the royal relatives", according to the Surakarta Major *Babad*.[16] The senior Dutch officer for the north coast of Java described him as "much loved … and having many adherents".[17]

The VOC observed developments with concern, believing that perhaps Ratu Amangkurat and certainly Danurĕja were conspiring to discredit Mangkunagara the Elder in the eyes of his brother the King. In January 1728, Danurĕja advised the Dutch officers that the elder Mangkunagara had been discovered attempting to arrange a liaison with one of Pakubuwana II's wives and had then asked the King to be allowed to have her. Such conduct was unheard of, and the accusation could hardly be believed by the VOC officers at the time, whose assistance was sought in exiling the errant prince. As is common with such intrigues, where sources reflect both information and disinformation, insights and confusions, the truth of the matter remains uncertain. Whatever the case, the politics of the situation were clearly threatening. Mangkunagara the Elder, now in his mid-20s, had only returned to court from rebellion five years before.

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[14] Haasbroek, Kartasura, to Ter Smitten, Semarang, 25 Sept. 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxi, p. 30. Hartingh was wrong in KV, p. 129, to say that in the 1740s chaos MN left the court with his mother; she was already dead by then.

[15] On developments down to the exile of Mangkunagara the Elder in 1728, see the more detailed discussion in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 19–21, and the sources cited there.

[16] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxi, p. 25: Canto 144 (Sinom): *Mung Pangeran Arya maksih, pangidhĕpanira sagung ing santana*.

[17] Tersmitten, Semarang, to Batavia, 26 Apr. 1728, in VOC 2107 (OB 1729).

Grave of Mangkunagara's mother, R. Ay. Wulan (d. September 1727), at Keblokan (near Wonogiri)

He was, reported the VOC commander at the court, "a prince of royal blood, loved and feared by many Javanese". He had many powerful courtiers on his side who shared his hatred of Danurĕja.[18] The Company feared the consequences if Mangkunagara the Elder should revert to rebellion.

In the end, the Dutch went along with Pakubuwana II's demand—orchestrated by Danurĕja—and exiled Mangkunagara the Elder in April 1728. He was allowed to take with him ten servants, two wives and one child. He was obliged to leave behind his sons R. Umar (reportedly three years old), Suradi (reportedly five months of age), Ambiya (said to be ten months) and—of crucial interest for us here—Mas Said, the future Mangkunagara I, then said to be 1.5 years old but in fact just turned two.[19] The beautiful young woman

[18] Tersmitten, Semarang, to Batavia, 11 Jan. 1728, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728).
[19] Vergadering, Kartasura, 26 Jan. 1728, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728).

who was the alleged object of Mangkunagara the Elder's amour was strangled in Danurĕja's residence. Mangkunagara the Elder was kept for several years at Batavia, the VOC intending his presence there to be a potential brake upon Danurĕja's despotism, but was eventually exiled to Sri Lanka, where he died in 1738. Other courtiers are said to have feared for the future of the kingdom, since it seemed to be in the hands of a capricious King. After Danurĕja himself fell from grace and was exiled in 1733, senior figures at Kartasura reputedly observed that Mangkunagara the Elder's tragedy was caused entirely by Danurĕja, without whose "heating up" the King would undoubtedly have been calmed.[20]

Thus it was that, at the age of two, the child Mangkunagara found himself both motherless and fatherless in a dangerous, intrigue-ridden court. It is important to understand where the child stood in court hierarchy. Status was both ascribed and achieved in this system, which rested on a principle of declining nobility with each generation's remove from a monarch, although there seems to have been more irregularity in the 17th and 18th centuries than was the case under Dutch colonial rule in the 19th century. The principles were, however, the same as set out by the scholar-official L.W.C. van den Berg in 1902:

> The principle upon which … nobility rested is descent from a King. The more remote from the ancestral King, as measured by how many generations separated one from that ancestor, the lower the nobility. The son of a King is of higher nobility than the grandson of a King, and he higher than a great-grandson, etc.[21]

Thus, one's noble standing declined at each generation until once-royal descendants became ordinary folk after the fifth generation of descent. The King could also ennoble subjects at will. Mangkunagara the Elder was the child of Amangkurat IV and thus a prince (*pangeran*). His son Mangkunagara was a grandchild of Amangkurat IV and already on the upper rungs of the ladder of declining nobility. He could reasonably expect to be declared a prince but one of lesser standing in the court, and his own children, the late King's

[20] BTJ(BP) Vol. xxi, p. 63: *mokal sidaha runtik, pasthi lilih sang Prabu, Patih kang gawe panas*.
[21] L.W.C. van den Berg, *De inlandsche rangen en titels op Java en Madoera*, 2nd ed. ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1902), p. 28.

great-grandsons, would probably earn a non-princely title such as Raden Mas. The same principle applied to female descendants.

Mangkunagara's reputation and standing in court therefore seem to have relied as much on his personal qualities and the reflected eminence of his father as upon his formal status. We know little about his early childhood. In later years one of the persons closest to him was Kudanawarsa, whom one Dutch source describes as his *voedster-vader* (foster father).[22] Well into the 20th century young Javanese were often passed to other households to be raised, a practice which was standard among aristocrats. According to the index to *Babad Giyanti*, Kudanawarsa himself was from within the house of Purbaya.[23] Perhaps, therefore, the young Mangkunagara was raised in the household of Kudanawarsa, just as his father had been raised in the household of the rebel Prince Purbaya. I have unfortunately found no other information about Kudanawarsa from these early years, but he was clearly not a member of the royal house. He may nevertheless have been an appropriate person to raise a young boy whose standing at court was near the bottom of the princely ranks.

The reign of Pakubuwana II was as full of intrigue, violence and tragedy as any other.[24] In fact, more so than most. We have already introduced his formidable, blind Sufi grandmother Ratu Pakubuwana, then in her late 60s, and the *patih* and master-intriguer Danurĕja. Another major figure was the man who, according to Javanese tradition, was the greatest writer of Javanese literature of the first half of the 18th century, Tg. Tirtawiguna. He also became a formidable political force, opposing Danurĕja and, it seems, the Islamising clique promoted by Ratu Pakubuwana. Later both the VOC and Pakubuwana II relied upon his advice. The King reportedly nicknamed him *Tir* or *Ĕtir*,[25] the Javanese word for the castle in chess. His role was evidently rather like that formidable piece, waiting quietly for the moment to mobilise his influence on the game around him, ever ready to protect the King. In a court controversy of 1741,

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[22] KV, p. 129.

[23] *Babad Gijanti: Pratélan namaning tijang lan panggénan* (Batavia Centrum: Balé Poestaka, 1939), p. 6, s.v. Bandhek.

[24] Discussed in detail in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*. Only direct quotations or other matters of particular significance will be footnoted in the overview here, down to the end of this chapter.

[25] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxi, p. 60.

other Javanese lords reputedly said of him, "The man is like a small cannon. Where there is consultation he remains silent, constantly casting frightening sidelong glances, accusing his senior colleagues; that's his great talent."[26] *Babad Giyanti* depicts him as a selfish, improper companion of intriguers who sold out the kingdom, one who indeed ruined the world.[27]

The King's half-brother Prince Mangkubumi,[28] around nine years old in 1726, would also emerge as a major player, as will be abundantly clear as this book progresses. His career culminated in his accession over half the kingdom as Sultan Haměngkubuwana I of Yogyakarta (r. 1749–92). Thus, the child Mangkunagara had much to learn and to emulate as the years passed, becoming a master of the deceptions, evasions and intrigues central to survival at court and, eventually, of those arts central to mastery and survival on the field of battle.

The young Mangkunagara would have imbibed much about the crowded supernatural realm. In the late 1720s and early 1730s there were religious issues being discussed at the court. Ratu Pakubuwana was in a formidable position. She was a master of the occult and Islamic mystical realms and the centre of a clique of courtiers who sought a more perfectly Islamic realm (as they understood that to be). She was the widow of Pakubuwana I, the mother of her much-unloved son Amangkurat IV and now the grandmother of the teenage King. She was an experienced manipulator of court affairs and the grandmother of almost everyone else who mattered at court, including the King's wife Ratu Kěncana and all the royal brothers and sisters. She evidently loathed Danurěja. In 1729–30 she caused three powerful books to be written that drew upon Islamic traditions with the aim of bringing about a more perfect realm on earth by supernatural means. These were new versions of works originally from the time of the founder of both the dynasty's power and of its myths, Sultan Agung (r. 1613–46), and were created just a century (in the Javanese calendar) after those originals were composed.

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[26] Ibid., Vol. xxiii, p. 4 (Javanese text in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 173–4n41).
[27] *BG* Vol. iii, p. 46 (Javanese texts in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 174n42).
[28] His date of birth is uncertain. See the discussion in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 130–1n13. I am inclined to think that a birth date c. 1717 is most likely.

The first of Ratu Pakubuwana's magical books was *Carita Sultan Iskandar* [The Tale of Iskandar], a highly elaborated romance based on traditions about Alexander the Great, represented by the figure Dhu'l Qarnayn in Qur'an 18:82–98. The work was written down by the old Ratu's scribes in September 1729 and opens with extravagant praise of Ratu Pakubuwana, who is said to be gentle, just and a master of religious teachings, beloved by God, the beneficiary of the Prophet's intercession, and honoured by all. The book, we are told, was composed and offered to her royal grandson "so that it may become a *pusaka* (a royal heirloom), so that all the ancestors may be taken as examples in the future". She invokes blessings of God and the Prophet Muhammad upon the young King so that he might succeed as King. The text itself presents Iskandar as the very model of the pious, conquering King. Its magical purpose is less clear than in the case of the two major works that followed.

On the day that *Carita Sultan Iskandar* was finished, Ratu Pakubuwana's scribes began writing her *Carita Nabi Yusuf*. Here we find the ultimate exemplar of male piety and beauty as depicted in Javanese tradition, the Prophet Yusuf (Joseph), again much elaborated from the Qur'anic version (*sura* 12) of the story of Joseph in Egypt. The writers proclaim that their work, under Ratu Pakubuwana's blessing, would lead to intercession with God, would protect them from curses and all other perils, and would make them firm in their religion.

The third and most remarkable of Ratu Pakubuwana's books was *Kitab Usulbiyah*, the writing of which commenced in December 1729. This is a work that is, so far as presently known, without precedent in Malay or Arabic literature, but which has some echoes of the Arabic *mi'raj* stories about the Prophet's ascension to heaven. The title seems to mean "Book about the origin of the prophets" and was probably intended as an analogue of the Arabic *Qisas al-anbiya* [Tales of the Prophets]. The opening of this text makes clear Ratu Pakubuwana's claims to special status and her intentions. She is said to be a gentle servant with "a blessed heart" who had already received God's love and the intercession of the Prophet Muhammad. She was watched over by angels, the book proclaims. She created the book *Usulbiyah* "to make perfect the reign of her royal grandson, for her sun, indeed, rests upon the mountain-tops".[29]

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[29] *Kitab Usulbiyah* (RP MS 263 carikan), p. 1. Full translation and Javanese text in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 62–3.

At the end, the book declares that writing out *Kitab Usulbiya*h was equivalent in religious merit to performing the Mecca pilgrimage a thousand times in a day or reciting the Qur'an a thousand times in a day and night. Anyone preserving the book would be watched over by God and 7,700 angels, freed from witchcraft, evil spells and all adversity. The blessing power of the book, it proclaimed, was greater than the falling rain and more than the sands of the sea. An infidel who owned the book would become a Muslim, a vehement person would become patient, a severe person calm, an ignorant person learned. The book contained, claimed the ending, the mystical science of perfection. And if *Usulbiyah* were carried into battle, one would be invulnerable. Here, indeed, was supernatural power, perfection and salvation encapsulated in epic verse.

The combination of religious and political messages in these books was central to Javanese court culture as, indeed, it was to other cultures of the 18th century—and as it remains so in many parts of the world today. At one stage in *Kitab Usulbiyah*, God declares to Muhammad that the "being of a King is the being of the All-Disposing, his attributes are the attributes of God, his works are the works of God; a King, Muhammad, is King of God's mystical knowledge",[30] a doctrine that would also have warmed the hearts of European monarchs claiming divine right to rule.

At a date that is not clear, but was some time after the writing of the three books described above, Ratu Pakubuwana seems to have produced several smaller works of poetry. One of them, titled *Suluk Garwa Kancana* (a somewhat obscure title, but evidently meaning the "Song of the House of Gold")[31] is of particular significance, for it presents a doctrine of the perfect Sufi King. It seems that it may, indeed, be a work originally composed by Sultan Agung himself a century before, for in a note preceding the text we read, "This is *Suluk Garwa Kancana*, which is from Susunan Ratu." That is a title that was evidently used by Agung in the period 1636–37.[32] After him the title was borne by his three immediate successors, but not thereafter when the royal line changed through usurpation to the

[30] RP MS 263 carikan, p. 3, Canto I (Dhandhanggula): 23. … *dat ing ratu iya ananing Yyang Widi, sifate sifat ing Yang*. 24: *afngal ing ratu afngal ing Widi, ratu Muhamad ratu elmulah*….

[31] A complicated matter. See Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 114–5.

[32] The matter is obscure. See the discussion in ibid., pp. 113–4.

Pakubuwana branch. Of those who employed that title, only Sultan Agung could be credibly associated with a pious Sufi understanding of kingship.

Suluk Garwa Kancana[33] depicts a model of kingship that Ratu Pakubuwana hoped would pattern her teenage grandson's reign. It opens with a metaphor of the five senses as royal officials whose blandishments the spirit (that is, the King) must ignore. The monarch must approach all misfortunes and adversities "with a fortress of clear vision", resisting the sexual pleasures of this world. In a sweeping metaphor of the stages of the Sufi path as royal arms and raiment, the text admonishes the King. In battle his citadel should be constant struggle,[34] his weapon the contemplation of God and his vehicle steadfast trust in God. Piety should serve as his bow and *dhikr*[35] as its quiver, with the Qur'an as the arrows. The King's royal vestments should be a crown of Reality (*Khak*) with the Sufi way (*tarekat*) as its crest, his lower garments being the law (*sarengat*).

Thus it was that this poem married Javanese traditions of martial kingship to Sufi traditions of the mystical way. This has roots in the Sufi tradition of the *jihad al-akbar*, the "great Holy War", the struggle for purity against the demands of the physical self. It is not known what Sufi order or orders were influential in Kartasura at this time. It is, however, clear that the woman who later became Prince Mangkubumi's wife and then his queen when he founded the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, Ratu Kadipaten (d. 1803), was a devotee of the Shattariyya order. This order was introduced into West Java by Shaikh Abdulmuhyi (d. c. 1715) of Saparwadi (now known as Pamijahan), a follower of the great Sumatran Sufi saint Abdurrauf Singkili (c. 1615–93). It may have been particularly influential among aristocratic Javanese women, to judge from surviving spiritual genealogies (*silsilah*).[36] Abdulmuhyi's family may have promoted the Shattariyya in Central Java.[37]

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[33] RP MS 263 carikan, pp. 60–1 (translation and Javanese text in ibid., pp. 115–21).

[34] *Mujahadah*, from the same Arabic root as the word *jihad*. J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, with new foreword by John O. Voll (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 149, prefers to translate the term as "the Purgative Way".

[35] "Remembrance", the repetition of divine formulae, the names of God and similar phrases, as a means to mystic enlightenment. Various Sufi orders have their distinctive forms of *dhikr*.

As we will see in this book, Pakubuwana II tried to emulate this Sufi model of martial kingship but was an imperfect vehicle for such grand aspirations. They were, however, more successfully emulated in the person of Mangkunagara.

It was not only Ratu Pakubuwana's books that reflected religious matters at the court. Around 1731 a religious controversy erupted over whether esoteric mystical knowledge was a matter only for a sophisticated elite. This was indeed an issue in the work of the Shattariyya saint Abdurrauf, who in his writings "cautions against sharing esoteric knowledge with those who are inadequately prepared for it".[38] This episode is captured in the work *Sĕrat Cabolek* (the title refers to a north-coastal village), which is known only in later MSS and presents problems of interpretation.[39] Its author is not known; it is conventionally ascribed to the Surakarta poet Yasadipura I (1729–1803), but that is questionable. Despite the interpretive problems that surround the work, we may accept it at least as a guide to how courtiers of the 1730s may have seen religious issues and, as will be seen below, as an indicator of Prince Mangkubumi's high standing in *kraton* circles.

According to the surviving versions of the *Cabolek* story, c. 1731 (but perhaps as late as 1733) a north-coastal divine named Ky. H.

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[36] Oman Fathurahman, *Shaṭṭārīyah Silsilah in Aceh, Java, and the Lanao Area of Mindanao* (Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and Culture of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2016), esp. pp. 49–70; Ratu Kadipaten's *silsilah* is on pp. 51–3. For a short account of Abdulmuhyi, see Werner Kraus, "Abdulmuhyi", in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam Three* fascicle 2007-3, ed. Gudrun Krämer et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), p. 32.

[37] D.A. Rinkes refers to a son of Abdulmuhyi named Pĕkih Ibrahim and notes that a person with this name served as *pĕngulu* (chief religious official) under Pakubuwana II, but it is not certain that the two persons were the same, for the title Pĕkih Ibrahim was commonly used for anyone in the position of *pĕngulu*; D.A. Rinkes, *Nine Saints of Java*, transl. H.M. Froger, ed. Alijah Gordon, intro. G.W.J. Drewes (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1996), pp. 13–4. For other examples of *pĕngulus* named Pĕkih Ibrahim, see Peter Carey, *The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785–1855*, *VKI* Vol. 249 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), index s.v. Pekih Ibrahim; M.C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749–1792: A History of the Division of Java* (London, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 87.

[38] P.G. Riddell, "Abdurrauf Singkili", in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam Three*, fascicle 2007-2, ed. Gudrun Krämer et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 27–30, quotation from p. 29.

[39] See Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, Chapter 4, for a detailed discussion of this text and the issues surrounding it.

Ahmad Mutamakin of the village of Cabolek or Cĕbolek—who is locally regarded as a saint and whose grave is in the adjacent village of Kajen—began spreading his teachings, too widely for the taste of some. He is said to have been a disciple of one *Seh Jen* of Yemen, identifiable as Shaikh Zain al-Yamani (c. mid-17th–early 18th century) of the Naqshabandiyya Sufi brotherhood. Differences between Naqshabandi and Shattari devotions may have been behind this controversy; elite disdain for rustic village clerics was more clearly so. Ahmad Mutamakin's teaching was opposed by one Kĕtib Anom (which just means "young preacher") from the holy city of Kudus, who was evidently well connected at court. Ahmad Mutamakin was denounced by other religious teachers, who charged that

> he revealed (to the uninitiated) secret knowledge,
> disclosing the essence of the mystical science of Reality,
> holding firm to the stage of reality (*kakekate*, Arabic *haqiqa*)
> but rejecting the stage of the law (*saringat*, Arabic *shari'a*).[40]

His case was brought before the King—the floundering young Pakubuwana II—who found it all rather confusing, it seems. Mutamakin's critics wanted him burned, but the King was reluctant. In the *Cabolek* text, under the influence of his brother-in-law R. Dm. Urawan (son of the exiled Prince Purbaya), Pakubuwana II pardons Mutamakin. Thereafter, Kĕtib Anom challenges Mutamakin's competence as a religious teacher by explicating the Old Javanese, pre-Islamic work *Sĕrat Dewa Ruci* or *Bima Suci*, which tells of the mystic search for the elixir of immortality and which was, in this court culture, accepted as a receptacle of Islamic mystical thought. In the hands of an expert exegete, Urawan reassures the King, citing such works "is not condemned regarding the essence of the mystical science of Reality"; indeed, he says, many such examples "were used by all the saints of God".[41] In the subsequent debate, Mutamakin is bested by Kĕtib Anom, his standing destroyed.[42] Kĕtib Anom tells the small-town *haji* that he might "return again to Arabia and ship all the books!" but in fact the essence of mystical knowledge

[40] Javanese text in ibid., p. 141.
[41] Javanese text in ibid., p. 143.
[42] The local version of the story in Kajen, where Mutamakin is buried, depicts him as the winner of the competition to explicate *Dewa Ruci*.

is contained in the Old Javanese classics *Dewa Ruci* (*Bima Suci*), *Arjunawiwāha* and *Rāmāyaṇa*.

Then Pakubuwana II himself asks to be shown a copy of *Dewa Ruci*, for he was surprised to find that an Old Javanese work was presented as a work of Sufism. The King's teenage half-brother Prince Mangkubumi is among the courtly connoisseurs of Old Javanese literature, along with Urawan, who owns several Old Javanese works that he has loaned to Mangkubumi. Servants are sent to find the latter. He is, however, away from his residence, engaged in an ascetic and occult adventure in the countryside near Mount Merapi. There, one of Mangkubumi's servants reports, the prince was attacked by multiple spirits the size of children, whom he repelled and whose leader he subdued. These were the spirits causing the most devastating of the rice-plant diseases in Java, called *mĕnthek* or *ama mĕnthek* in Javanese, now known as the tungro virus.[43] Although other courtiers at first reject this story as nonsense, the servant persists. The battle climaxed, he says, when Mangkubumi fought the spirit king, the *ratu mĕnthek*. By reciting in his heart five *suras* of the Qur'an[44] and battling "with the help of the All-disposing God", Mangkubumi triumphed. The *ratu mĕnthek* submitted and asked to enter the prince's service. Why, asked Mangkubumi, should he accept the service of a devil? The spirit replied that since the time of the Prophet Muhammad some spirits were Muslims, for the Prophet was in charge of both spirits and mankind.[45] So Mangkubumi accepts his service on the basis of a treaty between them to limit the destruction of rice fields. Given the absence of pre-19th-century MSS of *Cabolek*, we cannot know when this tale was inserted into the story. But certainly its general ethos is consistent with what we know of court culture in the reign of Pakubuwana II. Here was a young, pious and valiant prince, a master of Old Javanese and Islamic literatures, both refined in culture and engaged in ascetic exercises, doing battle with evil spirits, combining martial and spiritual capabilities as we have seen depicted in *Suluk Garwa Kancana*. This was the Sufi warrior model of the Javanese court. We shall encounter it often in this book, exemplified particularly by Mangkunagara.

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[43] See William B. Ward, *Science and Rice in Indonesia* (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain [1985]), pp. 56–7.

[44] *Suras* 27 *an-Naml*, 34 *Saba'*, 36 *Ya Sin*, 39 *az-Zumar* and 112 *al-Ikhlas*.

[45] Prophetic traditions supporting this interpretation are referred to in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 158n119.

Cabolek ends with a gathering in Mangkubumi's residence, to which Kětib Anom, Mutamakin and Urawan are invited. There Mangkubumi declines to explicate a *Dewa Ruci* text, for, he says, its meanings are obscure and inadequate understandings can lead one astray. We may imagine the country bumpkin Mutamakin squirming with discomfort at the others' sidelong glances. Instead, Mangkubumi sings from the Old Javanese *Arjunawiwāha*. He stops to interpret mystical meanings at relevant points, displaying his mastery of the text and its meanings.

The young princes depicted in the *Cabolek* story—notably Urawan and the King's younger half-brother Mangkubumi—were indeed rising to prominence in the early 1730s court. A formidable elderly figure disappeared with the death of Ratu Pakubuwana in January 1732. Mangkunagara was not yet a teenager and, indeed, not yet raised to the status of a prince at the time, so he does not figure in the *Cabolek* tale and is rarely visible in the extant sources. Yet doubtless many eyes were upon him. His father, Mangkunagara the Elder, was still being held by the VOC in Batavia, and there must have been clandestine communications between him and Kartasura, impossible for the Company to prevent. The high regard among aristocrats for Mangkunagara the Elder and the evident belief that he was the victim of a conspiracy engineered by the *patih* Danurĕja no doubt cast reflected eminence on his young son.

Meanwhile Danurĕja, who seems to have had little sympathy for the mystical Islam championed by Ratu Pakubuwana and her set, was falling from royal favour. When a favourite of Ratu Amangkurat, who now seemed to be the *patih*'s principal enemy, was murdered in October 1729, it was believed that this had been done at the orders of Danurĕja. Tirtawiguna, another of his enemies, rose to be royal treasurer in December of that year. Danurĕja faced an increasingly hostile environment, with both political and spiritual forces being mobilised around him. However he judged his situation, we may be confident that he was taking care with his food, poison being a favoured tool of assassins in 18th-century Java.

The Surakarta Major *Babad* says that in 1732 prophecies about the child Mangkunagara and teenager Mangkubumi were notified to the court. A regional official reported a hermit's prediction that in the future there would be two great princes in Kartasura: one would be a war leader who would change the government and become King, while the other would be an outstanding warrior, a master of the

arts of war. Danurĕja investigated and was told that these were predictions respectively about Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara. Then Danurĕja was informed that Pakubuwana II's mother, Ratu Amangkurat, had a dream in which the moon fell into Mangkubumi's lap, whereupon he ate half of it and threw the remainder away. We may read this as a prediction of the partition of the kingdom and Mangkubumi's elevation to monarch in 1755, but when Ratu Amangkurat asked for Danurĕja's explication of the dream, he professed not to understand it. When he asked for a prediction about himself, he was distressed on being told that he would not see these things himself.[46] Whether all of this took place in 1732 or the predictions were inserted into the chronicle tradition later is unknowable, but the former is possible.

Danurĕja's domination of court affairs was indeed coming to an end, further facilitating the influence of a younger generation of the elite. Pakubuwana II, by then into his early 20s, evidently wished at last to run his own kingdom, which was achievable only by ridding himself of the old *patih*. In July 1733, the VOC arrested Danurĕja upon the King's request when he paid his regular visit to deliver cash and rice dues to the Company in Semarang. He was sent into exile in Sri Lanka, where he died in 1745. His wealth was confiscated by the ruler. When the elite of Kartasura reflected upon Danurĕja's fall from grace, they ascribed it in large part to his role in the exile of Mangkunagara the Elder seven years before. The latter had been kept in Batavia throughout the intervening years, but now the Company decided to send him also into exile in Sri Lanka. While there is some obscurity in the surviving sources, it seems that the ship which reached Colombo in 1733 may have carried both Mangkunagara the Elder and his nemesis Danurĕja.[47] The chronicle account says that after the ship conveying Danurĕja from Semarang suffered damage at sea, the old *patih* found himself transferred to the ship bearing the elder Mangkunagara. It depicts the two together on board, where Danurĕja repeats the prophecies about the elder Mangkunagara's son and Mangkubumi.[48] Danurĕja's successor as *patih* was R. Ad. Natakusuma, one of the Islamising clique at court; the senior Dutch

[46] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxi, pp. 55–9. It should be pointed out that some anachronisms —or perhaps intentional "flash-backs"—are found in this section of *BTJ(BP)*.
[47] See Batavia to H.XVII, 22 Dec. 1733 and 31 Mar. 1734, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. ix, pp. 540, 589.
[48] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxi, pp. 67–9.

officer at the court described him as "pious and innocent" as well as rather stupid, a man who was led astray by Urawan.[49]

The younger Mangkunagara must have observed these developments, and others that reflected a court entangled in lethal intrigues and confusions, with growing interest. We know nothing of his education in these early years, but he was certainly being educated, perhaps by Kudanawarsa, who is still invisible in the sources available to me from this period. Later in his life, Mangkunagara displayed significant literary skills. He was devoted both to indigenous spiritual forces and to Islam, which was characteristic of the Mystic Synthesis style of Islam (discussed below in this book). His later mastery of the skills, brutalities and deceptions of warfare probably had roots in youthful studies as well as in his long experience of battle. From court intrigues there was much to learn. In 1738 he witnessed the fall from grace of Pakubuwana II's then-most-influential courtier, his brother-in-law Urawan—by then raised to the status of a prince with the name Png. Purbaya. Urawan's sister, the King's wife, died after delivering a stillborn son, leaving him without a protector in the *kraton*. Urawan was charged by his enemies with arrogance, extortion and homosexuality (which is denounced in several texts from the time as well as in the Qur'an),[50] and he, too, soon found himself exiled to Sri Lanka. Shortly before that exile, according to the Surakarta Major *Babad*, 12-year-old Mangkunagara had met Urawan/Purbaya, who prophesied that the boy would become a great warrior.[51]

Mangkunagara learned much about higher Javanese culture during these years, for he was devoted to such Javanese arts in later life. The court and surrounding courtiers' residences resounded to the sounds of *gamĕlan* orchestras and singing by both male and female singers. These were entwined in the literary world, where both men and women were active, for, as J. Kunst commented, in Javanese culture "singing and poetry are one and the same thing; poems are always recited in song-form".[52] The literary works we have already

[49] Duirvelt, Kartasura, to Duyvensz, Semarang, 23 Aug. 1735, in VOC 2358 (OB 1736).

[50] He was not the only aristocrat so accused. Indeed, Pakubuwana II himself was evidently bisexual to a degree that seemed at one stage to threaten the production of a royal heir. See Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, index s.v. homosexuality.

[51] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxii, p. 14.

[52] J. Kunst, *Music in Java: Its History, Its Theory and Its Techniques* (ed. E.L. Heins; 2 vols; 3rd ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), Vol. i, p. 122.

Gamĕlan orchestra, Yogyakarta, 1888

discussed above were thus sung or chanted aloud, not read in silence, and Mangkunagara probably attended and took part in many such performances. Dance was also performed to the sound of *gamĕlan* and was more than mere entertainment.

The *bĕdhaya* was the most sacred dance, performed in stately unison by seven or nine beautifully attired young women. Leading courtiers had troupes of seven, but the monarch's *bĕdhaya* troupe was of nine; and when it performed, the supernatural powers present were so great that all the courtiers in attendance turned their backs so as not to look upon the dance. In 1740 a Dutch officer observed that this was "because, out of awe, they may not watch this".[53] The most sacred forms, the *Bĕdhaya Kĕtawang* and *Bĕdhaya Sĕmang*, commemorated the meeting between Sultan Agung and the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, who was believed to be immaterially present in the performance. Other dances were of more vigorous style, notably martial dances such as *bĕksa jĕbĕng* (pike-dance) and *bĕksa*

[53] Baerenclouw, dagregister 5 July–12 Aug. 1740 (under date 3 Aug.), in VOC 2512 (OB 1741).



Bĕdhaya dancers, Yogyakarta, 1884

Wayang kulit performance, with *gamĕlan* performers in the foreground, Yogyakarta, 2016

Wayang topeng, Yogyakarta, 1888

jěmparing (arrow-dance) that were performed by large numbers of soldiers in unison, dressed in richly coloured uniforms with matching weapons; these were a form of military drill as well as performance. They were often seen at the twice-weekly court tournaments, which were also occasions for tiger-baiting and other forms of blood sports. These, too, were sometimes imbued with supernatural interpretations. Among weapons, special veneration was attached to one's personal *kris* (dagger), which was believed to be alive with a spiritual personality.[54] *Wayang kulit* (shadow-theatre performed with flat parchment puppets), *wayang wong* (dance drama) and *wayang topeng* (masked dance drama) were regular parts of *kraton* life.

Court glory was displayed most publicly at the thrice-yearly Islamic festivals called *Garĕbĕg*. These were *Garĕbĕg Mulud* celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad on the 12th of the month Mulud, *Garĕbĕg Puasa* to celebrate the end of the fasting month on the first day of Sawal, and *Garĕbĕg Bĕsar* on 10 Bĕsar to commemorate Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son and the pilgrimage to Mecca. At these times the court city was full of thousands of

[54] The authoritative study of *krisses* is to be found in Isaäc Groneman, *The Javanese Kris*, preface and intro. David van Duuren, transl. Peter Richardus and Timothy D. Rogers (Leiden: C. Zwartenkot Art Books and KITLV Press, 2009).

Wayang wong, Yogyakarta, 1899

people—all the princes and other dignitaries as well as regional lords and their entourages in temporary accommodation at the court city. There were grand ritual events, tournaments, soldiers in mass performances on the great field before the court (the *alun-alun*), parading of sacred objects, and musical and theatrical performances in which the general populace along with the dignitaries could see royal grandeur on display. It was a time for night markets and food stalls. For the court elite, it was an occasion to pay obeisance to the monarch, to demonstrate their own standing in grand displays, less happily to pay their taxes and to engage in heavy politicking.[55] Failure to attend a *Garĕbĕg* was taken as an indication of rebellion or the threat of rebellion. Young Mangkunagara would have watched all of this with the same fascination as many young Javanese of the centuries after him.

The court of Kartasura, in this peaceful interlude, was a cultural connoisseur's delight with its resonant harmony of literature, music, dance, martial skills and the supernatural, but there was little harmony in politics. By 1739 the court was splintered into hostile factions,

[55] A valuable 20th-century account is in Soedjono Tirtokoesoemo, *De Garebegs in het Sultanaat Jogjakarta* (Jogjakarta: H. Buning, 1931).

A modern *Garĕbĕg*: *Garĕbĕg Puasa*, Yogyakarta, 1992

and Pakubuwana II's capacity for manipulating them—the key to royal dominance in such a realm—was close to zero. The kingdom was teetering on the brink of geographical splintering as well, for the lord of West Madura, Cakraningrat IV (r. 1718–46), was operating with increasing disdain for Kartasura's authority in East Java.

The VOC was hardly in a better state. Its capital city, Batavia (today's Jakarta), was a pestilential graveyard as malaria spread across the city from new coastal fishponds. From 1733 onwards, Batavia—with its picturesque canals and narrow, airless, Dutch-style houses—was no longer thought to be a sort of Venice of the East. About one-half of newcomers and newborn children died within a year. Those who survived had heightened risks of dying from secondary infections such as typhus and dysentery. In 1753 Governor General Mossel told the Company's directors in Amsterdam that "because of the general decline of Batavia … one misses the cheerful spirits seen when the city was flourishing". The population within the city walls fell from some 20,000 around 1730 to 12,000 in 1790.[56] The surrounding countryside—too far from the fishponds for the anopheles mosquito to fly—meanwhile grew in population. In 1815 the acerbic

[56] P.H. van der Brug, *Malaria en malaise: De VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994), pp. 139–41, 143.

English naval surgeon Joseph Arnold called the city of Batavia "the most unhealthy spot almost in the world". "This place is dreadfully sickly for strangers," he noted, "who die like rotten sheep."[57]

The Company's administration was chaotic. Dirk van Cloon was named as governor general in 1732, but in less than two years he sought to retire because of ill health. Before the directors could agree to his request, he died in early 1735. The disputatious Council of the Indies in Batavia was unable to agree on his successor, so resorted to drawing lots. Thereby emerged Abraham Patras as governor general, already 64 years old, feeble and unenthusiastic about his new eminence. He asked Amsterdam to relieve him of his burden but died in 1737 before an answer could arrive. He was, wrote F.W. Stapel, "a devout and good-hearted man, who lived very quietly".[58] His sole distinction as governor general is to have been the only Frenchman to have held that position. Meanwhile, the Company was losing a great deal of money from its business enterprise in Java.

Pakubuwana II, surveying his own disintegrating regime, seems to have sought remedy in a display of royal grandeur and links to the supernatural. In September 1739, he went on a royal tour to the dynasty's original home territory of Mataram. He set off from Kartasura with an entourage of 20,000 pikemen and 1,000 musketeers with 150 banners and flags, a VOC escort, and most of the senior members of the royal family and court. He wore a great golden crown, evidently that worn by his distant ancestors of Majapahit, the greatest of the pre-Islamic kingdoms, an important object seen for the last time in public during this grand tour. The King visited dynastic gravesites, where he paid obeisance and undertook devotions, and oversaw the slaughter of hundreds of wild animals as sport. But there were also inauspicious omens of bad times ahead. The Dutch reported a carriage accident that killed one servant woman and wounded two others, and whirlwinds that unroofed houses. The Surakarta Major *Babad* tells of omens of the impending "destruction of the world".[59]

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[57] John Bastin, ed., "The Java Journal of Dr. Joseph Arnold: 3 September–17 December 1815", *Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 46, 1 (1973): 40, 75.

[58] F.W. Stapel, *De Gouverneurs-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië in beeld en woord* (Den Haag: W.P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1941), pp. 51–3.

[59] A fuller account of the royal progress and the sources mentioned here is in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 232–6.

In 1740, as disaster loomed for both the Dutch in Batavia and the Javanese in Kartasura, we catch a rare glimpse of the young Mangkunagara in a list of dignitaries compiled by the *kraton*'s chief secretary, Ng. Surawiguna, Tirtawiguna's son. Here, among the many other royal family members and senior lords of the court, we discover the young Mangkunagara, at this stage still known as Raden (or Mas) Sahid. He is said to be 12 years old—in fact he was 14—and to have an appanage of 50 households for his support. With him are listed his two brothers who would play important roles at his side in coming years: R. "Amdo" (a transcription error for Ambiya, said to be ten years old but more probably about 13, with an appanage of 25 households) and R. Sabar (said to be aged eight but more probably around 12, also with 25 households).[60] They will appear here with their later princely names as, respectively, Png. Pamot and Png. Mangkuningrat (also known as Mangkudiningrat).

War Begins Again

Then struck the disaster that plunged the Javanese kingdom and the Dutch East India Company into 17 years of bloody warfare.

Chinese had long played a crucial role in the economic life of Batavia and, in smaller numbers, along the coast and in the interior of Java. Their relationship with Javanese society varied, but some people of Chinese descent had, in effect, become Javanese—and rather grand Javanese at that. They embraced Islam and Javanese styles, some being granted sonorous Javanese names and even becoming major lords of coastal territories. As will be seen shortly, when presented with a choice between allying in war with the Europeans or the Chinese, many Javanese chose the latter.[61]

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[60] "Lijst der thans in wesen zijnde kinderen, broeders en Susters mitsgaders de afkomst van den Soesoehoenang Pakoeboeana, De hooft Regenten en mindere bedientens dewelke haar aan't Hof en zoo aan de stranden als binnen en bovenlanden bevinden … opgegeven door den Keijserlijken Secretaris den Ingabeij Soeroewigoeno", Kartasura, 1 Aug. 1740, in VOC 2512 (OB 1741) (Javas Oostkust section ii, under date 10 Sept. 1740, p. 143). MN I's older brother, R.M. Umar, had died by this time. Readers will note discrepancies regarding the boys' ages between this list and that given in 1728 above (Vergadering, Kartasura, 26 Jan. 1728, in VOC 2080 [OB 1728]). The same information about their appanages is given in *BK* f. 655r. (published ed. Vol. ii, p. 352).

[61] For a valuable analysis of a somewhat later period, see Peter Carey, "Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755–1825", *Indonesia* 37 (Apr. 1984): 1–47.



Engraving of Batavia c. 1750 by Giuseppe Filosi

Between the Company and the Chinese there was a volatile mixture of mutual dependence and suspicion. In September 1740, the Company became convinced that the Chinese were about to mount a rebellion, while the Chinese believed that they would be rounded up and taken on VOC ships to be thrown overboard at sea. By this time there were about 15,000 Chinese in Batavia and its surroundings. In October, a VOC search of the Chinese quarter in Batavia turned into a lawless, full-scale anti-Chinese pogrom in which some 10,000 Chinese were slaughtered. About 5,000 Chinese lived along Java's north coast; they and the survivors who had fled Batavia organised themselves for armed resistance. Thus began what is known as the Chinese War (1740–43).[62]

The VOC's fortified trading posts along the north coast of Java were attacked by Chinese, soon joined by local Javanese. The coastal headquarters at Semarang was besieged, and for a time the local Company officers doubted whether they could defend it. Their situation was not improved by the senior officer there, Bartholomeus

[62] See further J.Th. Vermeulen, *De Chineezen te Batavia en de troebelen van 1740* (Leiden: Eduard Ijdo, 1938); Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*, *VKI* Vol. 122 (Dordrecht and Riverton: Foris, 1986), Chapter 5; and Willem Remmelink, *The Chinese War and the Collapse of the Javanese State*, *VKI* Vol. 162 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994).

Visscher, becoming "more than half out of his wits".[63] He was replaced in June 1741. In May, the post at Juwana was overrun at the cost of seven VOC lives. The Company withdrew its personnel from Demak to aid in the defence of Semarang. It also tried to withdraw the post at Rembang, but that was impossible: Rembang was cut off by the enemy and overrun in July. There the Company lost a significant number of heavy cannon and most of its men. In the first half of 1741, it seemed possible to the Europeans that they would be driven from Java's central north coast. At Surabaya, however, circumstances were different. There, West Madura's lord Cakraningrat IV saw an opportunity to enlarge his influence in East Java by intervening on the side of the Europeans. In July his forces carried out a general massacre of Chinese in the area.

Pakubuwana II wondered what he should do in these unprecedented and bloody circumstances, so unlike that mystical realm whose contemplation he seemed to prefer. After a difficult debate, about which our main source is an interesting but flawed account in the Surakarta Major *Babad*, the court decision was to join the war against the VOC.[64] On 20 July 1741, a group of senior Javanese lords and accompanying entourages entered the VOC fortress at Kartasura, ostensibly to make a courtesy call upon the commandant Capt. Johannes van Velsen. Once inside, the Javanese attacked in coordination with a second assault on the small VOC guardhouse at the *kraton*. The survivors from the latter escaped to the Company fortress and joined the mayhem there. The Javanese side lost about 80 dead, including some prominent courtiers, while on the VOC side Van Velsen and seven others were wounded and about 35 were killed, before the attackers were expelled from the fortress. The Javanese thereupon besieged the Company's post for three weeks. After the survivors surrendered, they were forced to convert to Islam, while Van Velsen and several others were murdered. There was now no doubt that the aspirant Sufi King, Pakubuwana II, had embraced Holy War against the infidel Company.

But the categories were not really as simple as that. Certainly, the Company's Europeans were Christians—more precisely, they

[63] Batavia to H.XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in dJ ix, pp. 377–8.

[64] See M.C. Ricklefs, "The Crisis of 1740–1 in Java: The Javanese, Chinese, Madurese and Dutch, and the Fall of the Court of Kartasura", *BKI* 139, 2–3 (1983): 268–90.

were Calvinists who tended to regard Catholics as a greater threat than Muslims, and who were known for bibulous and debauched behaviour far from the Calvinist ideals of Netherlands society. But there were also Muslim soldiers employed by the VOC, known to the Javanese as *Kumpĕni Islam*, whom Pakubuwana II tried but failed to lure from the Company's side. Furthermore, Cakraningrat IV's Muslim forces of Madura were supporting the Company and, therefore, were now enemies of Pakubuwana II. It seems that some, perhaps many, of the Chinese whom the King had now opted to join were also Muslims. In other words, there were Muslims on all sides. Nevertheless, the court seems to have seen this as a religious war. The later 18th-century Yogyakarta chronicle *Babad Kraton* tells how Islamic scholars (*ulama*) and *hajis* marched against the VOC in Semarang, confident that they were fulfilling God's will.[65]

Pakubuwana II's timing was—perhaps predictably—catastrophic. The Company had control of the sea lanes off the north coast and thus could reinforce its coastal headquarters at Semarang. In May 1741, its besieged garrison consisted of only 90 fit Europeans and 208 Indonesian soldiers. By November there were over 3,400 soldiers there. The enemy forces were formidable: estimated (perhaps overestimated) to be as many as 40,000–50,000 men with 50 pieces of artillery. Nevertheless, the VOC forces managed—rather to their own surprise—to break the siege in November and then went over to the offensive. Meanwhile, Cakraningrat IV's forces were sweeping through East Java. The effect of these two developments was to force the Chinese fighters and their allied Javanese farther inland towards Kartasura, where they believed they would find an ally in Pakubuwana II.

By November 1741, the King recognised that he had backed the wrong side. Delicate negotiations began between Pakubuwana II, that pious King who had overseen the killing of VOC officers at Kartasura, and the Company, which could hardly trust him. The 177 survivors of the VOC garrison at Kartasura were released and allowed to return to the coast in January 1742. *Babad Kraton* reports that the King's mother, Ratu Amangkurat, and, in particular, Tirtawiguna were principally responsible for the King's change of policy, in opposition to the *patih* Natakusuma.[66]

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[65] *BK* f. 668v. (published ed., Vol. ii, p. 368).
[66] *BK* ff. 674v.–682v. (published ed., Vol. ii, pp. 375–84).

This new policy was as disastrous as the previous one. Now the *kraton* was allied, suspiciously on both sides, with the Company. Between the *kraton* and the VOC forces on the coast, however, were the Chinese and Javanese fighters who saw Pakubuwana II no longer as their conquering monarch of Holy War but as a faithless deserter of their cause, a craven supplicant for the Company's forgiveness and protection. They now proclaimed a Susuhunan of their own, a descendant of the deposed ruler Amangkurat III named R.M. Garĕndi, then some 12 years old, who became known as Sunan Kuning. To the court's east, the Madurese were also marching towards the centre of the kingdom. The Company sent a small detachment under Capt. Joan Andries Baron van Hohendorff to the court in March 1742, consisting of the assistant Balthasar Toutlemonde (who would play a prominent role in the future), a corporal, six common soldiers and some servants. But this was only symbolic and, for Van Hohendorff and his men, hazardous. In June 1742 Pakubuwana II offered his *patih* Natakusuma to the Company for exile; he was soon on his way to Sri Lanka to join the colony of Javanese aristocrats there.

The rebellion was now as much anti-Pakubuwana II as anti-VOC, yet the Company had no means of offering the King military support. Kartasura fell to rebel attack on 30 June 1742. Pakubuwana II fled along with Van Hohendorff and his men as the rebels burned and plundered the court and city. The ten-year old Crown Prince, the future Pakubuwana III, was taken along, but the women of the court were abandoned to the none-too-tender mercies of the rebels. Also abandoned were "sacks of money, packs with gold and silver, gold betel sets, chalices and other priceless objects".[67] That night, rather than sleeping in the royal chambers of the Kartasura *kraton*, Pakubuwana II rested his head upon Van Hohendorff's saddle, covered, if the Surakarta Major *Babad* is to be believed, with the *pusaka* jacket Ky. Gundhil, which was believed to be from the Prophet Muhammad himself, magically transported to Java.[68] Princes scattered in the face of the enemy, as Sunan Kuning and the Chinese and Javanese rebels took over the court. Mangkubumi and most of the other senior princes made their way to Semarang.

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[67] Van Hohendorff and Hogewits, eerbiedig bericht, Semarang, 25 Aug. 1742, in A.K.A. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, "De zwerftocht van Sultan [*sic*] Pakoeboewana II, na diens flucht uit den kraton te Kartasoera, op 30 June 1742", *BKI* 74 (1918): 599–600.

[68] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxvi, p. 76.

Only a few princes remained behind at Kartasura under Sunan Kuning, among them Mangkunagara. He later wrote to the VOC that at the court of Pakubuwana II—the man who had authorised the exile of his father in 1728—he had been mocked as "a remnant and a thorny stump" (implicitly, of a cut-down princely line) until he could stand it no longer. So he left Kartasura and joined Sunan Kuning. He subsequently abandoned Kuning when military fortune turned against him and fled. Mangkunagara claimed that at that stage Kuning had proclaimed Mangkunagara himself to be "the reigning King".[69] We do not know when his teenage brothers Pamot (then about 15) and Mangkuningrat (about 14) fled, but they evidently went in separate directions in the chaos.

Pakubuwana II was excluded from his court for five months, during which time he sought to gather together the few lords still loyal to him. Van Hohendorff left him in Ponorogo and returned to the coast to assemble VOC forces. Javanese sources depict the desolate monarch as concentrating mainly on spiritual exercises, including communing with the indigenous spirit of Mount Lawu, named Sunan Lawu. The Company's military strength was still restricted to the coast, and when the annual monsoon rains hit in November, turning roads to seas of mud, the Company army was immobilised. Cakraningrat's Madurese nevertheless marched on and reconquered the court at the end of November. Pakubuwana II was near Kartasura at the time, but the Madurese refused him entry while they sacked whatever was left to sack. Only on 20 December did a VOC column under Van Hohendorff and the Company's senior commander Nathanael Steinmetz reach the court. The following day Pakubuwana II was escorted by them back to his battered *kraton*. By this time Kartasura and surrounding villages had been "totally destroyed and plundered" by the Madurese.[70]

The double plundering and burning of the court in 1742 meant the loss of many books and other cultural treasures, while deaths among senior courtiers in this episode and the warfare to follow meant the loss of much cultural knowledge. The fall of Kartasura was a tragic caesura in Javanese cultural history. *Babad Kraton* comments that the fall of the court "was God's dispensation, for it was the

[69] Prince Aria Prangwadana [a name used by MN], n.p., to GG, Batavia, received Aug. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).
[70] Steinmetz, Kartasura, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1742, in VOC 2588 (OB 1743).

decree of the All-Disposing that the retribution of the Immaterial should fall upon the Javanese, employing the Chinese as the means".[71] For what was this retribution, we may ask? We can only presume that it was for the hopeless incompetence and faithless caprices of Pakubuwana II.

Sunan Kuning fled with his followers first to Yogya (present-day Yogyakarta) then to a place called Randhulawang, near the 9th–10th-century Prambanan temple complex.[72] Hostilities continued, with the main combatant forces being the Chinese on one side and the VOC's troops on the other. The rebel side was on the defensive as a major Company assault loomed in May 1743.

Facing impending attack, one of Sunan Kuning's entourage attempted again to mobilise the sort of literary magic found in Ratu Pakubuwana's books of 14 years before, in a situation in which supernatural reinforcements were much needed. Ny. M. Kaduwang, a lady from a literati family, wrote out a new version of *Kitab Usulbiyah*. Just as Ratu Pakubuwana's aim in 1731 had been "to make perfect the reign of her royal grandson" (Pakubuwana II), so now Ny. M. Kaduwang sought supernatural power, perfection and salvation, "in the hard times of Java".[73] The new 1743 version of *Usulbiyah* claimed supernatural powers:

> 5. … Whosoever holds firm to the message,
> for that person, a weapon will be *Kitab Usulbiyah*.
> If it is taken into battle,
> there will be victory in battle….
> 6. … The destruction of the infidels
> will be easy
> through the supernatural power of this book,
> that is, the reciting of
> *Kitab Usulbiyah*.[74]

In a less uplifting vein, Ny. M. Kaduwang concluded her work with a prose passage: "This is the end. May they receive the love and

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[71] *BK* f. 713v. (published ed., Vol. ii, p. 428): *sampun dilalah, pan takdir ing Yyang Widi /0/ pamalĕse Yyang Sukma prapteng wong Jawa, Cina kinarya margi*.
[72] Randhulawang is no longer known but was probably present-day Randugunting; see the discussion in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 292n51.
[73] Sonobudoyo MS PB A.109, p. 182: *ing jaman rĕkasa Jawa*.
[74] Ibid.; Javanese text in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 296.

grace of God, those who read this and write this and listen to this and keep this; may they be given (God's) reward. God knows best. Praise be to God."[75]

This application of literary magic did no more good for Sunan Kuning than it had for Pakubuwana II. The rebel capital at Randhulawang fell to the VOC in June 1743. Sunan Kuning himself surrendered in October, marking the end of the Chinese rebellion.

Pakubuwana II formally repaired his relations with the Company, upon which he was now utterly dependent, in a new treaty of November 1743. But there were still important matters to be resolved. The Company had already got rid of Natakusuma but also wanted two other courtiers exiled, Ky. H. Mataram (evidently a Javanese) and Sayyid 'Alwi (presumably an Arab), who had been the King's main religious mentors since they arrived in Kartasura in, respectively, 1735 and 1737. The Company believed them to be its main enemies at court. The VOC had a backup plan if the King refused to surrender them. When Mangkunagara the Elder was shipped off to Sri Lanka, there remained behind in Batavia a son, brother to the younger Mangkunagara, known as Png. Tirtakusuma or Png. Pancuran, the latter being the name of the district of Batavia (and of present-day South Jakarta, now commonly spelled Pancoran) where he lived. The Company contemplated simply deposing the abject Pakubuwana II if he did not agree and replacing him with Tirtakusuma. So Mangkunagara—then in Java's highlands after fleeing the fallen *kraton*—might have found his own brother to be the new King. But Pakubuwana II agreed to the VOC demand, and Tirtakusuma remained in Pancuran.[76]

For Mangkunagara and many others, however, hostilities were not over, for Java's last great civil war of the 18th century had begun. Mangkunagara was by now a youth of short height but striking appearance. Later, Nicolaas Hartingh described him as "small in stature but amazingly animated and nimble of foot, with fire radiating from his eyes".[77] When Hartingh and Mangkunagara finally met in person in 1757, at the end of the wars, *Babad Giyanti* says that the Dutchman was so much taller than the prince that

[75] Sonobudoyo MS PB A.109, p. 182; Javanese text in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 300.
[76] KV, pp. 105–6.
[77] KV, p. 237.

they looked "like a water buffalo beside a goat".[78] All that this short young man had learned of courtly intrigue, Javanese high culture and mystical sciences was now to be supplemented with many hard lessons of warfare.

As we will see in the following chapter, in 1743 Mangkunagara experienced a battle which demonstrated yet again the relative efficacy of supernatural powers and gunpowder in war.

[78] *BG* Vol. xxi, p. 31: *lir maesa kalawan kambing*.

2

Into Rebellion, 1743–46: Early Skirmishes

The civil war which now commenced, led by princes of the Mataram line, devastated much of Central and East Java for the next 14 years. Hartingh, a major player in these conflicts and one of the very few Dutchmen claiming competence in the Javanese language, was evidently the author of the "Short Account of the Javanese Wars … From the Year 1741 to the General Peace Concluded in 1757" (*Kort verhaal …*). He reflected on the terrible costs of the fighting, the "devastation of land and people", the "almost inexpressible treasure devoted to it and the multitude of European and native soldiers killed by the violence of weapons and the unbearable hardships of war".[1] Yet, in his view, the Company had no choice but to involve itself militarily "for her own interests and out of cautious statecraft, … for neutrality or sitting still while everything was in uproar could have brought pernicious consequences and perhaps her total ruin on this island".[2] "Never," he believed, "was this entire island so close to its total ruin as then, for one saw … brothers warring against brothers, subjects against their lawful lord and the entire land as if flooded by innumerable multitudes of murderous and violent men".[3]

Into this chaos went Mangkunagara, a young man persuaded that a great destiny awaited him. He presumably knew of prophecies and expectations about his future, which contrasted painfully with

[1] KV, pp. 77–8.
[2] Ibid., p. 82.
[3] Ibid., p. 89.

the mocking as "a remnant and a thorny stump" (of the princely line cut off by his father's exile) that he claimed to have endured at the court of Pakubuwana II.[4] As we shall see, Mangkunagara believed that supernatural forces were preparing him for greatness. He would not be deterred by military failures or the faithlessness of others. Nor would he be seduced away from his path by inducements to accept amnesty and to return to life at court. At least, not until after another 14 years of warfare produced military stalemate. Yet it seems that he was uncertain what his great future was to be. We will note that, according to his own account, he was reluctant to claim kingship for himself although we can hardly doubt that he thought of it. He was never reluctant to claim divine approbation as he fought on against formidable enemies. He awaited his destiny.

From the early stages of the fighting, Hartingh recognised that Mangkunagara, despite his youth, was among the most formidable combatants. "From youth onwards, he was accustomed to the pursuit of war, … little by little acquiring great skills in military matters." It would be difficult to subdue such a prince, he believed, "who was never short of adherents … and who, as if from the cradle onwards, was steeled to hardships".[5]

Where Mangkunagara had gone immediately after abandoning Sunan Kuning's cause in 1743 is not clear. His autobiographical chronicle of the war years opens with a statement of the location of various princes, but the time setting is unclear. He was in Ponorogo in the south of the Madiun valley, he records, but there is no more detail at this point in his *babad*.[6]

Our first clear sight of him in battle is in June 1743, after the defeat of Sunan Kuning described in the previous chapter. The village of Tembayat, in the mountains south of the road from Yogyakarta to Surakarta, is the holy gravesite of Sunan Bayat, the legendary bringer of Islam to south-central Java. It had a history of fostering rebellious movements from the time of Sultan Agung a century before. There a religious figure named R. Pangulu emerged as a rebel leader. The Surakarta Major *Babad* tells how Van Hohendorff ordered some of Pakubuwana II's Javanese forces to march against R. Pangulu,

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[4] Prince Aria Prangwadana [a name used by MN], n.p., to GG, Batavia, received Aug. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).
[5] KV, p. 129.
[6] *SBPn* f. 2v.

whose men were estimated at 300 "intending Holy War against the Dutch".[7] Mangkunagara was among his followers and appears to have had some mounted soldiers of his own. His brother Png. Pamot may also have been with him.[8] The rest were all on foot, except for R. Pangulu himself, and armed with pikes, in an age when firearms were the keys to success. Pakubuwana II's Javanese, however, were fearful and withdrew. Van Hohendorff then reinforced with VOC soldiers and marched on Tembayat himself. There, the *babad* tells us, the Company and Kartasura side faced "many of the religious folk who joined the war, all carrying religious books and the Qur'an and chewing *daringo běngle* [calamus or sweet flag, used medicinally], advancing and spitting".[9] This was obviously meant to project supernatural power, and, the chronicle says, several times the guns of their enemies indeed failed to fire. So R. Pangulu's people continued to advance, spitting calamus and intending Holy War.[10] But then the Dutch guns fired, and R. Pangulu's people were cut down. He fled but was overtaken and killed by the VOC's indigenous (Ternate) troops. Mangkunagara escaped eastwards accompanied by five cavalrymen. Houses at Tembayat were burned, and Van Hohendorff returned to his quarters in Yogya.[11] A Dutch report at the end of the year says that R. Pangulu had been put up as a King by "some superstitious infidels living in Mataram". Van Hohendorff had attacked with 450 men and, after facing fierce resistance, killed R. Pangulu and many of his followers. And so, said the report, R. Pangulu disappeared as quickly as he had arisen.[12] Mangkunagara does not describe this episode in his autobiographical *babad*, so we do not know what lessons he drew from it. We may assume, however, that he probably concluded that he needed less calamus root and more men, horses, firearms and ammunition.

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[7] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxx, p. 16: *sědyane aprang sabil, pěrang lan Walonda.* Remmelink, *Chinese War*, pp. 197–203, provides an account based on VOC sources covering events of 1743.

[8] According to the account in D.A Rinkes, "De heiligen van Java IV: Ki Panḍan Arang te Tembajat", *TBG* Vol. 53 (1911), nos. 5–6, pp. 505–9, 563–73. This is from a *Babad Pěcina* published in Semarang in 1874.

[9] *BTJ(BP)* Vol. xxx, p. 18: *apan kathah kaum kang tumut ayuda, běběktanira sami, gendhong kitab Kuran, apan sami amamah, daringo běngle sireki, pamangsahira, anĕmburakĕn sami*.

[10] Ibid., p. 19: *tansah nĕmburakĕn dilango běngle, sasambatira sami, nědya Sabilolah*.

[11] The whole episode is in ibid., pp. 15–21.

[12] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1743, in dJ ix, p. 430.

Mangkunagara's escape eastwards after the defeat of R. Pangulu may have facilitated contacts with the Madurese forces of Cakraningrat IV. The latter's adventures need not detain us long here, but there is an important link to Mangkunagara. In the wake of his victory in expelling Sunan Kuning from Kartasura, Cakraningrat IV made demands for territories and a degree of independence which the VOC found excessive. Eventually this led to war in 1745. A Company expeditionary force was besieged in Madura for six months but eventually broke the siege and Cakraningrat took flight. He crossed the Java Sea to Banjarmasin and there sought refuge on an English ship, where he was robbed. The Sultan of Banjarmasin then turned him over to Batavia. In 1746 he was exiled to the Cape of Good Hope, where he died in 1753. His son took over West Madura as a compliant subject of the VOC, and the Madurese lords were thereafter excluded from involvement in Javanese affairs.

Mangkunagara began his *babad* with an account of Cakraningrat IV's doings and ultimate defeat. The essential part of this story for us is that Cakraningrat IV reportedly wished to support Mangkunagara's rebellion, which would have been useful to Cakraningrat IV by diverting and weakening his opponents, the Kartasura monarchy and VOC. He therefore sent Madurese and Balinese forces under his command to support Mangkunagara in Sukawati (north-east of Kartasura) as well as another rebel named Tg. Martapura in nearby Grobogan. The Balinese and Madurese contingents, however, fell out with each other and the Balinese—or at least many of them—went over to the VOC.[13] The timing of all this is not clear, but we may assume that it was c. 1743–44.

Madurese fighters will appear again in this and the next chapters, for the exclusion of Madurese princes from Javanese affairs did not mean that all Madurese soldiers were repatriated to their home island. These warriors were regarded by all sides with both respect and caution, looked upon as ruthlessly effective fighters, evidently unconstrained by fellow feeling for local Javanese and thus maestros of mayhem, slaughter and scorched earth.

In the early stages of rebellion, as alliances and relationships were being sorted out and Mangkunagara was unsure of his destiny,

[13] *SBPn* ff. 2v.–29r. KV's general account (p. 106 et seqq.) parallels that in *SBPn*, including the defection of the Balinese from the Madurese side and their submission to the VOC on pp. 117, 119. Martapura was also called Panĕmbahan or Pangeran Pugĕr.

he seems to have been based mainly at a place called Sedayu or Sidayu (not to be confused with Sedayu/Sidayu, north of Surabaya). This was in the remote country around Jatisrono,[14] south of Mount Kukusan and Mount Lawu southeast of Kartasura. This area—some 60km, or several days' hard march, from the court, remote, thinly populated, mountainous and difficult of access—would long form Mangkunagara's main base and resort in good and bad times. Tg. Martapura was active along the north coast, causing havoc in Kudus and Pati in March 1743 but retiring at the approach of VOC forces. He rejected Company overtures to submit and remained active along the Solo River, in the area of Sukawati. In late 1743 the Dutch believed that the King's rebel brothers Buminata and Singasari were with Martapura. They understood at that stage that Mangkunagara and his brother Pamot were in the Blora area and wished to submit.[15] The latter information seems doubtful and was probably just the first example we have of the dance of deception—would he submit, would he not—that Mangkunagara performed until 1757, the purposes of which were presumably always to assess his options, confuse his enemies, and buy time for his plans and operations.

In January 1744, Mangkunagara wrote to the VOC that he was on the march with "a powerful army", intending to enter Mataram. Rather than seeing this as advice to stand aside, the Company mobilised local dignitaries to join VOC troops in resisting him. They encountered Mangkunagara at Yogya and put him to flight back across the Opak River, then in flood in the midst of the rainy season, in which (so it was reported) 300 of his men drowned. If that report is correct, his following was already significant by this time. Mangkunagara marched northeast and reassembled on the east side of the Solo River, from where he might threaten Kartasura. He was driven from there by Van Hohendorff on 14 January.[16]

Greater success attended an attack by Mangkunagara on Sukawati in April 1744. He defeated and captured the local head Tg. Suradigdaya, who thereafter appears on Mangkunagara's side in his autobiography. The senior VOC officers on the coast—realising that

[14] W.F. Schoel, *Alphabetisch register van de administratieve- (bestuurs-) en adatrechtelijke indeeling van Nederlandsch-Indie*, Vol. 1: *Java en Madoera* (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1931), p. 337 s.v. Sidajoe.
[15] Verijssel and Theling, kort bericht, Semarang, 14 Dec. 1743, in AN Solo 42.
[16] Theling, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Feb. 1744, in VOC 2633 (OB 1745).

they faced a formidable opponent—admonished Van Hohendorff "to employ caution" in dealing with Mangkunagara.[17]

Mangkunagara's autobiography for this early period contains details of his and others' activities that were mostly invisible to the Europeans and thus not reflected in their sources, except when clashes of arms occurred. It tells us that Tg. Martapura urged the senior Prince Mangkubumi, then in Kartasura, to flee the court and join the rebellion in Sukawati because he was shamed at court, where it was known that, after Kartasura fell and Mangkubumi fled to Semarang, he had unsuccessfully asked to be named King by the VOC. Mangkubumi thereupon left the court and joined Martapura. But they fell out because Mangkubumi—a descendant of kings and by any measure superior in standing to Martapura—was unwilling to accept the latter's leadership. A battle followed which Mangkubumi won.[18]

In Sidayu, Mangkunagara was informed of this conflict by both Mangkubumi's and Martapura's emissaries and found himself in a quandary. Mangkunagara enquired after Mangkubumi's intentions and was told that he left the court intending to join Mangkunagara in his rebellion. When Martapura learned that Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara stood together against him, he tried but failed to get them to join in a united front against the Dutch. His emissary, one Tuwan Sayid (Arabic *sayyid*, indicating an Arab descendant of the Prophet), was instead beheaded on Mangkubumi's orders. Mangkubumi then sent his mother, M. Ay. Tejawati, to Pakubuwana II with the Sayid's head as a token that he had fulfilled his duty to the King. Here we see described in Mangkunagara's chronicle the enigmatic role played by Mangkubumi, which also mystified the VOC, as we will see below. When Van Hohendorff asked Tejawati why Mangkubumi had left court, she replied that he did so out of concern for the shrinking of the King's realm. She presented Mangkubumi's greetings and the Sayid's head to Pakubuwana II as acts of obeisance. Mangkubumi had left the court, she said, pretending to assist the rebels but really to reclaim lands lost to Pakubuwana II's control. Pleased at this, Pakubuwana II said that if Mangkubumi was truly loyal, he should destroy Martapura. Van Hohendorff sent back his own greetings to Mangkubumi. The latter prepared to destroy

[17] Theling et al., Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Mar. 1744, in VOC 2633 (OB 1745).
[18] *SBPn* ff. 29r.–31v.

Martapura, whom he drove from Grobogan to the mountains of the Kendeng range. Upon reporting this to Kartasura, Mangkubumi was "trusted in his doings by the King and the Company and was a comrade of the King".[19]

Mangkunagara's understanding of events from the vantage point of Sidayu, as recorded in his *babad*, may be compared with VOC reports, which suggest that he overestimated how much the Dutch knew of Mangkubumi's comings and goings. There were spies reporting in all directions, but, unsurprisingly, understandings were often contradictory and inaccurate. The Company was evidently mystified by Mangkubumi's conduct. It seems that after secretly leaving the court c. early August 1744, Mangkubumi did initially join with Martapura in Grobogan.[20] In August 1744, the Dutch came into possession of a letter he had written to Martapura ordering the latter to appear before him to pay obeisance.[21] In September Mangkubumi wrote to Pakubuwana II and to Van Hohendorff, sending weapons and banners taken as war booty from Martapura's followers. He also requested gunpowder and lead "just as if he were acting under orders there",[22] which is to say, the Company did not think that he was. The Company's senior officer in Semarang, Elzo Sterrenberg, was visiting Kartasura at the time. He and Van Hohendorff advised Pakubuwana II to invite Mangkubumi to return to court, to which the monarch agreed.[23] But such invitations failed.

In October 1744, Sterrenberg wrote that Mangkubumi "still roams about in the highlands … on the borders of Grobogan and displays such discharge of duties against the enemies, as if he had been sent there to drive them away".[24] Towards the end of that month, Mangkubumi returned to Kartasura bearing more weapons and banners taken from Martapura's forces.[25] The VOC never figured

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[19] Ibid., ff. 32r.–36r. Quote from f. 36r.: *kapracayeng karya, mring Sang Nata lan, Kumpni, wus dadya kanthining Nata*.

[20] This relies on Van Hohendorff, Kartasura, to Sterrenberg, Semarang, a letter erroneously dated 5 Aug. 1741, which must be an error for 5 Aug. 1744, in AN Surakarta 15, "Aparte brieven naar Samarang 1740–41".

[21] Sterrenberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1744, in VOC 2633 (OB 1745).

[22] Sterrenberg, dagregister, Semarang, 29 Sept. 1744, in VOC 2634 (OB 1745), under date 11 Sept.; also in dJ x, p. 42.

[23] Ibid., under date 12 Sept. 1744; also in dJ x, p. 42.

[24] Sterrenberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1744, in VOC 2633 (OB 1745).

[25] Sterrenberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 Nov. 1744, in VOC 2634 (OB 1745); Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1744, in dJ x, p. 35.

out what Mangkubumi's role had been. Hartingh, looking back on 1744, repeated Sterrenberg's observation that Mangkubumi "roamed in the highlands around the borders of Grobogan, not as an enemy, but rather as if he had been sent by the King".[26] He still did not know whether that had been so. Nor, nearly 275 years later, is it any easier for us to know.

A VOC letter of May 1745 reported that Mangkubumi had again engaged Martapura and driven him out of Sukawati. Martapura had reportedly lost a leg when one of his own cannon burst, but confirmation of this was still awaited.[27] This renewed attack on Martapura is also recounted in Mangkunagara's chronicle, which does not, however, report his being wounded.[28]

It was crucial for the future that Mangkunagara believed his uncle Mangkubumi to be duplicitous, that he was even conspiring with the VOC as well as with Pakubuwana II. A foundation for distrust between these two most important princes in the civil war was thereby laid. Mangkunagara would have sympathised with Viscount Palmerston's famous description of British policy just a century later, in August 1844, that Britain had "no eternal allies, and … no perpetual enemies". Rather, it was the nation's interests that were "eternal and perpetual". For Mangkunagara, Mangkubumi would be sequentially his enemy, then his closest ally and father-in-law, then again his bitterest enemy nearly to the end of his days, followed by a final reconciliation. At all times, the issue was to define and pursue his own interests in perilous and changing circumstances, to seek that destiny which lay somewhere in his future. Everyone else of prominence in this civil war would also, of course, have agreed with Palmerston's dictum.

Mangkunagara's chronicle, implicitly describing late 1744 to early 1745, says that his *patih* Kudanawarsa informed him that Mangkubumi was preparing to attack in cooperation with VOC troops—information that was evidently false but consistent with what was believed in remote Sidayu, as seen in the previous paragraphs. Mangkunagara indulged at this point in a description of himself as an incomparable commander, skilled as a child of warriors and trusting

[26] KV, p. 128.
[27] Sterrenberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 29 May 1745, in VOC 2655 (OB 1746); also to be found in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).
[28] *SBPn* f. 80r.

in God, a sign of the self-belief—not to say arrogance—that attended his affairs. He decided that it would be better to raid Kartasura than to await an attack. He advanced with cavalry alone, leaving infantry and heavier guns behind, himself shaded "charmingly" by a yellow parasol (a mark of royal standing). They burned villages around the court and captured cattle, putting villagers to flight, and then withdrew south to Tangkisan, along the Solo River. There Mangkunagara summoned his brother Png. Pamot to join him. The latter, however, said that he was unwilling to fight and sent a single cannon instead as a token of loyalty, causing predictable offence to Mangkunagara. The latter advanced again, this time taking along eight smaller pieces of artillery (*kalataka*). Again he raided villages near Kartasura. *Kraton* and VOC forces responded and repelled Mangkunagara, who withdrew to his refuge in Sidayu.[29]

VOC sources also describe how, in early 1745, a party of Madurese and Balinese from Mangkunagara's forces advanced towards Kartasura from Sukawati. As some of Kartasura's panicked residents fled the city, Van Hohendorff employed half a company of dragoons (approximately 75–100 men)[30] and 100 Indonesian auxiliaries to resist the enemy. They found them with "the infamous Pangeran Mangkunagara" and "a substantial force". A heavy battle ensued, hand-to-hand for two hours, with a ferocity "of which I have never seen the equal in Java", wrote Van Hohendorff. Both sides suffered losses before the VOC returned to Kartasura and the enemy withdrew to the Gunung Kidul mountains.[31]

The VOC had by this time identified Mangkunagara as a serious threat to the court. Van Hohendorff worried that, given more time, Mangkunagara might "not only make himself master of all the surrounding lands and regencies hereabouts but will get all the faint-hearted Javanese to submit and join him". In order both to defend Kartasura and to prepare an offensive, Van Hohendorff requested reinforcements of dragoons and retained at Kartasura VOC troops intended to fight rebels in Kediri, who could not get there anyway because roads to the east of the court were blocked by enemy forces.

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[29] *SBPn* ff. 36v.–40v. Quotation from f. 37r.: *rĕspati asongsong kuning.*

[30] The size of companies in Dutch military usage varied considerably but was usually around 150–200 men; see D. de Iongh, *Het krijgswezen onder de V.O.C.* ('s-Gravenhage: W.P. van Stockum en Zoon, 1950), p. 16.

[31] Van Hohendorff, Kartasura, to Verijssel and Theling, 24 Feb. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).

Van Hohendorff proceeded to clear the highlands around Kartasura in the course of 1745.[32] As he did so, he burned Mangkunagara's residence and all other lodgings at Sidayu, which had been abandoned. In a series of further engagements, causing losses on both sides, Mangkunagara was repeatedly forced to retreat from the field.[33]

We may interrupt the narrative here to note the sense of humour that Mangkunagara's chronicle shares with other *babads* in the matter of Dutch names. Maj. Van Hohendorff was called *Mayor Undur* (Major Retreat). The commander of forces intended for action in Kediri and elsewhere in East Java, Hendrik Jan Keijser, was called *Mayor Kengsĕr* (Maj. Shoved-Aside). There was, however, little humour in the fighting going on across Central and East Java, not least for commoners who paid heavy prices for the passage of contesting armies.

Such fighting rarely produced definitive or enduring outcomes, unless the chief enemy combatant was killed. Once an area was cleared of enemy forces there were only two ways to keep it so. For the Company, it could only be to position VOC detachments to garrison the area, a tactic which the Dutch were unwilling to embrace until the Java War of 1825–30. The other was to install Javanese governors whose loyalty to Pakubuwana II could be relied upon, with sufficient local forces to defend themselves however much the rebels might threaten; both such reliability and sufficiency of forces were often problematic. Being a local overlord in the midst of this civil war was a dangerous occupation.

As he avoided the pursuing Company and Kartasura forces, Mangkunagara once again summoned his brother Pamot. The latter asked how his elder brother's war was going and was told that he had been defeated. So Pamot sent his *patih* with some soldiers but again refused to appear in person. Convinced that his brother cared nothing for him, Mangkunagara was obliged to rely on his own followers. In the next engagement, Pamot's people fled the field.[34]

Mangkunagara moved westwards into the dynasty's historic heartland of Mataram. There, as well as to the northwest in Kedu

[32] Ibid.; KV, p. 119. There is much more VOC documentation about military action against MN in VOC 2633 (OB 1745).
[33] *SBPn* ff. 41r.–51v. This account puts Van Hohendorff's force at approximately 500 VOC Indonesians and 1,000 Javanese.
[34] *SBPn* ff. 48r.–51v.

and farther west into Bagelen, Mangkunagara's troops marauded, taking booty and capturing local officials who were loyal to the Kartasura and Company side.[35] Meanwhile, VOC forces turned their attention to the King's brother Png. Singasari, who was in rebellion in Kediri. Mangkunagara's brother Mangkuningrat was then with him.[36] Singasari was the prince who held out longest as a rebel and, in the end, won the least, finally dying in Dutch captivity in 1768.[37]

At Bendungan village in the mountains of Gunung Kidul, Mangkunagara was resting with some of his military, happy with their successes, when the VOC launched a surprise attack. The rebels' women were with them but fled higher into the mountains for safety. Soon Mangkunagara was fleeing higher as well. The Company troops pursued him for a time but then returned to base at Ngoro-Oro, in the hills east of Yogya.[38] Thus, the young prince's prospects remained distinctly uncertain and his great destiny elusive. The VOC, however, had also suffered losses in these various engagements and its goal of Mangkunagara's capture, death or surrender was just as elusive. Nevertheless, the governor general and Council of the Indies in Batavia confidently informed the Company's governors in Amsterdam that, with the exception of some rebel remnants, "the Company … can now be said to be the complete master in Java, more than she has ever been before".[39]

In the closing months of 1745, Mangkunagara communicated with the VOC about possible reconciliation. The accounts in *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*,[40] *Babad Giyanti*[41] and the Surakarta Major *Babad*[42] differ in some details from VOC records, but the story is

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[35] *SBPn* ff. 52r.–v.
[36] *SBPn* f. 52r.
[37] Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 135.
[38] Ibid., ff. 53r.–v. Schoel, *Register*, pp. 58–9, lists 31 villages called Bendung or Bendungan (which just means a dam). Several are in the Yogyakarta area. I am unable to be certain which is meant here but believe it to be the one in the mountains of Gunung Kidul, given the reference to Ngoro (which I take to be today's Ngoro-Oro) in *SBPn* f. 53v. The initial VOC lines are said to have been at Kĕpuhbuta (*SBPn* f. 53r.), but I am unable to identify this location.
[39] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1745, in dJ x, p. 52.
[40] *SBPn* ff. 102v.–104r.
[41] *BG* Vol. i, pp. 16–22.
[42] LOr 1786, Vol. x, pp. 329–39. This is from the section of the *babad* text that comes after the end of the printed version in *BTJ(BP)* and thus has to be consulted in the MS.

clear enough. Mangkunagara wrote to Governor General G.W. Van Imhoff (in office 1743–50) in August. He told why he had turned against Pakubuwana II and joined Sunan Kuning—the humiliations he experienced, as described above—which explained his continuing refusal to stand under the Susuhunan. He said that after Sunan Kuning had been defeated he had even raised Mangkunagara himself to be "the reigning King". Did Mangkunagara perhaps know that the Dutch contemplated making his elder brother Prince Tirtakusuma (or Pancuran) the new King if Pakubuwana II proved insufficiently cooperative, as seen in the previous chapter? Did he imagine that they might instead now favour him for the role? As improbable as that was, we could perhaps forgive such extravagant fantasies on the part of a 19-year-old prince in search of his destiny. Whatever the case, Mangkunagara proposed to become a subject of the Company.[43]

The Dutch pursued the opening. Batavia sent a letter to Mangkunagara in September, offering clemency. The *babads* say that the letter was from Png. Tirtakusuma in Batavia, urging Mangkunagara to submit. The Dutch sources do not say this, but it is possible that another letter from Tirtakusuma accompanied a VOC missive and/or, as the *babads* say, that a servant of Tirtakusuma was employed as the emissary. Later Tirtakusuma clearly played an important role in communications between his brother and the Company. Mangkunagara replied that he would consider the proposal.[44] The *babads* claim that a personal meeting took place in the countryside between him and Van Hohendorff—including the imbibing of *jenever* ("Dutch gin"), as was normal protocol, until "half drunk"—but failed to induce him to surrender. I am reasonably confident that he did not meet with Van Hohendorff, but it is possible that another VOC officer was employed as an emissary and met the prince. In December, however, the Company's senior officer on the coast had to advise Batavia that "Pangeran Mangkunagara, roaming about in the highlands, has so far shown little inclination to enjoy the clemency which Your Excellencies … have shown him". Instead he made new demands, notably that Png. Tirtakusuma be allowed to leave Batavia to join him.[45]

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[43] Prince Aria Prangwadana [a name used by MN], n.p., to GG, Batavia, received Aug. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746). Note that a brother of PB II also used the name Prangwadana; see Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 268n102, 273.

[44] Sterrenberg and Van Hohendorff, Salatiga, to Batavia, 19 Oct. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).

[45] Sterrenberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).

The Javanese accounts say that he was much distressed at the thought of Tirtakusuma, whom he had not seen since he was an infant. But the proposed reconciliation came to nothing. Mangkunagara's own *babad* does not mention the episode.

Mangkunagara continued southwards towards the coast and at last met his brother Pamot, who had twice declined to join him in battle. They embraced each other and were reconciled, as Mangkunagara spoke of his now rather long series of military misfortunes. The brothers thereafter remained together, at least most of the time, until—as we will see later—Pamot's tragic death.[46]

Again Mangkunagara moved to Mataram, now to the sacred dynastic site of Lipuro, south of Yogya. There, according to Javanese traditions, a falling star had spoken to the dynasty's founder, Senapati Ingalaga (r. c. 1584–1601), predicting the rise of Mataram and its subsequent fall under his grandson (Amangkurat I, whose reign ended in 1677 with the conquest of Mataram by the Madurese Prince Trunajaya). There Mangkunagara and his soldiers again entertained themselves while "the Mataram villagers submitted, offering their veneration and homage, all loving their lord Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara] and exalting him".[47]

Another royal relative and rebel now attracted Mangkunagara's attention. Png. Buminata had remained behind when Kartasura fell and had submitted to Sunan Kuning.[48] Now, however, he was among the princely rebels in the countryside and had arrogated to himself the grand title of Sultan Kadhandhĕr (a name which makes no sense to me). He was located at a place called Sĕmbuyan, in the wild country south of Mount Lawu, where the headwaters of the Solo River are found.[49] In May 1745 he had, like Mangkunagara, sounded out the VOC about a pardon. Van Hohendorff was authorised to

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[46] *SBPn* f. 54v.

[47] *SBPn* ff. 57v.–58r. Quote from f. 58r.: *wau wong padesan, Mataram wus suyud, atur bĕkti ngestupada, samya asih ing gusti Pangran Dipati, tur kinulawisuda*.

[48] Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 273, 307.

[49] *Babad Gijanti: Pratélan namaning tijang lan panggénan* (Batavia Centrum: Balé Poestaka, 1939), end-map, shows this as a district south of Pidekso. Schoel, *Register*, p. 331, lists a place called Sembuan (near Jatisrono, on the southern slopes of Mount Lawu), but that is farther north. Sĕmbuyan was important in Mangkunagara's life; we will continue to use that 18th-century name despite being uncertain of its present-day equivalent. Buminata is also mentioned in the spy's information cited in Verijssel, Gresik, to Batavia, 14 July 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746), but this report seems rather confused.

give him a written guarantee, but nothing further came of this.[50] Buminata is depicted throughout the Javanese sources as a coward and fool.

Upon learning that Mangkunagara was in Mataram, Buminata sent an emissary to Mangkunagara demanding that the lands of Mataram and Gading (to the southeast, towards the mountains) should be turned over to himself.[51] In this delicate situation, Buminata decided to march with the people of Gunung Kidul and Sĕmbuyan, who had all submitted to him, to the edge of the Opak River, close to Lipuro. Mangkunagara's reply accepted that it was appropriate for Buminata, his elder and uncle, to proclaim himself King if he wished, for that was God's will. And Mataram should be under his authority, but Mangkunagara insisted on retaining for himself Gading, where he would raise troops to support Buminata. This response troubled Buminata, who consulted his officials. They were of divided opinions about how to read Mangkunagara's reply. Buminata decided to go to Lipuro to meet with Mangkunagara and ascertain his intentions. In Lipuro, Mangkunagara—perhaps in receipt of misleading intelligence—believed that Buminata was insisting on having Gading and was marching against Lipuro. Surprised by this, Mangkunagara readied his troops and closed the gates of his compound (probably surrounded by a perimeter of sharpened wooden stakes), surprising Buminata at this sign of hostility. Nevertheless, he was allowed in to speak with his nephew, whose angry mood Buminata was able to calm. Thereupon the latter also set up a residence near Lipuro.

Two princely egos and conflicting demands were at work. Buminata again demanded Gading for himself. Mangkunagara again said that his uncle could have the rest (i.e., Mataram) but not Gading. In that case, said Buminata, he was unwilling to declare himself King and unwilling to take part in the war of rebellion. He would instead go and plant rice and cassava in the mountains. In his chronicle, Mangkunagara recorded his angry response: "If you don't dare (to fight), then enough! For I dare and lack nothing for war. You don't believe what I say, and I have no need for an ally."[52]

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[50] Sterrenberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 29 May 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).

[51] The following account of the episode involving Png. Buminata rests upon *SBPn* ff. 58r.–62v.

[52] Ibid., f. 61r.: *yen batĕn purun sampun, pan kawula purun lampahi, tan kewran ing ayuda tan gugu aturku, nora kudu babaturan*.

Thereupon Buminata, ever more worried, left with his soldiers without the usual courtesy of requesting his host's permission to depart.

Mangkunagara concluded that this was no time for half-measures. He set up residence at Nogosari (now Nogosaren),[53] where the people of Mataram submitted to him. He distributed appanages and new names to his followers, behaving like a monarch. We should, however, note that he claimed no kingly titles for himself. *Bĕdhaya* dances were performed, the prince feasted and drank with his troops, "day and night enjoying themselves", while Mangkunagara—a lusty lad and always a lover of beautiful women—"made love without interruption".[54] Here was the prince in regal style, a direct challenge to Buminata, who still wished to establish himself as King in Mataram. His senior advisers were still divided about how to respond to this affront, but Buminata now chose to fight. A battle followed at Gading, where Buminata's commander was wounded and put to flight. His soldiers abandoned their weapons and, with the levied villagers, fled in panic. According to Mangkunagara's chronicle, and as we can well imagine, Buminata was distressed at this outcome. He withdrew into the mountains. On hearing this news, Mangkunagara was delighted, "day and night enjoying himself, with *bĕdhaya* and dancing girls and *wayang*".[55] After this defeat of Buminata, Mangkunagara's younger brother Pamot arrived from the mountains, evidently yet again having avoided involvement in battle. He was welcomed with entertainments.[56]

Further fighting followed as Pakubuwana II sought to reimpose his control over Mataram, with the support of Van Hohendorff's troops. Mangkunagara marched forth from Nogosari. He sent his womenfolk southwards for their protection but kept with him seven dancing girls who sang to *gamĕlan* music as he marched. His men first put Kartasura forces to flight but were themselves then driven back by VOC troopers, all mounted and "called dragoons". Thereupon Mangkunagara himself joined the melée but was forced to retreat

[53] Godean area, west of Yogya.
[54] *SBPn* ff. 61r.–v.: *karya bĕdhaya Kangjĕng Pangran Dipati, agung babĕdhayan, dhahar nginum lan prajurit, siyang dalu akasukan … Duk kala sĕmana, Kangjĕng Pangeran Dipati, tan pĕgat andon asmara.*
[55] Ibid., f. 62v.: *siyang-dalu akasukan /0/ babadhayan taledhekan miwah rin[ng]git.*
[56] Ibid., ff. 62v.–63r.

in the face of the Company's arms. Fleeing southwards and then into the mountains, Mangkunagara was distressed to find himself "separated from his concubines, his seven dancing girls, scattered on the battlefield".[57]

Mangkunagara moved through the mountains of Gunung Kidul until establishing a new residence at Bangsri.[58] It was here that he was reunited with his younger brother Mangkuningrat. The latter had been farther east at Kediri, where Pakubuwana II's brother Png. Singasari (also known as Prabujaka) was the foremost rebel prince. Descendants of the Company's greatest enemy of the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Surapati (d. 1706), were also there, led by the senior member of that line named Wiranagara.[59] According to Mangkunagara's *babad* (which probably relied on information from Mangkuningrat), these allies fell out over whether to resist advancing VOC and Javanese forces or to flee. Company columns were sweeping through East Java in 1745 in alliance with Javanese lords, their main objective being to rid Java of Madurese fighters.[60] In the midst of these battles, in which local villagers suffered the usual hardships,[61] Mangkuningrat fled into the mountains alone, without a single servant or soldier. He made his way westwards through rough country until finding Mangkunagara at Bangsri, where he paid his obeisance. The brothers embraced and rejoiced in their reunion for the first

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[57] Ibid., ff. 63r.–66v. Quotes from f. 66r.: *dragundĕr namanira*; and f. 66v.: *pisahe kang kalangĕnan, saicale taledheke, piputu mawur ing rana*.

[58] Ibid., f. 67r. Schoel, *Register*, p. 48, lists 12 villages of that name. Following the map in *Babad Gijanti Pratélan*, I believe this to be the Bangsri on the east side of the River Solo, in the Sukoharjo district, but I cannot be certain.

[59] A spy reported rather confused information on the rebels in this area to the VOC, to judge from Verijssel, Gresik, to Batavia, 14 July 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746). On Surapati and his descendants, see Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, via the index. See also H.J. de Graaf, *De moord op Kapitein François Tack, 8 Febr. 1686* (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935); Ann Kumar, ed. and transl., *Surapati, Man and Legend: A Study of Three Babad Traditions* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976).

[60] As of the end of 1744, the VOC forces in East Java, based at Surabaya, Pasuruan and Kediri, totalled 722 Europeans and 1,134 Indonesian troops for a total of 1,856 men; list signed by Gerrit van der Poll, Surabaya, 7 Jan. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746). There is much information on military actions in East Java in this VOC volume.

[61] See Keijser, Kediri, to Verijssel, 10 Feb. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).

time since the fall of Kartasura. With Mangkunagara's soldiery, they celebrated with feasting, drinking and dancing girls.[62]

Celebration of a family reunion was understandable, but the rebel princes had little else to celebrate as 1745 drew to a close, except for their own survival. Farther north, in Sukawati, Martapura's forces had done battle earlier in the year with Mangkubumi, with mixed results. So Martapura and the Madurese fighters with him came south to Bangsri to join Mangkunagara. The latter accepted their support. The Madurese discussed whether they should elevate Mangkunagara to be their King, with the title Susunan Adiprakosa, but Mangkunagara declined this, according to his autobiography. We will see in the next chapter that others, at least, thought that he had accepted this royal title. He claims in his *babad* that he insisted instead on bearing titles which, while not royal, could hardly be called modest: Pangeran Dipati Arya Amĕngkunagara Senapati Ing Ajurit Lalana Jayamisesa Digdaya Diningrat Adi, i.e., Prince Dipati Arya Mangkunagara, Commander-in-Chief in Battle, Roaming About in Overpowering Victory, All-Victorious in the Beauteous World. He and his followers headed again for the usual areas of refuge in the mountains of south-central Java. At Tangkisan, on the east side of the Solo River, Van Hohendorff surprised them. A battle ensued in the muddy rice fields, where Van Hohendorff's horse was shot out from under him and he himself suffered some sort of wound, according to Mangkunagara's account. The Company withdrew, but the Madurese suffered heavy losses; and Kudanawarsa, whom Mangkunagara had sent to assist them, arrived too late to do so. Mangkunagara marched out to engage the Company again, and yet again Pamot declined to join him, claiming sickness. Consistent with his style of warfare, Mangkunagara took a *gamĕlan* of the style *cara Balen*,[63] presumably with the instruments carried on horseback. They decided to wager an attack on Kartasura itself. Having skirmished on the east side of the *kraton*, Mangkunagara's forces were put to flight. "The Company had many muskets," wrote Mangkunagara, "and they fired without cease."[64] A significant change followed the defeat of Cakraningrat IV in 1745, after which most of the Madurese forces

[62] *SBPn* ff. 55r.–57r., 67r.–v.

[63] For further discussion, see Kunst, *Music in Java*, via the index s.v. gamelan charabalèn.

[64] *SBPn* ff. 67v.–79v. Quotation from f. 76v.: *Kumpni keh kang sunapan, pangĕdrele gumrudug tan ngagopi*.

supporting Mangkunagara returned to Madura, leaving only some 50 fighters with the prince.[65]

In the see-saw battles of late 1745, Mangkunagara won no significant victory but nevertheless maintained his ability to keep armed forces with him. He also continued to believe that some sort of greatness awaited him. In his chronicle, he commented, "It was the fate of the Prince [Mangkunagara himself] that none could equal his actions, granted strength by The Creator of the World, able to keep his troops in order."[66] Nevertheless, late 1745 was a hard time for Mangkunagara and his followers. He, his *patih* Kudanawarsa and many of his soldiers were seriously ill for two months and suffered military setbacks. Mangkunagara was again pushed back into the mountains for refuge.[67] But he continued to harass his enemies in the *kraton* and the Company. Indeed, in early 1746, when Governor General Van Imhoff set off to visit the court (as we will see in the next chapter), Mangkunagara was occupying the roads that he had to use and attacked some of his entourage.[68]

The most significant events of late 1745 and early 1746, however, were not the ongoing rebellion but two other developments. The first was the relocation of the court.[69] There were extensive discussions between Pakubuwana II and the Company, with European engineers' analyses of possible locations. On the Javanese side, there were complex considerations of the supernatural implications of this location or that. In the end, the village of Sala (or Solo) on the Solo River was chosen. Construction took place during 1745. Surakarta Adiningrat was proclaimed as the name of the new court city, meaning Valiant, Prosperous, Most Beauteous of the Earth. On 9 February 1746, the new *kraton* was occupied. Despite its grand new name, it was to be far from valiant or prosperous for nearly a decade. Mangkunagara either misunderstood or chose to reject the new name, for throughout his chronicle he calls the court *Salakarta* rather than Surakarta.[70]

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[65] Ibid., f. 81r.

[66] Ibid., f. 78r.: *wus takdir ing Pangeran, tan kĕna tiniru, lampahe Pangran Dipatya, sinung kuwat dene kang Amurbeng Bumi, wagĕda anata bala*.

[67] *SBPn* ff. 81v.–87v.

[68] KV, p. 131.

[69] For details, see Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, Chapter 10.

[70] For MN's account of the establishment of the new *kraton*, giving the correct date for its occupation, see *SBPn* ff. 89r.–v.

The other and still more significant event of early 1746 occurred just three months after the new court was occupied: the rebellion of Prince Mangkubumi. As we will see in the following chapter, this utterly changed the Javanese strategic context and propelled Mangkunagara to greater success than he had in the challenging years covered in this chapter. His hard times were far from over, but they would soon be tempered with significant successes. Perhaps he would then begin to make out the lineaments of that destiny that had so far eluded him.

3

The Third Javanese War of Succession, Phase 1: Together with Mangkubumi, 1746–51

The reconciliation between the VOC and Pakubuwana II of 1743 precipitated the third and last of Java's Wars of Succession in 1746. This resulted in the partition of the kingdom into two, the elevation of Png. Mangkubumi as rebel King in 1749 and as the first Sultan of Yogyakarta in 1755, and, finally, Mangkunagara becoming the senior prince of Surakarta in 1757. It also contributed in a major way to the bankruptcy and abolition of the Dutch East India Company at the end of the century.

The 1743 agreement gave jurisdiction over major ports of the north coast to the VOC—the Company already controlled Semarang—along with the whole of the Eastern Salient of Java and all of Madura, with an option for the Company to take a strip of land along the entire northern coastline. In 1746 the imperious Governor General (1743–50) G.W. van Imhoff[1] decided to visit the new court of Surakarta. Pakubuwana II went personally to Semarang to receive him, reading out an obsequious speech of devotion to the VOC. He ended, "May God Almighty go with Your Excellency and grant you long life, to the well-being of the Company and all of Java."[2]

[1] *Babad Giyanti* renders his name as *Fan Emuk* (roughly, "Rising or Increasing"), e.g., Vol. 1, p. 29. Other sources employ terms such as *Tan Emut* (Forgetful); Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 384–5n45.
[2] Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 323.

Engraving of Governor General G.W. van Imhoff in 1744 by P. Tanjé after a painting by Ph. van Dijk

So much for the quondam Sufi lord of Holy War. We may imagine how poorly such subservience impressed haughty Javanese dignitaries who heard it.

Mangkubumi's Rebellion

Pakubuwana II escorted Van Imhoff to Surakarta, where the governor general intervened in an explosive local conflict. The King had evidently promised Mangkubumi an appanage of 3,000 *cacahs* (households) in Sukawati, a very large holding for a prince, in return for

expelling rebels from there. Mangkunagara was active in that area and had even threatened Van Imhoff's passage to Surakarta, harassing his forces and requiring the governor general to summon reinforcements.[3] Mangkubumi duly drove Mangkunagara from Sukawati and claimed his reward. There were two new *patihs* at the court since 1743: Tirtawiguna, who now became R. Ad. Sindurĕja (d. 1751), and Pringgalaya (d. 1755). The latter was a crucial figure in the years that followed and now positioned himself as one of Mangkubumi's bitterest enemies. At Pringgalaya's urging, Van Imhoff intervened to stop the land grant to Mangkubumi on the grounds that it would feed the prince's arrogance and make him too powerful. He even admonished Mangkubumi in a court gathering, thereby publicly shaming him. Van Imhoff also exercised the Company's option to take control of the whole northern coast of Java in return for a payment of 20,000 *reals* per year, a figure well below the income derivable from the coast. To this Pakubuwana II—weak and vacillating as ever—agreed. Mangkubumi objected both to the sum and to the manner of its negotiation. According to *Babad Giyanti*, he told the Susuhunan that this was an abuse of royal authority: "the role of a ruler carries the obligation to reign only", while administrative authority lay with the *patihs*, royal relatives and other officials. There was, he said, "no *adat* [custom] for the ruler himself to negotiate". The King replied, "Yes, that is true, … But when I met [with Van Imhoff] I asked him to be patient, without success."[4] Governing through consensus (*mufakat*) was indeed a central principle of Javanese political tradition. Pakubuwana II's violation of that principle was evidently the last straw for Mangkubumi.

Nicolaas Hartingh has left us a valuable pen-portrait of Mangkubumi from a later time, after he had become the first Sultan of Yogyakarta. It provides a helpful indication of what he was probably like in his younger days as well.

> He is … courteous, steeped in knowledge and extraordinarily able to dissemble. He doesn't easily let himself be talked out of his ideas unless there are solid reasons that persuade him. He is haughty but splendid and holds money in no great regard; at

[3] KV, p. 131.
[4] *BG* Vol. i, pp. 34–5; Javanese text in Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 42. The story is supported in *SBPn* ff. 107v.–109r.

> least, he spends it impetuously, mainly on his courtly entourage, which is superb, particularly his household troops … I hold him in high regard.[5]

On 19 May 1746, Mangkubumi left the court and took up the life of rebellion, beginning the Third Javanese War of Succession (1746–57). *Babad Giyanti* says that Pakubuwana II understood Mangkubumi's distress and blessed his departure.[6]

The VOC's military was ill prepared for the conflict that followed. Troop numbers were inadequate, pay was low, and equipment was often insufficient. For example, it was common for both the VOC's European and Indonesian soldiers to march into battle barefoot. The Company attempted to impose strict discipline and harsh punishments to keep its soldiery in order, in a situation in which soldiers drank heavily while armed with weapons of cold steel. There were European officers and formations, but much of the fighting for the Company was done by Balinese, Ambonese, Makassarese, Bugis, Ternaten, Malay and Madurese companies. These were what the Javanese called *Kumpĕni Islam*, a collective term which seemingly ignored that the Balinese were Hindus and some of the Ambonese were Christians. In 1746 the Company had fortresses at Semarang, Jepara, Pekalongan and Tegal. More were built in the interior at Ungaran, Salatiga, Boyolali and Surakarta.[7] These were often far from impregnable, surrounded with earthworks or sharpened bamboo palisades rather than substantial revetments. In 1761 Hartingh judged that, "with all these forts, one is master no farther than the cannons can carry, whereas mastery in the field is the core of the matter, especially in the interior, as is evidenced by what difficulty we had, with just three fortresses, in keeping open lines of communication between Semarang and the court during the war".[8]

We have less evidence about the state of Javanese military forces at the start of the war, but can make reasonable presumptions. In settled times, courts had standing companies of professional troops, each with its own name, uniforms and standard weapons. These

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[5] Hartingh, *Memorie*, Semarang, 26 Oct. 1761, in dJ x, p. 365.
[6] *BG* Vol. ii, pp. 46–8.
[7] P.J.F. Louw, *De derde Javaansche successie-oorlog (1746–1755)* (Batavia: Albrecht & Rusche; 's Hage: M. Nijhoff, 1889), pp. 9–15; De Iongh, *Krijgswezen*, esp. pp. 80–3; Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, pp. 19–21.
[8] Hartingh, *Memorie*, Semarang, 26 Oct. 1761, in dJ x, pp. 368–9.

professionals included cavalry, infantry and artillery. Some had other particularities, notably the Suranatan corps, which consisted of religious officials and students of Islam (*santri*). There were also professional female troop companies, the *prajurit estri*, one of whose main tasks was to guard the interior of the King's or prince's residence at night, when men were excluded in the hope of eliminating the risk of assassination. Rijklof van Goens visited the earlier court of Plered five times in the 1640s and 1650s, and reported that "the King's interior watch is all women, and in the court at night there is not a single man except for the King".[9] The Javanese professional military corps were supported financially by the taxes of districts assigned to them in appanage. In times of conflict monarchs and lesser officials also levied ordinary villagers, who were, naturally, less trained and more simply armed than the professionals and more likely to flee the field of battle.

Javanese military forces must have been in great disarray in 1746. The double sacking of Kartasura in 1742, the subsequent conflicts, the divided loyalties that prompted some Javanese to support Mangkunagara or another of the rebel princes rather than the discredited Pakubuwana II, were all now compounded by the rebellion of the senior and highly regarded Prince Mangkubumi. In these circumstances, one of the tasks of the King was to rebuild his military, for which Pakubuwana II had only limited success. Consequently, the Company's support for the King was crucial; without it he would probably not have lasted to the end of the year. Needless to say, the rebel princes also faced challenges in constructing and training their own armies.

For Mangkunagara, the opening months of the Third Javanese War of Succession in 1746 brought no improvement in his fortunes. Pringgalaya defeated him and his brothers Pamot and Mangkuningrat. It was reported that both Pamot and another rebel called M. Guntur were killed. Their supposed heads were displayed at Semarang until it was discovered that they belonged to ordinary Javanese who had been falsely identified. "So one is often misled and more is made of the exaggerated battles than they really were,"[10] wrote Hartingh, reminding us of the confusions that are found in many of our sources.

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[9] H.J. de Graaf, ed., *De vijf gezantschapsreizen van Rijklof van Goens naar het hof van Mataram, 1648–1654* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 256.
[10] KV, pp. 131–2.

Mangkunagara bounced back to the offensive and took Kaduwang,[11] south of Mount Lawu in the mountains that were well established as his principal base area.

At some stage in these early months, evidently before July 1746, Mangkubumi established a fortified position at Gebang near Wonogiri, in the same mountain area used as a base by Mangkunagara. It was set up like a royal city, says *Babad Giyanti*. From there, Mangkubumi sent emissaries to his brothers Png. Buminata and Png. Singasari and to his nephew Mangkunagara. The last, according to *Babad Giyanti*, had given himself the royal title of Susunan Adiprakosa. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was a title offered to him by Madurese followers which he claims to have declined. Buminata, as we know, was using royal titles, the version in *Babad Giyanti* being Sultan Dhandhun Martengsari. Mangkubumi told these princes that Martapura had now submitted to him and his rebel relatives were invited to join as well. Buminata was angered by this. *Babad Giyanti* ascribes the following speech to him:

20. "Although we are both royal children,
I was born of the principal royal wife (*prameswari*),
Ratu Kadipaten.
As if I should follow
my brother [Mangkubumi]!
He was born of a secondary wife from the forests,
and his grandfather was a rice-carrier,
his great-grandfather a man who carried rice,
21. "his great-great-grandfather and great-great-great-grandfather
ordinary villagers
who weeded the fields while looking after cattle,
hoeing, ploughing, harrowing.
Where are his ancestors from?
It is old custom that even if they are equally sons of the King,
the one who has authority to rule the world
is the son of the *prameswari*."

Two of Buminata's old servants countered this courtly snobbery with Islamic teachings:

24. … "Indeed you are right, Your Majesty.
But don't abandon sound reasoning

[11] Sterrenberg et al., Semarang, to Batavia, 25 Aug. 1746, in VOC 2681 (OB 1747); *SBPn* ff. 110r.–v.

and depart from God's words (the Qur'an) and Prophetic Tradition (*Hadith*):

25. "Regarding all descendants,
those who become supporters are true men.
Sons of people who carry rice-baskets,
if they are favoured by the King,
that is not lowly for a King
and does not destroy religion.
If there is an official

26. "who is the son of a villager
who serves and is then granted a princess as wife,
that leaves no trace behind.
If he is a capable and brave
supporter, he is still an aristocrat (even though) of village descent."[12]

Clearly Buminata was unwilling to join the coalition of other princes forming around Mangkubumi. Mangkunagara, by contrast, recorded that from the earliest stage of Mangkubumi's rebellion he wished to be reconciled with and to join his uncle.[13] The early battles of this war were, however, indecisive. Mangkubumi, Mangkunagara and the other rebel princes gained victories and suffered defeats, but there were no large engagements or conclusive outcomes. P.J.F. Louw—colonial infantry officer and historian of this war, whose work rested entirely on VOC sources—wrote that "mostly the [Company's] successes were of so little significance, that [Mangkubumi] was soon able to take revenge or to appear somewhere else with new troops".[14]

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[12] *BG* Vol. i, pp. 57–64. Quotations from pp. 61–4, Canto 8 (Pangkur): 20. *nadyan padha anak raja, nanging ingsun mĕtu sing prameswari, Ratu Kadipaten Ibu, lamun ingsun anuta, mring kakang mas, bibekne wijil kapundhung, putune wong gendhong bĕras, buyute wong mikul pari*. 21. *canggah warenge wong desa, matun gaga sinambi angon sapi, macul maluku anggaru, luhure saka apa, adat kuna nadyan padha anak Ratu, kang mĕngku mĕngkoni jagat, putra saka prameswari.…* 24. *… yĕkti sampun kaluhuran dhawuh Prabu, nanging sampun tilar nalar, anyingkiri dalul kadis*. 25. *sadaya wiji punika, ingkang dados ugĕr jalĕr sayĕkti, sutane wong gendhong wakul, lamun kinarsan Raja, inggih botĕn dados kanisthaning ratu, sarta tan ngrisak agama, kalamun wontĕna mantri*. 26. *asli sutane wong desa, asuwita nuli tinriman putri, dereng wontĕn tabĕtipun, yen guna lan prawira, ugĕr taksih kusuma wijil ing dusun*. Mangkubumi was born to the *garwa pangrĕmbe* M. Ayu Tejawati, according to Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, pp. 144–5, but Buminata's mother is not clear in that standard reference work.

[13] *SBPn* f. 109v.

[14] Louw, *Successie-Oorlog*, p. 18.

Mangkunagara's Nadir

In these early months, Mangkunagara suffered a major setback at the hands of the VOC at Papringan. He lost many men, a hundred horses, and significant quantities of gold and silver. In the night and in heavy rain, Mangkunagara took flight into the forest while his surviving soldiers (both male and female are mentioned) and the other women and children who had been with him scattered.[15]

Mangkunagara appears to have been at an emotional nadir in the wake of these events, to judge from the Javanese chronicle accounts. Among the children taken for refuge into the forest was his one-year-old daughter, R. Aj. Sombro, who was ill with a fever. On encountering a servant carrying her, he took Sombro into his arms, travelling on through heavy rain. Whenever he was tired of his small burden and sought to put her down, the child protested. Then the prince came across his wife, Sombro's mother, in the midst of the forest. As will be seen in Chapter 7, this was Kusumapatahati, a secondary wife at this stage who later came to be Mangkunagara's principal consort (*garwa padmi*). Thereafter, mother and father took turns carrying the baby. The child wanted food, but there was none. Eventually a banana was found, which calmed Sombro's distress. Mangkunagara travelled through rough country to Mount Pidekso, where he encountered Png. Buminata. Discussions with him came to nothing, so Mangkunagara determined to make his way to join Mangkubumi. The VOC declared a bounty on Mangkunagara's head of 500 *reals*. When the prince passed through a village with only a few followers, the local people concluded from the travellers' fine clothing that this must be the prince and poured out to attack him. They evidently had no firearms themselves and were put to flight when Mangkunagara fired upon them. All along the way, villagers beat their pots as warnings of the approach of the prince, crying out that thieves were nearing.[16]

In his distressed state, Mangkunagara met two hermits at Samakaton on Mount Lawu, brothers named Adirana and Adisana,

[15] KV, p. 132; *BG* Vol. ii, pp. 33–5; *SBPn* ff. 119r.–122v. Schoel, *Register*, p. 275, lists five villages named Papringan, but none seem to be relevant to this tale, which is set in the mountains of Pidekso, south of Mount Lawu.

[16] *BG* Vol. ii, pp. 34–9; *SBPn* ff. 120v.–121v. R. Aj. Sombro's birth is recorded in *SBPn* f. 82r.

according both to his own account and to *Babad Giyanti*.[17] They chastised him for his arrogance and addictions to life's pleasures, which were the cause of his misfortunes, for forgetting—as the *Babad Giyanti* version has it—that "defeat or victory in battle is in the hands of the All-Seeing". In that version, the hermits are said to have admonished Mangkunagara for taking the extravagant title of Susunan Adiprakosa; but, as we have seen above, his own *babad* says that he had been offered but had declined that title. In any case, he was told to stay at the hermitage, meditating without eating or sleeping. In his account, he set off through mountainous ravines but found the way ahead blocked by Surakarta forces. *Babad Giyanti* records that seven horsemen then arrived to summon him to Mangkubumi.[18] Mangkunagara's interpretation was supernaturally inflected: "God's aid arrived and a great storm in the mountains shook the earth, with heavy rain in great confusion", putting the surrounding enemies to flight. Seven men then appeared and paid obeisance to the prince. "Truly this was the assistance of the Immaterial, angels appearing like men; Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara] prostrated himself before God and His Messenger."[19] Whatever modern readers may make of such tales, this episode was clearly of significance in Mangkunagara's interpretation of events. There is no need to doubt that there were hermits on Mount Lawu, for such figures were ubiquitous in old Java and can still be found today.

The recurring question of whether Mangkunagara adopted the royal title Susunan Adiprakosa is of interest. For the historian—as for the lawyer or judge—conflict of evidence is a normal state of affairs. We saw in the previous chapter that, in his autobiographical account of the war years, Mangkunagara insisted that when his Madurese soldiers offered him this title in 1745, he declined it: "but [to] Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara], it was imperative that he remain entitled lord Pangeran Dipati Arya Amĕngkunagara Senapati Ing Ajurit Lalana

[17] *BG* Vol. ii, pp. 39–44 (there is a translated section in Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis*, pp. 165–6); *SBPn* ff. 122v.–124v. Quotation from *BG* Vol. ii, p. 40: *supe lamun sor unggul ing jurit, kagungan Hyang Manon*. Samakaton was near Druju (according to *Babad Gijanti Pratélan*, p. 60), on the western slopes of Mount Lawu.

[18] *BG* Vol. ii, p. 63.

[19] *SBPn* ff. 124r.–v.: *pitulung Allah kang prapta, ampuan ardi gumuruh, udanan drĕs aliměngan…. Estu pitulung Yyang Sukma, malekat mindha jalma, Pangran Dipati asujud, ing Alah lan Rasulullah*.

Jayamisesa Digdaya Diningrat Adi."[20] *Babad Giyanti*, however, consistently claims that he used the title Susunan Adiprakosa and that the hermits of Mount Lawu denounced this as a sign of his arrogance. In Appendix 1, which discusses primary sources in detail, we will consider how such chronicles may have been compiled. Here we may simply note that the MS of *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* on which we rely, which is preserved in the British Library, is a copy made in 1779 of an autobiography that was evidently given its final form after (possibly soon after) Mangkunagara abandoned rebellion in 1757. He was then positioned as the senior, largely independent prince of Surakarta, undoubtedly grand but clearly not a King. So perhaps he bowdlerised his account to expunge former claims to royalty, which might be a potential embarrassment. It is also possible that in the 1740s, as Mangkunagara tried to work out just what was the great fate that he believed awaited him, he began to suspect that his destiny was to be at a secondary level in hierarchical eminence, not a monarch. Perhaps Mangkunagara's account was correct that he never accepted a royal title. Perhaps *Babad Giyanti*, written in Surakarta and reflecting what was known by courtiers and other rebels, with information only second-hand at best about Mangkunagara's affairs, was wrong. We are unlikely to resolve this question confidently.

Whatever the case, being number two was certainly the position Mangkunagara soon found himself in when he formed an alliance with his uncle Mangkubumi, who was unquestionably number one in that relationship.

The Alliance of Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi

Spiritually refreshed, if we follow the Javanese accounts, Mangkunagara made his way northwards towards the coast to join Mangkubumi, taking along only those seven horsemen mentioned above. He approached the Kendeng hills, where he hoped to join Mangkubumi and the latter's mother, M. Ayu Tejawati, with whom Mangkunagara seems to have had a strong relationship. Perhaps she had played a grandmotherly role, replacing Mangkunagara's own dead mother in his early years. En route came news from Tanjung village, which had

[20] *SBPn* f. 69v.: *nanging Pangeran Dipati /0/ kĕdah taksih ajujuluk, Gusti Pangeran Dipati Arya Amĕngkunagara Senapati Ing Ajurit, Lalana Jayamisesa, Digdaya Diningrat Adi*.

been a centre of opposition to the VOC during the Chinese War,[21] that the Chinese there were unanimously willing to follow Mangkunagara and awaited his arrival.[22]

Mangkunagara and Martapura both responded to the summons to join Mangkubumi, and their alliance was confirmed. This seems, from the context in the *babads*, to have taken place c. August 1746. In the face of a VOC advance from Semarang, however, Mangkubumi was compelled to withdraw with Mangkunagara into the Kendeng hills. As these two leading rebels progressed, locals welcomed them, say the Javanese sources, and their army swelled in numbers. During this time, Mangkunagara also met again his "grandmother" M. Ayu Tejawati and acquired two new wives for himself, whom he married through a representative rather than appearing in person. According to *Babad Giyanti*, Mangkubumi now bestowed upon himself the grand title of Pangeran Adipati Sukawati, Senapatining Prang Pramuka Jayengrat (roughly, Prince of Sukawati, Foremost Commander-in-Chief in Battle, Victorious in the World). He was not yet claiming kingship.[23]

This alliance between the two foremost princes was further confirmed a year later, in December 1747, when Mangkubumi's daughter Ratu Bĕndara was given to Mangkunagara in marriage. The occasion was celebrated with *wayang* performances, dancing parties, drinking and grand feasting.[24] The marriage would prove emblematic of the alliance itself: founded on shared inclinations and celebrated *con brio*,

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[21] Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 244.

[22] *SBPn* ff. 125r.–126v.

[23] *SBPn* ff. 127r.–128v.; *BG* Vol. ii, pp. 60–8 (here the text returns to late 1746, after describing events mainly concerning the Dutch down to Van Hohendorff becoming governor of Java's northeast coast in February 1748). The MN-MB meeting was at a place called Subĕr, Sumbĕr or Rambut. Schoel, *Register*, has seven pages (pp. 357–63) listing villages named Sumber or a variation of that. This was in the Kudus-Pati area, to judge from the context. Marriage by a representative (*wakil*) was a common practice. A man could even send his *kris* as his *wakil*; KV, p. 81, comments on this. It rather reminds one of the present-day practice of Islamic divorce by SMS.

[24] *BG* Vol. iii, p. 49; *SBPn* ff. 137v.–141v. The former source dates the marriage Wednesday 15 Bĕsar, Be, *sĕmbah sapta rasa siji* [AJ 1672], but 15 Bĕsar should have been a Tuesday; the latter gives Saturday 19 Bĕsar, which is a correct combination in 1672, but does not mention the year. The correct date was evidently Saturday, 19 Bĕsar 1672 (23 Dec. 1747). The Dutch appear not to have known of the marriage at the time and believed that it only occurred in December 1749; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 33.

but ending in bitter separation. Ratu Bĕndara bore Mangkunagara only one child, a daughter who died young,[25] and in 1763 their marriage ended in divorce. The wedding celebrations also occasioned the growth of uncertainties in the relationship between Mangkunagara and his brothers Pamot and Mangkuningrat. Both were invited, but neither attended. "Perhaps they care nothing for me," he thought. "All right, I must leave this to the Creator of the World."[26]

The alliance of Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi, with the latter clearly the leading figure, was a turning point in the Third Javanese War of Succession. Pamot and Mangkuningrat joined them, as had Martapura. This combination gave Mangkubumi immediately an army of some 3,000, according to Mangkunagara's chronicle. This was a formidable coalition of princes who were already experienced in battle (albeit often unsuccessfully) and who could call upon wide support among both the aristocracy and commoners. It could have been still stronger if Buminata and Singasari had been willing to join, but the former refused[27] and the latter continued to go his own way for the time being.

Mangkubumi gathered more adherents rapidly. By late 1746 the VOC observed his partisans almost everywhere on the north coast. A bounty of 500 *reals* was offered for Mangkubumi's head, without effect.[28] He turned against Surakarta and put part of the new court city to the torch. From there he marched to the coast and threatened Juwana and Pati in December. He surrounded the Company fortress at Demak with a force by then reckoned to be 13,000 strong, including 2,500 cavalry. The VOC's Lt. Coen foolishly marched out to tackle the enemy with only 13 men and a small force of Javanese. He and all his men were slaughtered. Mangkubumi launched an attack on Demak with 2,500 foot soldiers and 500 cavalry on 31 December, but the Company's fortress withstood the assault. With both sides impeded by heavy monsoonal rains, Mangkubumi withdrew.[29] Nevertheless, his army, reported the Company's commanders,

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[25] The child was born on 1 July 1752; *SBPn* ff. 285v.–286r.

[26] *SBPn* ff. 138v.–139r.: *Baya wis ya tega mring mami … iya mongsa bodhowa kang Murbeng Jagat*.

[27] *SBPn* ff. 128v.–129r.; *BG* Vol. ii, pp. 70–2.

[28] Sterrenberg et al., Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Dec. 1746, in VOC 2681 (OB 1747).

[29] KV, pp. 131–3; *SBPn* ff. 111r.–113r.; Sterrenberg and Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 6 Jan. 1747, in VOC 2707 (OB 1748); Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 18–9.

"grows more and more as time passes"; and on the coast, military matters were "little changed for the better". They sought reinforcements from Batavia.[30]

The VOC feared that the alliance against them might explode into general rebellion as 1747 opened. Van Hohendorff captured a Javanese in the highlands, the son of a "holy Panĕmbahan", who was carrying two letters. One claimed to be from Sunan Kuning, the former leader of the Chinese rebels, and was addressed to Mangkubumi. The second was supposedly from Mangkunagara's exiled father (who had in fact died in Sri Lanka nine years before), written from Batavia to his sons Mangkunagara, Pamot and Mangkuningrat. The letters urged the rebels to fight on against the Company, but also told of a conspiracy involving the Sultan of Cirebon (on the eastern boundary of Batavia itself) with other indigenous lords to rise together and throw off the Company's oppression on 13 January.[31] Van Hohendorff should have been sceptical about the authenticity of these documents. Yet letters of this kind, from captured or even dead aristocrats and conveyed by a person with a spiritual pedigree, could indeed motivate credulous persons to take action. The Dutch generally professed little regard for such "Mohammedan rabble" or "barbarians",[32] except, of course, when facing them on the field of battle.

The back-and-forth hostilities continued through 1747, with neither side being able to strike a decisive blow.[33] During this period, Balinese troops appeared in Mangkubumi's ranks and played a prominent role in Mangkunagara's account.[34] The combined princely rebels attacked Company and Surakarta positions in multiple locations and, when finding the opposition too strong, took refuge in sparsely populated upland regions. The rebels' attack on Jipang in September 1747 demonstrated a more widely observed pattern of events. When the rebels attacked, the local governor (*bupati*) fled to Tuban without offering resistance. VOC dragoons responded, and the rebels

[30] Sterrenberg and Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 6 Jan. 1747, in VOC 2707 (OB 1748).
[31] Ibid.
[32] Quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 19.
[33] An overview based on VOC sources alone is in ibid., pp. 19–20.
[34] *SBPn* f. 134v. et seqq.; *BG* Vol. iii, p. 3 et seqq.; KV, pp. 133; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 20.

withdrew.[35] Mangkunagara's *babad* records him raiding and burning buildings in Surakarta during this period.[36] This was an event repeated several times.

Mangkubumi's mountain base in this period was Jekawal in the Kendeng range. There he set up his residence in *kraton* style and called it Majapahit, after the last and greatest of pre-Islamic kingdoms. It had an open field (*alun-alun*), as always stood before courts and the residences of regional lords, with a mosque in the usual position on the western side, so that the prayers of worshippers would be directed westwards towards Mecca, as required in Islamic law. He named dignitaries to various positions in his hierarchy and discussed protocol matters. On the *alun-alun*, just as in royal courts, tournaments were held every Saturday. *Wayang* and *gamĕlan* were performed. When Mangkunagara went there for his wedding festivities, he took along his own *gamĕlan*, which performed his personal composition titled "Udan Riris" [Gentle Rain]. Battle manoeuvres were performed to the sound of *gamĕlan* orchestras with beautiful effect, we read. There was feasting and drinking. Mangkunagara, we should not be surprised to read, "constantly made love".[37]

Hartingh, looking back on 1747, said that Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara were "like grass which is indeed flattened by a strong squall but which, immediately after the wind calms, arises again".[38] There was more frustration ahead for the Dutch. Louw writes, "In the year 1748 the war went from bad to worse."[39] At the start of the year, Pakubuwana II told the Company that his *patih* Pringgalaya promised to bring the rebellion to an end within a month.[40] This was perhaps the most quixotic of all promises in this time of chaos.

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[35] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 27 Sept. 1747, in VOC 2706 (OB 1748). An attack on Jipang in April is described in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 20; see also *SBPn* ff. 134v.–137r.

[36] *SBPn* ff. 137r.–v.

[37] *BG* Vol. iii, pp. 21, 23–4, 34–8; *SBPn* ff. 138v.–141v. Quotation from ibid., f. 141r.: *Kangjĕng Pangeran Dipati, kang tansah andon asmara*. Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 22, refers also to MB's "hiding-place 'Jacawal'".

[38] KV, p. 134.

[39] Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 20.

[40] PB II, Surakarta, to Batavia, 19 Sapar 1672 "ofte 1748", in VOC 2725 (OB 1749). There is confusion in the dating of this letter in the VOC records. 19 Sapar AJ 1672 would be 3 Mar. 1747, but the letter seems clearly from 1748, so it should be 19 Sapar AJ 1673 (20 Feb. 1748).

In the latter half of 1748, Batavia sent more dragoons and hussars under Majs W.H. van Ossenberch and H.P. Faure to Semarang with the intention of sweeping the rebels from the highlands. Van Ossenberch,[41] who became a major figure in the VOC's hierarchy, seems to have made an ambiguous impression on the Javanese. His name is rendered as *Sakebĕr*, the name of a servant of the eponymous hero of the *Baron Sakendĕr* myths, which are fundamentally about the supernatural origins of the relationship between the Dutch and the Javanese.[42] *Babad Giyanti* says of him that he was "large and tall with fine muscles, like the King of Ngalĕngka",[43] a reference to the evil King Rawana from the *Sĕrat Rama* (the Modern Javanese version of the *Rāmāyaṇa*). This new expeditionary force achieved nothing. Mangkubumi abandoned and burned his residence at Jekawal and avoided contact. The VOC forces and their supporting Javanese returned to base without having met the enemy.[44]

Pakubuwana II's new *kraton* in Surakarta was under constant threat. In August 1748, while Pakubuwana II's main force and the Company's dragoons and hussars were away, fruitlessly seeking contact with the rebels, they attacked Surakarta again. An advance party burned buildings around the *kraton*, and then Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara struck. *Babad Giyanti* and *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* describe furious fighting up to the walls of the *kraton* itself, with widespread panic among the residents of the city. Inside the court, Pakubuwana II prepared to defend himself with *pusaka* weapons in hand. According to these accounts, he ordered the *pusaka* named Ky. Bicak, a small military gong (*bĕndhe*), to be sounded. When struck four times, however, it remained silent, to the King's consternation, for this signalled contrary supernatural forces at work. But at last Ky. Bicak sounded and thereupon Mangkubumi ordered a slow withdrawal. More prosaically, the rebels were facing cannon

[41] A biography of Van Ossenberch is in P.J.B.C. Robidé van der Aa, "De groote Bantamsche opstand in het midden der vorige eeuw", *BKI* 4th series, Vol. 5 [= Vol. 29] (1881), pp. 53–8.
[42] See A.B. Cohen Stuart, ed. and transl., *Geschiedenis van Baron Sakéndhèr, een Javaansch verhaal* (Batavia, 1850); Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 376 et seqq. (in this version of the text, Sakebĕr appears as Kasebĕr).
[43] *BG* Vol. iii, p. 69: *Mayor Kebĕr gĕng inggil otote bĕcik, kadya Prabu Ngalĕngka*.
[44] KV, p. 135; *BG* Vol. iii, pp. 68–73; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 22.

fire from the VOC fortress. Mangkunagara also withdrew but continued to burn and plunder in the vicinity of Surakarta.[45]

Mangkunagara moved westwards, towards Mataram. En route he encountered troops of his brother Pamot, with whom his relationship was fraught, as we have seen. He ordered his men to plunder the goods of Pamot's people and to take their mounts so as to have fresh horses. Another senior figure was encountered at Delanggu and was treated in the same way. When Mangkunagara shortly met his brothers in person, Pamot's own weapons and horses were confiscated; we may recall that they indeed seem to have been put to little use. Mangkunagara denounced Pamot for his many failures, and the latter fearfully submitted to his brother's wrath, according to Mangkunagara's account. Another object of Mangkunagara's anger, his uncle Png. Suryadi (or Suryadikusuma), was obliged to surrender his personal *kris* to Mangkunagara in an act of humiliation and submission. The sins of Mangkunagara's other brother, Mangkuningrat, were judged to be lesser in nature, so he was forgiven upon his fervent oath of loyalty. Mangkunagara sent Pamot and Suryadi up into the mountains with a few servants but no soldiers. Pamot's horse, now Mangkunagara's, he named Pun Daru (Falling Fireball or Falling Star, an omen of impending good fortune in Javanese). He and his men returned to his base at Gemantar in the mountains near Wonogiri. There they celebrated reunion with their families. As the virile young prince recorded, "night and day he was satiated with making love with all his wives and concubines, making love while constantly training the troops and giving them furlough".[46]

There followed a period of training his brothers' former soldiers:

5. … The new (soldiers) were brought together
and offered their obeisance
to Lord Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara].
Then they enjoyed joining in dancing,
the soldiers feasting and drinking,
employing beautiful dancing girls.
Lively was the dancing of the troops.

[45] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 16 Aug. 1748, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 20–1; *BG* Vol. iii, pp. 68–Vol. iv, p. 57; *SBPn* ff. 143r.–152v. On *běndhe*, see Kunst, *Music in Java*, Vol. i, p. 150; Vol. ii, p. 441.

[46] *SBPn* ff. 152v.–154r. Quotation from f. 154r.: *siyang dalu anuwuki ing asmara, lan sagung para rabi, miwah sěsěliran, andon pulang asmara, tan pěgat ulah prajurit, ngu[ng]gar kang bala*.

6. We will not tell how they finished up,
the soldiers in their doings.
In the daytime, it was dancing (drilling) with bow-and-arrow,
the new troops with the former soldiers,
the soldiers allowed their way
in their bravery, all.
Lord Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara]
weighed up the soldiers.[47]

Mangkunagara then raided Surakarta again, taking cattle as booty and leaving local villagers in hardship. The animals were distributed among his troops, who were then given leave to return to their home villages. This left Mangkunagara at Gemantar with only a few troops and a sick wife when the VOC suddenly attacked, evidently at the start of September 1748. His account of the engagement is dramatic. His new horse Pun Daru fell as he sought to flee. But he remounted as Company forces neared and made good his escape with only five companions. He had to abandon Pun Daru as he struggled through forested ravines to save his life. It was now the turn of the Company detachment to plunder local villages.[48]

We may pause to note that plundering or destroying villages was nothing unusual in that age, whether in Java or anywhere else. When scouting parties, larger regular or irregular forces, or whole armies passed, villages were gravely at risk. There were two main reasons to raid, plunder and/or destroy. The first was to forage for provisions needed for one's own side, in an age when military logistics were inadequate to provision forces on the move. The second was to impede enemies who were following. In Java, as in Europe, as Mark Greengrass comments, "destruction of civilian livelihood to delay an enemy advance became an accepted military practice". Consequently, "armies on the move were held in real hatred and

[47] *SBPn* f. 154v., Canto 44 (Sinom): 5. … *bala kang saking kang rayi, kang anyar-anyar amapag, saha atur bakti, Kangjěng Pangran Dipati, nulya kasukan anayub, dhahar nginum kang wadya, tur mawi taledhek asri, praprajurit ramya samya aběběksan*. 6. *tan warnanĕn aluwaran, tingkahe bala prajurit, yen rina ajĕmparingan, wadya anyar wadya lami, ingu[ng]gar kang prajurit, sadaya prawiranipun, Kangjĕng Pangran Dipatya, ananting-nanting prajuritya*….

[48] Ibid., ff. 155v.–157r.; *BG* Vol. iv, pp. 58–60. Both accounts give a date Sunday-Wage, 14 or 15 Ruwah [AJ 1673], which was not possible; assuming that the combination of seven- and five-day weeks should be given priority, the correct date was probably Sunday-Wage 7 Pasa (1 Sept. 1748).

fear" and stragglers were sometimes murdered by local people.[49] The situation in Java differed only in that stragglers were also at risk of attack by tigers.[50] Little wonder that Mangkunagara had feared being attacked by villagers in the wake of his defeat at Papringan. Or that the villagers beat pots as a warning of the approach of thieves, even if they appeared in the fine clothing of princes. Given the disasters that often awaited them as battles loomed and armies approached, villagers frequently fled to the hills if they could, taking their dependants and whatever they could carry with them.

Mangkubumi turned north against coastal towns in August 1748. There lay the Company's main posts, its control of the coast having been one of the main stimulants to his rebellion. *Babad Giyanti* says that he marched with 2,000 cavalry, 40 banners (of infantry companies), two *gamĕlan* sets and other musical instruments. For Javanese armies, such instruments played the roles that trumpets, pipes, fifes and drums played for European forces, inspiring soldiers and communicating orders. Mangkubumi passed through the highlands of Sukawati without the Company forces there being aware of his movements. As he passed, coastal regions submitted to him. On 15 August 1748, he attacked and took Cengkalsewu. Pati fell to him the next day. On 17 August, he attacked Juwana. There he faced the Resident R.A. van Goens, who was killed along with ten European military and most of the indigenous soldiers. According to *Babad Giyanti*, Mangkubumi himself fought incognito with the pike-bearing infantry, while a double imitated him with the prince's horse, clothing and yellow parasol. The garrison's widows, three seamen and some slaves escaped overland to the VOC post at Rembang. Mangkubumi burned the Juwana fortress and the warehouse with its store of rice and captured a money chest. *Babad Giyanti* reports that this loot required a dozen horses to carry it, amounting to 36,000 "new *reals*", and that 35 VOC Bugis soldiers at Juwana went over to Mangkubumi's side (perhaps in fact Makassarese: the Javanese sources do not usually distinguish). He then took Kudus. The Dutch observed that he was supported by a substantial number of locally settled (*pranakan*) Chinese and Malays. The *babads*, however, confusingly record both that Mangkubumi's people plundered and burned

[49] Mark Greengrass, *Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517–1648* (London: Allen Lane, 2014), pp. 56–7.
[50] In the first few weeks of a campaign in East Java in 1724, Javanese forces lost 150 men to tigers; Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, p. 214.

Chinese houses, taking their women and goods, and that after its conquest Mangkubumi gave authority over a quarter of Juwana to *pranakan* Chinese. Van Hohendorff ordered out the hussars and dragoons under Faure and Van Ossenberch, who at last saw action, along with Pringgalaya's Javanese. Heavy fighting inflicted serious losses on both sides. Thereupon Mangkubumi withdrew to the south towards Jekawal, leaving many dead behind. His forces, according to *Babad Giyanti*, were "broken" (*rĕmpu*), while those of his enemies were "worn out" (*anglĕs*).[51]

Babad Giyanti provides a vignette from near the end of the battle which reminds us how tangled loyalties and family relationships can be in civil wars but at the same time invites some scepticism. Mangkubumi had a full sister—also a child of M. Ayu Tejawati—called R. Ayu Pringgalaya, the wife of his enemy Pringgalaya, the *patih* of Surakarta. She reportedly arrived at the battlefield, accompanied by 30 cavalry, and called out, "Heh, Mangkubumi, lad, your actions are too much for the soul of our mother, not caring about death; think about our mother and don't overdo it."[52] Upon hearing this, Mangkubumi withdrew.

We need not doubt that such a message could have been sent to Mangkubumi by his sister; our scepticism rests instead on the conditions of warfare. An 18th-century battle was chaotic: a tremendous cacophony of men shouting in attack and screaming when wounded, horses whinnying and snorting and groaning when themselves wounded or bolting riderless across the field, muskets firing and, if they were employed, cannon blasting. The last could make the earth shake. To this were added the sounds of trumpets, drums, *bĕndhe* and other gongs used to inspire troops and to issue commands to them. All of this took place on a battlefield where black-powder weapons obscured the action with thick smoke, where infantry found themselves run over by cavalry and cavalry found themselves tumbling

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[51] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 and 28 Aug. 1748; D.W. van der Brugghen, Rembang, to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1748; all in VOC 2725 (OB 1749). Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Sept. 1748, in VOC 2726 (OB 1749); *SBPn* ff. 161v.–166v.; *BG* Vol. iv, pp. 62–76; Louw, *Sucessie-oorlog*, pp. 21–2. VOC currencies were complicated; see Appendix 3 in Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, p. 239. *BG* Vol. v, p. 37, reports that some of this booty was later distributed among MN's troops, who then used it in betting on cockfights.

[52] *BG* Vol. iv, pp. 75–6: *Eh kulup Mangkubumi /0/ kabangĕtan babo nyawa solahira, nora angeman pati, bok uwis elinga, aja kaliwat-liwat.*

into ditches, being impaled on enemy pikes or caltrops, or trampled underfoot by their comrades when their horses were shot out from under them. We may reasonably doubt that a feminine voice could have been heard over all of that and suspect that the message, if delivered, came in a written rather than an oral form. Yet, that is how *Babad Giyanti* claims the sibling message was given.

What *Babad Giyanti* depicts as an indecisive battle was unquestionably a defeat for Mangkubumi. Perhaps, and maybe for the first time, he began to think that the Europeans could not be expelled and the VOC was a permanent feature of the north coast. Company forces pursued him to Jekawal. There he met with Mangkunagara, to whom he said that his forces were "destroyed" (*rusak*). Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi's other officials advised him to flee, given the poor state of his army. Mangkubumi escaped, leaving Jekawal in flames, before the Company and Surakarta forces could make contact. The Company's reinforcements were thereupon sent back to Batavia, having evidently achieved their objectives in Central Java.[53]

With the hubris not unknown to other foreign invaders facing local enemies, Van Hohendorff reported that Mangkubumi had been so "ruined" that he would be unable to do anything significant again. "Native affairs, both in the lowlands and the uplands, and above all at the court, are now all quiet and in good order," he reported.[54] He repeated these judgements at the start of 1749.[55] It was indeed possible for the VOC with its Surakarta *kraton* allies to win battles, but winning the war would prove to be a task of a different order.

This was the sort of war in which both victories and defeats were likely to be temporary. Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara's escape from Jekawal was in October 1748. By early November, Jipang was again in rebel hands. Mangkubumi once more withdrew as Company and Surakarta forces approached. When Surabayan troops supporting the VOC subsequently departed from Jipang, Mangkubumi occupied it again. And then, once again, he was driven out by a VOC detachment.[56] Late in November, Mangkunagara attacked Kedu and put a VOC force to flight there and then repulsed reinforcements

[53] *BG* Vol. v, pp. 5–6; *SBPn* ff. 166v.–178v.; Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 16 Oct. 1748, in VOC 2725 (OB 1749); Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 22.
[54] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 28 Aug. 1748, in VOC 2725 (OB 1749).
[55] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 29 Jan. 1749, in VOC 2749 (OB 1750).
[56] Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 22–3.

sent by the Company. He then stormed the VOC's fortified garrison post itself, eventually being repulsed with significant losses.[57]

Thus ended the year 1748, with much bloodshed but no secure victory for any side. In addition to the battles described above, Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara suffered other setbacks. A major loss was Png. Silarong, a prince who defected from Surakarta to join them. He was turned away by the governor of Mataram, Tg. Jayawinata, who was allied with the rebels. *Babad Giyanti* suggests that this was because Jayawinata regarded Silarong as being of inferior ancestry on his mother's side. He then went to Ponorogo, where his father-in-law, the governor of Ponorogo, captured and turned him over to Van Hohendorff. Understandably distressed by the circumstances in which he found himself, he seized the *kris* of his guard and attacked the man, but was himself killed in the fight that followed.[58]

Relations among the other rebel princes remained marked by suspicion and conflict. There were hostilities particularly from Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara's side against Buminata and Singasari. Mangkunagara is quoted as calling Buminata, who still employed his Sultan title, "Sultan Bělis Lanat" (The Accursed Satanic Sultan). He reportedly sent a message to Buminata that "even if your mother is Nyai Rara Kidul (Goddess of the Southern Ocean), if you dare not go into battle, who will trust to follow you?" The message employed "low Javanese" (*ngoko*) words, insultingly treating Buminata as an inferior. These divisions weakened the rebel side in facing Company and Surakarta forces.[59] Nevertheless, at the end of the year Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara held the dynasty's historic heartland in Mataram.

1749: The Year when Dynastic Politics Changed

The year 1749 was relatively quiet in terms of military action. Despite some skirmishes and a few larger clashes, in April Van Hohendorff could repeat his somewhat exaggerated view that "in the lowlands

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[57] Ibid.

[58] *BG* Vol. iii, pp. 14–5; Vol. v, p. 13; KV, pp. 134–5; *SBPn* f. 159r. Silarong was a son of Amangkurat IV by a secondary wife (*garwa pangrĕmbe*); Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 146.

[59] E.g., *BG* Vol. v, pp. 18–35, 39; *SBPn* ff. 176r.–179v. Quotation from *BG* Vol. v, p. 28: *nadyan ibu iya Nyai Rara Kidul, yen nora wani prang, sapa kang ngandĕl tut wuri*.

and the highlands all is peace and quiet".[60] On the rebel side, there were important developments in the second half of the year.

Png. Buminata called himself Sultan and had been in rebellion for nearly seven years. He was now seriously threatened by Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara, who were gathering adherents and rebuilding their forces. Their main immediate priority was to drive Buminata and Singasari out of Gunung Kidul. Mangkunagara did not find this an easy task, so Mangkubumi himself then joined that campaign, according to Dutch sources. They report that the fighting was heavy but in the end Buminata and Singasari were put to flight, leaving many dead behind, and made their way to the highlands of Sukawati. There, Buminata decided that he had had enough of being a self-proclaimed Sultan in rebellion. He offered to submit to Pakubuwana II. The VOC was anxious that he be leniently treated in order to encourage other submissions, so Buminata was allowed to return to Surakarta in early September and to resume his life as a senior prince. Remarkably, within a few months he would be nominated as Crown Prince. Singasari did not follow him and, according to *Babad Giyanti*, now paid obeisance to Mangkubumi.[61]

The Mangkubumi-Mangkunagara alliance was the heart of resistance to the Surakarta *kraton* and the VOC, but tensions were appearing between these two rebels. Javanese sources enable us to see how this became entangled in the Buminata story.[62] We need to remember that until Mangkubumi's rebellion in 1746, these two—the uncle Mangkubumi and the leading-rebel nephew Mangkunagara—had been enemies. Now the uncle, father-in-law, leading rebel and also-leading-rebel nephew were on the same side.

But were they really allies? Mangkunagara's account tells of his time in Yogya c. mid-1749, a time of feasting and drinking, gambling over cock- and button-quail fights, dancing parties, *wayang topeng*

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[60] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 Apr. 1749, in VOC 2749 (OB 1750).
[61] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 11 Aug., 30 Aug. and 11 Sept. 1749, in VOC 2750 (OB 1750); KV, p. 137; *BG* Vol. v, pp. 40–2, 64–74, and Vol. vi, pp. 6–7; *SBPn* ff. 185v.–192r.
[62] The following account down to MB's occupation of Yogya rests on *SBPn* ff. 179v.–184v.; *BG* Vol. v, pp. 37–44. The small fighting bird called *puyuh* in Javanese is the barred button-quail (*Turnix suscitator*); females were usually used for fights; see John MacKinnon, *Field Guide to the Birds of Java and Bali* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1991), p. 103, pl. 8.

performances, *gamĕlan*, and constant lovemaking. Every Monday there were tournaments, and his brothers Pamot and Mangkuningrat frequently attended upon him. They hunted deer in the forests and made tours to the south coast. Pleased with his nephew's achievements in battle, Mangkubumi sent him gifts of cannon and money. Mangkunagara organised a new troop company of 50 men, named the Red Fire-Arrows (*Saragĕni Abang*), to join his other regular formations. He had new *gamĕlan* sets created and named. He restored old court buildings in the area. In other words, he was behaving like a monarch.

Mangkubumi, then in Sukawati, was told tales of Mangkunagara's doings. He became suspicious of his nephew's kingly style and the number of his troops in Yogya, thinking he might declare himself King. Mangkubumi's first step was to seek reconciliation with Buminata—then not yet submitted to Surakarta—which failed as had all such efforts in the past. Thereupon Mangkubumi ordered Mangkunagara to expel Buminata from the mountains. While Mangkunagara was away on this mission, Mangkubumi marched rapidly to occupy Yogya himself. Mangkunagara's account bluntly puts it that he was deceived by being ordered into the mountains to fight Buminata. He feared that his concubines would be demanded by Mangkubumi, so he ordered them away except for his wife Ratu Bĕndara, Mangkubumi's daughter. Thus, Yogya came to be Mangkubumi's court site rather than that of Mangkunagara, who was obliged to welcome his uncle's arrival there. Mangkubumi lodged in the fortified residence that Mangkunagara had built, while the latter lodged outside, north of the *alun-alun*.

Mangkubumi "was now like a King but did not yet intend to arise as monarch, although all was ready".[63] He gave his son R.M. Ĕntho the title of a Crown Prince, *Pangeran Adipati Anom*. In their cups, the two drunken grandees, Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara, agreed that the latter would be both commander-in-chief (*Senapati ing Ayuda*) and *patih* when the former became King. They swore oaths of faithfulness to each other, says Mangkunagara's account. All the officials present also swore to this arrangement and celebrated it in drink and dance. The timing of this is uncertain but was probably

[63] *BG* Vol. v, pp. 44–5: *Pangran wus kadya narendra, nanging dereng anĕdya juměněng aji, sanadyan wus samĕkta*.

c. July–August 1749.[64] Already in early July the VOC heard that Mangkubumi had named himself Susuhunan and had then occupied Mataram, but that was a premature, or at least partially untrue, rumour.[65] He had indeed occupied Yogya, the heart of the Mataram district, but was not yet declared to be king.

Mangkubumi was unwilling to declare himself King while his brother Pakubuwana II still lived.[66] But that was not going to be for much longer, for Pakubuwana II—not yet 40 years old—was seriously ill. The political elite of Java, the VOC and no doubt many villagers awaited the end of the regime with disquiet. Royal successions were sometimes smooth, but succession amid civil war was unlikely to be. In such circumstances, ordinary folk often buried their valuables and prepared to flee to the forests and mountains, while aristocrats looked to their arsenals and measured up allies and enemies. Before the King's death could change the strategic political environment of the war, however, a personal tragedy struck Mangkunagara's family.

Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi had again established a *modus operandi*, but the former's family relations remained unsettled and now became tragic. We have seen his brother Pamot's unwillingness to engage in battle and Mangkunagara's doubts about Pamot's affections and reliability. When Mangkunagara pursued Buminata and Singasari, his brothers Pamot and Mangkuningrat marched with him. They plundered the villages they passed, captured women and put villagers to flight into the highlands. On coming down from the mountains, Mangkunagara again celebrated with his troops, created another company—the Black Fire-Arrows (*Saragĕni Cĕmĕng*)—and gave furlough to his soldiers. But Pamot was distressed at not having been accorded the appanage lands he held in the past. There were other things disturbing the young man, the *babads* tell us. First, he

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[64] *BG* Vol. v, pp. 45–6; *SBPn* ff. 184v.–185v. *BG* Vol. v, p. 45, dates the court gathering when MN was appointed with just the seven- and five-day weeks: Rĕspati (Thursday)-Manis, which can only occur once every 35 days. The possibilities in the latter half of the year are Javanese dates equivalent to 15 July, 19 Aug., 23 Sept., 28 Oct. or 2 Dec. 1749. This happens before *Garĕbĕg Puasa* (14 Sept. 1749) is described in *SBPn* f. 194r., but *babads* do not always proceed in strictly chronological sequences.

[65] Faure to Van Hohendorff, Semarang, 9 July 1749, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 25.

[66] *BG* Vol. vi, pp. 16–7.

was devoid of soldiers, all of them having abandoned him. Second, he had not really regained a place in Mangkunagara's affections. Third, he had heard that Mangkuningrat, younger than he, would be placed in command over him. Fourth, his wives urgently begged him to produce children but he had none. Deeply shamed, in a quandary, and unable to eat or sleep, Pamot prepared a mixture of citrus juice and arsenic and committed suicide. His women and other servants wept in anguish at the death of the 22-year-old prince, who, it seems, was ill fitted to a life of violence and warfare. Mangkunagara, too, was shaken by his brother's death, as was Mangkuningrat. The body was conveyed for burial at Nitikan (now within the city boundaries of Yogyakarta).[67]

From this time, c. September 1749, to December, the attention of Javanese and Europeans alike was fixed on the ailing Pakubuwana II. Of hostilities there were few as everyone, as it were, held breath awaiting the inevitable. A parade of princes absented themselves from Surakarta to join Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara: Pngs Adiwijaya, Rongga and Panular. Little did they know at the time that they thereby escaped the fate of the princes who remained at Surakarta, all of whom were soon to be exiled. Pringgalaya is quoted in *Babad Giyanti* as offering a semi-economic explanation of the defection of princes: they had insufficient resources to support dependants because their appanage lands were in the hands of the rebels. Even some Dutch soldiers defected in this period; getting such deserters back in their hands was always an objective of the VOC's officers. According to Mangkunagara's *babad*, Mangkubumi at first proposed to kill the European deserters but Mangkunagara stood guarantor for them and persuaded Mangkubumi that they could be employed. They were, however, killed on Mangkubumi's orders a few months later. There was correspondence between Van Hohendorff and Mangkubumi. The former hoped that the example of Buminata might encourage Mangkubumi to surrender. The latter hoped—doubtless with little optimism—that the Company might back him as the successor Susuhunan. Their correspondence predictably came to nothing. *Babad Giyanti* describes a display put on for the Company's Javanese emissaries when they were at Yogya. Thousands of soldiers were gathered

[67] *SBPn* ff. 186r.–189r., 192r.–193v.; *BG* Vol. v, pp. 74–5. *SBPn* places this immediately before the celebration of *Garĕbĕg Puasa* (14 Sept. 1749). The appanage lands in question were in Wedi and Masaran.

on the *alun-alun* for drill and war games, with one side representing the Company. Fake battle was engaged in to the sound of *gamĕlan* and cannon.[68] We can guess which side was depicted as the victor.

Through the latter months of 1749, Pakubuwana II's illness worsened.[69] Van Hohendorff, who in 1748 had moved from Surakarta to Semarang to become the VOC's first governor of Java's northeast coast (1748–54), travelled to Surakarta in early December to oversee the impending succession. On 8 December he found the King—his protégé since that first contact in Kartasura six years before—in a lamentable state. Van Hohendorff consulted with the Crown Prince, the future Pakubuwana III, who was currently estranged from his father and evinced little interest in becoming Susuhunan. He did, however, agree that he would uphold the contracts with the Company.

On his deathbed, Pakubuwana II trusted no one among the Javanese elite, so many of whom had abandoned him, and therefore placed his faith in Van Hohendorff, the one person who retained his confidence. He made the extraordinary proposal that the Dutchman should take charge of the realm. On 11 December 1749, Pakubuwana signed a contract that had two main objectives. The first was to entrust his personal goods, as opposed to state property, to Van Hohendorff as trustee to ensure their safe transmission to his heirs and to look after his children, a common Javanese practice. The second purpose—as clear in the Javanese as in the Dutch text of the treaty—was anything but common practice. The treaty surrendered the entire kingdom to the Dutch East India Company without reservation. As remarkable as this seems—and however much Dutch colonial authorities later regarded it as the legal foundation of their rule—this second and evidently revolutionary aspect of the treaty was an utter dead letter in the context of the Third Javanese War of Succession. Not until the 19th century would the Netherlands have the necessary resources to exercise sovereignty in Java. To my knowledge, no Dutch or Javanese dignitary referred to this treaty again during the period covered in this book.

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[68] *SBPn* ff. 197r.–199v.; *BG* Vol. v, pp. 46–54, and Vol. vi, pp. 7–12; Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 11 Sept. and 7 Nov. 1749, in VOC 2750 (OB 1750); Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 24–31. According to KV, p. 144, in early 1750, when MB was driven out of Yogya, in revenge he killed all but one of the 30 European deserters who had gone over to him.

[69] The general account here, down to the death of PB II, follows Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 48–53.

Meanwhile, in Yogya, Mangkubumi was declared King by Mangkunagara and his other followers. He had said that he would not take this step while Pakubuwana II still lived but now in fact did so on the first day of the new year: 1 Sura AJ 1675, equivalent to 12 December 1749. He did this because, according to the *babads*, spies reported that the King had already died, whereas in fact he was comatose but alive. Mangkubumi, pressed by his mother, Tejawati, Mangkunagara and the other dignitaries surrounding him in Yogya, thus acceded to the throne prematurely. He took the titles held by previous monarchs: Susuhunan Pakubuwana Senapati Ingalaga Ngabdurrahman Sayidin Panatagama (Commander-in-Chief on the Field of Battle, Ngabdurrahman [Servant of the Merciful], Lord of the Faith, Regulator of Religion); we will continue to call him Mangkubumi here. *Babad Giyanti* adds that he "was the true ruler established in and administering the land of the island Java". It was Mangkunagara who stood as Mangkubumi's champion and formally declared him to be King, challenging anyone among the assembled notables who refused to accept this. The leaders of the religious centres (*pradikan*) of the realm, those of Kajoran, Tembayat, Kembangarum and Wedi along with others, attended to bless his reign. The spiritual leader Png. Wijil of Kadilangu sat with Mangkubumi, as did the *sayyid* Ngabdurahman and Mangkunagara. There were prayers and religious meals to invoke divine blessing (*slamĕtan*) and attendance at the mosque. As he had promised, Mangkubumi declared Mangkunagara to be his *senapati* and *patih*. His *pĕngulu* was named as Ky. Ngabdullah, formerly of the *pradikan* Astana Wedi, whom he renamed Dipaningrat. The new chief law officer (*jaksa*) was also named.[70]

The Dutch reported that more dignitaries attended Mangkubumi's inauguration than that of Pakubuwana III in Surakarta three days later. Mangkubumi wrote to Van Hohendorff seeking Company recognition of his accession, with predictable negative outcome, while

[70] *BG* Vol. vi, pp. 23–9; *SBPn* ff. 200v.–201r. Quotation from *BG* Vol. vi, p. 28: *ingkang tuhu Narendra, mandhireng amĕngku, talatah nuswa Jawa*. There are complications because Surakarta adjusted the calendar at the start of the year by one day, creating the new "Thursday calendar", which was not recognised in Yogyakarta; see Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 54. *BG* Vol. vi, p. 27, says that MB specifically rejected this innovation.

still refusing to hand over Dutch deserters on the grounds that at least some had converted to Islam.[71]

On 15 December, Van Hohendorff installed the new Susuhunan Pakubuwana III (r. 1749–88) in Surakarta, with the same titles as Mangkubumi claimed, in his increasingly abandoned court, notable for the absence of princes or commoners. He was just 17 years old. Of all people, Png. Buminata—only recently returned from rebellion—was named as Crown Prince. The six princes still in Surakarta had their *krisses* demanded and were arrested. They pondered how it was that Buminata, who had behaved badly, should meet good fortune while they, who had behaved faithfully, encountered misfortune. The Company took the view that because rebellions were caused by princes, it would enhance Pakubuwana III's reign to have no princes. Hence, those whom the Company could lay hands on were all arrested and exiled. The new monarch agreed to turn over for exile his younger brothers when the eldest reached the age of ten. Exiling the princes reflected a profound European misunderstanding of the need for demonstrated elite support and consensus in maintaining a Javanese monarch's standing. Getting rid of all those who might offer such support and imagining that it could be replaced by VOC arms reflected wooden analysis remarkable even for its time. This political blunder at the very start of his reign weakened Pakubuwana III profoundly. By 1752 the exodus of people from his court left too few servants remaining even to care for the King's horses and elephant. Even Buminata himself would eventually give up and go back to rebellion. On 20 December 1749 Pakubuwana II died, ending one of the most disastrous—perhaps the most disastrous of all—of the reigns of the Mataram dynasty.[72]

The kingdom of Mataram was now divided between two rival monarchs. In Yogya, Mangkubumi began his reign (1749–92) as the dynasty's most able King since the time of Sultan Agung a century before. At his side stood Mangkunagara, already one of the most

[71] *BG* Vol. vi, pp. 35–7; Van Hohendorff, Surakarta, to Batavia, 21 Dec. 1749, in VOC 2749 (OB 1750); Van Hohendorff, Surakarta, to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1749, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); KV, pp. 137–8, 141–3. See also *SBPn* ff. 222v.–223r. on hussars who had gone over to MN being circumcised and converted to Islam.
[72] *BG* Vol. vi, pp. 30–7; *SBPn* ff. 201r.–v.; Toutlemonde, Surakarta, to Semarang, 30 May 1752, quoted in Louw, *Successie*-oorlog, p. 56. PB III was born on 23 February 1732; Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 138.

formidable war leaders of his time. In Surakarta, by contrast, Pakubuwana III would prove to be a cipher so long as the war went on, a near-powerless *wayang* puppet manipulated by the Company. On the day of his inauguration, indeed, he was seated in a position inferior to that of Van Hohendorff as the VOC governor of Java's northeast coast. As the war resumed its vehemence in early 1750, there were only two major forces in conflict. On one side stood Mangkubumi, Mangkunagara, and the Javanese elites and commoners who followed them. On the other stood the VOC and the Javanese allies whom it could mobilise.

Warfare Renewed with Emerging Tensions in the Rebel Alliance, 1750–51

In early 1750, hostilities resumed with as much fury as before. It was as if a cork in the bottle of politics had been removed by the dynastic changes and out poured war.

In the last days of 1749, Mangkubumi sent forces to control Bagelen and Sukawati.[73] In January 1750, Mangkunagara raided and burned houses in Surakarta, Pngs Rongga and Panular took control of the border areas of Roma and Bagelen, and Png. Adiwijaya dominated Kedu. Throughout these districts, local officials submitted. In response, the VOC ordered Maj. Faure to attack the rebel base in Mataram, aiming for Mangkubumi's capital in Yogya. Although the Company had misgivings about employing Madurese troops, given their reputation for unrestrained brutality, it asked the Company's client lord of West Madura to provide fighters. In the face of this advance, Mangkubumi abandoned Yogya, burning his new *kraton* as he did so and killing the European deserters who had previously gone over to his side. He went westwards, crossing the Progo River which was then in full monsoon flood. He looted and burned Chinese

[73] The following account, down to the arrest of Faure, relies upon the following sources: Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1749, 10 Feb. 1750, 17 Feb. 1750, 22 Feb. 1750 in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 13 Sept. 1751, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 36–7; KV, pp. 143–6; *SBPn* ff. 202v.–206v.; *BG* Vol. vi, pp. 37–49 (which says that *Sakëber*/ Van Ossenberch was present at Tidar; he was indeed the commander of the hussars, but he seems not to have been present at the battle); Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 35–7.

houses, perhaps because Chinese in the interior were most likely to be rice purchasers on behalf of the VOC.

Faure occupied Yogya but then engaged in a catastrophic battle on 12 February, in the midst of the wet monsoon. The rebel side attacked back into Mataram from both east and west, with Mangkunagara in command of the vanguard. Abandoning the Company's general policy to adopt defensive postures, Faure sallied out from his fortification at Mount Tidar, north of Yogya, with his European and Indonesian VOC soldiers. He was later accused of failing to give clear orders about what further action to take. His left wing soon found itself surrounded by Mangkubumi's cavalry, and its discipline broke. An attempt to reinforce that flank with dragoons left this new force attacked from the rear by Mangkubumi's troops. The Company soldiers fled back to Yogya, losing—according to the VOC records—four dead and five wounded Europeans, 60–70 dead or missing Indonesian VOC troops, and more dead and wounded Javanese and Madurese soldiers. *Babad Giyanti* improbably recorded hundreds of enemy dead. When reading such tallies, we should never forget the observation by Carl von Clausewitz that "Casualty reports are never accurate, seldom truthful, and in most cases deliberately falsified".[74]

After the battle, Faure departed Yogya to avoid being cut off by the rebels and returned to Surakarta with his remaining force of 130 dragoons and some 300 Indonesian soldiers. He abandoned a goodly amount of gunpowder which the VOC believed he burned to prevent it falling into rebel hands, but Javanese sources say that gunpowder was left behind intact. There is no doubt that Faure ceded the rebels a handy number of muskets, carbines and other matériel. The Company's dragoons mutinied and refused to serve further under his command. Faure's life was indeed at risk from his men. The West Madurese lord was furious that his fighters had been led into such a situation in which, according to Mangkunagara's *babad*, the Madurese commander was killed. Faure was relieved of his command over the dragoons and sent to Batavia under arrest. Javanese sources rather appropriately dubbed him *Mayor Prol* (Maj. Easily-Falls-Apart) or *Mayor Por* (Maj. Exhausted).

Mangkubumi reoccupied the Yogya area three days after Faure's retreat. All the rebel princes gathered there, and their followers began

[74] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, transl. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 234.

constructing Mangkubumi's new *kraton* at Banaran (or Kabanaran) just west of present-day Yogyakarta, under Mangkunagara's command. From this time on, Mangkubumi was commonly referred to as "Sunan Kabanaran" (King of Kabanaran). As the court was established, commoners built their houses along the roads, so that Banaran began to look like a court city. It was also built for defence. *Babad Giyanti* recorded that the houses of officials had moats dug around them. Regional governors from surrounding areas came to pay obeisance to the newly declared monarch. Prince Singasari appeared, according to the Javanese chronicles. So did Mangkunagara's and Mangkubumi's women and children who had been sent to Sukawati for their safety, including M. Ayu Tejawati. Because they had been long separated, Mangkunagara's chronicle predictably tells us, his wives were eager to make love. Banaran "prospered like a city that was already old", with daily markets where prices were low, tournaments, cock- and button-quail fights, Saturday tournaments, and feasting. *Garĕbĕg Mulud* was celebrated there on 20 February 1750.[75]

Evidently disgusted with the military record of his subordinates, Van Hohendorff himself marched from Semarang with a company of dragoons, a substantial number of Madurese and artillery. The most significant engagement followed on open ground at Banyudono, on the main road west of Surakarta, on 13 May 1750.[76] The Dutch believed that they were attacked by the main rebel force of 8,000 commanded by Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara in person. Other princes, including Singasari, were also involved. At this stage, Hartingh's *Kort verhaal* estimated Mangkubumi's total force to be 60,000 men, which may be exaggerated. But perhaps not. *Babad Giyanti* reports Mangkubumi's side to have had 11,600 mounted troops plus infantry too numerous to count, bearing 480 battle-banners and accompanied by the musical instruments of war: countless *bĕndhe* and *beri* war gongs, four *gamĕlan* orchestras (presumably

[75] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1750, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); *BG* Vol. vi, pp. 48–51; *SBPn* ff. 206v.–208r. Quotation from *BG* Vol. vi, p. 50: *arja lir nagri wus lama*.

[76] The account of the battle of Banyudono rests upon the following sources: Van Hohendorff, in camp above "Clabang" River south of Surakarta, to Batavia, 17 May 1750, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); *SBPn* ff. 210r.–212v.; *BG* Vol. vi, p. 74–Vol. vii, p. 17; KV, pp. 147–9. *BG* Vol. vi, pp. 76–7, reports a discussion of the disposition of MB's troops and the battle-formations (*gĕlar*) to be employed in the attack.

horse mounted) in different styles, European-style drums, 400 flutes, and four great drums. The attack began:

> 18. … Immediately the signal was sounded:
> The three Kodhok Ngorek (Croaking Frog) *gamělans* sounded,
> 19. the Cara Balen (Balinese Style) *gamělans* of Prince Mangkunagara and Prince Singasari,
> their Cara Balen sounding together.
> The (European-style) drums tattooed loudly,
> joined by the great drums, the *běndhe* and *beri* war gongs and loud shouting,
> like the thunderous roar of a thousand volcanoes.[77]

After heavy fighting, however, the Company prevailed and Mangkubumi ordered withdrawal. Mangkunagara and his forces found themselves trapped in the rear of the retreat, hindered by those in front of them and under cannon fire from behind. But, says *Babad Giyanti*, Mangkunagara was still protected by God. He survived and delivered to Mangkubumi a battle standard, drum and *běndhe* that the latter's own men had abandoned as they fled, to the shame of Mangkubumi's senior commanders. Van Hohendorff reported that the rebel side lost hundreds of dead, including two European deserters. *Babad Giyanti* also reports heavy losses. Among the wounded, according to Van Hohendorff, was Mangkunagara, who was shot in the thigh; Png. Rongga, who was also shot; and Mangkubumi's son Ěntho, who was wounded in the arm by a grenade and, Van Hohendorff said, later died. Ěntho survived, so we know that last piece of intelligence was certainly wrong and much of the rest may have been as well. Our Javanese sources do not mention the wounding of these figures. In any case, this was a significant engagement. Had it gone the other way, in Hartingh's view, "all would have been lost and we would have had to give in". On the other side, Mangkubumi and his men were dejected by the lamentable outcome. The Company wanted to pursue Mangkubumi in the hope of ending the rebellion, but the Javanese forces they levied abandoned their task in the face of the rebels and Mangkubumi made good his escape to Mataram. There he chastised those officials who had abandoned the battlefield.

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[77] *BG* Vol. vii, p. 6, Canto 60 (Durma): 18. … *sigra těngara, Kodhok Ngorek munya tri*. 19. *Cara Balen Pangeran Mangkunagara, Pangeran Singasari, Cara Balen samya, gumuruh tamburira, barung tětěg bĕnde beri, kukuk asurak, lir guntur sewu wukir*.

The middle months of 1750 saw Java devastated not only by war but also by a smallpox epidemic. Van Hohendorff reported that both in the highlands and in Surakarta "almost all villages are about half deserted and uninhabitable". The VOC army had lost some 300 dead, but "thank God" only 25 Europeans, among them Capt. Keijser, he whom the Javanese called *Kengsĕr* (Shoved-Aside). Among the Javanese who fell seriously ill was Mangkunagara's surviving brother Mangkuningrat, who was taken to Kabanaran to be cared for. Mangkunagara rushed to his brother's side to find him prostrate with only *sirih* (a combination of areca nut, gambir and lime) for medication. Mangkubumi ordered Mangkunagara back to battle, and Mangkuningrat survived.[78]

Babad Giyanti associates the smallpox epidemic with a curious ritual act by Mangkubumi by means of which he took revenge on the enemy who had defeated him. He sent his troops westwards across the Progo River and ordered them to await him there. He then turned back, travelling incognito with only two servants and ten cavalrymen, towards a place called Saribit, near Delanggu on the Kemiri River between Kartasura and Yogya. He then headed towards Piji, which seems to have been higher up the river on the slopes of Mount Merapi, where the VOC and Madurese lines were located.

30. At night he rested at Saribit,
intending to exercise Islamic law (*shari'a*).
Incognito he went
with only two servants,
carrying a well-worn grinding-stone.
And in the cavity, it contained
writing wrapped in *dluwang* (Javanese bark-paper).
31. Arriving west of Piji,
this was buried in the middle of the river,
that well-worn grinding-stone and also
the *dluwang* which had writing.
This was immediately prayed over
by his Highness the King [Mangkubumi],
with 12 prayer repetitions (*raka'at*).

[78] Van Hohendorff, in camp at Jabung, to Batavia, 16 June 1750, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); KV, p. 152; *SBPn* ff. 214v.–215r., 220r.–v., 222v.; *BG* Vol. vii, pp. 31, 36–7; KV, p. 149; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 37.

32. His two servants were confounded:
"Yes, true, Your Highness."
They returned back to the east
and arrived at Saribit at sunrise.
From there he went
with only the ten horsemen
to the west of the Progo.…
33. … Three days after
the burying
by the King of Kabanaran [Mangkubumi]
of that grinding stone which was prayed over,
divine retribution struck
all the [enemy] troops in their lines:
If they fell ill in the afternoon, they died the next morning.
If they fell ill in the morning, they perished in the afternoon.
35. Madurese and Company:
none were passed by,
feverish, hot-and-cold their illness.[79]

Whatever readers may make of this story, there is no doubt that supernatural acts—the more mysterious the better—were widely believed and practised, that Mangkubumi was a person thought capable of such occult measures, and that there was certainly an epidemic of smallpox.

In the more tangible world of warfare, there were multiple clashes of arms in which the rebels, wrote Hartingh, "fought like fanatics, fearing neither fire nor steel". Nevertheless, the Company and its allies regularly defeated the rebel side. The Javanese chronicle accounts fully record those repeated defeats. In the wake of such losses, the rebels withdrew to safe havens in difficult, heavily forested mountain terrain, sometimes felling trees across their route to hinder

[79] *BG* Vol. vii, pp. 19–20, Canto 61 (Asmaradana): 30. *ing ratri rĕrĕm Saribit, arsa namakakĕn sarat, anamur wau lampahe, amung kalih abdinira, bĕkta pipisan gĕrang, myang luwang isi puniku, tulisan binuntĕl dluwang*. 31. *prapta sakilen ing Piji, tĕngah kali pinĕndhĕman, pipisan gĕrang malihe, daluwang kang wis sinurat, sinalatakĕn sigra, dening Kangjĕng Sang Aprabu, kaping ing rolas rakangat*. 32. *abdi kalih ngungun sami, lĕrĕs inggih Sri Narendera, ing babon wetan kondure, prapta Saribit wanci byar, lajĕng ing tĕdhakira, amung turongga sapuluh, dhatĕng sakilen Paraga.…* 33. *… antara ing tigang dina*. 34. *lawan denira mĕndhĕmi, Sang Nata ing Kabanaran, pipisan densalatake, nulya katiban wĕwĕlak, sagung ing wong barisan, gĕring sore esuk lampus, gĕring esuk sore pĕjah*. 35. *Madura miwah Kumpĕni, datan wontĕn kaliwatan, rumab panas-tis sakite.…*

pursuit. In such terrain, the VOC's cavalry and artillery, the keys to success in open country, were of little use. The rebel princes then regrouped and resumed their attacks. Their numbers continued to grow despite setbacks and the ongoing epidemic of smallpox, a major hindrance for all sides. The implicit illegitimacy of Pakubuwana III—who depended on the Dutch East India Company rather than a demonstrated consensus of Javanese notables to maintain his position—no doubt fuelled the rebellion. Adiwijaya took Kedu but then suffered a serious defeat and took refuge in the surrounding mountains. Pngs Rongga and Panular were driven from Bagelen and took refuge with Adiwijaya. Martapura dominated Grobogan and Sukawati and again burned the VOC post at Demak. There was a significant encounter in late July 1750, when Mangkunagara and Singasari again raided Surakarta with a force estimated at 5,000–6,000. They burned houses in the area before being forced to retreat, but the VOC lost heavily in the fight. Mangkubumi himself was obliged to maintain a defensive posture based in the mountains of Gunung Kidul. Mangkunagara alone among the rebels seemed to go from strength to strength as he moved around Gunung Kidul and the lowlands of Central Java, obliging the Company to undertake tiring marches and countermarches without catching him. His forces continued to grow; in 1750 his cavalry alone was estimated at 13,000 men (which strikes me, however, as a possible exaggeration or even a scribal error).[80]

None of the successes of the Company and its Javanese and Madurese allies could finish off the rebel princes and Mangkubumi, their new rebel King. "The obstinate Mangkubumi and his son-in-law Mangkunagara … will never want to lead a peaceful life until they have been removed from this world," wrote a frustrated Van Hohendorff in July 1750. Png. Suryadikusuma, Mangkunagara's uncle whom the latter had humiliated and sent into the mountains with no soldiers, surrendered after he was cut off from other rebel forces. He was exiled to Sri Lanka, but Van Hohendorff's hope that Prince Panular might also surrender came to nothing.[81]

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[80] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 22 July 1750, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); KV, pp. 149–52 (quotation from p. 152); *SBPn* ff. 213r.–225r.; *BG* Vol. vii, p. 21–Vol. viii, p. 19; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 38–9.

[81] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 22 July 1750, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); *BG* Vol. vii, p. 55; KV, p. 149; *SBPn* f. 213r.

All wars provoke bitterness between enemies, but this war was now so venomous that it produced a rare phenomenon in Javanese history: ritual cannibalism. This was recorded once in the past, to my knowledge. In January 1680, the surrendered rebel Trunajaya was personally stabbed to death by Susunan Amangkurat II. The Javanese officials present at this event were ordered to join in mutilating the body and then to eat its liver.[82] Over a century after that, Pakubuwana IV (whom we will come to know better later in this book) had a younger sister strangled for an illicit love affair. Her lover himself was "apparently dismembered and one of his ears eaten raw by Pakubuwana IV's younger brother … after he had been dissuaded from eating his heart and genitals".[83] In the Third Javanese War of Succession, beheading dead opponents was commonly practised by both sides and captives were frequently killed, but eating bits of them was rare.

In the *babad* accounts for 1750 we read of cannibalism for the first time in this war, in a way which suggests this was an innovation by Mangkubumi which was not to the taste of everyone. It could certainly not be reconciled with any interpretation of Islamic law. *Babad Giyanti* records Mangkunagara presenting to Mangkubumi dead enemies' ears which were made into "very tasty" (*langkung eca*) soup, eaten along with shrimp crackers (*karupuk*) and spicy sauce (*samběl*). This was served to Bagelen forces who had not performed well in battle. In this version, Mangkubumi asked his soldiers what they thought the delicious soup was made of. They did not know, so he told them, laughing heartily, that they, the cowardly folk of Bagelen who feared the Dutch, had just consumed Madurese ears. The soldiers, while spitting, promised to be reliable in battle in the future, to Mangkubumi's pleasure.[84] The slightly different version in Mangkunagara's autobiography—perhaps recording Mangkubumi's actions at second hand—says that after Mangkunagara had defeated VOC and other Indonesian soldiers in a skirmish c. August 1750, the ears of dead enemies were cut off, strung together and presented

[82] Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, p. 57.
[83] Carey, *Power of Prophecy*, p. 173n42.
[84] *BG* Vol. viii, pp. 7, 11. Ibid., pp. 14–5, records Dutch ears being made into soup and eaten, and described by an unknowing consumer as being like *jamur kuping* (ear-mushroom, an edible fungus perhaps better known as wood ear in Chinese cuisine).

as trophies to Mangkubumi along with bound enemy captives. Mangkubumi ordered the ears chopped fine, mixed with buffalo meat and spices, and made into soup. This was served with rice to his men who had avoided fighting, who had taken no ears in battle, "it being intended so the troops would stand firm in battle. Those who had been afraid were compelled, so all ate ear soup, distributed equally among the soldiers."[85]

Despite the exigencies of warfare, there were still occasions for festivities. Mangkunagara recorded the conviviality in Kabanaran for *Garĕbĕg Bĕsar* in AJ 1675 (1 November 1750). He and other dignitaries paid obeisance with their troops to Mangkubumi. The Dutchmen who had defected to Mangkunagara were described as splendidly attired. In the evening, Mangkubumi himself joined Mangkunagara in dancing to the sound of *gamĕlan*.

49. When the King [Mangkubumi] joined the dance,
the people's voices reverberated loudly,
shouting and making noises,
firearms and cannon firing repeatedly.
Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara],
when he danced, was not left behind.
50. With the sound of signals and cannon,
mixed with the loud shouting,
all the royal relatives also danced,
the Tumĕnggungs and the officials,
the whole night through.
Happy was the King,
51. exceedingly joyful,
satiated with pleasures.
All the troops were drunk.
At sunrise, they broke up to go home,
all leaving the *kraton*.…
53. … Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara] was very drunk,
lugged away by his wives,
his concubines at his feet.

[85] *SNPn* ff. 221v.–222r.: *mila kang abdi pina[ng]kan kuping, ingkang abdi kari yudanira, tan antuk kuping yudane, kang putra balanipun, angsal kuping tan idhĕp ngisin, pinurih ingkang bala, mantĕpa ing pupuh, kang abdi ajrih kapĕksa, pramilanya sami mangan pi[n]dhang kuping, ingkang bala warata*. This seems to have been c. August 1750; on ibid., f. 223v. is recorded the celebration of *Garĕbĕg Puasa* (1 Sawal AJ 1675/3 Sept. 1750).

54. Indeed many were his concubines,
all beautiful and young,
desiring their very drunken lord,
when he awoke,
to satisfy their love.[86]

In Mangkunagara's account of 1750 we encounter an object of long-term significance in his life and in his enduring fame after death. Javanese kings, aristocrats and soldiers marched to war with battle standards flying. These flags were named, just as Americans might refer to "Old Glory", the British to the "Union Jack", the French to *le Tricoleur* or Indonesians to *Sang Merah Putih*. In Javanese aristocratic culture, however, there was more to the matter than mere patriotic nicknames. Weapons, saddles, items of clothing, *gamĕlan* instruments, books, other objects and, above all, one's personal *kris* could be regarded as spiritually powerful—as if they were living things with their individual names and personalities, which demanded respectful treatment. The most revered of these—the holy royal heirlooms (*pusaka*) of the *kratons*—included some that could only be seen or touched by certain persons who had the spiritual standing to control the otherwise-dangerous powers that were believed to inhere in these objects. For warriors and professional troop companies, their battle standard was a venerated object. Capturing an enemy's banner or losing one's own was a matter of pride or shame. We know of the battle banners of some other dignitaries of Mangkunagara's time. After his installation as the first Sultan of Yogyakarta, Mangkubumi's banner was named *Gula Kalapa* (Coconut-Palm Sugar).[87] That of his leading commander Rongga Prawiradirja was called *Gĕniroga* (Fire-sickness) and was adorned with an image of an ape blue-black in

[86] *SBPn* ff. 225v.–226v., Canto 60 (Mijil): 49. *Yen ti[n]dak bĕksa Sri Narapati, gumuruh punang wong, asurak kalayan tangarane, bĕdhil mariyĕm awali-wali, Pangran Adipati, yen baksa tan kantun*. 50. *mawi tangara mariyĕm muni, wor surak gumuroh, prasantana samya baksa kabeh, pratumĕnggung myang kang para mantri, anutug sawĕngi, kasukan Sang Prabu*. 51. *kalangkung suka-suka Narpati, atuwuk kalangon, samya wuru sawadya-balane, byar raina aluwaran mulih, sadaya wus mijil saking ing kadhatun.…* 53. *… langkung wuru Pangran Adipati, binayang prarabi, sĕlir daganipun*. 54. *tuhu kathah sĕlir para rabi, samya ayu anom, ngayam ing Gusti sangĕt wurune, sĕlilire Pangran Adipati, anuwuki kang sih,….*

[87] *BG* Vol. xviii, pp. 67–8.

colour.[88] Prince Natakusuma's battle standard was named *pun Supit* (the Pincer).[89]

Mangkunagara's personal battle standard was named *Samběr Nyawa*: the Soul Catcher. We see it here in the midst of hostilities in late 1750 at Gondang, near Surakarta:

> 48. But of the inner *mantri*, there were only the *Kawandasa* [a troop company],
> and the young fighters who carried regalia,
> all mounted on horses;
> in the very centre was their place.
> The blue-black flag named
> the *Samběr Nyawa*,
> distinguished by a white moon:
> 49. its place was somewhat to the rear,
> for Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara]
> did not wish
> to storm Gondang …[90]

Thus we know that his banner was blue-black in colour, adorned with a white (almost certainly crescent) moon and no doubt a revered object. It did not, however, have the status of a princely *pusaka*, for it lacked the title for *pusakas* of *kyai* or *nyai*.

Much later, in 1791, a hybrid chronicle-diary kept in Mangkunagara's palace reminisced about his years at war and referred to the supernatural powers of his battle standard. There we read that "the reason it was named *Samběr Nyawa* was that rarely could anyone stand against it". If Mangkunagara fled to the mountain forests with enemies in pursuit, down from the mountain those enemies were "snatched up (*sinamběr*)" and many died. "His standard was for

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[88] *BG* Vol. xix, p. 72.

[89] *BG* Vol. xiv, p. 12.

[90] *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, f. 231v., Canto 61 (Durma): 47. *Nanging kang mantri lĕbĕt mung kawandasa, lan wong kapĕdhak ngampil, samya mu[ng]geng kuda, tĕngah-tĕngah pĕrnahnya, bandera wulung kakasih, pun Samběr Nyawa, ciri wulan aputih*. 48. *ĕnggenira ragi angantuneng wu[n]tat, sawab Pangran Dipati, dede karsanira, angrangsanga ing Gondhang*.… A fuller discussion of the name may be found in Ricklefs, "Origin of Prince Mangkunagara I's Appellation". See also Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 39. We do not know the shape of MN's standard. A search of old depictions and photographs showed that both rectangular and triangular flags were employed.

that reason named old *Samběr Nyawa* (the Soul Catcher)."[91] *Samběr Nyawa* became so firmly associated with Mangkunagara that after his death it became the most common way of referring to him. He is still known in Javanese memory as the legendary Prince *Pangeran Samběr Nyawa*. Thus it is that his flag lends its name as the title of this book as well.

The passage from Mangkunagara's *babad* just quoted about Gondang also points to an issue of increasing importance in 1750: emerging estrangement between the prince and his monarch Mangkubumi. We see episodes in the Javanese chronicles where Mangkunagara wished to preserve his forces from attrition so as to focus on decisive engagements. In facing fortified enemy posts, he preferred to surround and harass the enemy garrison rather than to storm the position, cutting off the enemies' supplies and hoping to entice them into battle on open ground, where his cavalry, infantry and artillery could be deployed effectively. He was reluctant to waste his forces in fruitless assaults on entrenched positions. Mangkubumi, however, ordered frontal attacks on enemy positions with, it seems, little regard for the cost. From this contrast of tactics grew greater distrust. Mangkubumi evidently suspected Mangkunagara of frivolity and cowardice, while the latter believed Mangkubumi to lack judgement, to be overly audacious in risking his battalions.

According to *Babad Giyanti* and *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*,[92] Mangkubumi ordered Mangkunagara to march against the VOC and *kraton* troops at Gondang. On arrival there, Mangkunagara assembled his commanders and troops for a night of entertainment with music and dancing girls to raise their spirits. Then arrived a brief note from Mangkubumi, in a dirty condition signalling disfavour. He admonished Mangkunagara to be mindful of his descent from warrior kings, who were never so lacking in seriousness as he. Mangkunagara was rendered speechless. His own account says that Mangkubumi listened to inappropriate advisers and was misled by slanderous gossip. In his view, Mangkubumi's wish to attack the Gondang fortifications

[91] *BT* f. 300 right–301 left; the full translation and Javanese text are given below, p. 314.

[92] The following description of the Gondang episode rests on *BG* Vol. viii, pp. 58–64; *SBPn* ff. 229r.–234r. Quotations from *SBPn* f. 230r.: *tan gugu mringwang, tan gugu senapati /0/ denarani ingsun wĕdiya ngayuda, pamrih ingsun prajurit, angantĕpa ayuda;* and from *BG* Vol. viii, p. 63: *udani mimis*. See also Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 39, 42–4.

would mean the destruction of his forces. "He doesn't believe in me, he doesn't believe in his commander-in-chief. I am called one who fears battle. My aspirations are those of a warrior, firm in battle."

Mangkubumi sent reinforcements, and an attack on Gondang followed, but, as we saw above, Mangkunagara "did not wish to storm Gondang". His *babad* records that he marched to battle troubled about how to deploy his forces and confident that an attack on his enemy's entrenched position would lead to defeat. His men would be trapped in the surrounding trench and become targets for musket fire. The engagement followed, the rebel forces indeed finding themselves entangled in the enemy's defence works, unable either to advance or to retreat. At the end of the day, losses were far heavier on the rebel than on the VOC side. Mangkunagara wrote to Mangkubumi to report this discouraging outcome, saying that his forces had faced "a rain of shot". Mangkubumi thereupon, we are told, thought long about God's command that in death and suffering one must be grateful to God. He then wrote back to Mangkunagara, telling him not to engage dancing girls, which distanced him from the Prophet's law and from divine assistance in battle. Mangkunagara was relieved that Mangkubumi's letter was at least not angry in tone.

In a subsequent engagement at Gondang, the rebels committed the Suranatan corps, distinguished by its Islamic piety, along with people described as those committed to Holy War. They attacked on horseback with sabres, which were more potent cavalry weapons than the inaccurate and clumsy firearms of the day. One of its commanders, Kaji (Haji) Wingka, was hit in the midriff by cannon fire. His head and upper body were blown from his horse, but the lower body remained mounted, feet in the stirrups, as the horse bolted among the Suranatan troops. According to *Babad Giyanti*'s account, this macabre scene so unnerved the common soldiery that most of them fled the field.[93]

The fighting from late 1750 into early 1751 was a miserable, bloody and costly affair for both sides, its wretchedness increased by the annual monsoon drenching of the countryside. P.J.F. Louw's estimation was that, from the Dutch point of view,

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[93] *BG* Vol. viii, pp. 68–70. Ibid, p. 67, mentions a date equivalent to 9 or 10 Mar. 1751, which I think to be erroneous; the Gondang fighting took place from Sept. 1750 to late Jan. 1751, according to the VOC records available to me. *SBPn* f. 229r., dates the birth of MN's son R.M. Sura, at the time of the fighting, on 17 Dec. 1750.

> the campaign of 1750/1 failed totally. For, although Van Hohendorff was victorious [in an early February 1751 engagement], the enemy again won some advantage in Bagelen and Kedu over the forces left behind there by Van Ossenberch and over the column of De Clercq. Van Hohendorff indeed succeeded there also in forcing the enemy back, but that consumed the last energies of his army and he need not count on resupply, because there was a great shortage of troops everywhere in Java.[94]

The VOC's position was only made worse by rebellion in Banten and Madura and insecurity in Batavia's highlands.[95] These required the diversion of forces which might otherwise have been deployed against Mangkubumi, Mangkunagara and the other rebel princes. For the rebels, too, this was a low period.

The Gondang conflict deepened the estrangement between Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara. *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* recorded a speech by Mangkunagara to his brother Mangkuningrat which smacked dangerously of *lèse-majesté*:

> 17. "Hey, brother Mangkuningrat,
> this is a consequence of [Mangkubumi] not believing in his *senapati* [Mangkunagara himself].
> We were forced to attack,
> which certainly led to destruction,
> and the retreat from battle got tangled up in the coolies.
> This *senapati* is not yet resigned to this,
> reckoning it was crazy to be put into attack."
> 18. All the Tumĕnggungs
> together feared to bow to this [opinion], greatly ashamed,
> and reported
> to the King of Mataram [Mangkubumi].[96]

Hostilities continued uninterrupted in this war of attrition, with neither side able to win an enduring outcome. The fighting so ruined the land of Mataram that the VOC could not station troops there

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[94] Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 45.

[95] KV, pp. 155–7; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 49.

[96] *SBPn* f. 233r., Canto 62 (Pangkur): 17. *Eh yayi Mangkudiningrat, lapak iki tan gugu senapati, akĕdah angajak magut, satĕmah karusakan, mu[n]dur aprang dadi kĕnthete kang batur, senapati durung eklas, tangguh ngedang* [sic] *ngajak jurit*. 18. *para Tumĕnggung sadaya, samya ajrih tumungkul langkung ngisin, nulya angaturi wĕruh, mring Sang Nata Mataram*. I take *ngedang* to be an error for *ngedan*.

for want of foodstuffs.[97] Mangkunagara harassed and skirmished with a column commanded by B. Toutlemonde. His failure to dislodge the Company from its position at Pamalon (in Mataram) earned him and his commanders another denunciation from Mangkubumi. In February 1751, Mangkunagara engaged in a larger battle there which he lost. The fighting cost large numbers of dead and wounded on both sides. The VOC, however, could not pursue Mangkunagara because their force was short of ammunition and in a generally poor physical condition. There were indeed so many sick among the infantry that they hindered the force's movement and it was difficult, in that nearly depopulated district, to find bearers.[98]

The Dutch continued to regard Mangkunagara as "the foremost brigand", in command of some 2,500–3,000 cavalry. For both sides, the wet season, the constant presence of disease and losses in battle were serious problems. Gunpowder and other matériel ran low on both sides.[99] *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* describes Mangkunagara's people making shot during the night, expending it during the day, and then again manufacturing shot at night while enjoying *wayang* and playing dice and cards.[100]

Mangkunagara's and Mangkubumi's spirits sagged after the defeats of late 1750 to early 1751, according to the Javanese records and to the report of a former VOC defector who returned to the Company's lines. *Babad Giyanti* reflects Mangkubumi's perception in describing Mangkunagara as an unreliable commander.[101] In February 1751, Van Hohendorff fought his way through the rebels' cannon-mounted fortifications at Randhulawang, which defended the route to Mataram from the east. The forces of Mangkunagara, Singasari

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[97] Van Hohendorff, Surakarta, to Batavia, 20 Dec. 1750, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751). The Javanese accounts of these months are in *SBPn* f. 235r. et seqq.; *BG* Vol. viii, p. 68 et seqq.

[98] KV, pp. 152–5; Van Hohendorff, in camp at "Tlogowono", one hour north of Yogya, to Batavia, 17 Feb. 1751, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); *SBPn* ff. 239v.–245v. I have been unable to identify Pamalon or Malon, as the name is in *SBPn* and VOC sources, on modern maps; *BG* calls the place Kamalon, but I have been unable to identify that also.

[99] De Ravallet et al., Semarang, to Batavia, 16 Feb. 1751, in VOC 2766 (OB 1751); KV, pp. 152–3.

[100] *SBPn* ff. 237r.–v.

[101] *BG* Vol. viii, p. 71; *SBPn* ff. 235r., 237v.; Van Hohendorff, in camp at "Tlogowono", one hour north of Yogya, to Batavia, 17 Feb. 1751, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751).

and Mangkubumi were all driven into retreat after heavy fighting. Van Hohendorff then found Kabanaran deserted. Mangkubumi—privately angry at Mangkunagara, according to *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*—had set his own *kraton* alight and fled for refuge to Gunung Kidul. There his followers feared being attacked by tigers and robbed by local people. The exhausted VOC forces returned to their cantonments in dreadful weather to recover their strength and spirits.[102]

Babad Giyanti uses the term "the fall of Mataram" (*bĕdhah ing Mataram*) for these events.[103] For the Europeans, it was some grounds for satisfaction that, with this reversal of rebel fortunes, 40 Indonesian and five European VOC deserters offered to return if they were promised pardon. Van Hohendorff asked Batavia to agree to this. A further three hussars deserted from VOC lines, but only one remained alive after the other two were killed by Mangkubumi, according to Van Hohendorff's information.[104] Mangkunagara's account says that two hussars came over to him and were accepted.[105] By this time, according to *Babad Giyanti*, the European deserters in Mangkubumi's service included four who had become Javanese, no doubt through conversion to Islam. They were given the middling rank of Dĕmang and the Javanese names Condrajaya, Condrayuda, Imayuda and Imajaya. Javanese looked at them and laughingly wondered,

> So! What age is this? Dutchmen desert and become Dĕmangs, Ngabeis and Ronggas. This is an age when things are all twisted up. Lots of Javanese become soldiers of a foreign force; lots of Company white men desert and become Javanese, many of them becoming officials.[106]

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[102] Van Hohendorff, in camp at "Tlogowono", one hour north of Yogya, to Batavia, 17 Feb. 1751, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751); *BG* Vol. ix, pp. 16–20; KV, pp. 154–5.

[103] *SBPn* f. 245r.; *BG* Vol. ix, pp. 16–7. The latter gives Thursday the 7th as the date for MB's abandonment of Kabanaran, without further details. This would probably have been Thursday 7 Mulud AJ 1676 in the Friday calendar, equivalent to 4 Feb. 1751.

[104] Van Hohendorff, in camp at "Tlogowono", one hour north of Yogya, to Batavia, 17 Feb. 1751, in VOC 2767 (OB 1751).

[105] *SBPn* f. 240v.

[106] *BG* Vol. ix, pp. 13–6, 36–7, 39. Quotation from pp. 14–5: *lah jaman apa, Walonda padha balik /0/ padha dadiya Dĕmang Ngabei Rongga, iki jaman bĕndhalit, wong Jawa kweh, manjing sĕrdhadhu sabrang, Kumpĕni putih keh balik, dadi wong Jawa, akeh kang dadi mantri*.

Mangkunagara recorded another Dutchman who was circumcised (along with several others) and given the Javanese name Onggaděrpa, who wore a Balinese-style *kris* and could sing in Javanese.[107] Such European-to-Javanese conversions may have been less remarkable than they seem. A significant number of people regarded as European in Java were the children of liaisons or marriages between European men and Javanese (or other Indonesian) women, and/or were largely raised by Javanese servants. They may have learned at least some colloquial Javanese at their mother's or carers' knees. The most prominent such offspring in the period of this book was Johannes van Velsen, the commandant who had been killed at Kartasura in 1741.[108]

As the wet monsoon came to an end around March 1751, the familiar pattern of indecisive raiding, harassing and skirmishing resumed, at the usual cost to both the rebels and the Company, and to villagers unfortunate enough to be caught up in the action. Surakarta was again a target for the rebels, who harassed it without inflicting serious damage. For both sides losses were significant, setbacks frequent and victories transient. The estrangement between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi continued to fester.[109] For their part, the Dutch continued to regard Mangkunagara as "the most dangerous rebel" despite Mangkubumi's seniority as the rebel King.[110]

Mangkubumi went to Sukawati to recruit new members for his piously Islamic Suranatan corps, which had suffered heavy battle losses. *Babad Giyanti* describes him summoning the sons of religious scholars (*ngulama*, Arabic *'ulama'*) and others from *pradikan* religious centres. Those who answered his call were tested on their ability to recite from the Qur'an before being accepted. Piety was an integral part of their practice of war. In preparation for a subsequent battle, they were ordered to purify themselves with ritual ablution-water (*toya wulu*, Arabic *wudu'*), one of the obligatory practices of Islam. Rainwater was the best source of pure ablution-water, of which there was rarely a shortage in Java. One recruit left Mangkunagara's contingents to join Mangkubumi's Suranatan corps, the sort of defection

[107] *SBPn* f. 223r.
[108] Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 247.
[109] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 30 Mar. 1751, in VOC 2788 (OB 1752); Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Oct. 1751, in VOC 2787 (OB 1752); *BG* Vol. ix, pp. 23–59; *SBPn* ff. 251r.–256v.; KV, pp. 155–8.
[110] Batavia to H.XVII, 24 Sept. 1751, in *Gen.miss*. Vol. xii, p. 92.

that did nothing to repair strained relations between the two leading rebels.[111]

Mangkubumi seems to have sought justification in religious law for executing people whom he didn't trust. By this time, he had established a new *kraton* at Margawati (Krapyak area, north of Yogya). According to *Babad Giyanti*, he sought advice about Islamic law regarding defections to an enemy. This had to do with one R. Tg. Mangkupraja, who abandoned the Surakarta side and came over to Mangkubumi. Now he was believed about to defect to the Company. Mangkubumi summoned his *pĕngulu* and asked whether, in such a case, a defector to the other side in war was guilty of apostasy (*murtat*, Arabic *murtadd*), for which the penalty was death. Dipaningrat and two *sayyids* (presumably Ngabdurahman and Yusup, as named elsewhere in *Babad Giyanti*) advised that if a Muslim became an infidel (*kapir*, *kopar*, Arabic *kafir*), that earned the death penalty. But if it was a case of two opposing sides, both Javanese, and a person defected from one to the other—like someone who defected from Surakarta to Mangkubumi, they pointedly said—that could not be called *murtat*. Unfazed, Mangkubumi summoned Mangkupraja to a court gathering, where he told him, according to Mangkunagara's account, that he was the sort who just followed whoever was winning. He had him bound and taken to the mosque, where he was strangled.[112]

Towards the end of 1751, fortunes began to turn as significant rebel victories sapped Company morale and raised that of its enemies. At Gowong (near Bruno, in Bagelen), the VOC had a fortified post which was attacked by Mangkubumi's forces. In late October, the VOC's commander there, Lt. Forster, and the senior Surakarta officer Tg. Arungbinang thought that they saw an opportunity to catch or kill Mangkubumi himself. *Babad Giyanti* captures Forster's hope for distinction and promotion by ascribing to him the thought that if he could lay hands on Mangkubumi, "certainly I'll be promoted to Admiral". Van Hohendorff, frequently critical of his junior officers,

[111] *BG* Vol. ix, pp. 21–2, 59. On *wudu'*, see E. Chaumont, "Wuḍū'", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New [2nd] Edition*, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, P. Bearman et al., Vol. xi, pp. 218–9 (13 vols; Leiden: Brill, 1986–2009).

[112] *BG* Vol. ix, pp. 62–70; *BG* Vol. x, p. 58; *SBPn* ff. 258v.–261r. On apostasy in Islamic law, see W. Heffening, "Murtadd", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New [2nd] Edition*, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, P. Bearman et al., Vol. vii, pp. 635–6.

wrote instead that the impetuous lieutenant suffered from "carelessness". He attempted to tackle Mangkubumi with just some 20 European and 50 Indonesian troops (Bugis and Balinese, according to the *babad*). In the ensuing heavy battle in a rainstorm on 27 October, Forster and all but three of his men were slaughtered.[113] Further hostilities continued in that western region thereafter.

A still greater rebel victory followed on 12 December 1751. At Jenar on the Bogowonto River, in the westerly theatre of war where the major battles were now taking place, VOC troops commanded by Maj. H. De Clercq encountered Mangkubumi's main force. Believing that he had put Mangkubumi to flight, De Clercq charged forward with his cavalry, leaving his infantry behind and unwittingly bypassing his enemies, who had concealed themselves as ordinary villagers. He was thus isolated from the rest of his army. Mangkubumi's soldiers doubled back and attacked De Clercq's infantry and rear guard. The ensuing battle in the rice fields, once again fought in the midst of monsoon rains, produced devastating VOC losses, which Van Hohendorff blamed on the commanders' rash actions. In the flooded rice fields, Capt. Wouthier and his entire company of dragoons were slaughtered except for a few who were captured. De Clercq turned back to assist, but too late, and was attacked by Mangkubumi's men. As De Clercq tried to flee through the muddy rice fields, his horse stumbled and became bogged. Thus trapped, he and nine of his hussars were cut down; others were captured and killed. The Company reported the deaths of Maj. De Clercq, Capts Bieleveld and Wouthier, Lt. Laurens, Cornets (equivalent to today's 2nd lieutenants) De Haas and Roodenhuijs, five more junior officers, a dozen dragoons plus De Clercq's entire dragoon company, and 60 VOC Indonesian troops. Several Javanese officials from Banyumas, a *bupati* named Dipayuda and other Javanese were killed. At the end of the fighting, in Jenar's rice fields lay 180 dead VOC and Surakarta soldiers, by the Company's count. The survivors fled for their lives,

[113] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 3 and 16 Nov. 1751, in VOC 2787 (OB 1752) (the 3 Nov. letter is also quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 50); *BG* Vol. ix, p. 77–Vol. x, p. 9 (quotation from Vol. ix, p. 79: *pasthi ingsun nuli munggah dadi Amral*); *SBPn* ff. 261r.–263/4r. (there is an error in the MS folio numbering here); KV, p. 158. The Javanese tended to ascribe the rank of admiral to the commanders of VOC armies, on the model of Admiral Speelman in the 1670s. The Javanese sources give lower casualty figures than Van Hohendorff, whose numbers are cited in the discussion here.

leaving behind "artillery, ammunition, baggage and a portion of their firearms" according to Batavia's report to Amsterdam. "Thus," wrote Hartingh, "this army was totally defeated."[114]

The Javanese accounts of the battle add details from the rebel side. We should note that battle accounts are not stereotyped in our two main Javanese sources for this period—*Babad Giyanti*, whose compiler(s) tended to see events from Mangkubumi's perspective, and Mangkunagara's own *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgara*. Nor do their descriptions and those from VOC sources contradict each other with regard to this battle. That is in itself remarkable, given that observers' reports of such chaotic and bloody events are rarely in agreement, at whatever place or time. *Babad Giyanti*'s account[115] tells that the battle at Jenar was preceded by a massive rainstorm accompanying a volcanic eruption (of which mountain is not said). Mangkubumi and his advisers agreed that the marketplace at Jenar was the best location for a battle and positioned themselves to await the arrival of the enemy. Their initial battle array (*gĕlar*) was called *Candhrasa* (Magic Weakener of the Enemy's Essence), but when fighting commenced they agreed to reform in *Gajah Bangun* (Arising Elephant); unfortunately, we might guess but do not know what formations were described by these and most of the other battle arrays named in Javanese sources.

De Clercq arrived and did not know that he was bypassing half of Mangkubumi's hidden soldiers as he advanced. Mangkubumi then commanded, "Put them in the cage!" and the trap was sprung. Mangkubumi himself commanded the left wing, while Png. Adiwijaya led the right. Their enemy Dipayuda fell early, and other Surakarta commanders were wounded. Wouthier and all the VOC's captains were killed, along with 50 of their dragoons and further foot soldiers. In this engagement the rebels captured valuable munitions: 60 carbines, 150 bayonets and 100 barrels of gunpowder. These were already hidden away in the surrounding village by the time De Clercq, hearing the sound of firing behind him, hastened back to join the mêlée. He arrived only to be slaughtered with most of his men. Many others among the enemy forces also fell. According to

[114] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1751, in dJ x, pp. 185–6; Van Hohendorff, Tegal, to Batavia, 8 and 28 Jan. 1752, in VOC 2789 (OB 1752); KV, pp. 158–60; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 50–1.

[115] *BG* Vol. x, pp. 41–54. Quotation from p. 46: *padha ngĕrĕmna*.

the Javanese count, the dead on the Company side were 250 "white Company" and 500 *Kumpĕni Islam*. The *babad* dates this event correctly in full detail with the fitting year-chronogram *arga muni bah ing bumi* ("the mountain sounded and moved the world", AJ 1677), giving a date equivalent to 12 December 1751.[116]

Mangkunagara was then fighting in the southern mountain (Gunung Kidul) region and was not himself involved in the Jenar battle. His memoir is therefore of less interest to us. It also emphasises the utter destruction of the VOC and Surakarta forces and the large amount of war matériel they abandoned. Reflecting the second-hand nature of Mangkunagara's knowledge—*Babad Giyanti* reports that he was informed of the victory by a letter from Mangkubumi—his *babad* gets the date of the battle wrong by two or three days.[117]

Mangkubumi's victory at Jenar marked a turning of the military tide in the Third Javanese War of Succession, now of nearly six years' bloody duration. From here on, the rebels began to have the upper hand in the conflict. As we will see in the next two chapters, the VOC reluctantly drew the uncomfortable conclusion that while it could maintain Pakubuwana III precariously in the court of Surakarta, it could not subdue his enemies. On the rebel side, the costs of the war and, as we will see below, the breakdown of his alliance with Mangkunagara pushed Mangkubumi also towards compromise.

A related development will be seen in the next chapter. With Mangkubumi's military successes there grew his sense of greatness as the Sunan of Kabanaran and, with that, arbitrary actions that discomfited his subordinates. This was central in the breakdown of the relationship between Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara, who was supposed to be his most powerful ally and his *senapati*, his commander-in-chief, as well as his son-in-law. They were shortly to become the bitterest of enemies.

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[116] Sunday-Lĕgi, 22 Sura, Jimawal *arga muni bah ing bumi*. This date is correct in the Friday calendar, still in use in Mangkubumi's domains until c. 1755; Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 80n31.

[117] *BG* Vol. x, p. 60; *SBPn* ff. 265v.–267r. The date on ibid., f. 267r., is Sunday, 25 Sura, whereas it should be either 22 Sura in the Friday calendar or 23 Sura in the Thursday calendar then being used in Surakarta. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that MN was using some local calendrical variant.

4

The Third Javanese War of Succession, Phase 2: The Collapse of the Rebel Alliance and Internal Warfare, 1752–53

Mangkubumi's Invasion of the Coast

In the first half of 1752, the war again swept over the VOC's core territory on Java's north coast.[1] Having initially been satisfied that the Company was doing well against the rebels, Van Hohendorff was surprised to learn on 18 March that Mangkubumi was on the move with his main force against the coast, in the midst of the heaviest rains of the wet monsoon. *Babad Giyanti* describes Mangkubumi marching northwards over the central mountain range with Png. Adiwijaya, the two *sayyids* and a large contingent of Islamic religious leaders. Unusually, all the women and children followed in the rear. They transported all their cooking gear with them, except only for their large wooden rice-stamping troughs. It was "like a city on the march, with markets all along the way".[2] VOC forces farther south

[1] The general account of the events of March and April 1752 below rests on the following sources: Van Hohendorff, Tegal, to Batavia, 8 Jan. 1752; Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 27 and 31 Mar., 16 Apr. and 10 May 1752; Falck, Tegal, to Batavia, 2 (there are two letters of this date), 19 and 25 Apr. 1752; all in VOC 2789 (OB 1752). KV, pp. 161–3; *BG* Vol. xi, pp. 3–5, 27–57; *SBPn* ff. 269r.–274r. (where the Thursday calendar is used for dates); Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 52–5. The Javanese sources consistently refer to the Makasarese as *Bugis*.

[2] *BG* Vol. xi, p. 4: *kadya nagri alalampah*, *pĕkĕne samargi-margi*.

in the interior were ordered to hasten to protect the Company's coastal positions.

On 23 March, Mangkubumi devastated Pekalongan. There the commander, Capt. C.F. von Bielefeldt, was interrupted at his lunch table by the attack. He rushed into battle on the *alun-alun* and was first reported to have been massacred there with all his troops. In fact, he escaped to Tegal, having lost over half of his hussars and much of his infantry in the fighting. Many of his Makassarese surrendered to Mangkubumi; Von Bielefeldt had complained about their "recalcitrant conduct" in January. Mangkubumi and Adiwijaya also suffered significant casualties in the encounter but captured large amounts of booty in money and war matériel. Van Hohendorff, as usual, criticised his subordinate officers, complained again about having too few soldiers and asked Batavia for reinforcements when the dry season arrived.

Chinese formed a substantial part of the population in most coastal towns. In the 1730s, for instance, the population of Losari consisted mainly of Chinese who grew tobacco and sugar for the VOC, and much of the rice farming in Pemalang was done by Chinese.[3] Van Hohendorff blamed Capt. Von Bielefeldt's defeat at Pekalongan partly on the Chinese community there, who were armed but stood aside from the battle. At Batang, Mangkubumi burned everything else but did no harm to the Chinese or to the Chinese-run sugar mills. We saw in the previous chapter that in 1746, the Chinese of Tanjung reportedly declared themselves willing to follow Mangkunagara and awaited his arrival.[4] The anti-Company sentiments that had fuelled the Chinese War of the 1740s probably still resonated among the Chinese, inspiring understanding and perhaps more between them and the rebels.

The VOC ordered the *bupatis* of Pekalongan, Batang and Wiradesa, who had left their areas when they came under attack, to return and take charge again as clients of the Company. They temporised, waiting to see which way the political and military winds would blow. By mid-April they had gone over to Mangkubumi, as did the governor of Pemalang. Mangkubumi rewarded Ad. Jayaningrat of Pekalongan with the princely title and name Png. Ar. Natakusuma. According to *Babad Giyanti*, the senior Surakarta commander Tg. Arungbinang

[3] Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 178–9.
[4] *SBPn* ff. 125r.–126v.

secretly submitted to Mangkubumi, too, describing himself as "serving him on the inside but on the outside still an enemy".[5]

The VOC's senior officer at Tegal, C.G. Falck, was worried at the absence of any reinforcements while "the progress of the rebels grows greater from day to day". The governors of Tegal and Brebes renewed their oaths of allegiance to the Company on the Qur'an and then—no longer having any significant number of men to command—asked to come inside the VOC fortress with their families for protection. But then they changed their minds and they, too, submitted to Mangkubumi. All access to Tegal from the landward side was cut off by the rebels. In late April mounted rebel forces appeared daily before the VOC fortress, but the Company garrison was too weak to respond. Maj. J.D. Hoff was sent to reinforce Tegal, but he was stuck at Kendal. All the roads and bridges had been destroyed by the rebels and all boats burned so that he could not cross the swollen rivers. In any case, according to Hartingh's *Kort verhaal*, Hoff's force had no impact on the rebels, "who far surpassed him in the art of war".[6]

The *bupatis* who had defected to Mangkubumi wrote a letter to the VOC explaining their decision. They said that they were obliged to submit to the rebel King "because the common people would not take up arms against him" and had urged them to turn against the Company. They claimed that they had long wished the Company to name as Emperor over Java the one whom the common folk, including the Chinese, desired as their ruler, i.e., Mangkubumi. "Furthermore, Pangeran Dipati Mangkunagara will march through Mataram to the east in order to ruin the coast," they wrote. They professed that they were favourably disposed towards the Company but wished Mangkubumi to be the sole Javanese ruler.[7] Had the

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[5] *BG* Vol. xi, pp. 56–7: *inggih angger kula rumiyin, duk Rama jĕngandika, inggih rawuhipun, ing Pagĕlen pan kawula, inggih sampun angabdekakĕn ing batin, laire maksih mĕngsah*. This was expressed in a letter addressed to MN. On Arungbinang's duplicity, see also *BG* Vol. x, p. 25; Vol. xi, pp. 62, 65–73 and elsewhere. In his uncertainty about what to do, Arungbinang was consulting his spirit wife named Dyah Bulupitu.

[6] KV, p. 164.

[7] Translated Javanese letter from R. Ad. Jayaningrat of Pekalongan, Tg. Cakrajaya [Javanese sources give his name as Cakranagara] of Pemalang, Ng. Jayengrana of Wiradesa, seen at Batavia 30 Apr. 1752, in VOC 2789 (OB 1752). There is further confusion of names in Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 9 July 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753).

Company responded favourably to this missive, the war might have ended in 1752. But it was not likely that the Europeans would abandon the pliable Susuhunan Pakubuwana III, whom they had themselves installed, in favour of the most dangerous and powerful rebels they had ever faced. It would be three more years before any political settlement would be possible.

Mangkubumi again turned to his Islamic advisers for a ruling on what to do with his captured Europeans, said to be 40 in number, who were weeping in sorrow at their fate. Sayyid Ngabdurahman ruled that if *kafirs* submitted and embraced Islam in all its rules, then they should be forgiven and respected. But it was different regarding *kafirs* captured in war. If they were obedient and happy in their hearts, then they were to be shown grace. But if they were remorseful and weeping, they were still secret enemies and should be killed. Mangkubumi asked whether that meant that innocent captives could be killed. Ngabdurahman agreed that was so if they were weeping. All the captives except the fife and drum players were then executed. The three musicians who were spared were given Javanese attire and the names Ongganaya, Onggaswara and Onggaprayitna.[8]

Mangkunagara was not involved in the Jenar victory in December 1751 or the subsequent coastal campaign of early 1752; he was informed of Mangkubumi's successes by letter. Instead, he was harassing VOC and Surakarta positions to the east of Yogya. In the back-and-forth fighting, Mangkunagara became angry at some of his officers and threatened in the future to kill whoever among them was first to abandon the field of battle. When several officers subsequently performed poorly against the VOC at Prambanan, Mangkunagara confiscated their *krisses* to shame them instead of executing them, so that all would be fearful in the future.[9]

Babad Giyanti reports a prophecy about the future at about this time. This story is not dated, and the timing is confusing. Its

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[8] *BG* Vol. x, pp. 71–2. See also Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 51. Cf. Qur'an 8:70–1, "Prophet, tell those you have taken captive, 'If God knows of any good in your hearts, He will give you something better than what has been taken from you, and He will forgive you: God is forgiving and merciful.' But if they mean to betray you, they have betrayed God before, and He has given you mastery over them"; and 47:4, "When you meet the disbelievers in battle, strike them in the neck, and once they are defeated, bind any captives firmly—later you can release them by grace or by ransom" (Abdul Haleem's transl., pp. 115, 331).

[9] *SBPn* ff. 274r.–281v.

location in *Babad Giyanti* suggests a setting in either mid-1751 or early 1752, while the *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* account seems to fit the latter. If the tale should be taken seriously, it suggests that the idea of a partitioning of the kingdom was beginning to be discussed. Among the vanguard commanders whom Mangkunagara chastised for their conduct in fighting near Prambanan was Tg. Wiranata, a man whose loyalties were changeable throughout this war. He wrote to the Surakarta *patih* Sindurĕja offering to submit. He claimed that many people were prophesying that his lord, Mangkunagara, would be unable to subdue the land of Java, the result being ongoing trouble and failure in the end. Those who would continue to rule Java would be Mangkubumi of Kabanaran and the King of Surakarta, come what may.[10] Mangkunagara knew of Wiranata's defection and described it in his *babad*. His *patih* Kudanawarsa pursued the fleeing deserter and his followers and engaged them in battle, but Wiranata made good his escape to Surakarta. Mangkunagara's chronicle does not indicate, however, that he was aware of the prophecy described by Wiranata.[11] In December 1752, Wiranata defected from the Surakarta side and again returned to Mangkunagara.[12]

On 1 May 1752 Mangkubumi left the coast and headed inland for Mataram, intending to build a stone *kraton* there, according to the VOC's information. That would give him a court more readily defended than the Surakarta *kraton*, which was effectively defenceless against fire, being so "widely spread out and built only of bamboo".[13] According to *Babad Giyanti*, later in 1752 Pakubuwana III and the VOC decided to upgrade the fortifications at Surakarta. By February 1753 the court and VOC post were defended by earthwork surrounds and ditches.[14] After Mangkubumi's return southwards, the Company regarrisoned the coastal areas against only light resistance. R. Ad. Jayaningrat of Pekalongan and the other *bupatis* who had fled once

[10] *BG* Vol. x, p. 65; here the story is placed after the report of MB's victory at Jenar (12 Dec. 1751, at Vol. x, p. 60) but concerns episodes involving MN that occurred before the death of Tirtawiguna/Sindurĕja of Surakarta (4 June 1751, at Vol. x, pp. 65–6).
[11] *SBPn* ff. 281v.–282r.; *BG* Vol. xii, pp. 6–8.
[12] *SBPn* f. 298v.; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 70.
[13] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 4 June 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753).
[14] *BG* Vol. xii, pp. 37–8; Vol. xiii, p. 70.

again became clients of the VOC.[15] They were, says *Babad Giyanti*, "evil in their hearts, returning to the Company again".[16]

Van Hohendorff reported that some people believed Mangkubumi's departure from the coast, where he currently held a military advantage, was his reaction to an awesome natural phenomenon. Van Hohendorff reported in detail on this "remarkable event perhaps unlike anything before". The day dawned clear with gentle winds, but at 7.30am there was the tremendous sound of light and heavy cannon fire and the discharge of handheld weapons, as if two great armies were at war. The ordinary Javanese of Semarang took fright and fled. The VOC, no less uncertain what was afoot, took up defensive positions and sent out scouts to discover what was happening. They feared that Semarang was about to be attacked—a not-unnatural fear, given what had transpired during the previous two months. Then at 9.30am the sound of firing ended and "from the east a fiery cloud arose over Mount Lawu, which stretched from the south to the north, as far as the eye could see". The cloud grew ever darker and drifted westwards in the dead still of a windless day. Around 1.30pm this began to attenuate, and a "very pale sun" appeared. At about 3pm the sky turned azure blue, but at 3.30pm this disappeared. By 4pm again all was so dark that candles had to be lit in the houses and torches kindled on the town walls. Then a mighty ash-rain fell. It was subsequently reported that the ash was about 2.5cm deep at Semarang and Demak, some 0.66cm deep at Salatiga, and a full 10cm deep at Surakarta. Nature's cannon barrage had been heard along the entire north coast. The Semarang VOC officers believed that Mount Lawu must have erupted.[17] The Company had no forces in that area who could confirm that. *Babad Giyanti*, undoubtedly better informed, recorded this as an eruption of Mount Kelud (near Kediri) and dated it with the chronogram "the voice of the mountain moved the world".[18]

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[15] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 May 1752, and Falck, Tegal, to Batavia, 20 May 1752, both in VOC 2789 (OB 1752). Falck, Tegal, to Batavia, 30 May 1752, and Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 9 July 1752, both in VOC 2805 (OB 1753). KV, pp. 165–6.

[16] *BG* Vol. xi, p. 76: *kang ati durjana, balik mring Kumpĕni malih*.

[17] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 May 1752, in VOC 2789 (OB 1752). The original measurements are by Dutch *duijm* (thumb), approx. 2.5–2.7cm.

[18] *BG* Vol. xi, pp. 58–9. The event is correctly dated in the Thursday calendar as Monday-Paing, 16 Jumadilakir, Jimawal *swaraning gunung obah ingkang jagat* (1 May 1752).

The panicked response to this massive eruption was nothing unique to Javanese. Europeans, too, tended to see omens in such events. Keith Thomas has shown how English folk had a capacity for interpreting natural phenomena in supernatural ways—not, of course, including volcanic eruptions, of which there were none in England. They saw apparitions in the sky, even including "dragons or armies in battle".[19] Given that the Javanese and the Europeans were in the midst of a genuine war, their fear that some great armies were approaching was rather more rational than that. And anyone in Java with a long memory might have recalled Kelud's previous massive eruption of July 1716. That produced white ash-rain which reminded VOC officers of a European snowfall. It presaged the outbreak of the Surabaya War (1717–23) and the Second Javanese War of Succession (1719–23).[20]

War in the Interior and Increasing Tensions between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi

Mangkunagara was also disturbed and his affairs disrupted by this eruption. After the fighting around Prambanan, he retired to Mount Sendang, near Ponorogo in East Java, where his women had been sent for safety.

His wife Ratu Běndara (Mangkubumi's daughter) was seven months pregnant, and it was time for the customary celebrations (*tingkěban*) of that milestone. Her grandmother M. Ayu Tejawati arrived along with many other dignitaries. For seven days, three sets of *gamělan* played loudly; and on the seventh, cannon salutes were fired. Dancing had begun when the ash-rain fell. No doubt the noise was impressive, for Mount Sendang was only some 100km from Mount Kelud, whose eruption was causing so much concern in Semarang, about 230km distant from it. *Tingkěban* celebrations came to a halt. The women feared the approach of an enemy. So did the men, who prepared to do battle. When all fell quiet again, Mangkunagara moved with his women and soldiers to Samakaton on the

[19] Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 104.
[20] Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, p. 164.

slopes of Mount Lawu, where years before he had been chastised by two brotherly hermits for his arrogance. There, as his *babad* records, Mangkunagara and his entourage resumed entertaining themselves with night-time *wayang krucil* and daytime outings on the river, singing and drinking to the sound of boat-borne *gamĕlan*.[21]

As Mangkubumi returned from the coast towards Mataram, he interrupted Mangkunagara's entertainments with an order to build "a *kraton* which is fitting, to create a fortress of Mataram east of the river Opak at the edge of the mountains, at a place called Pabrĕkan market". (Unlike the VOC records, the Javanese sources do not mention stone construction, which was unlikely.) This place—also spelled Pabrĕgan in the sources—was northeast of Kabanaran, according to *Babad Giyanti*. It was perhaps somewhere north of Prambanan, in other words at a forward position facing the VOC and Pakubuwana III troops based in Surakarta. This was quite aggressive positioning and may be taken as a mark of Mangkubumi's greater confidence in the wake of his successful coastal campaign. Mangkunagara was surprised at this command and hastened to fulfil it. He sent his brother Mangkuningrat ahead to begin the work, as Mangkunagara and his senior followers feared Mangkubumi's anger if he arrived to find an unfinished *kraton*.[22]

But Mangkubumi did arrive only a day later to find his new *kraton* unfinished, and at this—according to Mangkunagara's chronicle—he displayed the arrogance and anger of a victorious conquering monarch. Despite the firing of salutes and the playing of *gamĕlan* to welcome him, "he arrived with all his troops, with exceeding pride which was not the custom". Mangkubumi was "offended in his heart but did not express his anger". The attending Tumĕnggungs and *bupatis* nevertheless could perceive this anger, for "His Highness did not speak to them, didn't wish to look upon those who were before him". Nor did he greet Mangkunagara, which was utterly shaming. Mangkunagara recorded thinking to himself, "O God! His Majesty has the bragging style of a victor in war, flaunting his grandiosity and

[21] *SBPn* ff. 282r.–282v. The three *gamĕlan* are described (f. 282r.) as *sakati salendro, katiga pelog*.
[22] *SBPn* ff. 282v.–283v. (quotation from f. 283r.: *kadhaton kang patut, karyaa kitha Mataram, sawetane kali Upak pinggir ngardi, aran pasar Pabrĕkan*); *BG* Vol. xi, p. 74.

not speaking to us. It's probably unavoidable that I will part ways (from him) in the future."[23]

With a breach looming between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi, the former prepared a feast for Mangkubumi and the latter took possession of his new *kraton* on 20 May 1752.[24] The brief *Babad Giyanti* account of the occupation of the new court, however —here again, we may guess, describing how the world looked to Mangkubumi—makes no mention of tensions.[25]

The Company's intelligence (not necessarily to be taken at face value, of course) estimated rebel strengths in mid-1752 as follows. Mangkubumi was said to have 6,000 able-bodied men among a total following of 10,000 including women and children. These allegedly consisted of "Javanese, fled Chinese, slaves, Balinese and other fugitives". In Mataram itself he commanded 4,200 Javanese and more than 400 "fugitive Chinese, Makasarese, Balinese and 3 Europeans". Mangkunagara had under his command 2,000 Javanese and one European. Png. Adiwijaya had 1,000 Javanese. Pngs Rongga and Panular had 2,000 men on the Mataram-Bagelen border. Pngs Singasari and Martapura had only 400 men on the border of Sukawati and Cengkalsewu. Mangkubumi had effective control over Mataram, Sukawati and the whole of Gunung Kidul. The VOC claimed that he was so oppressive and demanded so much from the inhabitants of the interior districts that they were much disturbed. The condition of the land was dreadful, with fields unplanted, and people fled.[26] The Dutch description of Mangkubumi's oppressive conduct is so critical that we may be inclined to doubt it, but it does mirror what Mangkunagara recorded in his *babad*, as noted above. *Babad Giyanti* records indiscipline later in 1752 among Mangkunagara's own troops, who were indiscriminately looting villagers.[27]

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[23] *SBPn* ff. 283v.–284r.: *Sunan sabala kang lagya prapti, piyangkah langkungi, sanes adatipun … Kangjĕng Susunan duk prapti, rĕngat jroning galih, duka tan kawĕtu /0/ sawarnine Tumĕnggung Bupati, kang mapag Sang Katong, samya raos kadukanan kabeh, Sri Narendra tan ngaru-aruhi, tan karsa ningali, mring kang mapag wau /0/ miwah Pangeran Adipati, sĕmana Sang Katong, kendĕl tan sinapa ing putrane, Pangran Dipati raos tur isin, tan ngandika aji, rĕngat jroning kalbu /0/ osik kang tyas Pangeran Dipata, Yatalah Sang Katong, samakeyan wong mĕnang yudane, adol angkuh tan ngaru-aruhi, baya wus pinasthi pisah ingsun besuk.*

[24] *SBPn* f. 284r.

[25] *BG* Vol xi, pp. 78–9.

[26] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 4 June 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753).

[27] *BG* Vol. xii, p. 74.

Tensions between the two leading rebels deepened further over family issues, as Mangkunagara himself recorded. One R. Suraprameya defected from Surakarta and arrived with his wife at Pabrĕkan. Mangkunagara was attracted to her, feelings which she reciprocated. When news of this liaison reached Mangkubumi, he was furious. No doubt his anger was in part because Mangkunagara's wife Ratu Bĕndara—Mangkubumi's daughter—was then about to give birth. On 1 July 1752 she delivered a daughter named R. Aj. Supiyah, who died in infancy, the only child by Ratu Bĕndara and Mangkunagara. Mangkunagara, however, was so distracted by his passion for Suraprameya's wife that he briefly ignored the birth of his daughter.[28] This episode and the fact that the marriage produced no more children suggest that any personal affection Mangkunagara may have felt for Ratu Bĕndara was at an end.

Then Mangkubumi elevated some of Mangkunagara's closest followers in rank. Adipati Kudanawarsa—the man closest to Mangkunagara since his childhood—was given the rank of Tumĕnggung, and others were also summoned to Mangkubumi. He wanted to make them "outer heads" (*wadana jawi*). That is to say, Mangkubumi was implicitly detaching them from Mangkunagara's entourage and attaching them to his own. Mangkunagara was unhappy about this interference in his own prerogatives, "because his father[-in-law] the King, ever since he arrived back from Pekalongan with his army, behaved very differently towards Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara], not as was his wont".[29]

The VOC learned of the estrangement between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi as it was happening. Hartingh later wrote, "in this time, when the enemy seemed at his most powerful, unexpectedly Divine Providence … offered help. I refer to the disunity between Mangkubumi and Mas Said [Mangkunagara]." He regretted that the Company did not make better use of this opportunity which, in his judgement, might have ended the war then and there.[30] Van Hohendorff recommended to Batavia that it attempt to open "peaceful

[28] *SBPN* ff. 285r.–287v. Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 267, is wrong to say that the child died before she received a name.
[29] *SBPn* ff. 287v.–288r.; *BG* Vol. xi, pp. 76–7. Quotation from *SBPn* f. 288r.: *sawab ingkang Rama Sri Bupati, salamine rawoh, saking Pakalongan sawadyane, sangĕt denya angowah-owahi, mring Pangran Dipati, sanes adatipun*.
[30] KV, p. 168.

negotiations" with Mangkubumi. In July Batavia agreed to adopt this approach.[31] The VOC exchanged communications with the rebels in 1752, but nothing came of these feelers and the rebel conquests continued. By November Van Hohendorff was even becoming uncertain about how deep the estrangement between the two foremost rebels really was. Nevertheless, he assured Batavia in December that "during the inactivity associated with this bleak weather, I will spare no means to talk Mas Said [Mangkunagara] around".[32]

Van Hohendorff told Batavia that the limitations the Company placed on Pakubuwana III—an utterly insignificant player on the politico-military stage—reduced the latter's capacity to gain a following. Of particular importance were the practice of the VOC Resident at the court sitting upon the throne in a position level with the young monarch during court appearances and the limitations on the ruler's powers over justice. These should be revised so that he would have a "a bit more grandeur" and "not appear too trivial in the eyes of his people".[33] Batavia agreed with this belated recognition of how Javanese royal politics worked. Pakubuwana III subsequently expressed his pleasure at being able to appoint and remove *bupatis* from their positions (albeit with the prior knowledge of the VOC governor of the northeast coast), to execute lesser subjects—but not *bupatis*—without the approval of the VOC Resident at the court, and to adjudicate civil matters himself. A major source of dissatisfaction was removed by the European Resident henceforth sitting at a lower level and to the side of the King in public.[34] The military-political dynamics of the time, however, rendered these reforms too little and too late. Pakubuwana III remained a cipher in affairs of state.

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[31] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 4 June; Van Hohendorff, Banyudono, to Batavia, 30 Oct. and 12 Nov. 1752; all in VOC 2805 (OB 1753). Batavia to H.XVII, 30 Dec. 1752, in dJ x, p. 192.

[32] Van Hohendorff, in camp at "Panawangang" in uplands of Grobogan, to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1752; Van Hohendorff, Banyudono, to Batavia, 30 Oct. and 12 Nov. 1752; all in VOC 2805 (OB 1753). Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1752 and 14 Apr. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754). KV, pp. 172–4; *BG* Vol. xii, pp. 63–6; *SBPn* f. 297v.; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 66–7, 70.

[33] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753).

[34] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1752, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); KV, p. 173.

War in East Java and the Looming Breach

Mangkubumi divided his forces in several directions, ordering Mangkunagara to march against the eastern "outer lands" (*moncanagara*), which were still beyond his control.[35] The governors of Kaduwang and Ponorogo had failed to pay obeisance to Mangkubumi at Pabrĕkan. The former sent only a letter, and the latter dispatched a representative rather than coming in person. Meanwhile, one of the governors of Surabaya, Tg. Sawunggaling (as he is named in *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*; he is called Dipati Cĕbolang in *Babad Giyanti* and was known as Sĕcanagara to the Dutch), rebelled against the VOC but was soon defeated. He sought Mangkubumi's assistance.

Mangkunagara set off for the east in early September 1752. Prince Mangkuningrat went with him, while Kudanawarsa—evidently still in Mangkunagara's chain of command after all—preceded him. Their campaign was interrupted when Mangkubumi called the two princes back to Pabrĕkan, where he was about to receive the fleeing Sultan of Banten.[36] They resumed their march a few weeks later, easily taking Kaduwang, which they found deserted.

Ponorogo was a more serious challenge. There the *bupati*, Ad. Suradiningrat, stood firm. Several fortified positions defended the approaches to Ponorogo. Mangkunagara's march from Kaduwang to Ponorogo, according to his *babad*, continued in the fashion we have come to expect from him, with attention to his soldiers' fitness and morale. Their wives accompanied them, and whenever they rested they were entertained with performances of *gamĕlan* and *wayang*. Mangkunagara wrote to Mangkubumi saying that his advance was slowed because of the difficulty of moving cannon through the precipices and gorges he faced. On 28 September they took a fortress in a ravine so difficult that horses could not be used.

Clausewitz has left us a vivid description of what it was like to move an army through such mountainous country in Europe. We

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[35] The account of MN's and MB's eastern *moncanagara* campaigns of September 1752 relies on *SBPn* ff. 288v.–289v., 290v.–293v.; *BG* Vol. xii, pp. 27–36, 40–54; Van Hohendorff, Banyudono, to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753) (also quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 66); Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 57, 65.

[36] On the conflict in Banten, which is tangential to the main interest of this book, see Ota Atsushi, *Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750–1830* (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2006), pp. 59–74; Robidé van der Aa, "Groote Bantamsche opstand".

may borrow his picture to supplement the briefer descriptions in our sources, for circumstances were little different in Java. Except perhaps that there was more frequent and heavier rain to add to the misery:

> A column toils at snail's pace up a mountain through narrow gorges; gunners and teamsters yell and swear as they flog their weary beasts along the rocky tracks; each broken-down wagon has to be removed at the cost of indescribable effort while behind it the rest of the column stops, grumbles, and curses. At such a moment, each man secretly thinks that in this situation a few hundred of the enemy would suffice to cause a total rout.[37]

Having overpowered the mountain fortress, Mangkunagara marched his soldiers to Magetan, on the eastern approaches to Mount Lawu. From there the advance turned southeast towards Ponorogo itself. Mangkunagara had a force of 700 cavalry, according to his account (*Babad Giyanti* refers to 1,600), less than Suradiningrat's reputed (but doubtful) 10,000. Despite being outnumbered, Mangkunagara pressed the offensive. Ponorogo fell to his assault on 30 September 1752, and his forces sacked the town. Suradiningrat was killed during the fighting; his severed head was sent to Mangkubumi as a war prize. Van Hohendorff received a letter from Mangkunagara telling him of this victory. Van Hohendorff reported to his superiors that "R. Ad Suradiningrat of Ponorogo, that enterprising regent who was faithful to the Company, was murdered by the bloodthirsty rabble in an inhuman and execrable fashion". *Babad Giyanti*, however, says that Suradiningrat's horse fell on him as he sought to flee and he was smothered to death, dying without a wound on him. What Van Hohendorff received must have been an account of the subsequent mutilation of Suradiningrat's body. According to *Babad Giyanti*, the corpse's head and genitals were severed and the latter were stuffed into the mouth; this grisly trophy was put into a rice steamer and sent as a prize to Mangkubumi. He and his dignitaries found this gift hilarious.

Mangkubumi himself appeared with his army and occupied Madiun, which he found deserted. Van Hohendorff observed that the rebels had thereby "at a stroke made themselves masters of the two most important and most populous districts of Java, namely Ponorogo and Madiun". This was something of an exaggeration, but nevertheless the conquest of the usually fruitful and well-populated

[37] Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 417.

Madiun River valley was important.[38] With Mangkubumi at the north of the valley and Mangkunagara at the south, however, this achievement was about to exacerbate the estrangement between them. Again, family issues and Mangkunagara's irrepressible love of beautiful women were at the centre of the conflict.

The day after occupying Madiun, Mangkubumi headed south to Ponorogo. *Babad Giyanti* says that at this stage his army consisted of 2,800 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. At Ponorogo town he was grandly received by Mangkunagara and his forces. Cannon and musket salutes, several *gamĕlan* orchestras playing, and *bĕdhaya* dances welcomed the rebel monarch. He immediately established his court in Ponorogo's fortifications, and Saturday tournaments commenced.

Upon conquest of Ponorogo, Mangkunagara's ever-wandering eye fell on two particularly beautiful *bĕdhaya* dancers named Pun Saripi and Pun Sampĕt, whom he took to his bed. With the candour that sometimes surprises a reader of Mangkunagara's *babad*, he recorded that these two exceeded Ratu Bĕndara (who had only recently given birth) in his affections. Ratu Bĕndara was distressed and her father Mangkubumi utterly furious. As an act of rejection and insult, he returned to Mangkunagara all the booty which had been offered to him. Realising that he was in a difficult situation, Mangkunagara submitted to his father-in-law's anger. He presented the two *bĕdhaya* dancers to Mangkubumi, but they were refused until Mangkunagara explicitly asked to be forgiven, whereupon Mangkubumi accepted the war booty. The two dancers, however, were returned to Mangkunagara, who turned to enjoying feasting and *bĕdhaya* performances. Thereafter, however, confusion and tension reigned when Mangkubumi again asked to have the young women. "They were offered [to Mangkubumi] before and then given to me," Mangkunagara recorded himself thinking, "so how is it that the *bĕdhaya* dancers are demanded [by him] again? This greatly disappoints my heart. Who could carry this out?" He was unable to eat or sleep, he wrote, pondering how Mangkubumi's wishes continually disappointed him.[39]

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[38] See M.C. Ricklefs, "Some Statistical Evidence on Javanese Social, Economic and Demographic History in the Later Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", *Modern Asian Studies* 20, 1 (1986), esp. pp. 3–4, 24, 27.

[39] *SBPn* ff. 293v.–295v.; *BG* Vol. xii, pp. 54–7, 68–70. Quotation from *SBPn* f. 295r.: *wus katur tamtu dhingin, kaparingakĕn mring wang, mĕngko kaya mangkana, bĕdhaya pinundhut malih, nyuwani manah, sapa bisa lakoni*.

The amorous entanglements went from bad to worse. At *Garĕbĕg Bĕsar* (19 October 1752) Mangkunagara's *gamĕlan* played continuously, but he was, according to his chronicle, ever more downhearted and subject to Mangkubumi's anger. He did not eat because of a stomach complaint, which only increased his superior's anger. He was accused of being sullen and withdrawn. "Ever more downhearted and sorrowful was the feeling in his soul. He spoke within his heart, 'What awaits me if I separate from the King? I am unable to restrain my desire', was the thought in the heart of Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara]." Ratu Bĕndara, distressed at her husband's passion for the two *bĕdhaya* dancers, demanded them through her father, Mangkubumi. The young Pun Sampĕt was at the mercy of the princes who desired her. Mangkubumi himself was now enamoured of her and renamed her Marioněng. To further complicate matters, Mangkubumi's son, the Crown Prince R.M. Ěntho, was also besotted and had sex with her. "Alas! It was the will of God!" says Mangkunagara's *babad*. It records his view that both Mangkubumi and Ěntho were behaving like animals. According to this source, Mangkubumi was now so furious that he considered having Pun Sampĕt/Marioněng murdered but was talked out of it by one of his concubines.[40]

Mangkubumi ordered Mangkunagara to return to Mataram while he himself would march eastwards to assess the state of the war in Surabaya. There all went badly for the rebel known variously as Sawunggaling, Cĕbolang or Sĕcanagara. The VOC received reports that he conspired with Mangkubumi. Hartingh expressed doubts about this in his *Kort verhaal*, but the reports were correct, as we noted above. The Company was also correct in believing that Mangkubumi's initial plan had been for Mangkunagara, if successful in the *moncanagara*, to march on to take Surabaya, but this was never acted on. The rebellion of Sawunggaling/Cĕbolang/Sĕcanagara failed when the Company's client lord of West Madura, Cakraningrat V (r. 1745–70), intervened militarily. The defeated rebel fled to the mountains around Malang, where he took refuge with the descendants

[40] *SBPn* ff. 295r.–297v.; *BG* Vol. xii, pp. 68–70 (the concubine [*sĕlir*] was Bok Aj. Jipang, whose husband Suradiměnggala had been murdered by MB: see below). Quotations from *SBPn* f. 295r.: *saya anglĕk anggĕgĕs raos in driya, ngandika jroning galih, aku nganti apa, pipisahan lan Nata, tan kawawa nambak brangti, raosing driya, Pangeran Adipati;* and from f. 286v.: *sampun dilalah, wus karsaning Yyang Widi*.

of Surapati, the Company's foremost enemy of the late 17th to early 18th centuries.[41] Mangkubumi's hopes that he might add Surabaya to his conquests remained empty.

Van Hohendorff sought to engage Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara in the eastern *moncanagara* where both were found in late 1752. He arrived in the area in late November, after struggling through "muddy and craggy" mountain paths and across dangerous rivers in full flood. But before he could get within eight hours' march of his opponents, they split up and disappeared "over forest and mountains". The rainy season meant that all the normally good roads were turned into streams "up to 2 or 3 feet deep" and were unusable for the VOC army (although we should note the capacity of the rebels to move quickly in the same conditions). Van Hohendorff led his bedraggled army back to the coast.[42] In the western theatre, Capt. B. Bacheracht and Tg. Arungbinang—still playing a deceitful role, according to *Babad Giyanti*—engaged forces commanded by Pngs Rongga and Panular and the Banten figure Ky. Tapa in equally atrocious conditions along the Bogowonto River.[43]

As of early 1753, "all the *moncanagara* people had submitted to the rebels" and would remain so until Company help appeared, Van Hohendorff was advised.[44] The prospects of a VOC campaign in East Java were small. In late January Van Hohendorff's total force consisted of 5,791 men, a loss of nearly 700 since his last report. Most had died in the Semarang hospital from the widespread disease still prevailing; others had fallen in combat. His horses were also dying in large numbers.[45] This was not a force—or a climate—which would enable Company arms to prevail against more numerous, well-trained, well-armed and well-commanded enemies who were at home in the terrain. Unless, of course, those enemies became divided against themselves, as was in fact happening.

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[41] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 June and 9 July 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753); Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1752, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); KV, pp. 166–71, 174–5; *BG* Vol. xii, pp. 25–32, 50–60, 72–8.
[42] Van Hohendorff, in camp at Brakas, to Batavia, 5 Dec. 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753); KV, p. 173.
[43] Bacheracht, "Katangie" near the Bogowonto, to Batavia, 16 Dec. 1752, and Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1752, both in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); *BG* Vol. xiii, pp. 20–30.
[44] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Feb.1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).
[45] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 22 Jan. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

Mangkunagara's Open Break with Mangkubumi

Having returned to the Mataram area, Mangkunagara received various dignitaries, the most notable being his uncle Png. Buminata. We have encountered him before, depicted in the chronicles as a snobbish, cowardly fool—but then, all of our sources are from people who were opposed to him. In 1749 he had abandoned his rebellion and returned to Surakarta. When Pakubuwana III acceded to the throne late in that year, remarkably Buminata was declared Crown Prince. We might imagine what he thought of being second in importance and presumptive successor to a younger nephew. He was evidently disheartened by the worsening position of VOC arms and of the court to which he was the putative successor. At the end of 1752, Van Hohendorff described the affairs of the Surakarta *kraton* as "abominable"; the *patih* Pringgalaya was behaving unconscionably, while Buminata was accused of debauching other dignitaries' wives. Buminata reportedly became upset when, in December 1752, R. Tg. Ranadipura (the head of Sukawati and Mangkubumi's brother-in-law) and the ever-changeable Tg. Wiranata defected to Mangkunagara. According to Van Hohendorff, this was after Ranadipura had first offered his submission to the VOC the previous October. In early 1753 Buminata himself—evidently convinced that being the heir to the crumbling Surakarta throne was an unattractive position—escaped from Pakubuwana III's court and submitted to Mangkunagara. The latter was then busily harvesting the rice in the fields around Surakarta for his forces and burning whatever remained, causing food shortages. Mangkunagara ridiculed Buminata for his past cowardice, according to *Babad Giyanti*. Mangkubumi summoned this deeply unadmired brother to Ponorogo. As for Pakubuwana III, Van Hohendorff despaired: "I hardly know how the government of the present unfortunate and lamentable King can be maintained any longer."[46]

According to his *babad*, Mangkunagara's inner soliloquies about breaking with Mangkubumi now became open discussions. Late in 1752 or early in 1753, a gathering was held at Mangkunagara's residence to celebrate the ritual first contact with the soil (*tĕdhak siti*)[47]

[46] Van Hohendorff, Banyudono, to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1752, in VOC 2805 (OB 1753); Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1752, 22 Jan. 1753 and 20 Feb. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); *SBPn* f. 298v.; *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 5–9; KV p. 175; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 70.

[47] A ritual observed 245 days, i.e., seven *lapan* (35-day cycles), after birth.

for his first son, R.M. Sura (later Png. Ar. Prabu Amijaya).[48] There a discussion of breaking openly with Mangkubumi took place, eliciting oaths of loyalty from Mangkunagara's followers. Prominent among those supporting a breach was Mangkunagara's uncle—Mangkubumi's younger brother—Prince Purbaya, who promised to wager his life in combat against Mangkubumi. "Loudly the soldiers, officials, *Tumĕnggungs* and officers promised, each and every one. Some drew their *krisses* and proffered them tearfully. Great was their faithfulness towards Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara]."[49] Thereafter, ill will between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi continued to grow.[50]

Mangkunagara received a letter from Mangkubumi announcing that he had established his court in Ponorogo. He summoned Buminata and Jayaningrat of Pekalongan, neither of whom could expect a cordial reception. He also demanded the presence of R. Tg. Ranadipura, who had defected to Mangkunagara in December 1752. Mangkunagara had vouched for Ranadipura and repeatedly written in his interest to Mangkubumi's leading general and (like Ranadipura) his brother-in-law, Mas Rongga Wirasantika. (He was later and more commonly known as Rongga Prawiradirja, one of the pillars of Mangkubumi's later sultanate; we will use that name throughout.) Mangkunagara had urged Rongga Prawiradirja to get Mangkubumi's agreement to a grant of land as reward for Ranadipura but had received no reply. Now Ranadipura was fearful of what awaited him. With Mangkunagara's support, he refused to go. Mangkunagara told Mangkubumi's emissary that Buminata and Jayaningrat could go to Ponorogo but Ranadipura would not. Come what may, he would remain united with Mangkunagara. This constituted open defiance—indeed, implicit rebellion. In Ponorogo, Mangkubumi asked others about the reports that Mangkunagara was no longer loyal but wished to become King himself.[51]

Mangkunagara summoned his *patih* and closest adviser Kudanawarsa, his *pĕngulu* Ki Iman, and other "special officials" (*mantri miji*)

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[48] His mother was Kusumapatahati, whom we will come to know more of later; Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 267.

[49] *SBPn* f. 299r.: *gumĕr prajurit pramantri, pratumĕnggung prapunggawa, prajanjiyan dhewe-dhewe, ana kang narik curiga, wĕnehana karuna, kalangkung prasĕtcanipun* [sic]*, dhatĕng Pangeran Dipatya*. See also *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 18–9.

[50] *SBPn* ff. 299v.–300r.

[51] *SBPn* ff. 299r.–301v.; *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 11–7, 30; KV, p. 176. I am not clear when Jayaningrat came to be with Mangkunagara again.

for advice in these difficult circumstances. His own account offers a vivid description of the discussion that followed, ending in public rupture with Mangkubumi:

42. In difficulty was Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara],
in difficulty, perplexed in his heart,
wishing to break with His Highness [Mangkubumi].
"What will become of Java?
If I should continue united
with the King, my fear is great,"
Pangeran Dipati said.
43. "The land of Java:
what will be its lot?
Its enemies will be delighted.
If I remain united
and am the *patih* of the King,
I greatly fear [for Java's lot]
and many (fear) similarly."
44. Kudanawarsa spoke calmly,
"Our 'father' the King
has changed and is extremely deceitful.
What more will happen now?
The people of Java are not yet brought all under (his) control.
If later they are all under (his) control,
(he) will command as (if he were) God.
45. "What worries me
is that your concubines and wives,
along with Ranadipura,
if the times prosper,
will be compulsorily demanded [by Mangkubumi],
like the *bĕdhaya* dancers earlier
who were from Ponorogo."
46. Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara] spoke:
"Yes, that's what I fear.
What of each of you special officials?"
They all said,
"If it is as you wish,
don't take half-measures.
So long as the times are not yet prosperous [for Mangkubumi],
47. "don't take half-measures.
Break from 'father' the King,
and meet him in battle wherever.
Your servants
are not frightened

of being the enemy of His Highness's army,
testing each other's courage."
All were firm in their advice.

48. Because he had heard (of this)
the Honourable Gentleman of Semarang [Van Hohendorff]
repeatedly exchanged letters with
Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara]:
If he were to separate from his "father",
he strongly promised
that the Company would support him in war.

49. The beginning of the splitting of hearts
between "father" His Highness
and Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara]
at Pajagalan in Mataram
was on Thursday-Wage the days,
the date the 20th,
the month Jumadilawal

50. the year Je, which was given the chronogram
"the elephant and the horse
felt courageous" [AJ 1678] in their hearts [29 March 1753].
Pangeran Adipati
Arya Mangkunagara,
was determined
to separate from his "father" the King.

51. The *tumĕnggungs* of Mataram
advised along with their soldiers;
and the princes,
they all reached consensus
to part company from His Highness.
Those who were far away gathered together:
the officials and *tumĕnggungs*, all,

52. all pleased to know
that Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara]
wished to separate from the King [Mangkubumi].[52]

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[52] *SBPn* ff. 301v.–302v., Canto 74 (Asmaradana): 42. *Kawĕdan Pangran Dipati, kewran wi[m]buh ing wardaya, arsa pisah lan Sang Katong, kapriye dadining Jawa, pama maksih ku[m]pula, lan Nata watir agung, Pangran Dipati ngandika*. 43. *iya ta nagara Jawi, paran tĕmahe ing be[n]jang, kang mungsuh dadi bungahe, yen ingsun maksih ku[m]pula, dadi patih ing Nata, abangĕt kawatir ingsun lan akeh lire mangkana*. 44. *Kudanawarsya turnyaris, ing mangke rama Sang Nata, acidra sangĕt owahe, ing mangke lagya punapa, wong Jawa dereng rata, sampun arata ing besuk, parentah Alah punika*. 45. *kang dadya rudating mami, sĕlir tuwan para garwa, miwah Ranadipurane, manawa kartaning jaman, pinĕksa pun[n]dhuta, kadi bĕdhaya*

Mangkunagara's chronicle records that his brother Mangkuningrat supported him, as did other dignitaries, including Mangkubumi's younger brother Png. Purbaya. But there were others who dissented. They set off, heading east to Ponorogo to join Mangkubumi.[53] The latter quickly learned of Mangkunagara's open rebellion. *Babad Giyanti* says that Prince Adiwijaya, another brother of Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara's uncle, attempted to prevent this breach. Adiwijaya appears often in the sources and seems to have been widely respected. "His advice was like a flowing river—Png. Adiwijaya's to his 'son' Png. Mangkunagara—but his 'son' was unmoved, like a mountain in a moderate breeze," says the *babad*. Adiwijaya's death in early 1753 in an engagement with Feber's forces in Kedu thus removed an important voice against Mangkunagara's action.[54]

Van Hohendorff received correspondence from Mangkunagara by mid-April announcing that he "had entirely separated" from Mangkubumi. Although he had lingering doubts about what was actually going on, Van Hohendorff followed Batavia's orders to leave Mangkunagara "unmolested" so long as he initiated no hostilities

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rumuwun, ingkang saking Pranaraga. 46. *ngandika Pangran Dipati, iya iku watir ingwang, priye mantri siji kabeh, ature miji sadaya, yen suwawi ing karsa, sampun katanggĕl ing laku, mu[m]pung dereng karta jaman*. 47. *Pan sampun katanggĕl ing kardi, pinisah rama Paduka, kapa[ng]gih pundi yudane, kawula pan dereng ngulap, mĕ[ng]sah bala Sang Nata, atandhing prawiranipun, ing rĕmbag gilig sadaya*. 48. *dhasar sĕmana rĕngi, ing Dĕler nagri Sĕmarang, awali-wali surate, mring Pangeran Adipatya, pisaha lan kang rama, asangĕt pangĕbangipun, Kumpni tulung ing yuda*. 49. *wiwite bĕlah kang galih, lan kang rama Sri Narendra, lan Pangeran Dipatine, neng Pajagalan Mataram, Kĕmis-Wage dinanya, ing tanggal ping kalihpuluh, ing sasi Jumadelawal*. 50. *taun Je densĕngkalani, punang liman lan turongga, angrasa wani galihye, Ka[ng]jĕng Pangeran Dipatya, Arya Mĕngkunagara, sampun nekad karsanipun, pisah lan rama Sang Nata*. 51. *para tumĕnggung Matawis, sampun rĕmbag saha bala, prapangeran, rĕmbag kabeh, sampun mupakat sadaya, apisah lan Sang Nata, kang tĕbih-tĕbih wus ku[m]pul, mantri tumĕnggung sadaya*. 52. *Sami kasukan uning, yen mangke Pangran Dipatya, lan Nata pisah karsane*.

Note that there is an apparent error in the date of the month here. To be consistent with the seven- and five-day-week days, in the Thursday calendar the date should have been 24, not 20, Jumadilawal. There is evidence in the sources of local calendrical variations, but I do not recall any that varied by as much as four days from what one would expect, so this seems to be an error.

[53] *SBPn* ff. 302v.–303r.

[54] *BG* Vol. xiii, pp. 44–50; *SBPn* ff. 300r.–300v.; KV, p. 176. Quotation from *BG* Vol. xiii, p. 45: *pituture anglir toya mili, Pangran Adwijaya mring putra, Pangran Mangkunagarane, kang putra sĕmunipun, datan keguh saengga wukir, kĕna angin ukuran*.

himself.[55] *Babad Giyanti* says that Van Hohendorff incited Mangkunagara to claim the kingship and even offered him military assistance. Doubting the Company's goodwill, Kudanawarsa counselled Mangkunagara against being swayed by these inducements.[56] Van Hohendorff's version of February 1753 was that he had offered Mangkunagara "one or another regency, independent of the court" but that it was Mangkunagara who insisted on Pakubuwana III being dethroned and replaced by himself. Mangkunagara had, however, agreed to a pause in hostilities.[57] At this stage, Batavia's inclination was, if possible, to detach Mangkunagara from the rebellion, leaving Mangkubumi alone in the field. Its approaches to Mangkunagara, as in the past, came to nothing in the end.

In Ponorogo, Mangkubumi sought to increase his army. In the months preceding the breach with Mangkunagara, he had gone farther towards Surabaya, although in the end he never attacked that major Company outpost. He summoned the descendants of Surapati and Cěbolang with their soldiers. They assembled in Kertosono, where his new recruits were assessed. They were reportedly much impressed by a demonstration of rapid cavalry manoeuvres by Mangkubumi's horsemen, hundreds moving in unison. Balinese troops also arrived, augmenting the army under Mangkubumi's command.[58] Mangkubumi was preparing to take the field again, not against the VOC or the Surakarta court, but against Mangkunagara.

The Unexpected Return of Mangkunagara the Elder

As the estrangement between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi moved inexorably towards open warfare, Mangkunagara's self-belief may have been strengthened by an unexpected reunion with his dead and storied father.

In Chapter 1 we saw how Mangkunagara's father, whom we have dubbed Mangkunagara the Elder, was a highly regarded prince

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[55] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Apr. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 16 Apr. 1753, cited in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 74.

[56] *BG* Vol. xiii, pp. 31–2.

[57] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Feb., 14 Apr. and 17 Apr. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

[58] *BG* Vol. xii, p. 77–Vol. xiii, p. 12; Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 22 Jan. and 6 Mar. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

in the court of Pakubuwana II. He fell afoul of court intrigues and was exiled in 1728, first to Batavia and a few years later to Sri Lanka, where he died in 1738. He was obliged to leave behind in Kartasura his sons R. Umar (who died sometime before 1740), Mangkunagara (then just two years old), Pamot and Mangkuningrat. He was accompanied to Batavia by another son named Png. Tirtakusuma. When Mangkunagara the Elder was sent off to Sri Lanka, Tirtakusuma remained in Batavia. He came to be known also as Png. Pancuran, after the Batavia and present-day South Jakarta district (Pancoran) where he lived. The Company seems to have thought well of him. As we saw in Chapter 2, in 1743, at the end of the Chinese War, the Company contemplated deposing Pakubuwana II and replacing him with Tirtakusuma, but the Susuhunan agreed to the VOC's demands and was restored to his throne. Tirtakusuma remained in Batavia. Then, in late 1745, Tirtakusuma seems to have been employed by the Company as a means of contacting his younger brother Mangkunagara, already well established in rebellion. Mangkunagara's response was to request that Tirtakusuma be allowed to leave Batavia to join him.

In 1751 began a series of events which led to the return of Mangkunagara the Elder's remains and his family members to Java. Pakubuwana III wrote to the VOC requesting the return from Sri Lanka of the body of the late Png. Ar. Purbaya—the former Urawan, Pakubuwana III's uncle, whose adventures down to his exile in 1738 were briefly recounted in Chapter 1—and of his surviving widow and children. He also requested the return of the remains of Mangkunagara the Elder, who was also one of his uncles, and his surviving family.[59]

The VOC had misgivings about the return of these remains and survivors. In May 1752 the Semarang VOC officers resolved to rent a house there for Png. Purbaya's widow, "because her residence elsewhere than here, we judge, would be very suspicious and give rise to many concerns. For not only is her entire family related to the brigands but also among her entourage is found a full sister of Png. Mas Said [Mangkunagara]". The Company's officers feared that Mangkunagara might whisk his sister away from Semarang, as well as entice an adult son of the former *patih* Natakusuma (exiled

[59] PB III, Surakarta, to Batavia, seen on 1 Nov. 1751, in VOC 2787 (OB 1752); Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Oct. 1751, in VOC 2788 (OB 1752).

in 1742) to join his rebellion.[60] Having requested the return of Purbaya's family, in February 1753 Van Hohendorff was surprised when Mangkunagara's older brother Tirtakusuma (Pancuran) and the body of Mangkunagara the Elder arrived in Semarang. This was a mistake by the Company's officers in Sri Lanka, but it was too late to undo it and Van Hohendorff sought to turn it to his advantage. Mangkunagara—at this stage the Company's favoured candidate for collaboration—requested his father's body. Van Hohendorff thought that the arrival of Tirtakusuma and of the Elder's body could be used to make the younger Mangkunagara "more manageable and more moderate".[61]

Mangkunagara sent dignitaries to Semarang to receive his father's body, along with the head of his uncle Png. Adiwijaya, recently fallen in battle. *Babad Giyanti* describes the cortège that conveyed the body to the interior: 400 horsemen, 200 foot soldiers, with *para kaum* (the religious) performing *dhikr* (the recitation of pious formulae as a mystical exercise) at the front. They were swept along their way by a great storm and earthquakes. For Mangkunagara, it was as if his father had arrived alive, says the chronicle. The burial at the royal graves at Imogiri was followed by seven days of *santris* (students of religion) reciting the Qur'an, all the *kaum* of surrounding districts having been summoned to Mangkunagara's residence, then at Barija near Gondangwinangun (Prambanan area).[62]

Mangkunagara's own account records his emotions at this reunion with his dead father:

24. The body of his father
was enclosed in a coffin and brought by all the *santris*,
accompanied by turmoil in nature,
25. an angry sky with lightning,
radiant rainbows and wind.
It was as if a person had arrived alive
but really a body had arrived.
These were frightening omens.
Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara]
sat in intense meditation,
internally paying homage
and accepting the love of the Creator of the World.

[60] Semarang to Batavia, 17 July 1752, in VOC 2804 (OB 1753).
[61] Semarang to Batavia, 20 Feb. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); KV, p. 176.
[62] *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 20–1.

Such were Mangkunagara's emotions upon this reunion with his father, whom he could hardly have known, in fact of whom he surely had no personal memories, before he was exiled when Mangkunagara was only two. There followed much feasting, and Mangkunagara distributed money to his followers.[63]

Van Hohendorff used the presence of Mangkunagara's emissaries in Semarang to attempt negotiations. They arrived on 11 May 1753, with an escort that Van Hohendorff reckoned at 500 "well kitted-out cavalry". They assured him, under oath, of their master's good intentions towards the Company. Lengthy discussion followed, full of distrust and dissembling (as we may judge from subsequent events). Mangkunagara's letter set out his demands: (1) that the VOC should promote him to whatever status he wished (which remained unclear, although the kingship was evidently in his mind), (2) that his father's body be turned over (the one demand which in the end was fulfilled), and (3) that his brother Tirtakusuma be sent to him. Van Hohendorff agreed to the last two demands but replied that he could not understand just what Mangkunagara meant by the first. The emissaries said only that Mangkunagara relied on the VOC's "great benevolence".

Eventually Van Hohendorff made it known that elevating Mangkunagara to the kingship was not possible, for there was already a King of his own family (Pakubuwana III) who was still young and alive. The emissaries reportedly said that they understood the reasonableness of that view; for the time being Mangkunagara would not press for this so long as the Company assisted him in some other prestigious way. What was intended by this remained obscure to Van Hohendorff. He told Mangkunagara's men that if Mangkunagara would turn over all the renegade Europeans with him and swear allegiance to the Company's orders, then he would ensure that Mangkunagara enjoyed the Company's clemency. The emissaries stayed until 20 May without further communication being received from Mangkunagara. Van Hohendorff released Mangkunagara the Elder's body, as we have seen, but urged Tirtakusuma to remain in Semarang for

[63] *SBPn* ff. 305v.–306r.; see also *BG* Vol. xiii, pp. 78–9. Quotation from *SBPn* Canto 75 (Dhandhanggula): 24. … *lan layone ingkang rama, tinabĕla kang mapag sagung prasantri, amawi gara-gara*. 25. *langit mu[n]tab sarta obar-abir, kukuwung teja sarta lan barat, lir wong arawuh gĕsange, cacak layon kang rawuh, dalajate kagiri-giri, Pangeran Adipatya, ing tyase anĕkung, ngabĕkti ing kabatinan, tur narima sihipun Kang Murbeng Bumi*.

the time being. According to Van Hohendorff, Tirtakusuma sent the message to Mangkunagara that he was willing to meet his brother only after there was some sign of Mangkunagara's goodwill towards the VOC.[64]

Tirtakusuma did not leave Semarang to join Mangkunagara. The VOC interpreted this as a sign of his loyalty to the Company, his protector of many years.[65] That may have been so. Van Hohendorff attempted to use Tirtakusuma to induce Mangkunagara to join the VOC side. Every letter that Van Hohendorff sent to Mangkunagara was accompanied by one from Tirtakusuma to his brother. Van Hohendorff even threatened to send Tirtakusuma and other returned family members back to Sri Lanka. This was all to no avail. Mangkunagara was unmoved and continued to demand that he be recognised as King. Although both he and the Company were avoiding hostilities, Mangkunagara's military manoeuvres caused concern. Notably, in April 1753 he approached the Company's post at Trayem (Muntilan area) with 3,000 men but then backed off and moved to Barija.[66]

Van Hohendorff proposed to his superiors in Batavia that Mangkunagara be offered the position of Crown Prince in Surakarta as a step towards restoring peace in Java. That post was rendered vacant by Buminata's flight and the fact that the youthful Pakubuwana III had yet to produce an heir. On 5 June 1753 Governor General Mossel and the Council of the Indies in Batavia considered Van Hohendorff's proposal to take Mangkunagara's side. They resolved to do so on condition that Mangkunagara (1) turn over all Europeans who had joined him, (2) swear to obey the VOC's orders, (3) agree to take up arms against Mangkubumi "albeit with the assistance of the Company", (4) thereby purge the countryside of all rebels, (5) thereafter dismiss all non-Javanese fighting under his command, and, finally, (6) lay down his arms and never again to take them up unless at the Company's behest. If all that were agreed to and if Mangkunagara would confirm the existing contracts with the VOC, then the Company would recognise him as Crown Prince and heir apparent to the throne of Surakarta. Van Hohendorff was authorised to promise Mangkunagara an unusually large domain

[64] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 May 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); quoted in part in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 75–6.
[65] KV, p. 176.
[66] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Apr. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 74–5.

in the lands he already controlled, "under the higher authority of the Susuhunan"—the only context in which the VOC thought it relevant to mention Pakubuwana III. If all this was arranged, then Van Hohendorff was to march to the field in coordination with Mangkunagara and put Mangkubumi's rebellion to an end. Batavia admonished him, however, to exercise caution in dealing with Mangkunagara's army.[67]

Thus it was that the Company committed itself to alliance with Mangkunagara against Mangkubumi. But this proved to be based on unrealistic understandings of Mangkunagara's position. He certainly wished for the support of the VOC's military against Mangkubumi, but there were few indications that any closer form of alliance was possible. On the Company side there was hope and much suspicion. On Mangkunagara's side, there was more of the latter than the former. There was little or no goodwill on either side. According to Mangkunagara's *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, his foremost adviser and *patih* Kudanawarsa opposed any meeting or peacemaking between Mangkunagara and Van Hohendorff. Mangkunagara did agree to such a meeting, as proposed by Van Hohendorff, but it never came about.[68] There was another player complicating these contacts. According to *Babad Giyanti*, Tirtakusuma feared that the VOC would elevate Mangkunagara to royalty, a position greater than himself. So he wrote to Mangkunagara with the warning, "Don't go so far as to meet with the Company. You've probably been lied to. Don't be like me, frequently bewitched by the Company."[69] Mangkunagara did send Kudanawarsa and others to talk with Van Hohendorff and to meet Tirtakusuma. This enabled Kudanawarsa to report to Mangkunagara that his elder brother was already "aged" (*kaki-kaki*).[70] (In fact, although Tirtakusuma's date of birth is not known, it is hard to imagine that he could have been older than, say, his mid-30s.) It would be four more years before Mangkunagara met in person with a VOC governor of the northeast coast or, indeed, his brother.

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[67] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 May 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 75–6; Batavia secret resolution 5 June 1753, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 76–8. See also *SBPn* ff. 306v.–307r.

[68] *SBPn* ff. 307r.–309v.; *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 49–50; KV, pp. 177–80.

[69] *BG* Vol. xiv, p. 46: *aja kongsi apanggih, iya lawan Kumpĕni, bok dheweke kĕneng apus, aja keh kaya ingwang, wus kasuwuk neng Kumpĕni*. Further, *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 60–1.

[70] *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 73–6; KV, pp. 178–9.

Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi in Open Warfare

The breach between the two foremost fighting princes had been partly born in, and continued to be exacerbated by, capricious conduct on the part of Mangkubumi. An episode involving one Tg. Suradiměnggala was an ongoing topic of discussion among Javanese dignitaries. He was a native of Jipang who had been made governor there after its capture by Mangkubumi. Even *Babad Giyanti*, which we normally think of as reflecting the world as seen by Mangkubumi, does not spare him from criticism regarding this episode.

The two *babad* accounts available to us have somewhat differing versions of events, but the core issue is clear: the execution by Mangkubumi of a supporter whose transgression was thought by others to be minor. In *Babad Giyanti*'s version, Suradiměnggala found his appanage lands insufficient to support the people dependent upon him. He therefore sought an increase from Mangkubumi. The latter took this request as *lèse-majesté* (a King might grant, but a subject could not request). Mangkubumi summoned Suradiměnggala to his current residence at Tambar (near Jombang, in East Java) and excoriated him in public for being demanding. Then he had Suradiměnggala killed, to the amazement of all, and took the dead man's widow into his seraglio. This killing was all the more shocking to others because Suradiměnggala was among 14 *bupatis* who had supported Mangkubumi at an early stage in his battles. Mangkubumi had declared that their blood was not to be shed. But now he himself shed it. Mangkunagara and his colleagues were among the many who discussed these events. His *pěngulu* said that the killing of Suradiměnggala was inconsistent with Islamic teachings and lowered the King's status. Mangkunagara's observation was, according to *Babad Giyanti*, "One person met [his death, and] many people have lost hope in their hearts." Fear of Mangkubumi spread among other followers.[71] Mangkunagara's own *babad* differs somewhat—we should remember that he was far from where these events took place, and his version may be less accurate than that in *Babad Giyanti*. According to Mangkunagara's account, it was Suradiměnggala's widow—Bok Aj. Jipang—who subsequently persuaded Mangkubumi not to kill

[71] *BG* Vol. xiii, pp. 61–9, 76–Vol. xiv, pp. 4, 10–11. Quotation from Vol. xiii, p. 77: *wong siji kang němahi, kang akeh gěmpal tyasipun*.

the *bĕdhaya* dancer Pun Sampĕt. She told Mangkubumi that to do this would bring shame upon him, as had his execution of her husband, whose fault had been small.[72]

As armed conflict loomed, Mangkubumi moved from East Java back towards Central Java with an army augmented by eastern *moncanagara* units. Dignitaries on both sides of the conflict sorted out their allegiances, moving from one side to the other. Those who supported Mangkunagara arrived at his base and, in their cups, swore loyalty to Mangkunagara and enmity towards Mangkubumi. The latter typically force-marched his regiments through difficult terrain in heavy rain, leading (according to VOC intelligence) to serious levels of death and defection. He was told that Mangkunagara had reconciled with the Company, which would promote him as King. At Ponorogo, Mangkubumi's followers, his brother-in-law Rongga Prawiradirja prominent among them, swore their loyalty. Mangkubumi declared a prize of 500 *reals* on Mangkunagara's head.[73]

By around mid-year 1753 the two main Javanese armies—Mangkunagara's and Mangkubumi's—were preparing for battle against each other. In June Van Hohendorff marched from Semarang into the interior with an army of Javanese, Madurese and VOC troops totalling over 6,000 men, in the hope of coordinating with Mangkunagara.[74] Like other proposals for cooperation and reconciliation, this came to nothing. Meanwhile, clashes between Mangkunagara's and Mangkubumi's forces were occurring.[75]

In August 1753 decisive battles took place. Mangkubumi's son, Crown Prince R.M. Ĕntho, held the vitally important Madiun-Ponorogo valley on his father's behalf while Mangkubumi marched farther west to Sukawati. Ĕntho was Mangkunagara's first major

[72] *SBPn* ff. 296v.–297v.

[73] *SBPn* ff. 303r.–306v.; Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Apr. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

[74] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 June 1753, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 78–9; Van Hohendorff, in camp at "Samangko", to Batavia, 8 Aug. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754); Batavia to H.XVII, 13 Aug. 1753, in *Gen.miss* Vol. xii, p. 278; *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 43–4.

[75] Van Hohendorff (the archive copy gives Mijlendonk, who was probably a secretary, as author), Semarang, to Batavia, 20 June 1753, and Van Hohendorff, in camp at "Samangko", to Batavia, 8 Aug. 1753, both in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

target.[76] Mangkunagara marched eastwards to attack Madiun in early August 1753.[77] There Ĕntho was defeated and put to flight. Mangkunagara occupied Madiun on 7 August. In the Madiun battle, according to *Babad Giyanti*, a prominent role was played by one of the Dutchmen-turned-Javanese named Onggaima, who personally broke down the door to the central fortification and shot dead the governor, Purwanagara. Others thereupon cautioned him that, in doing so, he had dispatched a second cousin of Mangkunagara. When he confessed this to Mangkunagara, the prince reportedly laughed loudly and told him not to be concerned for even though this was a relative, he was also an enemy whom it was Onggaima's duty to kill. Mangkunagara accorded Onggaima all Purwanagara's possessions as his prize, whereupon the ex-Dutchman offered nine gestures of respect (*sĕmbah*), to the entertainment of those who were present.

Three days later, Mangkunagara set alight housing at Madiun and marched south towards Ponorogo. En route he encountered enemy forces that were readily repelled. These included the son of Suradiningrat, the fallen governor whose body Mangkunagara had mutilated in September 1752. As Mangkunagara approached Ponorogo from the north, his brother Mangkuningrat advanced from the south, trapping the defenders in a pincer movement. He found Ponorogo deserted and its central fortification set alight by the fleeing enemy. Mangkunagara settled at Kasatriyan, just northwest of Ponorogo, where he characteristically remained still, resting his horses and men for seven days.

Mangkubumi was in Sukawati when he received news of his son's defeat and flight. Furious, he set off on a forced march to avenge himself upon Mangkunagara. There were no rest periods for his soldiers, leaving many hungry and exhausted. Horses also suffered in such forced marches. Informed of Mangkubumi's approach, in

[76] The description of the fighting of August 1753 rests on the following sources: *SBPn* ff. 310r.–317r.; *BG* Vol. xiv, p. 79–Vol. xv, pp. 3–21; KV, pp. 179–81; Batavia to H.XVII, 1 Oct. 1753, in *Gen.miss* Vol. xii, p. 292. Given that there were no VOC observers present at these engagements (except for those who had gone over to MN's side), VOC sources rest on spies' reports and are of only marginal value.

[77] There is an error in the date in *SBPn* f. 310r.; Saturday-Kliwon 3 Sawal, Je [1678]; 3 Sawal in the Friday calendar equates to Saturday, 4 Aug. 1753, but the five-day week day then was Paing. Subsequent dates given in the narrative above from *SBPn* are internally consistent in the *babad*.

Kasatriyan Mangkunagara consulted his senior officers and asked his soldiers whether they loved him, and if so, he asked of God that they should stand together, whether in life or in death. *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* says that this removed all uncertainties in their minds. Then came a gentle rain, and the stream at Kasatriyan flooded so that it would be difficult for enemies to cross it. Mangkunagara awaited Mangkubumi in this secure position.

When Mangkubumi reached Ponorogo, R.M. Ĕntho returned, only ten soldiers still with him, and embraced his father. Mangkubumi and his army surrounded the fortified central compound, expecting Mangkunagara to be inside. But the compound proved to be empty. On learning that Mangkunagara was instead at Kasatriyan, Mangkubumi set out the battle order for his assault. His soldiers were "like an endless sea, all talking arrogantly"[78] about their impending victory, after which they anticipated having their choice of Mangkunagara's many beautiful women. When Mangkubumi's troops appeared across the river, Mangkunagara sent the women away to safety and, ignoring advice from Kudanawarsa and others to retreat, instead prepared for the impending conflict. To his men he shouted—according to his *babad*—"Let us all submit to God and die together!"[79] His well-rested soldiers then launched into fierce hand-to-hand combat, putting Mangkubumi's exhausted regiments to flight at the cost of many dead (Mangkunagara's *babad* claims 500). Furious at this turn of events, Mangkubumi himself entered the fray, but his soldiers were tired from the previous forced march. Their shots missed, and many were killed. Mangkubumi watched on, speechless, with only 200 troops remaining (according to Mangkunagara's *babad*).

Mangkunagara moved among his troops, giving them orders. According to his *babad*, he was hampered by an injury to his right hand caused by the kick of his pistol, which made it difficult for it to move. Unable to fight himself, his *babad* records, he continued to urge his fighters on, shouting "Advance! Let no one speak of fear!"[80] *Babad Giyanti* reports that rheumatism or arthritis (*encok*) prevented him from handling bow and arrow, so he was obliged to use only the pistol. We will see in Chapter 9 that this may have been the early stages of a yaws infection.

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[78] *SBPn* f. 313v.: *lir sagara tanpa tĕpi, pangucapira sadaya samya kibir*.
[79] *SBPn* ff. 314v.–315r.: *kabeh payo padha pasrah ing Allah, payo barĕnga mati*.
[80] *SBPn* f. 316r.: *payo mangsaha, ajana ngucap ajrih*.

As Mangkubumi's soldiers fell, the lip of his own horse was grazed by a musket shot. He decided to flee the field, followed by his surviving cavalry. As his men tried to cross the flooding Madiun River, many died in its waters. *Babad Giyanti* observes that Mangkubumi's soldiers "reached the riverbank exhausted. Having just marched night and day for three nights, without food, then they plunged into the river, … exhausted men who died when only lightly wounded. More and more were easily killed."[81] Major commanders fell, and whole troop companies were destroyed.

This devastation of Mangkubumi's army took place on 17 August 1753. Mangkunagara's account again marks the event with the chronogram "the elephant and horse moved the world".[82] Mangkubumi lost 600 dead, with more surrendering to Mangkunagara, according to the latter's account. Mangkunagara did not, however, pursue the fleeing Mangkubumi, wishing no more battle with him, "inwardly and outwardly recalling that the King was his father-in-law".[83] What, after all, would he do with Mangkubumi if he were to be captured? Mangkubumi was allowed to escape across the flooding river, which was nearly choked with the bodies of the dead. With him went surviving senior figures, a mere 200 cavalry and 100 infantry. *Babad Giyanti* describes his distress as he paused at a village near Jogorogo, his heart disturbed at the thought that his utter defeat was a sign of divine anger. He was calmed, however, when supporters arrived with 2,000 cavalry and many infantry. He did not know whether his two sons, Crown Prince Ĕntho and Png. Ngabei, were dead or alive, having been parted from them in the midst of battle, so he ordered a search for them while he proceeded to Sukawati.

Mangkunagara wrote to Van Hohendorff reporting his victory over Mangkubumi, but by this time the Company's suspicions of Mangkunagara seemed confirmed. He had burned a village near Surakarta, whence he was driven off by the VOC's artillery. During his victorious campaign against Mangkubumi, his rear guard encountered and was "mangled" in a skirmish by VOC forces, according to

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[81] *BG* Vol. xv, pp. 15–6: *dharat lawan sayah, denya mĕntas lampah, rina-wĕngi tĕlung bĕngi, tan ana mangan, lajĕng gĕbyur ing kali /0/ … wong arip sayah, tatu kĕdhik ngĕmasi /0/ saya kathah kang pĕjah gampil kewala*.

[82] *SBPn* ff. 316r.–v. dates the event Friday-Kliwon, 16 Sawal, Je *gajah turongga angobahkĕn bumi*. This is internally consistent in the Friday calendar and equivalent to 17 August 1753.

[83] *SBPn* f. 316v.: *lair-batinya, emut mratuwa Aji*.

Hartingh.[84] At the end of the year, Batavia wrote to the Company's directors in Amsterdam that the appearance of a reconciliation with Mangkunagara had proved a failure and there would be no further negotiations with him.[85]

As of late 1753, the open warfare between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi favoured Mangkunagara. Mangkubumi's forces had been devastated. This might have justified continuation of the Company's policy of allying with Mangkunagara in order to destroy Mangkubumi, rewarding Mangkunagara with the Crown Prince's position in Surakarta. In theory, this might have brought the civil war to an end with the Javanese kingdom undivided.

There were, however, two factors that rendered the VOC's pro-Mangkunagara policy nugatory. The first was the reality which the Company now grasped: that Mangkunagara had no intention, at this stage, of accepting a second-rank position in the disintegrating Surakarta court. In the wake of his victory over Mangkubumi, he surely must have thought that he had a chance of winning the civil war outright. He now consistently demanded that the Company recognise him as King. In 1753, therefore, the Company's and Mangkunagara's political objectives were irreconcilable.

The second factor was one of those *deus ex machina* developments that confound historians' cheerful attempts to make the past seem logical. In early 1753 a mysterious Turk arrived in Batavia named Seh (*shaikh*) Ibrahim, also known to the Javanese as *Tuwan Sayid Bĕsar* (the Great *Sayyid*, a descendant of the Prophet) and *Sarip Bĕsar* (the Great *Sharif*, a noble descended from the Prophet). Contrary to all reasonable expectations, this extraordinary and puzzling man—whose identity is explored further in Appendix 2—contributed to a deflection of the politico-military tide in the Javanese civil war, to Mangkunagara's disadvantage. Ibrahim won Mangkubumi's trust and played the part of mediator between him and the Company. By the time Ibrahim left Java in mid-1754, Mangkubumi was on his way to being enthroned as the first Sultan of Yogyakarta, recognised by the VOC and ruling half of the Javanese kingdom, while Mangkunagara was left to fight on alone against greater-than-ever odds. His only realistic goal became not to become a King, but to stay alive.

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[84] KV, p. 181.

[85] Batavia to H.XVII, 30 Dec. 1753, in dJ x, p. 1.

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The Third Javanese War of Succession, Phase 3: Mangkunagara Fights Alone and Mangkubumi Becomes Sultan, 1753–55

The years 1753–55 saw a major turnaround in Java's politico-military affairs. Both Javanese political tradition and Dutch East India Company policy were predicated on the idea that there should be one Javanese state, governed by a single ruler. Since Mangkubumi's declaration as rebel Susuhunan in 1749, however, there had been two monarchs at war in Java. Mangkubumi—when allied with Mangkunagara—led the most powerful rebellion the VOC had ever faced in Java, whereas Pakubuwana III was an insignificant factor. Alienation between the two leading rebels in 1753 and particularly Mangkunagara's massive victory in August seemed to create a new strategic context. Mangkubumi remained a formidable figure, however, as the senior prince among rebels and the only one to be declared as a monarch. He set about rebuilding his army.

The costs of the ongoing war were high for all sides, and the prospects for peace seemed poor. In his *Kort verhaal*, Nicolaas Hartingh lamented, "In this wretched and lamentable state was Java situated, tortured from all directions by fire and other calamities." The Company was the sole significant support for Pakubuwana III, who was "deprived of almost all power and unable to maintain himself or his affairs". Despite his recent rout at Mangkunagara's hands,

Mangkubumi was still alive, with loyal followers, and bounced back strongly enough to resist Mangkunagara and the VOC. For his part, Mangkunagara was "haughty", profiting from his good fortune on the battlefield to burn and plunder at will. The princely descent of the rebels made it difficult for the VOC to capture or kill them. This was because, Hartingh believed, "no Javanese, great or small, dares lay hands on a prince of the Mataram blood, even if from the opposing side, because of superstitious deference for the ancient ancestor". (The latter was perhaps a reference to Sultan Agung.) Princes were killed in battle, of course, but indeed there was widespread respect for those with titles of nobility—ergo the enhanced utility of the VOC's non-Javanese units, unencumbered by such considerations. "Thus," wrote Hartingh, "peace was still very far away."[1]

In the midst of all this uncertainty, chaos and suffering, there arrived in Batavia a mysterious Turk who would—utterly improbably—play a significant role in resolving Javanese affairs. A new VOC officer also began to play a crucial role.

New Players: Seh Ibrahim and Nicolaas Hartingh

Seh Ibrahim was an important but enigmatic player in 1753–54. Appendix 2 endeavours to clarify some of the mysteries surrounding him. *Babad Giyanti* tells us that Mangkubumi and his Javanese compatriots understood Ibrahim to be an emissary of the Ottoman Sultan, known in Java as the Sultan of *Rum* (Arabic *Rum*, meaning Eastern Rome, hence Constantinople, Byzantium, Istanbul, the Ottoman Sultanate). In the Appendix, based on both the Dutch and Javanese materials available to us, I suggest that Ibrahim was probably a wealthy Turkish merchant, a descendant of the Prophet (a *sayyid* and *sharif*), whose ancestry gave him superior standing in Javanese Muslim society. He evidently carried two documents that the Javanese understood as the foundation of his authority. It is possible that these were genuine warrants on behalf of Ottoman potentates—possibly even in one case from the contemporary Ottoman Grand Vizier (1752–55) Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha—for Ibrahim to take steps to end the civil war in Java if an opportunity presented itself. Ibrahim was remarkably selfless in this endeavour and refused payment for his services. Thus, he was perhaps a person genuinely

[1] KV, pp. 181–2.

motivated by high principles who sought to do the right thing. In declining payment, according to *Babad Giyanti*, he told the Dutch, "If I can bring a halt to the people's conflicts, my reward will already be great in the eyes of God."[2] Perhaps that genuinely explains him.

To understand the remarkable influence that Ibrahim wielded over Mangkubumi and his compatriots, we need to turn to the Javanese myths that preceded him. We should remember that the Dutch side had not the slightest inkling of what we are about to discuss here. In Javanese mythology, *Sultan Rum* was a figure of immense significance.[3] MSS conveying the mythical *Aji Saka* tales and *Jayabaya* prophecies depicted him as the distant world ruler who was responsible for the civilising and peopling of Java. One of the earliest versions of these legends to have survived is in a British Library MS from Yogyakarta written in 1813,[4] which brings together the *Aji Saka* tales and the historical traditions subsumed under the generic title *Babad Tanah Jawi* [Chronicle of the Land of Java]. The story begins with Adam and proceeds through the time when Wisnu (Vishnu) ruled Java to the mythical kingdoms of Ngastina (as found in the Javanese *Bratayuda/Mahabarata*) and Purwacarita (which also appears in *wayang* stories and in Ronggawarsita's 19th-century *Pustaka Raja Purwa*). Then Java was destroyed and left devastated and unpopulated for 700 years. In his sleep, the universal ruler *Sultan Rum* received a divine revelation: "Java has become a deep forest; let people be planted there!" so that Java could become the equal (literally the "counterbalance") of Mecca and the capital of all lands east of Persia.[5]

Sultan Rum sent an expedition to populate Java, but it was destroyed by Javanese spirits and forces of nature. As the Southern Ocean roared and Mount Merapi thundered, the *Rum* expedition was destroyed almost entirely. A second attempt was made and again failed. *Sultan Rum* thereupon assembled his religious advisers, who prayed for a charm to subdue Java's evil spirits. This was received

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[2] *BG* Vol. xiv, p. 66: *yen amurungakĕn wong tukaran, pan wus gĕdhe ganjaran, mugguh Hyang Mahaluhur*.

[3] The discussion essentially repeats that in M.C. Ricklefs, "Dipanagara's Early Inspirational Experience", *BKI* 130, 2–3 (1974): 241–5.

[4] BL Add. MS 12308, an untitled *babad* beginning with Adam and ending abruptly.

[5] BL Add. MS 12308 f. 3v.: *nagri Jawa dadi wana writ, kenanĕmana jalma, karsaning Yang Agung, nungsyeku timbang ing Mĕkah, karatone wetan Ngajam tanah Jawi*.

and buried in several places in Java and Bali. God's voice ordered the spirits to obey the Prophet and the King of Java and to submit to the Queen (i.e., the Goddess) of the Southern Ocean, Ratu Kidul. A final age of disorder would come, when women would forget shame and nobles would be faithless, when children dishonoured their parents and parents forgot their children, when neither law nor justice prevailed and religion would be abandoned; then the spirits could again move among people. After this, a third *Rum* expedition succeeded and Java was populated. Aji Saka became King of Java, but for only three years.[6]

Such mythical texts thus positioned *Sultan Rum* as a universal ruler who was responsible for the peopling of Java and the early mythological stages of Javanese history. He was a founding figure of supernatural potency who enabled the subduing of Java's dangerous spiritual forces and their submission to the Prophet of Islam, the King of Java and the Goddess of the Southern Ocean. Little wonder, then, that when a Turk who was a descendant of the Prophet arrived in Java, apparently bearing a document which the Javanese understood to be from *Sultan Rum* himself, and he offered to mediate in the dreadful civil war then under way, Javanese were inclined to respect his authority. The VOC—entirely ignorant of these cultural issues—can hardly have guessed how lucky they were at the arrival of Seh Ibrahim.

In January 1753 Ibrahim arrived in Batavia, without prior warning, and informed Governor General Mossel that he was prepared to negotiate between the VOC and Mangkubumi.[7] *Babad Giyanti*, which probably rests upon what Ibrahim told Javanese interlocutors, says that he was a Turkish trader whose ship broke down in the Bay of Batavia. On learning that it was the governor general

[6] The BL Add. MS 12308 account is closely related to the version found in the beginning of C.F. Winter, Sr., J.J.B. Gaal and T. Roorda, eds, *Het boek Aji Såkå: Oude fabelachtige geschiedenis van Java, van de regering van vorst Siṇḍoela te Galoeh tot aan de stichting van Mådjå-Pait, door vorst Soesoeroeh* (Amsterdam: Frederik Muller, 1857). See also J.A.B. Wiselius, "Djåjå Båjå, zijn leven en profetieën", *BKI*, 3rd series, Vol. 7 (1872), pp. 172–217.

[7] This account of Seh Ibrahim's interaction with the VOC to March 1754 rests upon Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 85–7; G.W. van der Meiden, "A Turkish Mediator between Mangkubumi and the Dutch East India Company (1753–1754)", *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 15, 2 (1981): 92–8.

who governed the place, Ibrahim went to see him with his offer to be mediator. He claimed to have a warrant from higher authority—understood by the Javanese to be the Ottoman Sultan, *Sultan Rum* himself—to play a mediating role in Java's civil war.[8] In February the governor general and Council of the Indies considered this proposal. The Dutch had a generally favourable view of Turks, whom they judged to be less hostile to Europeans than Javanese Muslims. They decided to send Ibrahim to Semarang. Van Hohendorff was ordered to receive him, to take care not to reveal any classified information, but to see what he might be able to achieve. Van Hohendorff responded with doubt that the "Turkish priest recently sent here by your Excellencies" would be able to contribute anything through his "spiritual authority", but he would follow Batavia's orders.[9] Remarkably, Ibrahim asked for no remuneration for his services. In the 1753 contacts between Van Hohendorff and Mangkunagara noted in the previous chapter, which failed utterly, Ibrahim played no role. He was interested only in dealing with Mangkubumi.

Not much more is known from Dutch material until October 1753. Then, after his devastating defeat at Mangkunagara's hands, Mangkubumi wrote to Governor General Mossel, saying that he had complete trust in the man he called "Bapa Serif Besaar" (*Sarip Bĕsar*, the Great *Sharif*). In this letter, Mangkubumi indicated that he believed Ibrahim to have been sent with the authority of the King of Mecca, which may well be a Dutch translator's misunderstanding in rendering *Sultan Rum*, meaning the Ottoman Sultan. He complained that Van Hohendorff was standing in the way of a personal meeting with Ibrahim. A subsequent letter contained more complaints against Van Hohendorff and asked that Ibrahim be accepted as a mediator between Mangkubumi and the Company.

Van Hohendorff repeatedly refused permission for Ibrahim to travel back to Batavia. Finally, in early 1754, he was allowed to do so. Ibrahim took with him letters from Mangkubumi which were highly critical of Van Hohendorff, as well as a gilded *kris* and four horses as Mangkubumi's gifts for the governor general. It is a comment on the state of the Company's administration in Batavia that it included no one who could read a letter written in Javanese. It was therefore

[8] *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 61–3. Subsequent pages recount Ibrahim's interactions with the VOC in Batavia.

[9] Van Hohendorff, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Apr. 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

necessary for Ibrahim to convey Mangkubumi's views orally. This suggests that he was able to speak Malay, the *lingua franca* (along with Portuguese) of the archipelago also used by Europeans. Only in March did better translations of Mangkubumi's letters reach Batavia.

The Council of the Indies deliberated at length how to proceed. Mossel pressed the view that a peaceful solution to the war was essential because of its ruinous costs. With some dissenting councillors, it was resolved on 15 March 1754 to investigate further, through Ibrahim, the nature of Mangkubumi's demands. Batavia was prepared to cede some territory to him but did not intend at this stage to partition the heart of the Javanese kingdom.

In early 1754 there was a significant change in personnel on the VOC side. In February Van Hohendorff asked to be relieved of his position in Semarang as governor of Java's northeast coast, on the grounds of ill health but also "to conserve my reputation". He returned to Batavia to become a member of the Council of the Indies. Van Hohendorff was profoundly hated by Mangkubumi for his role in the events of 1746 that led to Mangkubumi's rebellion, when he had taken sides with the despised *patih* Pringgalaya. *Babad Giyanti* depicts Van Hohendorff's departure as him being dismissed.[10] His removal therefore improved the prospects of negotiations between the Company and Mangkubumi. His replacement in Semarang was Hartingh.[11]

Nicolaas Hartingh was born in Amsterdam. It seems that he arrived as a youth in Java c. 1734 and was posted to Kartasura to learn Javanese. The Amsterdam chamber of the VOC, which sent him to the East, rather hyperbolically reported that "on his arrival in the Indies he had to wander about among the ordinary Javanese for several years as a poor devil, naked and unassisted (*naakt en bloot*), in order to learn the Javanese language at the Company's expense". He was subsequently appointed as a translator at Semarang and then promoted to more senior roles with the patronage of Governor General Van Imhoff. He was named governor and director of Java's northeast coast in March 1754. The Batavia Council document appointing him noted that he was "not only knowledgeable in the land and the language, but has always shown to have the talent to get

[10] *BG* Vol. xvi, p. 24.
[11] KV, p. 183; Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 82–4; Van der Meiden, "Turkish Mediator", p. 98.

on well with the native". We will test that against *Babad Giyanti*'s information in a moment. He served as governor in Semarang until 1761 and thereafter rose to still greater eminence in the VOC. He eventually retired with formidable wealth that was inexplicable in terms of his official remuneration. The historian F. de Haan thought that, among other sources of income, he probably took a cut from the payments for soldiers under him, as was also common practice in Europe at the time.[12] As will be seen in Appendix 1, in this book I accept that Hartingh was most probably the author of the "Short Account of the Javanese Wars" (*Kort verhaal van de Javasche oorlogen*), which we frequently cite (questions about its authorship are discussed in Appendix 1).

Babad Giyanti's description of Hartingh shows that he indeed made an impression on the Javanese, but perhaps not one that he would have been pleased about:

> 22. … Secretary Nicolaas Hartingh
> was big and tall but not good looking,
> with a face rotundly bulbous
> and squinting eyes,
> his belly bulging out everywhere, folded over itself,
> big and dishevelled.
> 23. Those who saw him said,
> "This is a pig that's been replaced by a demon,
> the demon Terong for example."[13]

The demon Terong, to whom Hartingh was compared, is a giant ogre in the Javanese *wayang* theatre. *Terong* means eggplant, and the *wayang* puppet has a bulbous nose to fit. The modern authority Hardjowirogo described Buta Terong as "a giant destroyer of the peace, but actually he is not a destroyer because of his ferocity; rather

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[12] F. de Haan, *Priangan: De Preanger-Regentschappen onder het Nederlandsch bestuur tot 1811* (4 vols; [Batavia:] Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1910–12), Vol. i, Pt. 2 Personalia, pp. 50–6. Not all VOC officers who were believed by their colleagues to be proficient in local languages actually were; see J. Gonda, "Eenige grepen uit de geschiedenis der beoefening van de Maleische taal- en letterkunde", *Verslag Provinciaal Utrechtsch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* (1935), pp. 93–113.

[13] *BG* Vol. xvi, p. 24, Canto 149 (Dhandhanggula): 22. … *Sekrĕtaris Nikolas Arting, gĕdhe dhuwur tan pakra, muka bitha-bithu, kriyip-kriyip netranira, ting panjĕlut lĕmpitan wadhukireki, agĕdhe anglĕparah.* 23. *Amuwuse wong kang niningali, iki babi ginĕntenan buta, buta Terong upamane*.

The *wayang* character Buta Terong

it is because he is a big eater and doesn't feel satisfied with however much food. So that means he is a greedy person, one who can't be satisfied."[14] This was not, in other words, a comparison complimentary to Hartingh. Multiple MSS attest to the Javanese faith in the pseudo-science of physiognomy as a way to read character. We should not, therefore, forget the physiognomical thoughts that no doubt crossed Javanese minds whenever they encountered him, while his superiors continued to praise him for his ability to get along well with Javanese and his "proficiency in Javanese language and affairs".[15]

The military developments and changes in personnel of 1753–54 realigned Central Java's politics. Mangkubumi had suffered a heavy defeat at his son-in-law's hands and was prepared to contemplate political compromise with his other enemies. Seh Ibrahim had arrived and was influential with the Javanese side, while also urging the VOC to consider only the rebel monarch Mangkubumi as its appropriate negotiating partner. The VOC was prepared to negotiate a settlement, abandoning its original objective of keeping the Javanese kingdom united under its client King Pakubuwana III, if it would end the Company's haemorrhaging of personnel and financial resources. The losers in this were, first, the relatively powerless Pakubuwana III,

[14] Hardjowirogo, *Sedjarah wajang purwa* (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1952), p. 127.
[15] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, pp. 598–9.

who was about to lose a part of his kingdom without any possibility of vetoing it. The second was Mangkunagara.

Mangkunagara lost the most in these 1753–54 repositionings, for he had forfeited whatever opportunity he may have had to end his rebellion in triumph through negotiations with the VOC. Perhaps that had never been his real intention. Whatever the case, from early 1754 onwards, it was only Mangkubumi with whom the Company wished to negotiate, with Seh Ibrahim insisting on that approach and acting as initial mediator.

Negotiations towards a VOC-Mangkubumi Settlement in 1754

Serious negotiations between Mangkubumi and Hartingh commenced in April 1754.[16] These were indirect, with Seh Ibrahim as the principal mediator. Mangkubumi informed Hartingh that he would be satisfied if the VOC agreed that he should reign over half of the kingdom with the title of Sultan of Mataram. Mangkubumi was almost surely calculating that he would first seal an alliance with the Company that would enable him to destroy Mangkunagara. He would then be in a position to dispense with the lamentable Pakubuwana III and reunify Java's interior under his sole rule. Then, in due course, he could address the vexed question of the Company's control of the north coast, which had been a major impetus to his original rebellion in 1746. The Company was prepared to let Mangkubumi have extensive domains but wished them to be elsewhere than in the centre of the kingdom, which Mangkubumi rejected. He would only be satisfied with half of the kingdom's central territories. In this, he evidently had in mind the historical precedent of divisions between the districts of Mataram (where Yogyakarta is now located) and Pajang (where Surakarta is found).

The VOC sent Ibrahim to meet Mangkubumi at Simo, northeast of Boyolali, in June 1754.[17] Ibrahim returned to Semarang with Mangkubumi's brother Png. Pakuningrat as his emissary and a letter

[16] The account of these negotiations down to the Pědagangan meeting in September 1754 rests on Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 59–66, and the sources cited there. Additional material may be found in Van der Meiden, "Turkish Mediator", pp. 98–101. Other references are footnoted below.

[17] A vivid account of this meeting is found in *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 30–9.

for the governor general. The letter expressed various courtesies and asked for the Company's commitment to kill Mangkunagara. Batavia still wanted to see Mangkubumi installed somewhere other than in the heart of the kingdom, but this was a forlorn hope.

Seh Ibrahim was teaching pieties as well as managing delicate negotiations. His presence and influence must have encouraged a heightened sense among senior Javanese Muslims that they were members of a global religious community. We have already seen cases where Mangkubumi turned to religious advisers about Islamic law. So we might pause briefly to consider a vignette that appears in *Babad Giyanti* on the delicate subject of drinking intoxicating beverages, which is absolutely forbidden in Islam yet was (as we have seen) practised, even to excess, in Java. One day, after evening prayer, Mangkubumi was leaving the mosque when his new *patih*, Png. Natakusuma, delivered a letter from Seh Ibrahim about the negotiations with Batavia. Mangkubumi assembled all his dignitaries to learn its content. Natakusuma spoke, invoking a principle which he ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad to distinguish among one's enemies; this would shortly lead to Mangkubumi drawing a distinction between inviting the larger enemy—the Dutch—to join with him in order to destroy the smaller enemy—Mangkunagara. Mangkubumi interrupted Natakusuma:

36. Laughing heartily,
His Highness (asked),
"How is it, brother,
that you hold the Holy Prophet in awe
but you drink alcohol (*arak*) every day?
37. "You should fear the prohibition of the Holy Emissary [Muhammad]."
Laughing, he offered his *sĕmbah*,
did Prince Natakusuma, (saying):
"War and alcohol are different matters."[18]

In September 1754 Hartingh met personally with Mangkubumi, by which time Ibrahim himself had already departed from Java for the

[18] *BG* Vol. xv, pp. 46–7. Canto 141 (Pucung): 36. *Sru angguguk gujĕngira, Sang Aprabu, pa gene yayi mas, anganggo wĕdi Jĕng Nabi, ngumbe arak si adhi ing sabĕn dina.* 37. *Iku takut ing wawalĕr Kangjĕng Rasul, gumujĕng tur sĕmbah, Pangran Natakusumeki, sanes ing prakawis arak lawan aprang*. Natakusuma replaced MN as Patih after the break between MN and MB.

Middle East. The meeting took place at Pědagangan in Grobogan. There, several outstanding issues were settled to mutual satisfaction. It was agreed that the kingdom would be divided between equal monarchs, with Pakubuwana III in Surakarta bearing the title Susuhunan and Mangkubumi the title Sultan. Mangkubumi would abandon the royal name Pakubuwana which he had previously used. He insisted that his domain must be in the centre of the kingdom, and Hartingh had no option but to concede the point. Mangkubumi retreated from an attempt to claim some of the coastal areas under VOC control, but insisted on one-half of the annual rent the Company paid for that area. Hartingh and Mangkubumi swore oaths of friendship and loyalty between the Company and Mangkubumi. Mangkubumi, his sons and his senior followers swore to join the VOC in destroying Mangkunagara. At the end of the meeting, Capt. C. Donkel and 20 dragoons were left with Mangkubumi as a token of the new alliance and a practical step towards military cooperation. When Batavia examined the outcome of the Pědagangan meeting, the councillors tried again to see Mangkubumi's domain located somewhere in East Java, but he stood firm and in the end the Company conceded all his points. Batavia already began to use the formal title and name by which Mangkubumi and his successors have been known down to the present: Sultan Haměngkubuwana. We shall call him Sultan but continue to use the name Mangkubumi, which he clearly continued to regard as his own.

We will return to the Pědagangan meeting again below as we examine events from the perspective of Mangkunagara.

Mangkunagara Fighting On

After his victory over Mangkubumi of August 1753,[19] Mangkunagara maintained contacts with the Company. The negotiations were going nowhere and had probably not been pursued with much good faith by either side. He returned to Ponorogo, establishing his residence in the village of Tegalsari, the site of one of the most famous of Java's religious schools (*pěsantren*).[20] There he summoned *moncanagara*

[19] The following account to the end of 1753 rests on *SBPn* ff. 317r.–323v.; *BG* Vol. xv, p. 66–Vol. xvi, p. 11.

[20] For a discussion of uncertainties about the founding of Tegalsari, see Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 285–6. That *SBPn* makes no mention here of the *pěsantren* in 1753 deepens the mystery about when it was really founded.

forces to join him. His victory was celebrated with typical dancing, feasting and drinking at *Garĕbĕg Bĕsar* (8 October 1753). In his *babad*, Mangkunagara was unstinting in self-praise at this time. His troops were trained, including new Balinese fighters who joined him.

In October Mangkunagara marched to Sukawati. From there he advanced towards Mataram and made contact with Mangkubumi. The *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* and *Babad Giyanti* accounts differ somewhat, but they agree that the two great warriors toyed (probably disingenuously) with the idea of reconciliation. Hartingh's *Kort verhaal* also describes this.[21] At this stage, Mangkubumi was at his weakest and could not yet have been confident of the outcome of Ibrahim's mediation with the VOC. Mangkunagara was at his strongest and confident to enter into negotiations.

Mangkunagara proceeded towards Mataram. With the wet season under way, he was again suffering from fever (*panas-tis*). He was also learning that the fruits of his recent victories were falling through his fingers. He discovered that the VOC had decided, under Ibrahim's influence, to pursue an alliance with Mangkubumi. He sent emissaries to Mangkubumi with a letter which, according to *Babad Giyanti*, offered repentance and submission. Mangkubumi's reply was, according to the *babad*, brief, firm and written in *ngoko* (low Javanese)—in other words, in a fashion unwelcoming and lacking courtesies. Mangkunagara was in effect told to do whatever he liked, while being ordered to rejoin the war effort against the VOC. This may have been intended to entice Mangkunagara into hostilities that would forestall any last-minute armistice or reconciliation between him and the Company, although in practice there was no longer such a prospect. Mangkunagara ordered his detachments to abandon their hostile posture towards Mangkubumi's forces. There were undoubtedly several layers of duplicity at play here.

As Mangkunagara marched towards Mataram in November 1753, his assembled forces including *moncanagara* units amounted (according to *Babad Giyanti*) to 10,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry. He raided near Surakarta in late November 1753, withdrawing in the face of Company cannon fire.[22] He stopped at his residence called

[21] KV, pp. 196–7.

[22] Also in KV, p. 181, which says that MN lost ten dead in this attack. *SBPn* ff. 322r.–v. reports five dead and five wounded. This attack on Surakarta is also in *BG* Vol. xv, pp. 75–8, and is discussed in Vol. xvi, pp. 7–8, where MN is said to have lost six dead.

Kusumarĕja (or Sumarĕja, Sumarĕjadimulya),[23] near Klaten, where an emissary arrived from Mangkubumi, offering him the much-disputed and abused *bĕdhaya* dancer Pun Sampĕt. But this emissary's real task was to spy out whether Mangkunagara was intending to declare himself King, as was rumoured. He had not yet done so, but over ten days Mangkubumi's spy noted that the residence was laid out like a *kraton*, preparations were in place for Saturday tournaments and *gamĕlan* performances, and everything was as if in a royal court.

Still brimming with confidence, it seems, Mangkunagara may have adopted still more royal styles at the start of 1754. Mangkubumi's concern that Mangkunagara would declare himself King would have been strengthened by what reportedly happened at *Garĕbĕg Mulud* (7 January 1754) in Kusumarĕja, according to *Babad Giyanti*. This was a Dal-year, the fifth year in the Javanese eight-year cycle. The Prophet Muhammad is believed to have been born and died in a Dal-year, so *Garĕbĕg Mulud* festivities in such years were carried out with special observations.[24] Notably, the ruler, whose devotions were usually done in private, attended the court's grand mosque in person and joined in a ritual meal. Mangkunagara adopted the style of ancient kings of Arabia, *Rum*, Egypt, Yemen and all monarchs "above and below the wind", reports the *babad*, by going to the mosque not in grand attire but clad in a simple white sleeveless jacket. In everything, he behaved like a King. But Mangkunagara yet made no formal declaration of kingship.[25]

It is noteworthy that Mangkunagara's *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* passes over this *Garĕbĕg Mulud* in silence. For this period, it describes some of the Dutchmen in Mangkunagara's army fleeing again to the VOC while another came over to Mangkunagara, the further constructions at his residence, the VOC's fortified positions, ongoing contacts with the Company, his troop companies, and the circumcision of a son of his brother Mangkuningrat in February 1754.[26] If *Babad Giyanti*'s account of Mangkunagara's royal style at *Garĕbĕg Mulud*

[23] Formerly the village of Lĕbu, near Jimbung (south of Klaten), which MN had designated as his residence and given this grand new name in mid-1753; *BG* Vol. xiv, p. 43. *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 7–8, however, refers to MN being at Barija.
[24] Later 19th- and early 20th-century observances of *Garĕbĕg Mulud Dal* are described in Soedjono Tirtokoesoemo, *Garebegs*, pp. 109–33; and J. Groneman, *De garĕbĕg's te Ngajogyåkartå* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1895), pp. 48–63.
[25] *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 11–2.
[26] *SBPn* ff. 323v.–324r.

is correct, do we see here another example of Mangkunagara bowdlerising his memoir of the war years when he produced its final form after his surrender in 1757—like that discussed in Chapter 3 concerning his adoption, or not, of the royal title Susunan Adiprakosa? His position in the court of Surakarta after 1757 was grand, as we will see in following chapters, but he was no monarch. So perhaps he expunged earlier evidence of monarchical ambitions which might prove embarrassing in a post-1757 political environment.

As the prospects of a settlement with the VOC improved in early 1754, Mangkubumi set about reconquering the eastern lands lost earlier to Mangkunagara, free of fear that the Company might launch an offensive against him. His detachments prevailed at Madiun, Ponorogo, Kaduwang and Magetan. In Central Java, Mangkunagara was threatened by both the VOC's units and Mangkubumi's. It was at about this time—early 1754—that Mangkunagara was forced to accept (as *Babad Giyanti* has it) that Mangkubumi was allied with the Dutch, that this originated in the "emissary of the King of *Rum*" who ordered this alliance, and that Mangkubumi had been "sent a crown by the Sultan of *Rum*".[27]

Believing that he had been deceived in the preceding correspondence with Mangkubumi, Mangkunagara ordered his army to march from Kusumarĕja against Mangkubumi's detachments.[28] The dating of this march in *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* uses a chronogram in which the words presumably reflect the pivotal role of Seh Ibrahim: Friday-Kliwon, 14 Rabingulakir, *trus pandhita bah ing jalmi* ("continuously the sage moved men", AJ 1679), equivalent to 8 February 1754. During his march eastwards, Mangkunagara's memoir as usual records times of resting his horses and men, and of entertainments, including performances of Balinese *wayang*. After struggling through hard country, where food and water were scarce, Mangkunagara led his army to Ngawi, where both were in abundance. He received reports that Tg. Ranadipura had been defeated in Sukawati. Elsewhere, too, Mangkunagara's forces were engaged in hostilities against Mangkubumi's army, successfully in some cases.

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[27] *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 12–3; quotation from p. 13: *awit dutane Rajeng Rum, ingkang akarya parentah /0/ aken angukup tĕmuli, dhatĕng Rama jĕngandika, milane kinukup mangke, ing warti Rama Paduka, kinintunan makutha, inggih dhatĕng Sultan ing Rum*.

[28] The account below down to the killing of Jayengrana rests on *SBPn* ff. 325v.–332v. See also *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 26–9, 41–3.

More evidence of the deep animosities born of this civil war is found in Mangkunagara's *babad*. One of his detachments captured Mangkubumi's son-in-law R. Jayengrana in Gunung Kidul. He was taken to Mangkunagara, then at Mount Wijil (Wonogiri area), who asked him whether he wished to live or die. Jayengrana sought Mangkunagara's forgiveness and said that he wished to live, protesting that he was only a poor commoner. Mangkunagara replied that Jayengrana had been given a royal wife, just as he himself had, and that Jayengrana's standing was therefore the same as his own. Mangkunagara ordered him killed. His head was cut off, and—in another example of ritual cannibalism—the official who despatched him ate his heart.[29] The head was sent to Hartingh, "as if we lived in good friendship with [Mangkunagara]",[30] which was certainly no longer true.

By this time it was April–May 1754, and Mangkubumi's negotiations with Hartingh were under way, but for Mangkunagara this period seems to have been something of an interlude as he awaited further developments.[31] In early May Kudanawarsa led a successful campaign which regained Kaduwang for Mangkunagara's side. Mangkunagaran units also prevailed in Sukawati. Mangkunagara's account reports that at this stage Mangkubumi was in a weak position: his forces amounted to only "about 300, male and female, remaining and the King [Mangkubumi] was ill with fever". Hartingh reported around the same time that Mangkubumi's forces—according to Seh Ibrahim—consisted of only 1,500 men "among them 200 with flintlocks".[32] The rebel King was thus fortunate to have a *de facto* cessation of hostilities with the VOC.

Mangkunagara himself was not fighting. At Mount Wijil, he enjoyed his usual entertainments. His memoir records his own marriage to another secondary wife on 26 May 1754, the birth of another child on 1 June, and the marriage on 29 May of his daughter R. Aj. Sobro (or Sombro), whom we encountered in Chapter 3 at the age of one in 1746. She was now about nine and, by Javanese standards,

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[29] Jayengrana's capture, interrogation and execution are recorded also in *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 41–3, but without the cannibalism.

[30] KV, p. 193.

[31] The account of Mangkunagara's activities down to his fishing expedition rests on *SBPn* ff. 332v.–337r. Quotation from *SBPn* f. 333v.: *kang kantun bala Sang Nata, tigang atus winatawis, jalu-estri kantunira, Susunan gĕrah panas-tis.* See also *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 43–7.

[32] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Apr. 1754, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 89.

marriageable, but such child marriages were not consummated until after puberty.[33] The fasting month (Pasa, beginning 21 June 1754) was observed by Mangkunagara and all his people; no prayers or evening ritual meals (*malĕman*) were missed.[34] At *Garĕbĕg Puasa* on 21 July 1754, his nascent court city was full of officials and their entourages. He was receiving defectors from Mangkubumi's side and establishing new military units. Meanwhile, correspondence went on with Hartingh, who was trying to keep Mangkunagara uncertain about his intentions.[35]

At this stage—as politics seemed to hang fire, just as those early muskets often did in practice—Mangkunagara seems to have been overwhelmed by an attack of *ennui* or *Weltschmerz*:

1. Then Lord Pangeran
   Adipati Arya Mangkunagara
   was fatigued in his heart
   and wished to enjoy himself
   by going fishing at the village of Ji[m]bung.
   He had absolutely no wish
   to march to war.[36]

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[33] We know of three marriages to R. Aj. Sombro. *SBPn* f. 334r. and *BG* Vol. xiv, p. 11; Vol. xvi, p. 53; Vol. xix, p. 60, report that she was initially married to R. Sumanagara, the son of the *bupati* of Mataram named Jayaningrat. This was a "hung marriage", i.e., a child marriage which was never consummated. As will be seen in the next chapter, in 1755 Sumanagara defected from MN's side to MB's, leaving Sombro behind. She was then married to the rebel R.M. Guntur. She followed him into rebellion in 1761–62 (Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 23–4); after he was killed she was returned to MN. To judge from Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 267, she was then married to R. Tg. Yudanagara of Banyumas (the son of the Yudanagara of Banyumas who became Danurĕja I of Yogyakarta in 1755). On this "hung marriage" (*kawin gantung*) practice for children, see Hildred Geertz, *The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 56; Robert R. Jay, *Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1969), p. 39, and (based on the same practices in West Java and Madura) "Kinderhuwelijken op Java en Madoera (1921)", *Adatrechtbundels* Vol. 34 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), pp. 87, 91.

[34] *Malĕman* meals (*slamĕtan*) to break the fast were held on the 20, 22, 24 and 26 Ramadan/Pasa in Java.

[35] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 12 June 1754, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 90.

[36] *SBPn* f. 337r., Canto 81 (Pangkur): 1. *Anulya Kangjĕng Pangeran, Adipati Arya Mĕngkunagari, kawangkungĕn manahipun, akarsa cĕngkrama, mĕndĕt ulam dhumatĕng dhusun ing Jibung, nora sĕdya pisan-pisan, yen mangkata ing ajurit.*

He took his wives and children with him to Jimbung, which lies near Klaten, where he would be more vulnerable to attack than at Mount Wijil. They set off on 20 August 1754. *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* recorded dramatic events that followed. Mangkunagara's wives and concubines were all similarly attired for their jolly outing. They arrived at Kusumarĕja, intending to rest one night, when VOC cavalry from Prambanan appeared, driving back Mangkunagara's units who had been sent out ahead of his party. Chaos reigned as wives, children and soldiers scattered. The VOC unit paused, giving time for Mangkunagara to restore order. The two sides fired at each other from opposite sides of the river until Mangkunagara's side took flight. The VOC pursued and attacked Kusumarĕja itself, but they were eventually driven back. The next day, says the *babad*, Mangkunagara distributed money among the soldiers who had fought bravely but gave none to those who had fled the field.[37]

P.J.F. Louw underestimated this engagement when he wrote that, because Mangkunagara's forces had been too close to Surakarta, the VOC commander Steenmulder was obliged to "give him another lesson".[38] We may note *en passant* that Javanese sources call this commander *Istimolor*, roughly meaning "contemplating the hanging (snot)". There was, however, a good deal more to this than "another lesson" imposed on Mangkunagara. Hartingh's account of the same engagement notes that although Mangkunagara suffered a "painful pinch", on the Company side were killed "one Captain, Lieutenant and Ensign, 20 dragoons, and an entire company of Natives was scattered".[39] This compares with Mangkunagara's account of five wounded on his side against 20 dead Dutchmen plus a captain, 120 dead Bugis and Balinese, and others captured.[40] *Babad Giyanti* also records this pleasure outing to Jimbung that turned into a battle. It reports 30 VOC dead, including one captain.[41]

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[37] *SBPn* ff. 337v.–340v. The AJ date was Tuesday-Pon, 1 Dulkaidah, Dal *trus pandhita bah ing jalmi* (AJ 1679) = 20 Aug. 1754; this is correct in all details if in the Friday calendar.

[38] Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 91.

[39] KV, pp. 195–6.

[40] *SBPn* ff. 340r.–v.

[41] *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 52–6. The dead captain is here named *Sel*, no doubt the Lt. Commandant Zelle mentioned in Van Hohendorff (the archive copy gives Mijlendonk, who was probably a secretary, as author), Semarang, to Batavia, 20 June 1753, in VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

How tired was Mangkunagara, we might ask ourselves, that he should have undertaken something as dangerous as a fishing trip with his women and children to an area more vulnerable to enemy attack? He was now 28 years old and had been fighting continuously for nearly half his life. He had multiple women and children by then (their number is not known) and perhaps began to think that there were better ways to spend one's life. Certainly, he had always displayed his penchant for the higher Javanese arts and for Islamic piety (as he understood it, which allowed heavy drinking). But his war was still far from over. The VOC and Mangkubumi were now combining their power as allies against him. In such a situation, the outing to Jimbung with its nearly disastrous result seems a significant error of judgement. It was a surprising mistake for a warrior who had shown his wily capacity to survive against multiple enemies, and to strike his own decisive blows against them, since he was a teenager.

Whatever his mood may have been as he tried to go fishing at Jimbung, in the wake of that encounter Mangkunagara resumed the offensive. From late August 1754, he and his detachments drove into Mataram and Bagelen.[42] He was not finished fighting. Remarkably, however, he was still determined to go fishing at Jimbung and did so in early September.[43] *Babad Giyanti* says that he formally assumed the royal title Sunan Adiprakosa about this time.[44] Once again, Mangkunagara's own *babad* offers no confirmation of this. It does, however, report the receipt of a letter from Mangkubumi confirming that he had allied with the Company.[45] Mangkunagara now faced approaching VOC contingents from Surakarta to the north and Prambanan to the west and decided to avoid battle. He withdrew towards Grobogan. He thus headed for the region where the fateful meeting between Mangkubumi and Hartingh was about to take place at Pědagangan.

It was at around this time that Prince Buminata (then being called Bintara) exited the Javanese stage. There is some confusion in the sources about the sequence of events, but the outcome is clear. According to *Babad Giyanti*, he continued to pursue his own rebellious path with troops consisting of "crooks, villains, thieves and bandits". Mangkubumi unleashed his forces against him, pursuing

[42] *SBPn* ff. 340v.–343v.
[43] *SBPn* f. 343r.
[44] *BG* Vol. xvi, p. 57.
[45] *SBP* f. 343r.

and destroying his army until it consisted of only ten men. Buminata sought refuge with Png. Singasari in Kediri but was rejected. Finally, he fled to Surabaya.[46] There, in 1755, he surrendered to the VOC. After the Giyanti treaty, he offered his repentance to both Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana III, who both refused this approach. So the VOC exiled Buminata to the remote island of Banda in the eastern archipelago. At some later stage the Company transported him to Sri Lanka, where he died in 1783.[47] Thus the arrogant, vain, cowardly rebel who once styled himself grandly "Sultan Dhandhun Martengsari", the quondam Crown Prince of Surakarta upon whom no one could rely, sailed out of our narrative and into exile far from Java.

From Pědagangan (September 1754) to Giyanti (February 1755)

As we saw above, the personal meeting between Mangkubumi and Hartingh at Pědagangan was a crucial turning point. Mangkunagara gave next-to-no importance to the meeting in his *babad*. There we read of Mangkubumi and Hartingh making peace and of Capt. Donkel and his dragoons being detached to Mangkubumi's command. Dutch sources, however, record that Mangkunagara marched with some 2,000 cavalry, probably with the intention of interfering in the meeting. By the time he arrived, Hartingh had already departed. Had he got there earlier, he could have surrounded and seriously threatened Hartingh's small force. Mangkubumi and Capt. Donkel were forced to flee to an inaccessible area of caves in Grobogan, where they were safe from attack.[48]

After Pědagangan—when Mangkunagara faced the combined and now coordinated armies of Mangkubumi, the VOC and the few

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[46] *BG* Vol. xvi, pp. 44–7; quotation from pp. 44–5: *gĕntho bangsat maling kecu*.
[47] *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 3–12; Hartingh, Surabaya, to Batavia, 30 June 1755, and Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1755, both in VOC 2865 (OB 1756); Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss*. Vol. xii, p. 600; Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 26 Feb. 1756, in VOC 2887 (OB 1757); Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 22 Feb. 1783, in VOC 3651 (OB 1784); KV, p. 207; Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 90. See also *SBPn* f. 361r. PB III refused permission for Buminata's surviving wives and children to return from Sri Lanka to Surakarta; Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Mar. 1783, in VOC 3653 (OB 1784).
[48] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1754, quoted in Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, p. 102; KV, pp. 199–200.

dignitaries loyal to Pakubuwana III—the discipline of Mangkunagara's forces briefly broke. According to his own account and to *Babad Giyanti*, they desecrated one of the Mataram dynasty's holy sites, Selo (or Sěsela), east of Purwodadi in Grobogan *Kabupaten* (and not the site high on the slopes of Merapi with the same name). Here lies the grave of Ki Agěng Sela, the progenitor of the dynasty. He is said to have been a direct descendant of the last King of Majapahit and the grandfather of Ky. Pamanahan, who first occupied the land of Mataram. The latter's son was Panĕmbahan Senapati Ingalaga (r. c. 1584–1601), to whom dynastic tradition ascribes credit for laying the Mataram kingdom's supernatural and military foundations.[49]

Mangkunagara's own account of the desecration of Selo is damning. His troops were plundering villages despite being ordered to stop. When they reached Selo, the district of the pious (*pakauman*) and its mosque were pillaged; the gravesite of Ki Agěng Sela itself was destroyed.[50] Mangkunagara was outraged, but also disturbed, for he thought that this betokened divine displeasure and future misfortune in war. He demanded the return of everything that had been stolen. Everything that could be recovered was returned to its owners and the gravesite was rebuilt, as the pious folk (*pěthakan*) requested.[51]

Babad Giyanti, again reflecting affairs as seen from the point of view of the new Sultan—i.e., Mangkubumi—denounced the desecration of the holy site by "Suryakusuma" (the pre-princely name for Mangkunagara, which Mangkubumi demanded must be employed as a form of contempt). The *patih* Natakusuma said of Mangkunagara's troops, "There are none who know the *Kulhu* and none who recognised the 'palace' of Sela, who begat all the kingly line." The term *Kulhu* refers to *sura* 112 of the Qur'an, *al-Ikhlas* [Purity], which is a brief assertion of God's singularity and unity. This *sura* thus conveys fundamental doctrine.[52] In saying that Mangkunagara's people knew neither this nor the significance of Ki Agěng Sela's grave, Natakusuma

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[49] H.J. de Graaf, *De regering van Panembahan Sénapati Ingalaga*, *VKI* Vol. 13, pp. 5–15 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954).

[50] Meaning not the grave itself but its small roofed enclosure, known as a *cungkup* or, in the case of eminent persons, sometimes also called its "palace" (*astana*). Both terms are used in the *BG* account of these events.

[51] *SBPn* ff. 344r.–v.

[52] "Say: 'He is God the One, God the eternal. He begot no one nor was He begotten. No one is comparable to Him'" (Abdel Haleem's translation, p. 444). This *sura* was also used in teaching Arabic to children; see Gericke and Roorda (1901 ed.), Vol. i, p. 483. *Khulhu* (*qul hu*) are the opening words, "Say: 'He….'"

depicted them as barbarians ignorant of both their own Islamic faith and Javanese tradition. Mangkubumi wanted to attack Mangkunagara, but Natakusuma advised that there were two reasons not to do so. First, it would show neither respect nor honour to the ancestor to make war at his gravesite. Second, Sultan Mangkubumi was now accompanied by the VOC's foreign soldiers of a different religion whose presence would defile the holy site and destroy its beneficent powers.[53] The reckoning with Mangkunagara was postponed for a better time and place.

Over the later months of 1754—once again as the wet monsoon drenched the Javanese countryside—the Sultan and the VOC set out to find, engage and destroy Mangkunagara.[54] In the western theatre, to the west of Mataram, Mangkunagara's partisans were generally defeated. In the central theatre, however, the coalition against Mangkunagara faced greater challenges.

A critical battle took place in October 1754 which demonstrated how perilous Mangkunagara's position now was. He marched from Selo to Sukawati, intending to tackle the Company forces in that area. He stopped at the village of Pajok (modern Pojok) and awaited the response to a missive he had sent to Sultan Mangkubumi. Mangkubumi's reply advised that he was now allied with the VOC and was at Majenang (also in Sukawati, in *kecamatan* Pojok). The VOC, he advised, had 600–800 Dutch infantry and cavalry (different numbers are mentioned in different places), about 800 Bugis and Balinese, and 1,000 coastal Javanese soldiers, with whom the Sultan was joined. Mangkunagara established his lines across a broad field at Tugu in Sukawati, in the lowlands north of the town of Sragen with the Kendeng hills farther to his north.[55]

As Mangkubumi and the allied VOC approached Tugu from Majenang, according to *Babad Giyanti*, Mangkunagara awaited the

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[53] *BG* Vol. xvi, p. 79–Vol. xvii, p. 3. Quotation from p. 79: *balanipun tan wontĕn uningeng Kulhu, tan wontĕn miyarsa, astana Sela puniki, nĕdhakakĕn sagung para raja-raja*. MB's pronouncement in 1753 that MN must no longer be called Pangeran Adipati but rather be known by his earlier, pre-princely name of Suryakusuma is recorded in *SBPn* f. 304v. The VOC also began to use this name; e.g., Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 25 Jan. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756).

[54] The following account down to and including the battle at Tugu rests upon KV, pp. 200–1; Batavia to H.XVII, 15 Oct. 1754, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, p. 401; *SBPn* ff. 344v.–345v.; *BG* Vol. xvii, pp. 3–15, 28–9.

[55] See Appendix 3 on the probable location of this battlefield.

arrival of his enemies, positioning his forces so as to conceal their true configuration. Perhaps he did this to give the impression of a larger force than in fact he had. He may have been successful in such a ruse: we do not know the size of his army at Tugu, but Hartingh's *Kort verhaal* records that it was estimated to be still 16,000 strong, which was perhaps an exaggeration. This was not to be an ambush, a running battle through rough mountain country, an attack on a fortified position or a lightning raid like so many before, but a decisive clash of arms between main forces on an open field. We have no account of what the soldiers of either side felt as they formed up for this major battle, but can imagine that it must have been like the depiction in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*:

> The squadron … had just had time to mount its horses when it was halted facing the enemy.… There was no one between the squadron and the enemy, and there lay between them, separating them, that same terrible line of the unknown and of fear, like the line separating the living from the dead. All the men sensed that line, and the question of whether they would or would not cross that line, and how they would cross it, troubled them.
>
> The colonel rode up to the front, angrily gave some answers to the officers' questions and … gave some order. No one said anything definite, but the rumour of an attack swept through the squadron. The command to form up was heard, then sabres shrieked as they were drawn from their scabbards.… "God be with us, lads," Denisov's voice rang out. "At a trot, march!"[56]

Mangkunagara ordered his force into the attack. There followed three or four hours of intense, hand-to-hand combat on 18 October.[57] The VOC recorded that Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi were so closely involved that they could see each other clearly, but this is doubtful. It is possible that both were using body doubles that confused even the Company. *Babad Giyanti* says that Mangkubumi observed the fighting while grandly seated under two parasols. Mangkunagara himself did, evidently, join the fighting *incognito* and at one point was surrounded, but he escaped with his life.

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[56] Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, transl., annot. and intro. by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage Books, 2009), p. 188.

[57] *SBPn* f. 345v. has errors in the date, which it gives as Friday-Paing, 2 Sura, Be *sirna turongga obah ing rat* (AJ 1670); assuming Friday-Paing to be correct, the date should have been given as 1 Sura in the Thursday calendar, the first day of the new year, and the year should be AJ 1680.

Babad Giyanti's account of the combat is evocative:

> 47. The intensity of the fighting was as if a mountain was sundered
> and collapsed: such was the sound of firearms
> and the heavy cannon, firing turn by turn
> as the bores were swabbed out, and the lighter cannon.
> Of those who were attacked, many were killed,
> and of the horses,
> many were attacked and killed.[58]

The fighting was so heavy that, according to Dutch evidence, the VOC infantry nearly expended all their cartridges.

Mangkunagara's vanguard broke after a brief initial encounter, followed by the flight of his right wing and then of his left commanded by his brother Mangkuningrat and Png. Purbaya. They withdrew towards the southeast. Mangkunagara sent in reserves under Kudanawarsa, which put the coastal Javanese detachments to flight, but Mangkunagara's losses were nevertheless overwhelming. Kudanawarsa advised retreat, whereupon Mangkunagara withdrew a short distance to the east of Tugu. Mangkubumi occupied Tugu and counted what *Babad Giyanti* depicts as the one-sided outcome of the battle: 347 dead in Mangkunagara's army, while Mangkubumi's and the VOC's side suffered only two dragoons dead and some wounded. Hartingh's account, however, without recording specifics, commented that the VOC "suffered some damage due to the faintheartedness of one of our officers". (We should, of course, recall Clausewitz's caution already cited in Chapter 3 that "Casualty reports are never accurate, seldom truthful, and in most cases deliberately falsified."[59]) Sultan Mangkubumi ordered that the fallen enemy be beheaded and the heads strung up together on poles across the battlefield. After Mangkubumi and the VOC departed, Mangkunagara returned so that the heads could be collected by the brothers and widows of the dead, according to *Babad Giyanti*.

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[58] *BG* Vol. xvii, p. 13, Canto 158 (Durma): 47. *Ramening kang ayuda lir arga bĕntar, rug suwaraning bĕdhil, mariyĕm tinundha, sapu lĕbĕt rontaka, kang katrajang keh ngĕmasi, miwah turongga, katrajang keh ngĕmasi*. The bores of muzzle-loading cannon had to be swabbed out after each shot, lest lingering embers should ignite the new gunpowder while it was being loaded for the next volley, with disastrous consequences for the gunners.

[59] Von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 234.

As Sultan Mangkubumi and the VOC withdrew south from Tugu, Mangkunagara followed them.[60] He generally avoided engagement with his numerically superior enemies. He did, however, strike near Sidakarsa (presumably present-day Sidoharjo), evidently believing that he would find Capt. Steenmulder there with the VOC sick and invalids. He was repelled at a cost of 50 dead and 100 wounded, according to the *Kort verhaal.* He then retreated towards the mountains to the south, heading for his frequent refuge at Sĕmbuyan. Png. Mangkuningrat was ordered west to harass VOC forces, while Tg. Ranadipura was sent north to harass in that direction.

Mangkunagara was not only suffering the loss of fighters—both the dead and wounded and those who defected—but there was a sickness among his horses as well that claimed many of them, including two of Mangkunagara's own favourites. Also troublesome was pain in both his hands which made moving them impossible. This was consistent with what was earlier identified as arthritis or rheumatism (*encok*) but which, as we will see in Chapter 9, was probably in fact evidence of an advancing yaws infection.

In his *babad,* Mangkunagara recorded his despair as of the end of October 1754:

> 24. Great was the grief of Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara]:
> Many of his horses had died
> and he had been defeated in battle.
> His hands were exhausted,
> many grass-cutters [for the horses] had defected
> and he could handle neither a bow nor reins,
> so he was unable to do battle.[61]

He was, in other words, a 28-year-old warrior losing soldiers, losing horses, losing battles and suffering crippled hands. This was just the start of Mangkunagara's hardest times.

In the last months of 1754, Mangkunagara's forces lost almost every engagement with the armies of Mangkubumi and the VOC,

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[60] The following account down to the end of October 1754 rests upon *SBPn* ff. 346v.–349r.; *BG* Vol. xvii, pp. 14–9, 23; KV, pp. 201–2.

[61] *SBPn* f. 349r. Canto 82 (Dhandhanggula): 24: *Langkung sĕdhih Pangeran Dipati, ingkang turongga akathah pjah, sarta kasoran yudane, cape ing astanipun, wong pangarit akathah bali, tan bisa anyĕpĕnga gandhewa lan apus, mila tan bisa ayuda.* This is followed by the date Tuesday-Pon, 13 Muharram [AJ 1680], which varies by one day from what one would expect in the Thursday calendar: Tuesday-Pon, 12 Muharram = 29 Oct. 1754.

although not without costs to the latter side. More people defected to what was obviously the winning side, including R. Tg. Ranadipura. Firearms were repaired and horses rested, but many horses continued to die. As always, Mangkunagara found opportunities to spend the evenings with *gamĕlan* and dancing, but these were no celebratory times. Png. Mangkuningrat sought refuge in Pacitan, on the south coast of central Java. Mangkunagara was critical of his brother, but the two were reconciled when Mangkuningrat joined him at Ponorogo: this was no time for family disunity. In Ponorogo, Mangkunagara hoped to purchase new horses. Pg. Singasari—who had evaded all the decisive battles of the central theatre of war—was in Kediri, whence he supplied the needed animals. Around this time, Mangkunagara received letters from the Dutch and Sultan Mangkubumi, which he burned in anger.[62]

Mangkunagara recorded his sense of reconciliation with his fate:

> 70. … Within himself he prayed intensely
> while externally he took his pleasures
> to rouse his troops.
> In the afternoon, he often went riding
> with his soldiers. At night, when he was unable to sleep,
> he was content and thankful for whatever God might bring
> to be.[63]

Meanwhile, at the village of Giyanti (southeast of Surakarta, below Mount Lawu), Mangkubumi had established a temporary court. He was preparing for the formal partition of the kingdom of Mataram and his ascension to the throne over half of it as the first Sultan of Yogyakarta.

The Treaty of Giyanti and Meeting at Jatisari, February 1755

Nicolaas Hartingh travelled from Semarang to Giyanti, the temporary capital of Mangkubumi's new sultanate, at the end of January 1755.[64]

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[62] *SBPn* ff. 349r.–354v.; Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 25 Jan. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756); KV, pp. 202–3.

[63] *SBPn* f. 354v., Canto 82 (Dhandhanggula): 70. … *kabatinan maladi ĕning, kalairan asuka, ngunggar balanipun, yen sontĕn asring tĕtĕgar, lan kang bala yen dalu tan angsal guling, rĕna sokur ing titah*. MN was then at Tirem (Grobogan).

[64] Except where otherwise noted, the account of these events rests upon Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 67–80.

En route he paused at Surakarta, where Pakubuwana III confirmed that he agreed to the partition of his kingdom, half of it to go to Mangkubumi. Half of the 20,000 *reals* that the VOC paid annually for its control of the north coast would also go to the new Sultan. On 9 February Hartingh and Mangkubumi met privately with only a translator and Mangkubumi's *patih* Natakusuma present. They discussed the treaty drafted by the Company, which was altered when Mangkubumi objected to a provision that would have restricted his power over subordinates. Mangkubumi promised that he would not take revenge against officials for their conduct during the war.

It was time for Mangkubumi to choose a new *patih*, an appointment for which the treaty of 1743 stipulated that VOC approval was required. In practice, in the case of a ruler as determined and powerful as Mangkubumi, the Company had no choice but to agree. Natakusuma was clearly a trusted adviser, but his health was poor. Mangkubumi's choice for his successor was a somewhat surprising one. He wanted R. Tg. Yudanagara, the *bupati* of Banyumas, who was his brother-in-law but who had fought loyally on the Surakarta-VOC side against Mangkubumi in the war. Initially reluctant—perhaps indeed fearing for his life—Yudanagara was eventually persuaded to accept this weighty role and the VOC agreed. He was renamed R. Ad. Danurĕja I (in office 1755–99) and went on to be one of the most distinguished senior officials ever to serve the sultanate. His son succeeded him as *bupati* of Banyumas, also with the name Yudanagara, under the authority of Surakarta.

The Giyanti meeting also divided up the kingdom's territories between Susuhunan Pakubuwana III and Sultan Mangkubumi. These efforts were hampered by the absence of accurate cadastral information. There had been no census of Javanese population since 1651, so the population data used at Giyanti rested on theoretical population figures at least a century old, possibly updated in some cases with more accurate information. The preceding 80 years had been violent. During 36 of those years there had been major military campaigns on Javanese soil; some eastern regions were almost permanently disrupted. The population had suffered loss of life through hostilities, disease, foraging armies and disruption to agricultural production. This may well have meant that the actual population of 1755 was below the figures being relied upon at Giyanti. Those figures were expressed in conventional counting units (*cacah*) for households that were liable for taxation and *corvée*. In this period we encounter the terms *cacah gĕsang* (living, or functional units) and *cacah mati*

(dead, or non-functional units), reflecting the actual situation in the countryside. The theoretical figures divided at Giyanti added up to 172,500 *cacahs* split roughly evenly between the two rulers. We lack the evidence which would be needed to convert *cacah* to heads of population with any confidence; some scholars have multiplied by 4 or 6. If we simply guess and multiply by 5, we get a total population for the areas under the authority of the two rulers (some of it, of course, still in rebel hands), excluding the VOC-controlled coastal area, of 862,500 persons. Thus, each of the kings claimed sovereignty over a population of around 430,000 persons—for comparison, that was somewhat more than the population of Finland at the same time and, when added together, more than the contemporary population of Denmark or Norway. Population estimates published by J. Hageman in 1860 suggest (on no sound evidentiary basis) that the population of the areas controlled by the Javanese monarchs in 1755 plus Madura and the coastal areas under the VOC had a combined population of some 1.5 million; that would be rather more than, say, the population of Scotland at the same stage and close to the 1.6 million population of the 13 American colonies in 1760.[65] The massive population growth for which Java was to become famous began in the years after Giyanti, as peace returned to Java for what was probably the longest period since the 14th century.[66] In the absence of reliable cadastral information, this initial distribution of territories produced a chaotic kaleidoscope of territories, without logical or even, in many cases, clear boundaries between Yogyakarta and Surakarta lands. The predictable result was several years of low-level conflicts over villages.

On 13 February 1755, Mangkubumi and Hartingh swore to uphold the terms of the Giyanti treaty. They and other dignitaries signed and sealed the document. Henceforth, Mangkubumi became Sultan Haměngkubuwana I. As noted above, it is evident that he continued to regard Mangkubumi as his own personal name, and we will continue to employ that name for him in this book.

Two days later the Sultan, Hartingh and their entourages went to the village of Jatisari, midway between Giyanti and Surakarta.

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[65] B.R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970* (Abridged ed.; London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1978), pp. 3, 4, 6, 8; Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager and William E. Leuchtenburg, *A Concise History of the American Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 45.

[66] Ricklefs, "Statistical Evidence".

There, uncle and nephew met in person: Sultan Mangkubumi—the most powerful leader in Java by far, now some 38 years old—and Pakubuwana III, who was just turning 23 and was yet of no consequence whatsoever. In theory they were equal sovereigns; in practice there was little equality in the comparison. There was no Javanese protocol to cover such an odd occasion. The two monarchs sat staring at each other in silence, so Hartingh took their hands and led them to greet one another. They promised to stand together against Mangkunagara, and, to seal the solemn occasion, a glass of beer was drunk.

Pakubuwana III presented his uncle with a *kris*. Sources conflict about what this *kris* was. Hartingh understood it to be a family heirloom but not a major piece of regalia (*pusaka*). Mangkunagara—who was not present, of course, but whose chronicle seems well informed about these proceedings—wrote that it was the *pusaka* Ky. Běthok. Both *Babad Giyanti* and the Yogyakarta chronicle *Babad Mangkubumi*, however, identify it as Ky. Kopek,[67] the *kris* of the semi-legendary apostle of Islam (*wali*) Sunan Kalijaga and later one of three *pusaka agěng* (great regalia) of the Yogyakarta Sultanate. This was a particularly appropriate gift, for the legends ascribe to Kalijaga a crucial role in the 16th century in persuading the ruler of Pajang (where Surakarta is located) to surrender the land of Mataram (where Yogyakarta is located) to Ki Pamanahan, who went on to conquer Pajang and lay the foundations of the Mataram dynasty. Departing from Jatisari was another protocol problem: who (the inferior) was to take leave of whom (the superior)? Again, European-style conduct provided the only solution. The two rulers shook hands, embraced, shared another beer and departed. Never again did they meet in person. Sultan Mangkubumi soon sent officials to Yogyakarta to begin the construction of his new court there. It is perhaps of interest that the Giyanti meeting seems to have been less important to Mangkunagara than Jatisari: the former is not dated in his account, while

[67] *BG* Vol. xvii, p. 78, and Vol. xviii, p. 11; *BMang*, p. 42. For historical background on these and other *pusakas,* see Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, pp. 141, 148–9, 153, 157–8, 159; Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 182–3, 194–8, 207; and Ricklefs, "The Missing *Pusakas* of Kartasura, 1705–37", pp. 601–30, in *Bahasa-sastra-budaya: Ratna manikam untaian persembah kepada Prof. Dr. P.J. Zoetmulder*, ed. Sulastin Sustrisno et al. (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985), esp. the lists on pp. 625–8.

the latter is. He employed the chronogram "in the skies serpents felt as one".[68] *Babad Giyanti* does date the meeting at Giyanti, but wrongly.[69]

A central purpose of the treaty was that all should join in destroying Mangkunagara, the prime immediate objective of Mangkubumi and the VOC, and an ominous one for Mangkunagara. But all was not quite as it seemed, for the makings of a way out of the threatening circle surrounding him were already appearing at Giyanti. According to his chronicle, and not surprisingly, behind the façade of reconciliation between Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana III—the youthful loser in the new arrangement—there was concern in Surakarta at the division of the kingdom. *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* says that *patih* Pringgalaya, who was present at Giyanti as the representative of Pakubuwana III, was rather at his wits' end. "Many people wonder how it will go with two kings in Java," he reportedly said. "I reckon there is no way this will turn out well: there'll surely be fighting."[70] What he meant was fighting between Surakarta and Mangkubumi's new sultanate in Yogyakarta. Mangkubumi almost certainly had this in mind as a second step on his agenda if it were necessary, and no reasonable person could doubt who would be the winner of such a contest. Pringgalaya indubitably also had in mind Mangkubumi's implacable personal hatred towards him, going back at least as far as Mangkubumi's rebellion in 1746.

Previous divisions of the kingdom had always ended in the victory of one side over the other. Both historical precedents and current realities suggested that, when Mangkubumi and the VOC had finished off Mangkunagara, the Sultan would surely seek means to destroy or displace—or at least succeed—Pakubuwana III in Surakarta. Indeed, he raised with Hartingh the question of who would succeed in Surakarta if Pakubuwana III were to die without a male heir. Hartingh said it was too early to consider such an issue. He described Mangkubumi's "expectation of sole sovereignty over

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[68] Correctly dated in the Thursday calendar Saturday-Paing, 3 Jumadilawal, *wuku* Langkir, Be *wiyat naga rasa tunggal* (AJ 1680) = 15 Feb. 1755; *SBPn* f. 356r.

[69] *BG* Vol. xvii, pp. 44, 47, gives Monday, 10 Rabingulakir, Be *mur sarira ngayog bumi* ("flying away, the body moved the world", AJ 1680), which is internally inconsistent in either the Thursday or Friday calendar. The correct date in the Thursday calendar was Thursday, 1 Jumadilawal, Be AJ 1680.

[70] *SBPn* f. 357r.: *panyiptane wong kathah, paran dadinipun, Nalendra kalih ing Jawa, sun watara mongsa dadiya ing bĕcik, tan wande kĕkĕrĕngan*.

Java, for which he hoped and had his eye on, which after all he made quite clear in the first meeting at Pědagangan on 23 September 1754".[71] In these circumstances, Pakubuwana III needed a bulwark against his much more powerful, more experienced, older and more strongly supported uncle Mangkubumi. He needed now to take the first decision of his life that really mattered. It should not surprise us that he began clandestine contacts with his more powerful, more experienced, older and more strongly supported cousin Mangkunagara, the Sultan's greatest enemy.

[71] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Apr. 1756, in VOC 2887 (OB 1757).

6

The Third Javanese War of Succession's Final Phase: Mangkunagara's Concluding Battles to Senior Princedom, 1755–57

The strategic landscape of Central and East Java in February 1755 was clear. We may identify four major and some minor players on the war-ravaged Javanese stage. (1) The most powerful monarch was Sultan Mangkubumi, who was building his new *kraton* city at Yogyakarta and marshalling forces to finish Mangkunagara and other rebels in the countryside. (2) The next most powerful force was the VOC, but it had lost much in money and personnel in the preceding years of warfare and was already gratefully beginning to demobilise its indigenous troop enlistments.[1] The Company would have been delighted to leave the final mopping up to its Javanese allies Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana III alone if it could. (3) Pakubuwana III had been of no significance since ascending the throne of Surakarta in 1749: a cipher whom the VOC sources had described in terms such as "unfortunate and lamentable" and "deprived of almost all power and unable to maintain himself or his affairs". As hostilities ceased in Central Java after the treaty of Giyanti, however, courtiers who had formerly thought it suicide—politically and personally—to support

[1] By late 1754 the VOC had already demobilised over 1,200 "native" soldiers to cut costs and because, with exceptions, they had been of little value; Batavia to H.XVII, 15 Oct. 1754, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xvii, p. 401.

the Susuhunan began to return to Surakarta. As well as old loyalties to honour, there were also, they undoubtedly noted, vacant courtly positions and associated appanages to be filled there.

From the ranks of the princely rebels who had fuelled the chaos in Java since the 1740s, the most significant one remaining was (4) Png. Mangkunagara. It should not surprise us, given what we have seen of his character and actions, that he was still fighting and still capable of inspiring loyal followers, but he had suffered significant defections and his future looked bleak in the face of the alliance against him. The other remaining princely rebel was Singasari, who was generally in a defensive posture, avoiding military engagements. There were also small-scale rebels in the disturbed countryside, many proclaiming religious credentials, but none were of significance and most were indeed mopped up in the months following Giyanti.

Roots of Reconciliation between Mangkunagara and Pakubuwana III

There was a potential convergence of interests between Prince Mangkunagara and Susuhunan Pakubuwana III, both of whom were threatened by Sultan Mangkubumi's overpowering stature. Pakubuwana III's forces had been as much Mangkunagara's enemies as were Mangkubumi's, but now circumstances had changed. Arousing himself from the impotence that had been imposed on him by circumstances and probably by character, Pakubuwana III assessed the changing environment and took action. If we are to trust Mangkunagara's *babad*—a source which has stood up to critical scrutiny previously in this book—the Susuhunan wrote clandestinely to Mangkunagara.

In late February 1755, a court herald of the Surakarta court came to Mangkunagara, then at Tirem (Grobogan), with a letter from Pakubuwana III. The passage in the chronicle is unfortunately marred by rare copyist's errors. It describes the Susuhunan's message as follows:

2. … "I was greatly outdone,
   without an elder person.
3. "Only you, Mas (elder brother) Dipati,
   are appropriate to care for me.
   I am greatly outdone
   competing with uncle the Sultan.
   So you should care (for me)

and you, elder brother, in the first place,
make good a welcome for your 'father' [Sultan Mangkubumi]."[2]

The last line of the passage is obscure, but the essence of the message is clear: Pakubuwana III was seeking some sort of protection through collaboration with Mangkunagara.

A second, similar letter appears a few pages later in Mangkunagara's *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*. This is said to have reached him after he withdrew to Menang (Ponorogo area) and had been there for two months, "writing out the Qur'an and religious books",[3] enjoying his usual entertainments, and "gratefully content for whatever God might bring to be".[4] This second letter said, according to his chronicle:

30. … "Elder brother Adipati,
please quickly
look after me.
Elder brother,
were you looked after when you were young
by mother and father [Pakubuwana II and his queen],
excellently?
31. "Now I am outdone,
overshadowed by uncle the Sultan.
So, quickly
become my companion.
There is no one who is suitable
for me to consult,
other than you."[5]

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[2] *SBPn* f. 357v. Canto 83 (Asmaradana): 2. … *Kawula kontik* [i.e., *kontit*] *kalangkung, nora darbe wong atuwa.* 3. *mung dika kangmas Dipati, yogya mamonga kawula, kula kalangkung kontite, mamaru lan paman Sultan, mila dika momonga, lan dika kangmas rumuhun, binĕcika nibumra* [sic; i.e., *nĕmbramani*?] *rama*. The date for the arrival of the herald (*gandhek*) is also confused: Monday-Manis (Lĕgi), 3 Jumadilawal [AJ 1680]. Assuming Monday-Lĕgi to be the correct part, then the most likely possibility would be Monday-Lĕgi 12 Jumadilawal AJ 1680 in the Thursday calendar, equivalent to 12 February 1755.

[3] *SBPn* f. 359r.: *kalih sasi antarane, masanggrahan ing Paměnang, bumi ing Pranaraga, Jĕng Pangran pakaryanipun, nĕrat kitab lawan Kur'an*.

[4] *SBPn* f. 359v.: *asring kasukan badhayan sokur rĕna ing titahe*.

[5] *SBPn* ff. 359v.–360r. Canto 83 (Asmaradana): 30. … *kakang ĕmas Adipatya, dika kulaturi age, amongmonga ing kawula, punapa dika kangmas, ingingonan kala timur, pinĕdĕdan ibu rama.* 31. *Ing mangke kawula kontit, kinamaru lawan Sultan, mila dika dipunage, dadiya kanthi kawula, tan watĕn kang prayoga, kang kawula tantuntantun, liyane saking ngandika*.

The chronicle records that Mangkunagara replied to both letters from Pakubuwana III, but does not give the content of his replies. The idea that he had been well cared for in the court of Pakubuwana II stands in contrast to his own claim, cited earlier, that he had been maltreated as "a remnant and a thorny stump" at that court.[6]

We find no confirmation of this correspondence in VOC sources, so far as I am aware, so readers may be sceptical. *Babad Giyanti*, however, records a conversation at Daha in 1755[7] (see below) when Mangkunagara showed Kudanawarsa what must have been one of these letters from Pakubuwana III. We shall also see in the next section that Pakubuwana III's side, in the person of Pringgalaya, was heavily criticised for delaying the planned joint campaign to destroy Mangkunagara. The preceding passages from Mangkunagara's *babad* offer an explanation as to why this might have been so. They lead us to suspect at least an incipient understanding between Mangkunagara and Pakubuwana III. That there is no evidence of this in the VOC records suggests that the young Susuhunan and the battle-hardened Mangkunagara were successful in keeping their emerging understanding secret.

The Campaign to Destroy Mangkunagara and Incipient Negotiations, 1755–56

The forces of the VOC, the new sultanate and Surakarta were being assembled for a campaign to destroy Mangkunagara in the months after the Giyanti treaty. There was a sense of urgency, for it would be greatly advantageous to fight during the dry months of the year, usually from about May to October. During that season, it was much easier to move men, horses, all forms of supplies and particularly artillery through Java's demanding hinterland (although, we may note, a remarkable amount of the Third Javanese War of Succession was fought during wet monsoons instead). The plan was for Sultan Mangkubumi to march from the Giyanti area over Jogorogo on the north of Mount Lawu and thence into Madiun. Steenmulder and Pringgalaya with Surakarta troops were to march over Laroh to the south of Mount Lawu and through Kaduwang into Ponorogo. The

[6] Prince Aria Prangwadana [MN], n.p., to GG, Batavia, received Aug. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).
[7] *BG* Vol. xix, p. 55.

Madiun River valley would thus be attacked in a pincer movement from north and south. If Mangkunagara escaped into the mountains, he was to be pursued by the Javanese rulers' and the VOC's cavalry units—an arm of the military that could move with speed on the right terrain but which was better suited to flatlands than to mountains, it must be said. The VOC Resident of Surabaya was to march from the east with much-dreaded Madurese units to Kediri, clearing that area of enemy forces and cutting off escape in that direction.[8]

Babad Giyanti recorded difficulties in procuring the coolies needed for Pakubuwana III's part of the campaign. Surakarta villagers who were levied for such service demanded payment in money, which was a slow business—there was indeed a chronic shortage of coinage in Java. Yogyakarta people, however, were paid in land (of which there was a great deal devoid of people to till it), and the Sultan thereby quickly assembled 3,000 porters to support his forces in the grand campaign. Meanwhile, Madurese and Surabayan forces under VOC command marched to Kediri, which fell to them without resistance, and there awaited further orders. We read in the chronicle that Pringgalaya, who was in charge of assembling the Surakarta coolies, was heavily criticised by Pakubuwana III, Sultan Mangkubumi and the VOC for the coolie problem and that Pakubuwana III was embarrassed by his tardiness.[9] That may have been so, but this may instead have been intentional foot-dragging from the Susuhunan's side, consistent with an emerging understanding between him and Mangkunagara as discussed above. Not until early May 1755, two and one-half months after Giyanti, were the Surakarta forces ready to march, according to *Babad Giyanti.*[10]

While his enemies were preparing for their encirclement of Mangkunagara, his detachments were engaged in skirmishes in various places, with mixed results. Several important figures defected from his side—one of whom literally lost his head when his intentions were discovered before he could make his move.[11] Others were, not surprisingly, unsure where their loyalties belonged and how their personal prospects would best be served. R. Tg. Ranadipura was

[8] KV, pp. 206–7; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, p. 599.
[9] *BG* Vol. xviii, pp. 28–45.
[10] *BG* Vol. xviii, p. 46.
[11] Wiraguna of Kedu, who was defeated and killed by Kudanawarsa, according to *SBPn* f. 361v.

one such example. *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* describes his defection to Mangkubumi in December 1754, as we saw in the preceding chapter.[12] In April 1755 he offered his loyalty again to Mangkunagara and was accepted.[13] No doubt duplicity abounded in these affairs.

Mangkunagara established a residence at Menang but then had to respond to approaching enemy detachments. We noted above that his *babad* describes this as a period of two months extending into April 1755, during which time he wrote out the Qur'an and religious books, and received the second letter from Pakubuwana III, with its prospect of some sort of alliance. The prince learned of the occupation of Kediri by the VOC troops from Surabaya and their Madurese auxiliaries, and the consequent flight of Png. Singasari into the mountain forests. Mangkunagara and his officers observed the Ramadan/Pasa fast together at Menang in June–July. Then it became known that the forces of Yogyakarta, Surakarta and the VOC were marching to attack him. On 24 June Mangkunagara marched from Menang for Kaduwang, heading straight for the path of Steenmulder and Pringgalaya, approaching from the opposite direction. He was evidently able to swing south of Steenmulder and Pringgalaya's line of march and turn north towards Sidakarsa (presumably present-day Sidoharjo) in Sukawati. This manoeuvre meant that he turned the flanks of both attacking columns and was now behind Mangkubumi's forces, who had marched east in order to turn south to Madiun. During Mangkunagara's manoeuvre, Kudanawarsa harassed Surakarta and VOC forces.[14]

Babad Giyanti describes the devastation wrought by the Madurese and Surabayan troops as they marched on through the devastated Javanese countryside. "Eradicated were whomever they encountered, the males annihilated and the women captured. Even children, if male, were killed."[15] Hartingh depicted these eastern (*moncanĕgara*) lands—even before the Madurese and Surabayans marched through them—as "totally ruined; starvation, misery and suffering rampage

[12] *SBPn* ff. 350v.–351r., dating this in December 1754 (Monday-Wage, 24 Sapar, Be 1680, out by one day from the usual Thursday calendar combination).
[13] *SBPn* ff. 357v.–359r.
[14] *SBPn* ff. 358v.–362v. See further Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, pp. 599–600.
[15] *BG* Vol. xviii, p. 49: *tumpĕsan singa katĕmu, lanange tinumpĕsan, wadone binoyong sami, nadyan rare lanang pinĕjahan*.

extraordinarily and very violently there".[16] The Madurese and Surabayans drove all before them, precipitating defections from Mangkunagara's side as they marched south along the Madiun River. When Mangkubumi reached Madiun, he found it already plundered by the Madurese and Surabayans. Upon learning that Mangkunagara had turned his flank and was behind him, the Sultan reversed his direction of march and headed west again towards Sukawati.[17]

In mid-July 1755, Mangkunagara struck north with a surprise attack into VOC-held coastal territory, as if to prove that he remained a force to be reckoned with. Hartingh would soon have cause to reconsider his hopeful opinion of April that Mangkunagara was in "a very poor and desolate state", short of both men and weapons.[18] His "power had grown again", he notes in his memoir.[19] The Company's coastal positions were only lightly defended, most of their soldiery being away in the interior hoping to catch Mangkunagara in the encirclement of the Madiun valley, which he had just escaped.

Mangkunagara bypassed Surakarta, skirmishing with VOC units under Steenmulder en route, and then attacked the Demak area, burning villages. There his men found food in abundance. From Semarang, Company cavalry units were sent out against him, but Mangkunagara killed 30 or 40 of the Company's soldiers (the VOC reports vary) and forced others to drown in the river as they fled, including the commander, one Capt. Marquett. Chinese at Tanjung welcomed Mangkunagara, according to his *babad*, and offered more provisions. But his campaign of devastation on the coast was short-lived. As enemy armies pursued him into the coastal region, Mangkunagara fled into the interior, trying to elude any major engagement with his opponents but exchanging blows on a smaller scale in several places. Forced onto the defensive, Mangkunagara fled to Selo and from there to his old place of refuge at Sĕmbuyan in the southern mountains. Mangkubumi, Surakarta units and the VOC pursued him there and put him again to flight. Overwhelmed by enemy numbers, Mangkunagara split his forces into smaller parties, heading in different directions. At this point, in August 1755, his pursuers

[16] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756). See also KV, pp. 225–6.
[17] *BG* Vol. xviii, pp. 49–58; *SBPn* f. 364r.
[18] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756).
[19] KV, p. 208.

temporarily broke off their chase through precipitous, heavily wooded mountain terrain.[20]

In the midst of this pursuit of Mangkunagara, another man whom Mangkubumi detested absolutely, the Surakarta *patih* Pringgalaya, was removed from the scene. The Sultan had hated him at least since the time when his intervention in 1746 had won the support of the visiting Governor General Van Imhoff and prevented Mangkubumi being given the promised appanage in Sukawati. Now the Sultan denounced him for ongoing dishonesty. In fact, Pringgalaya by this stage had no allies who might defend him. According to *Babad Giyanti*, he consumed a citrus drink full of arsenic and opium, stared vacantly for a moment, defecated and dropped dead. This was on 6 October 1755. It is not clear how he was given this delicacy, whether he knew what was happening or not. But we may be sure that Mangkubumi enjoyed the spectacle.[21] Hartingh commented that this was a death "over which neither of the rulers has cause to grieve".[22] Pringgalaya was succeeded as *patih* of Surakarta by the former governor of Kedu, R. Tg. Mangkupraja. He was, Hartingh later wrote, "rather old and a commoner, plump and a real mountain-Javanese, but so far as I can see he is honest and truthful".[23] He was in office from October 1755 to April 1770, but in disfavour from late 1769.

The pursuit of Mangkunagara resumed in September 1755; by now he was indeed in parlous circumstances. At times, his *babad* records, he had to sleep in the open and then move on. He passed through Laroh: Hartingh recorded that this was an area "where he always found much love and many followers, because his grandmother came from there". In the Kendeng hills he met the rebel R.M. Guntur, who had some (it is not clear how many) fighters with

[20] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, pp. 600–2; KV, pp. 209–10; *SBPn* ff. 364v.–369v.; *BG* Vol. xviii, pp. 60–79.

[21] *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 12, 13–23; *BMang*, pp. 95–6. Also PB III, Surakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1755, and Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1755, both in VOC 2865 (OB 1756). *BG* dates the death Monday 27 Bĕsar, Be [AJ 1680], which is inconsistent with what we would expect in the Thursday or Friday calendar. PB III's letter gives 29 Bĕsar, which was indeed a Monday, equivalent to 6 October 1755, and this must be the correct date.

[22] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 13 Dec. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756).

[23] Hartingh, *Memorie*, Semarang, 26 Oct. 1761, in dJ x, p. 364.

him. He was a descendant of the deposed Susuhunan Amangkurat III (exiled in 1708) and of the youthful ruler of the Chinese war, Sunan Kuning, and was now being called Png. Anom. They joined forces.[24]

Mangkunagara and Guntur together moved quickly, with enemies in pursuit, higher into the Kendeng range, whence they descended into the coastal lands again. There, at Tanjung and elsewhere, the Chinese again welcomed them. Mangkunagara marched on Kudus, which he pillaged on 4 October 1755, according to his *babad*. Thence he went on to Demak, Rembang and Pati, with troops of the sultanate and VOC in pursuit. As usual, during his campaign Mangkunagara sought opportunities where he could to rest his men and horses and ordered entertainments to keep up his soldiers' spirits. But he was being closely threatened and harassed by his enemies, who outnumbered him. Mangkunagara kept up a correspondence with Pakubuwana III, Sultan Mangkubumi and Hartingh. He even sent a letter directly to Batavia. We have descriptions of only some of those letters but can presume that they all offered submission based on certain conditions, at least in some cases involving a demand for either all or one-third of the realm. Hartingh understood that Pakubuwana III advised Mangkunagara to submit and indicated that his brother Mangkuningrat (then retitled Png. Timur) would be the only appropriate emissary, but there is no indication that anyone knew of prior potential understandings between Mangkunagara and the Susuhunan, if such indeed existed.[25] VOC documentation says that in his letter to Batavia, Mangkunagara made wide-ranging demands which amounted to rule over all of Java—but we do not have the original letter and cannot be confident that the brief Dutch summary of the Dutch translation of the original Javanese is to be relied upon. The governor general and Council of the Indies thought it wrong to enter into negotiations themselves. Instead, the commissioner for native affairs, Diderik Freijer, replied on their behalf that if Mangkunagara submitted to one or other of

[24] *SBPn* ff. 370v.–371r.; *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 59–70; KV, pp. 209–10. His powerful ancestry is discussed in Chapter 7.

[25] *SBPn* ff. 372r.–374v.; Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 Nov. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756); KV, pp. 211, 213–4; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen. miss.* Vol. xii, p. 601; *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 56–8.

the Javanese rulers in good faith, the Company would demonstrate its friendship for him.[26]

The VOC reported to Amsterdam that Mangkunagara was "fleeing … everywhere with no fixed position … so that sometimes one neither knows nor hears where he is to be found, causing our armies much work and fatigue".[27] Mangkunagara fled back to the forests of the Kendeng range. The women with him were tired, falling behind and screaming as they were captured by Madurese fighters, as were other stragglers, *Babad Giyanti* records. In the rolling engagements through harsh countryside and in monsoon rains, Mangkunagara admonished his soldiers to submit to God and fight in the name of Holy War (*aprang Sabil*) against the Dutch. In an engagement at Blora, Mangkunagara's men dismounted to fight on foot as did the VOC's dragoons. The tactic was unwise for the latter. The commanding officer, Capt. Van de Poll, one of the Company's most seasoned commanders and the hero of the Madura campaign a decade before, was killed along with many of his men, while the remaining VOC were put to flight. Mangkunagara's losses were also significant. He fled onwards, surrounded by enemies on all sides, resting where possible. He marched through the night to Simo (north of Boyolali), there thinking that he could rest and gather provisions because his enemy would be far behind. He suddenly discovered that Mangkubumi's forces had made the same forced march: he saw approaching battalions under four banners. One of these was recognised as *Gĕniroga* (Fire-sickness), with its depiction of a monkey in blue-black, the battle flag of Mangkubumi's principal commander Rongga Prawiradirja. Heavy fighting ensued, and Mangkunagara was put to flight with only a few companions, including 30 mounted women. Kudanawarsa was wounded in the neck in this engagement and had to be carried from the field. Hartingh's memoir noted that circumstances were so harsh during Mangkunagara's retreat that for five days his people could gather no rice and had to eat their horses. Finally, he reached a village called Daha (or Dĕdaha, Dadaha, Dada), southwest of Mount Lawu, the area where he had often taken refuge in the past. There he was joined by Mangkuningrat, who had been

[26] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, p. 601; F.W. Freijer, Batavia, to MN, 31 Dec. 1755, in VOC 1009 (Afgaand Briefboek van Batavia 1755); KV, pp. 213–4. KV, pp. 215–6, has a partial translation and summary passages from one exchange between MN and Hartingh.

[27] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, p. 601.

defeated by the Madurese in the east and had fled to Pacitan.[28] "Against our expectations," wrote Batavia to Amsterdam, "the total defeat of the chief rebel was unsuccessful in this campaign," mainly because he could never be forced into a decisive engagement. Instead, whenever his enemies neared, "with the utmost speed … he retired to his inaccessible caves and hiding places".[29]

In Daha, Mangkunagara felt secure enough to engage in entertainments and to remain for several weeks, into January 1756. He was still surrounded in all directions by VOC and Javanese enemies, except to the southwest towards Gunung Kidul, but he was no doubt protected to a considerable extent by the surrounding rough country and the ongoing heavy rains of the wet monsoon. In his *babad* he described his mood:

17. … He was still entirely at his ease,
    reckoning that he was strong
    in Daha,
    focussing on only one thing:
    relying on God's Will.
    Pure was his heart.
    He was like a sandalwood tree:
    when burned and ground its odour is fragrant.
    Further, he was born of a "flower" [a prince; i.e., his father
        Mangkunagara the Elder]
18. descended from Mataram and Majapahit.[30]

Hartingh seems to have learned of Mangkunagara's mood. In his *Kort verhaal* he wrote that the prince was "indifferent to the calamities happening to him".[31]

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[28] *SBPn* ff. 374v.–378r.; *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 70–9, and Vol. xx, pp. 3–4, 8; *BMang*, pp. 97–101; Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 17 Oct. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756); Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, pp. 600–2; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xiii, pp. 96–7; KV, pp. 212–3. In locating Daha, I follow *Babad Gijanti: Pratélan.* The eating of horses is referred to also in *SBPn* f. 410v. and elsewhere.

[29] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1755, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xii, pp. 601.

[30] *SBPn* ff. 378r.–v. Quotation from f. 378v., Canto 86 (Dhandhanggula): 17. *… maksih eca-eca bae, kawilang-wilang pĕngkuh, neng Dada* [sic], *amadhĕp sawiji, ngandĕl karsaning Allah, ekyas* [sic; i.e., *iklas*] *manahipun, lir pendah wĕrksa candhana, duk ingobar pinipis ambunya wangi, trus wijil ing kusuma.* 18. *turun Mataram ing Majapahit*. For MN's time in Daha into January 1756, see *SBPn* ff. 378v.–380r.

[31] KV, p. 213.

Mangkunagara's Last Year as a Rebel, 1756

Mangkunagara's last full year as a rebel was now under way. Around the start of 1756, Mangkubumi called in Madurese units to attempt to deal with Mangkunagara, ordering them to plunder Matesih, on the western approaches to Mount Lawu, an area where Mangkunagara had been able to count on the loyalty of many local people. The Madurese contingents again did what they were demonstrably good at: razing everything. *Babad Giyanti* tells how the Madurese killed the local males and captured the women. Women who could do so fled to Surakarta in a pitiable state. They occupied empty houses; there were probably still many of those in the capital, but these women also needed protectors. Even a daughter of an official, as beautiful as the heavenly nymph Supraba from the *wayang*, would marry a hunchback, midget or dwarf rather than fall into the hands of the Madurese auxiliaries, says the chronicle. Those who fled to the forests and ravines or who tried to hide their wealth were caught. This scorched-earth tactic had a political as well as military purpose. The commoners who were so violently despoiled and ruined, according to the *babad*, denounced Mangkunagara for bringing this disaster upon them. He was "a lord who destroys the commoners", they cried. It was they, not he, who suffered destruction, driven from their homes, subjected for a month to the brutality of the Madurese warriors, whose conduct in all ways offended Javanese norms and reflected "the nature of Sampang (Madura) people, extremely foul-mouthed, now licensed (to do evil), who urinate while standing up, even while running, and who sit (crudely) with raised legs".[32] The VOC, too, reported that Matesih and Laroh had been "ruined by our Madurese".[33]

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[32] *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 12–4. Quotations from p. 14: *jěr Bĕndara kang angrusak ing wong cilik*; *… dhasar watak wong Sampang, lonyot lacut-lacut, ing mangke antuk pangaja, nguyuh ngadĕg mundhak anguyuh pĕnglari, langkung angingkrang-ingkrang.* See also *BMang*, pp. 67–70. The timing of these events is not entirely clear, but it seems to have been in the first months of 1756. Immediately before this (p. 11), *BG* reports the formal naming of MB's new *kraton* city as Ngayogyakarta Adiningrat. *BMang*, pp. 96–7, dates that renaming in November 1755, but contemporary VOC correspondence suggests that MB's move to the new court took place in February 1756 and the renaming was in April 1756; Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 80. Putting 400 Madurese into action is also discussed in Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xiii, p. 95.

[33] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xiii, p. 97.

Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran does not record this disaster for the people of Matesih and Laroh, but does note the defection from Mangkunagara of two officials from there. Other office holders also slipped away in this period, into January–February 1756.[34] One that seems particularly to have distressed Mangkunagara was that of his son-in-law R. Sumanagara in April 1756. After a skirmish, he slipped away in the night with only two companions and joined his father, R. Ad. Jayaningrat, the governor of Mataram on Mangkubumi's side. This ended his "hung marriage" to Mangkunagara's young daughter R. Aj. Sombro, who was shortly thereafter married to R.M. Guntur, sealing the alliance between him and Mangkunagara.[35]

By this time, Mangkunagara had been three and one-half months in Daha. On 2 February 1756, he ordered his remaining troops—whose numbers were dwindling—into the attack, marching down to the lowlands of Pajang and Mataram. The Dutch believed that this was an attempt to raze Mangkubumi's new *kraton* in Yogyakarta, then under construction (which is not confirmed in Mangkunagara's *babad*). This offensive failed. Mangkunagara found himself facing more powerful enemy numbers and retreated to Daha.[36] *Babad Giyanti* depicts this as a time when Mangkunagara sought to consolidate his influence over the surrounding area, to levy villagers as soldiers, and to maintain their spirits with various entertainments, including tiger vs. buffalo fights.[37]

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[34] *SBPn* ff. 379v.–380v. This is in a section dated in early January 1756, when MN lost two concubines (*sĕlir*) to smallpox. These deaths are also described on the basis of a letter from MN in Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 26 Feb. 1756, in VOC 2887 (OB 1757).

[35] *SBPn* ff. 383r.–v.; *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 52–4, 59–60; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xiii, p. 96; KV, p. 221. The Batavia letter and *SBPn* date Sumanagara's defection in April 1756. *BG*, lacking dates, seems to position this event several months earlier.

[36] *SBPn* ff. 380v.–382r.; Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 26 Feb. 1756, in VOC 2887 (OB 1757). The *SBPn* date for MN's march is wrong by a day from what one would expect in the Thursday calendar: Monday-Wage, 2 Jumadilawal, Wawu [AJ 1681]; assuming Monday-Wage is correct, the date should have been 1 Jumadilawal. We have noted before such variations (perhaps reflecting local usages) of a day.

[37] *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 54–5. On tiger-buffalo fights, see further Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 274–5, 303–4, 345–6; Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, pp. 9, 157, 207; Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 13–4, 206, 208, 234, 239.

Babad Giyanti records Mangkunagara seeking Kudanawarsa's advice about what to do if he became too weak to fight on. The latter proposed submission and asked, in such a case, to which ruler would it be better to submit? Thereupon Mangkunagara showed him what must have been one of the letters from Pakubuwana III, written in respectful language to his "elder brother" (*kakang*). Here the young Susuhunan is quoted as saying that he was King but had no one to look after (*momong*) him if not for Mangkunagara. "Elder brother, have you forgotten how, earlier, you were embraced as a child by my late father [Pakubuwana II]?" he asked, in terms similar to the versions of the letters quoted above from *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*. Then they examined a letter from Sultan Mangkubumi, written in "low Javanese" (*ngoko*) and addressed to Mangkunagara as *kulup* (young lad; an uncircumcised boy), telling him that he would not achieve his aims, was heading for a nasty death and was unworthy of his ancestry. Kudanawarsa drew the obvious conclusion that surrendering to Surakarta to look after Pakubuwana III would be wiser than submitting to Mangkubumi's not-so-tender mercies.[38]

Circumstances were harsh in Daha through the wet monsoon of late 1755–early 1756. In December Mangkunagara sent a Dutch dragoon captured after the battle at Blora, when Capt. Van de Poll was killed, with a letter for Hartingh. The Dutchman reported that circumstances in Daha were "very sober", with "hunger, shortages and death". Nevertheless, he reckoned that Mangkunagara still had 4,000–5,000 able-bodied men with him.[39] In early March 1756, Mangkunagara sent detachments out in search of food, while defections continued.[40]

In early April Hartingh was concerned that the two Javanese monarchs were not doing all they might to destroy Mangkunagara.

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[38] *BG* Vol. xix, pp. 55–8. Quotation from Vol. xix, p. 55: *punapa pun kakang supe, nguni ingambil sunu, inggih dhatĕng rama suwargi*.

[39] KV, pp. 217–8. This dragoon who was sent as an emissary is also mentioned in *SBPn* f. 379r. The letter in question is to be found attached to Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 13 Dec. 1755, in VOC 2865 (OB 1756). It is dated 25 Sapar, which is wrongly converted by the VOC to 27 November 1755. The date 25 Sapar (Wawu 1681) was equivalent to 30 November 1755. This is presumably the same letter mentioned in *SBPn* f. 379r., the bearers of which set off on Thursday in the month Mulud, year Wawu (= Thursday, [7] Mulud., Wawu 1681 = 11 Dec. 1755).

[40] *SBPn* ff. 382r.–v.

The Sultan was more eager in this regard than Pakubuwana III, he believed, partly because of Mangkubumi's long-term aim of governing Java on his own. He was indeed preparing to take to the field in person.[41] We may guess that this difference between the two monarchs reflected the incipient understanding between Pakubuwana III and Mangkunagara of which we have seen evidence before. Hartingh asked the two *patihs* whether it was not possible for them to deal with Mangkunagara on their own, leaving the VOC to concentrate on defending its coastal posts. They responded that they could resist his incursions but could not defeat him without the assistance of VOC arms.[42]

Through April and May 1756, various skirmishes took place to Mangkunagara's detriment. His *babad* records his activities in Daha, surrounded by enemies on all sides: *wayang* performances at night, dancing girls by day, drinking, dancing in the Balinese style and tiger-buffalo fights, while firearms, pikes, *krisses* and arrows were repaired. And, of course, there was communal prayer and observance of the fasting month (30 May–28 June 1756). Correspondence with his enemies continued, as did defections. A letter from the Sultan to Mangkunagara was again discourteously brief and used "low Javanese". The *babad*'s version is, "If you don't submit to Mataram, wherever you are I will drive you away; the Sultan himself will attack you in war; wherever you are I will follow you. That is the end of my letter."[43]

Further engagements followed during the middle months of 1756, mostly at significant cost in deaths and defections on Mangkunagara's side, but his enemies did not escape unscathed. He evacuated Daha in June (according to the VOC) or July (according to his *babad*), breaking out of the enemy encirclement. He again struck northwards towards the coast, with his enemies in pursuit. There he attacked and burned at Rembang and other Company positions, moving with what Hartingh called "unbelievable speed". Again his *babad* records that local Chinese communities welcomed him with money and provisions. But his enemies were always at his heels, and Mangkunagara was again forced to retreat south, through Sukawati,

[41] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Apr. 1756, in VOC 2887 (OB 1757).
[42] Ibid.; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xiii, p. 95.
[43] *SBPn* ff. 384v.–386r. Quotation from f. 385v.: *lamun tan seba Mataram, saparane ingsun usir, Sultan dhewe langgar yuda, saparane sun tut wuri titi tĕmbung ing tulis*.

heading back to Daha. His chronicle describes the march through rough country, on tracks with precipitous drops on all sides and thick, thorny brush through which the women were borne by others while their men guarded the rear of the column. Sultan Mangkubumi's forces caught up with the fleeing Mangkunagaran column on 24 August at Simo. After initial success against the Sultan's and Company's units, Mangkunagara's battle order was thrown into confusion and he was personally separated from most of his force in the mêlée. Kudanawarsa was again wounded, this time in the shoulder. Mangkunagara and his defeated and scattered army fled to Kaduwang. There Mangkunagara reassembled what remained of his army and set about buying horses for his troopers who had lost theirs.[44] On 15 October 1756, Batavia wrote to the VOC's governors in Amsterdam that Java was still "somewhat unsettled" by Mangkunagara's "raiders" but now and again they were given a slap, so that he was much weakened. He was in his "almost inaccessible hiding places" with no more than 400 men remaining.[45] The Company once again had underestimated their opponent.

Mangkunagara escaped the enemy encirclement in October with results that infuriated the Sultan.[46] The chronicle accounts are detailed and dramatic. As he neared a village called Candhini or Cendhani, which seems to have been on the western slopes of Mount Lawu, Mangkunagara experienced an omen. A flock of hundreds of crows arrived, all silent. They acted as if in a coordinated fashion, the flock changing locations three times so as to be in front of him as he travelled, as if leading him in a particular direction through the rough country. He thought, "What has brought this about, these crows? It must be the will of God." He would not resist this indication

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[44] *SBPn* ff. 386v.–399r.; KV, pp. 225, 227–8; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xiii, p. 96. The date of 24 August 1756 is found in both the Dutch sources and in *SBPn* f. 398v., but the latter gives this as Tuesday-Kliwon, whereas it should be Tuesday-Pon, 28 Dulkaidah, Wawu AJ 1681.

[45] Batavia to H.XVII, 15 Oct. 1756, in *Gen.miss.* Vol. xiii, p. 12.

[46] The account of MN's charge to and attack on Yogyakarta rests on *SBPn* ff. 406v.–409v.; *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 34–8; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in *Gen. miss.* Vol. xiii, p. 97; KV, pp. 228–9. Quotations from *SBPn* f. 406v.: *Nyipta sajroning driya, paran wahanane iki, kang paksi dhangdhang, baya karsaning Widi*; and 407v.: *sanadyan aku matiya, yen wus tumĕkeng jangji, aja doh Mataram, dagane luhur ingwang, payo padha derah pati, asrah ing Allah, payo alĕbu gni*. The date on *SBPn* f. 408r. is internally consistent in the Friday calendar but would be one day out in the Thursday calendar: Thursday 3 Sapar, Jimakir [AJ 1682].

of God's will, even if it meant his death. If he was about to die, he thought, let it not be far from Mataram. Kudanawarsa and his soldiers, however, were apprehensive of the meaning of this omen. They reached Giyanti and burned it. Thence they marched on towards Mataram, burning as they went. Kudanawarsa warned that, whatever Mangkunagara thought of this omen, his path was dangerous and he should withdraw, to no avail. The prince replied that he would rather die: "Even if I die, if I meet my end, let it be not far from Mataram, where my ancestors are buried. Let us all be indifferent to death, let us submit to God, let us enter the fire!" Following the crows, he escaped the enemy encirclement and marched towards Yogyakarta, which was then lightly defended because Mangkubumi and his main units were away searching for him.

Kudanawarsa's tearful entreaties could not divert Mangkunagara from his path. He rode forward with his elite cavalry units (Kapědhak, Kawandasa, Gulang-Gulang), Kudanawarsa commanding the rear guard. This was a total of some 300 troopers, without infantry or artillery, a force made for a lightning raid. They dispersed Sultanate forces guarding the market at Prambanan. As they rode into Yogyakarta on 28 October 1756, watchers thought this to be a friendly detachment returning from battle; this misapprehension was—says Mangkunagara's *babad*—as if God was protecting them. Somewhat more prosaically, *Babad Giyanti* recorded that Mangkunagara employed an effective ruse. As he approached the growing *kraton* city, Mangkunagara encountered youths with water buffalo and commandeered ten of the animals. These his party drove ahead of themselves, so that they appeared to be a fighting unit returning from the field with captured booty. According to *Babad Giyanti* and the VOC's report, Mangkunagara was mistaken by observers for the Sultan's son the Crown Prince R.M. Ěntho, returning from battle. *Sěrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* does not include this detail, so perhaps Mangkunagara was unaware that Yogyanese observers had drawn that conclusion.

Babad Giyanti's account seems to record the raid as observed from the Yogyakarta side. Mangkunagara's force approached the new *kraton*—at that stage entirely of wooden construction—as a senior official named Cakrakarti (or Cakrajaya) was playing Dutch-style cards in the VOC post, also constructed entirely of wood. When a Dutch soldier saw the approaching force, he asked whether the Sultan and Crown Prince were returning. Cakrakarti went out to have a look and was shocked to see a banner approaching which he knew was not one of theirs. He then recognised that it was Mangkunagara.

The sources do not name that banner, but we may presume that Mangkunagara had unfurled his battle standard *Samběr Nyawa*, the Soul Catcher. Mangkunagara's force reached the east side of the *alun-alun* and then turned south heading for the residence of R. Ad. Jayaningrat, the governor of the Mataram district, who was sharing a cup of tea with the head of the court scribes, Tg. Sindusastra. The attackers opened fire, and the two dignitaries fled through the garden. Sindusastra was caught and killed, and Jayaningrat was wounded. There was much screaming and panic. This was near the VOC watch-house on the southern *alun-alun*, manned by only 18 soldiers. They fired two salvos and then fled to within the *kraton*, locking the southern gate behind them. Mangkunagara and his men dismounted long enough to plunder the Company post, including three casks of alcohol (presumably *jenever*, "Dutch gin").

Mangkunagara pursued his fleeing enemies and the panicked women to the *kraton* walls. He was, wrote Hartingh in his *Kort verhaal*, "like a furious tiger". By this time the VOC troops had gathered their wits and were resisting the incursion, with losses on both sides. Mangkunagara withdrew in good order, while the Company maintained fire from within its fortified post. The Company's cannon put an end to the raid, but Mangkunagara's chronicle recorded that it was as if salutes were being fired for him and his soldiers. The Dutch reported that Mangkunagara lost 30 dead in this raid and "fled head over heels", but the Javanese accounts speak of orderly withdrawal. Mangkunagara returned along the main road towards Prambanan. The Sultan's new *kraton*, some parts of it left smouldering, had suffered a serious affront. On learning that he had been outfoxed—that Mangkunagara had slipped around the encirclement, attacked his new court, burned, killed and wounded both Javanese and Europeans, and then escaped again—Sultan Mangkubumi was outraged.

Negotiations and Settlement, Late 1756–57

The attack on Yogyakarta was Mangkunagara's last, and one of his most dramatic, major forays. It brought him three obvious benefits, and probably a fourth. First, it no doubt strengthened his position in the peace negotiations which were to follow by demonstrating his capacity to strike against his enemies. Second, it would have contributed to the morale of his troops, which was essential to at least slowing defections as far as possible and thus preserving his bargaining

position. Third, bypassing Surakarta and hitting Yogyakarta kept open the possibility of rapprochement with Pakubuwana III—the roots of which we have seen earlier—while making a deal with Sultan Mangkubumi more unlikely than ever. The fourth probable benefit was the personal pleasure Mangkunagara must have derived from delivering a grave insult to the Sultan, a pleasure that may have been shared by Pakubuwana III.

Mangkunagara withdrew to Kaduwang. The Sultan gave orders to pursue him but recognised that both Mangkunagara's forces and his own were "extremely tired" (*sayah kapati*) and that the levied villagers had been left without opportunity to till their fields. As Mangkunagara became once again confined to his remote hideaway, however, by the end of the year crops were being planted.[47] The wet monsoon season began soaking the Javanese heartlands again in November 1756. The VOC in particular found movement difficult. Military actions of the following months consisted of skirmishes and feints, as the important manoeuvres shifted to the diplomatic realm.[48]

Hartingh recorded in his memoir (which is written in the third person) the following apposite comment regarding his approach at this stage to Mangkunagara, rather overemphasising his past commitment to negotiations:

> Anyone with some knowledge of this island's circumstances will easily conclude that it is almost impossible to subdue by force of arms an enemy who finds support everywhere because of the privileges of his ancestry, and whom no one dares lay a hand on, let alone kill, and who moreover can find enough inaccessible mountains and caves to hide in where no European can pursue him.
>
> That is why Mr Hartingh always [sic: *altoos*] endeavoured to persuade him to surrender with gentleness and promises. Force of arms was employed to bring him around to this sooner.[49]

After a period of good spirits in the wake of his raid on Yogyakarta, Mangkunagara found himself pursued and harassed wherever he went, and his spirits sank, his chronicle tells us. He was, not surprisingly, still suffering from defections. His brother Mangkuningrat, who had

[47] *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 39–40, 51.
[48] KV, pp. 231–2.
[49] KV, p. 232.

once again taken refuge in Pacitan, joined him in the Kaduwang area.[50] By now it was December 1756, and despite the bravura displayed in the raid on Yogyakarta, there was clearly little future in Mangkunagara fighting on. *Babad Giyanti* records—but Mangkunagara's *babad* does not confirm—that Pakubuwana III's second letter to him which he received when he was at Menang in 1755, which we quoted above, had been lost in the chaos of war and flight. In this the Susuhunan had asked Mangkunagara to settle in Surakarta to "look after" the young Susuhunan. Mangkunagara is said to have feared that even this solution might now be closed to him. What was he to do, effectively besieged with little prospect of breaking out of his mountain refuge, nowhere to go and no one to turn to?[51]

There is an important difference to note between the negotiations that soon followed and those that previously led to the treaty of Giyanti, the meeting at Jatisari, and Mangkubumi becoming Sultan in February 1755. In the 1755 case, Seh Ibrahim facilitated contacts between Mangkubumi and the VOC. The initial agreement was between the two main combatants, the Company and Mangkubumi. A second step was the meeting thereafter between Sultan Mangkubumi and his young and, at that stage, nearly powerless nephew Susuhunan Pakubuwana III. In the first months of 1757, however, the sequence would be reversed. The initial reconciliation would be between Mangkunagara and Pakubuwana III. The agreement with the VOC would be the second stage. This reflected Pakubuwana III and the court of Surakarta beginning to matter in Javanese affairs, while the Company's wish was to withdraw to its core commercial concerns and coastal territories.

Once again, an unexpected figure appeared to facilitate a denouement. This time, however, it was not someone as mysterious or grand as Seh Ibrahim, the Turk who facilitated Mangkubumi's transition from rebel to Sultan. Rather, it was a determined woman trader from Surakarta named Bok Gĕrji or Garĕji. The two rulers imposed an embargo on trade across Mangkunagara's lines on pain of confiscation of the merchant's goods. Behind those lines, food was running scarce. Bok Gĕrji, however, cared nothing for this prohibition and smuggled goods across at night. She thereby won Mangkunagara's trust and

[50] *SBPn* f. 409r.–413v.
[51] *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 50–1.

became an initial intermediary across the lines, carrying letters between him and Pakubuwana III. These were not kept secret; the VOC commander at Surakarta, J.H. Abrahams (in office 1752–October 1757), and Hartingh were consulted and involved. The initial correspondence having gone well, Pakubuwana III invited Mangkunagara's brother Mangkuningrat to Surakarta as his brother's representative—i.e., as a token of good faith and at the same time as a hostage—in February 1757. There he was grandly received. Mangkuningrat is described in *Babad Giyanti* as wearing battle dress (*prajuritan*), with a jacket of the striped cotton fabric known as *lurik* and carrying two *krisses*, one in the Javanese fashion (worn in the waistband behind the back and drawn underarm) and the other in Balinese style (larger, worn on the back and drawn over the shoulder). After this auspicious step, further correspondence and emissaries were exchanged and further points discussed. Sultan Mangkubumi was informed of Mangkunagara's willingness to submit to Pakubuwana III, including a land settlement to which he refused to make any contribution. He sent his Madurese contingents home and ordered his Javanese units back to Yogyakarta.[52]

Batavia's view was clear. The governor general and Council of the Indies wanted at last to get out of the war in Java and to concentrate on pursuing a profit during what was proving to be a financially ruinous period for the Company. With regard to the appanage proposals made by Mangkunagara's brother and his fellow emissary to Pakubuwana III, they wrote:

> … whether it is the cession of Pacitan and Kaduwang or otherwise, it is best to leave this deferred to the Susuhunan and to deal with it entirely at his discretion. We think it best to agree with his interest, which is shared with the Company, which mainly consists in satisfying the rebel as far as possible in the best fashion.[53]

According to *Babad Giyanti*, at an earlier point in the negotiations the following exchange took place between Mangkunagara and M. Ng. Wongsaniti, the Susuhunan's emissary and a senior officer of his

[52] *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 53–79, and Vol. xxi, pp. 3–5. *SBPn* ff. 413v.–415r.; KV, pp. 231–4; Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 16 Feb. 1757, in VOC 2910 (OB 1758).
[53] Batavia to Hartingh, Semarang, 26 Feb. 1757, in VOC 1011 (Afgaand Briefboek van Batavia 1757).

Suranatan corps (the company of particularly religious style attached to the main mosque):

> 19. … [Mangkunagara speaking:] "Uncle, I was
> lied to, but it was Dutch lies.
> 20. "They tried to deceive me with news that the *kafirs* were in charge."
> Wongsaniti replied,
> "Even though they are *kafirs*, my dear lad,
> the Dutch have done very well, beginning in the time of great-great grandfather [Amangkurat II, r. 1677–1703].
> 21. "From the time of great-grandfather [Pakubuwana I, r. 1704–19] they have invested their sweat,
> have devoted their efforts
> to supporting the Javanese *kraton*.
> All descendants of the Mataram dynasty are indebted to them."[54]

It was understandable that such a favourable view of the VOC was held in Pakubuwana III's court of Surakarta, for it had only been saved from rebel conquest over the previous 11 years by Company arms. Sultan Mangkubumi was unlikely to have shared this estimation of the Company, however, having fought against it for nine years and finally beaten it into conceding half of the kingdom to him; no doubt he looked forward at this stage to winning still more, if no longer by force of arms.

For Mangkunagara these were views which were surely unpalatable, but to which he now had to accommodate himself. He, too, had fought against the Company. Since the 1740s, the VOC had consistently been among his enemies. With further rebellion clearly a dead end and Pakubuwana III—in alliance with the Company—offering a way out, Mangkunagara would have to adjust to new political realities and forms of struggle. Wongsaniti delivered further moral lessons to Mangkunagara. His enemy had been Pakubuwana II, now buried at Laweyan, not others, he said, and to think otherwise was to risk offending divine law. The talk was cordial. It was after

[54] *BG* Vol. xx, p. 67, Canto 200 (Pucung): 19. … *Paman lah kula puniki, inggorohi nanging goroh ing Walonda.* 20. *Wartinipun kapir wĕnang denbalithuk, Wongsaniti turnya, nadyan kapir-kapir kaki, pan Walonda wus mĕnĕdi awit canggah.* 21. *Saking buyut mĕdalakĕn karingĕt sampun, anglabuhi karya, anjunjung karaton Jawi, sawarnine trah Mataram kapotangan.*

this that Mangkunagara deputed Mangkuningrat and another to go to Surakarta on his behalf.[55]

Abrahams, the Company commandant in Surakarta, travelled a couple of hours southeast from Surakarta with the Surakarta *patih* Mangkupraja, the main commander Arungbinang (his Machiavellian deceits at last at an end) and others, to meet in person with Mangkunagara at Gĕmblung (near Jatisari). The meeting on 19 February was cordial, accompanied by *gamĕlan*, cannon salutes, feasting, drinking and—how could it not be so?—constant rain. Although there were still matters to be negotiated, notably which lands would fall to Mangkunagara's control, there was no barrier to his reconciliation. Mangkunagara was, however, evidently still uncertain how things might transpire with the Sultan's forces under Rongga Prawiradirja nearby. When Abrahams departed, Arungbinang and others remained with Mangkunagara at Gĕmblung, providing reassurance to both sides that a settlement was under way. One point of status that Mangkunagara insisted on was that he should be allowed to sit on a level with the Susuhunan, not flat on the ground like other grandees in the presence of their monarch. Abrahams returned to Surakarta to inform Pakubuwana III that all was in order.[56]

Having consulted Hartingh in Semarang by correspondence, Pakubuwana III set off southeast to the village of Tunggon, on the east side of the Solo River. There he met in person with Mangkunagara on 24 February 1757, accompanied by the usual *gamĕlan*, cannon and musket salutes, drums and trumpets.[57] The sources vary on the numbers of soldiers, women and children who were still with the prince. The highest estimate gave him some 400 cavalry; the lowest figure is found in Mangkunagara's own *babad* at 200. Plus,

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[55] *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 67–9.

[56] KV, p. 234; *SBPn* ff. 415r.–416r. (the date on f. 415v. is again expressed correctly in the Friday, rather than the Thursday, calendar: Saturday-Paing 29 Jumadilawal, Jimakir [AJ 1682]); *BG* Vol. xxi, pp. 10–6 (oddly, *BG* also uses the Friday calendar here, although the Thursday calendar was supposed to be official Surakarta usage since 1749).

[57] *SBPn* f. 416v. Again the Friday calendar is used: Thursday-Paing, 4 Jumadilakir, Jimakir *karna liman bah ing rat* [AJ 1682]. The same is given in *BMang*, p. 134, with the chronogram *pĕksa esthi rĕtu ing wong*. BG Vol. xxi, p. 19, is the same, with the chronogram *mulat liman bah ing rat* [AJ 1682].

there were other followers, women and children amounting to several hundred, perhaps 700, more.[58]

At Tunggon,[59] according to the Javanese accounts, Pakubuwana III greeted Mangkunagara as *kakang mas* (elder brother). Mangkunagara was seated on a chair, consistent with his protocol demands. They confirmed their commitment to the agreements discussed with emissaries earlier, with Abrahams expressing his approval. All three swore to their faithfulness to each other and to uphold all that had been agreed. More alcohol was drunk and more cannon fired. The Susuhunan then expressed his trust and, in the *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* account, invited Mangkunagara to look after him (*ĕmong kawula*). Mangkunagara could not be brought to swear an oath of loyalty to Mangkubumi, the hatred between them being too deeply rooted for that. Pakubuwana III told Mangkunagara that he might choose a residence in Surakarta wherever he wished and proposed that they return together to the court city. They crossed over a bridge guarded by the Sultan's chief commander Rongga Prawiradirja as well as Surakarta troops—which may have given Mangkunagara and his followers some moments of uncertainty—and entered Surakarta to the sound of musket and cannon salutes and *gamĕlan*.

On arrival in Surakarta, Mangkunagara felt "as if he were dreaming". He was reunited there with his brother Mangkuningrat (then renamed Prince Timur). The two brothers chose their residences: Mangkunagara selected the domicile of Tg. Mangkuyuda, and Mangkuningrat took over Arungbinang's. (There may have been those who thought that losing his residence was just deserts for Arungbinang's past duplicities, for they were recorded in *Babad Giyanti*, as we have seen, and must have been known or at least suspected in Surakarta). The next day Mangkunagara was provided with a VOC household guard. He sent Kudanawarsa off to the mountains to escort to Surakarta the women who were still in refuge there. He also turned over the few Europeans still with him and asked that they be forgiven by the Company.

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[58] *SBPn* f. 415r.; *BG* Vol. xx, p. 60, and Vol. xxi, pp. 12, 14; KV, pp. 236–7; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1757, in dJ x, p. 315.

[59] The account of events down to MN's entry into Surakarta rests upon *SBPn* ff. 416v.–417r. (quotation from f. 417r.; *angler kadi anupĕna*); *BG* Vol. xxi, pp. 16–23; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1757, in dJ x, p. 315; KV, pp. 234–5.

Mangkunagara's *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* tells of a discussion in Surakarta in which Pakubuwana III repeated to Mangkunagara the terms of the letter he had sent him in 1755:

> 20. … "Earlier, the promise of the King [Pakubuwana II must have been meant],
> elder brother, was that you would look after me
> when I am outdone.
> When, as if overshadowed
> am I by uncle the Sultan,
> it is you who will stand by me."[60]

Again he reminded Mangkunagara that as a child, orphaned by the death of his mother and the exile of his father, he had been cared for by Pakubuwana II and his queen.[61] We have already noted the contrast between this claim and Mangkunagara's own complaint in 1745 that in Pakubuwana II's court he had been treated as "a remnant and a thorny stump".[62]

Mangkunagara's entry into Surakarta and installation as the senior prince of the realm, the close confidant of the Susuhunan, is the final episode in his *babad*. Evidently for him, this marked the end of his years of warfare. The subsequent agreement with the VOC described below seems not to have deserved attention in his own account. It was the afterthought, the sequel, to the end of rebellion.

Despite Mangkunagara's own *babad* ignoring the matter, it remained to confirm his reconciliation with the Company.[63] On 12 March 1757, Hartingh left Semarang with Steenmulder's dragoons and other VOC officers. They met Mangkunagara and Pakubuwana III at Salatiga four days later. Danurĕja came from Yogyakarta as the Sultan's representative. Mangkunagara arrived with his wife Ratu Bĕndara and soldiery, which both Hartingh and *Babad Giyanti* put at 400. Hartingh recorded that their weapons seemed to be in bad

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[60] *SBPn* ff. 417r.–v., Canto 92 (Sri Nata/Sinom): 20. … *rumiyin jangjining Aji, kang mas dika ĕmong kula, ing mangke kawula kontik* [sic, i.e., *kontit*], *kinamaru upami, lan paman Sultan wak-ingsun, dika kang ngatotana*.

[61] *SBPn* f. 417v.

[62] Prince Aria Prangwadana [MN], n.p., to GG, Batavia, received Aug. 1745, in VOC 2656 (OB 1746).

[63] The account of the Salatiga meeting relies on KV, pp. 236–8; *BG* Vol. xxi, pp. 28–42; Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1757, in dJ x, pp. 314–9. Information on MN's appanage lands also from G.P. Rouffaer, "Vorstenlanden", in *Adatrechbundels*, Vol. 34: *Java en Madoera* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), p. 240.

condition. Mangkunagara wore a striped (i.e., *lurik*) jacket rather than princely grandeur—that is, he had chosen to appear in battle dress (*prajuritan*). He struck Hartingh as "small in stature but amazingly animated and nimble of foot, with fire radiating from his eyes". He found it remarkable "that a man who had roamed about in the wilds for some 16 years now carried himself with such moderation". He did, however, feel that he should reform the prince's drinking habits:

> Until now, the Pangeran had drunk nothing but *jenever*, a drink with which he was very besotted. But when His Excellency [Hartingh] informed him that this was a drink consumed only by common folk and not suitable for a prince, he immediately left that drink alone and, along with other guests, drank red wine.

Babad Giyanti also records the moment when these two enemies met in person for the first time. It records Hartingh's amazement that the prince was so short, indeed the size of a small youth. Remember the *babad*'s earlier account of Hartingh's height, bulk and graceless appearance, which led observers to compare him to the *wayang* ogre Terong.[64] Mangkunagara "only came up to [Hartingh's] waist", says *Babad Giyanti*; as the two stood together it was "like a water buffalo beside a goat".[65] It is notable that, despite Hartingh's reputation for his command of Javanese, the *babad* ascribes to him comments in Malay.

Mangkunagara's appanage areas were a main topic of discussion at Salatiga. He received 4,000 *cacahs* (households) located in the areas where he had long found the most loyal followers and the most secure refuge: Kaduwang, Laroh, Matesih and Gunung Kidul (the southern mountains). This constituted an appanage far greater in size than that of any other prince or official. As was the case with the cadastral information used at Giyanti in 1755, however, these *cacahs* were no doubt largely theoretical. There had been much fighting and disruption by marching and foraging armies in these areas—and consequently a great deal of flight and deaths among local people—so the actual number of households initially under Mangkunagara in 1757 may have been significantly below 4,000. We have noted above that in this period we find the terms *cacah gĕsang* (live, functioning units) and *cacah mati* (dead, non-functioning units) to describe

[64] *BG* Vol. xvi, p. 24, quoted on p. 149 above.
[65] *BG* Vol. xxi, p. 31: *mung wakĕt wĕtĕngipun, lir maesa kalawan kambing*.

the actual situation in the devastated countryside. Mangkuningrat received an appanage of 500 *cacahs*, 200 of them in Pacitan, where he had frequently sought refuge. Mangkunagara's son-in-law R.M. Guntur (then named Png. Anom) was given 400 households. Other followers also received appanages in accord with their status.

In protocol matters, Mangkunagara differed only slightly from his lord Pakubuwana III. Arrangements were agreed for weekly tournaments on Saturdays and for all the senior Surakarta dignitaries to appear at the Mangkunagaran residence to confirm their loyalty on Sundays and Wednesdays—arrangements like those that applied to a monarch. Every Saturday, Mangkunagara was to appear before Pakubuwana III.[66] He was now established with the special status of a *pangeran miji*. The term *miji* derives from the root *piji*, which means "to call someone to oneself separately", etc.[67] Mangkunagara thus became a prince of unparalleled standing in the court of Surakarta, directly called to the service of the Susuhunan. As we have seen above, Pakubuwana III—now 25 years old—had expressed his wish that Mangkunagara, his older (31 years old) and battle-hardened uncle, should "look after" him as he faced competition from the still older (probably 40) and more powerful Sultan Mangkubumi.

Earlier, when Steenmulder had gone to Sultan Mangkubumi to inform him that Mangkunagara was submitting to Pakubuwana III, Mangkubumi expressed his approval. He explained to Steenmulder that the term *miji* meant that someone stood immediately under a lord. Therefore, Mangkubumi explained, if he, too, were to contribute to the lands given as appanage to Mangkunagara, that would make Mangkunagara *miji* directly under himself as well; if the Sultan gave him no lands, then no relationship of fealty would exist. He also felt that Mangkunagara having an appanage as large as 4,000 *cacahs*, which was twice what his father Mangkunagara the Elder had had, was too much. He asked Steenmulder to pass this advice to *anak Prabu* (my son the King) Pakubuwana III.[68]

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[66] *BG* Vol. xxi, p. 42, Canto 208 (Asmaradana): 32. *Pĕpatih lan pradipati, tuwin sagung santana, kadya pasthi pasowane, ing Rĕbo kalawan Ngahad, sebeng Mangkunagaran, anggung kasukan anayub, Pangeran Mangkunagara.* 33. *ing Sabtu watang miyosi*….

[67] See the discussion in J.F.C. Gericke and T. Roorda, *Javaansch-Nederlandsch handwoordenboek* (Revised ed.; ed. A.C. Vreede and J.G.H. Gunning; 2 vols; Amsterdam: Johannes Müller; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1901), Vol. ii, pp. 316–7.

[68] *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 75–6.

Mangkubumi indeed refused to contribute any lands to the settlement with Mangkunagara from his domains. As a result, as he had explained to Steenmulder, Mangkunagara's position rested solely on his relationship within the *kraton* of Surakarta, whence came all of his appanage lands. There can be little doubt, however, that Mangkubumi would still have preferred to see Mangkunagara's head on a stake in the marketplace rather than him seated in a grand residence with courtiers paying obeisance to him.

After the Salatiga conference, Governor General Mossel and the Council of the Indies wrote to Pakubuwana III, Sultan Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara expressing satisfaction with the end of the civil war.[69] The Company continued paying off the indigenous military units which had been involved in the fighting, heaved an immense sigh of relief at the expenses thereby to be saved, and generously rewarded Hartingh.[70]

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The Third Javanese War of Succession was over. The young and inexperienced Susuhunan in Surakarta, Pakubuwana III; the seasoned warrior and Senior Prince Mangkubumi, who was now Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana I of Yogyakarta; and the diminutive and fiery Prince Mangkunagara, who had been waging war ever since he was a teenager but was now the senior and semi-independent prince of Surakarta—all now had to adjust to new circumstances. Clausewitz gave us his famous dictum that "war is … a continuation of political activity by other means".[71] One cannot help thinking that for Mangkunagara, it was the reverse. Here was a man for whom armed conflict had been an essential element in his growth and emergence as a person, someone in whose very being war was a formative and defining catalyst. It seems that the political activity of the next four decades of his life would be, for him, war by other means.

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[69] Batavia to PB III, Surakarta; Batavia to HB I, Yogyakarta; Batavia to MN I, Yogyakarta; all dated 16 May 1757, in VOC 1011 (Afgaand Briefboek van Batavia 1757).

[70] Batavia to Hartingh, Semarang, 28 Mar. 1757, in VOC 1011 (Afgaand Briefboek van Batavia 1757); Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1757, in dJ x, p. 316.

[71] Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 87.

PART II

War by Other Means

7

Becoming Established in Surakarta and the Defeat of Marriage Diplomacy, 1757–68[1]

Mangkunagara I's New Palace Establishment

That first morning when Mangkunagara woke in the princely residence he now occupied, all must have seemed very strange to him. After 17 years in the ranks of rebels, a time shaped by martial exploits and personal courage, by the high drama of victories and defeats and the loss of people close to him, for the first time he need not listen for the sounds of enemy *běndhe*, drums, trumpets, muskets and cannon, or be alert for the shouting of enemy Javanese or Company troops attacking. Instead, he could arise to the call to prayer and, rather than the sounds of an armed camp, he could hear cocks crowing and listen to songbirds as their cages were hoisted on poles to greet the sunrise, knowing that his morning tea would not be disturbed. We can understand him feeling, as he put it in his autobiographical *babad*, "as if he were dreaming".[2]

[1] Only sources relating directly to MN I's experiences, new evidence not previously published, or direct quotations will be footnoted in this chapter. Otherwise, the general narrative rests upon my book *Jogjakarta*, Chapter 4 and pp. 140–1. Readers who prefer an Indonesian-language edition may wish to consult M.C. Ricklefs, *Yogyakarta di bawah Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749–1792: Sejarah pembagian Jawa*, ed. Revianto Budi Santosa, transl. Hartono Hadikusumo and E. Setiyawati Alkhatab (Yogyakarta: MataBangsa, 2002).

[2] *SBPn* f. 417r.: *angler kadi anupěna*.

The Mangkunagaran palace, 1996

Inside the Mangkunagaran palace, 1996

The residence that Mangkunagara I established was approximately 1.4km northwest of Pakubuwana III's *kraton*. He turned this residence into what, in common usage, was and is called a *pura* or *astana*—a palace. In the aristocratic hierarchy, his *pura*/*astana* was less than a *kraton* or *kĕdhaton*—the place of the King, the *ratu* or *dhatu*—but more than the residence of an ordinary prince, which was called a *dalĕm*.[3] The palace and its extensive grounds are still occupied today by Mangkunagara I's descendants. His younger brother Png. Mangkuningrat—then named Png. Timur—occupied Tg. Arungbinang's former residence. I have been unable to find a contemporary source confirming its location, but I am confident that it was just off the southwest corner of Mangkunagara's palace lands, where today is still located the ward (*kelurahan*) called the Timuran. Nowadays these sites are part of the urban bustle of Surakarta, with several major hotels located in the area. In 1757 they would have been mainly rice fields, possibly with some uncultivated patches and with the river (*kali*) Pepe just to the north of Mangkunagara's establishment.

I have been unable to find sources setting out the stages of construction of the Pura Mangkunagaran, but we can assume much from other known examples. The main court and the princely residences of a court city constituted palisaded establishments. Among Mangkunagara's first steps would have been to ensure that he was surrounded by a defensive boundary, initially a bamboo palisade. Only later would it be replaced by more durable materials. The building of a mosque for the Mangkunagaran domain would have been an early priority. Initially this was located in the *kauman* district of Surakarta; only in the time of Mangkunagara II was one constructed as part of the Mangkunagaran palace grounds.[4] There were such practical requirements as horse stables, women's quarters, pavilions as spaces for public occasions, and the prince's own accommodation to an appropriate standard. An open field (*alun-alun*) was needed for weekly tournaments and other entertainments. Soldiers were accommodated in Mangkunagara's appanage lands, whence they would draw their sustenance, so that at night, when the gates were

[3] In literary works, however, the royal *kraton* was also sometimes called a *pura* and MN I's residence was sometimes called a *dalĕm*; e.g., see *BG* Vol. xxi, pp. 42, 107.
[4] According to *Tribun Solo*, 29 May 2017 (consulted online at http://solo.tribunnews.com/2017/05/29/mengenal-masjid-al-wustho-mangkunegaran-salah-satu-masjid-tua-di-kota-solo).

locked, Mangkunagara was the lone male (except for children) inside the palace gates. The only interior guards would be his female soldiers (*prajurit estri*), while his men guarded on the outside.

Mangkunagara's female soldiers were no hulking Amazons. In addition to their expertise with artillery, firearms, bows and weapons of cold steel, they were also two other things. They were his concubines (*sĕlir*), many young and beautiful, as he has already told us in his chronicle account. Interestingly, they—or at least some of them—were also literate and literary; their quarters constituted a scriptorium for the prince. We can recognise at least some of the products of this scriptorium by the use of a characteristic formulaic expression. This requires a brief excursus into 18th-century Javanese terminology.

Most Javanese works of literature and the individual MS copies of those works are anonymous. Determining who might have been the author of any such work is fraught with difficulty. Yet sometimes names or general descriptions of persons are given, but then the question is whether such a person is what we would call an author or a copyist. The boundary between the two is not always clear. Certain terms do, however, seem informative. When someone was the author, the first writer or compiler, of a work, he or she was sometimes described with words derived from the root *yasa* (to make, to have made, to create, to build, to found).[5] A person who qualified to be called such a creator (*ingkang ayasa*) of a work of literature seems to have been the one who determined the contents of the work—a broader concept than the modern sense of authorship, but still a creative act. It can mean authorship but might also mean something like what we mean in saying that Louis XIV built Versailles without ever having lifted a stone himself. Notably, when Ratu Pakubuwana was identified as *ingkang ayasa* of *Carita Iskandar*, *Carita Yusuf* and *Kitab Usulbiyah* in 1729, she was already completely blind, so she could not have actually written out the texts herself.[6] Terms deriving from the root *kirtya* (to make) were also used in the broad sense of

[5] See the fuller discussion of this term in the context of works by Ratu Pakubuwana (d. 1732) in Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 31–5. On another example of her as *ingkang ayasa*, see S. Kouznetsova, "The Javanese Chronicle Serat Sejarah Demak: A Provisional Study and Arising Questions", in *Milde regen: Liber amicorum voor Hans Teeuw bij zijn vijfentachtigste verjaardag op 12 Augustus 2006*, ed. Willem van der Molen et al. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), p. 130.

[6] Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 36.

"creator". An example is the supernaturally potent work *Surya Raja*, which the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta, later Sultan Haměngkubuwana II, created (*mangirtya*) and which was then copied (*anurun*, from *turun*; see below) by named scribes from the original (*wit pangirtyanireng*) of the prince, beginning on 8 Muharram AJ 1700 (21 March 1774 CE).[7] Also, the word *murwa* (to create for the first time, from *purwa*, with a wide range of meanings based on the concept of "the first") is used and may more specifically mean an author in our modern sense.[8] That term is found in *Babad Mangkubumi*, which I have argued was also authored by the later Sultan Haměngkubuwana II. That begins with the phrase that he *murwani* the work, beginning on 21 Jumadilawal Alip AH 1187 (10 August 1773 CE).[9] We will see that term used also for Mangkunagara's creation of his autobiographical *babad*.[10]

When Javanese manuscripts were copied, it was common for other terms to be used. These indicated that the work was being "transmitted" or "handed down", with words derived from the roots *turun* or *tědhak*, or with *sěrat* or *tulis*, meaning "to write". We find this term in Mangkunagaran MSS but we also find another, otherwise uncommon, expression, which seems to have been something of a trademark for Mangkunagara's *prajurit estri* scriptorium. These MSS say that they have been "written into a different book" or similar expressions; the words used for "different" (*seos* or *seyos*) and for "book" (*papan*, *korasan*) are, in my experience, uncommon in other 18th-century MSS. *Papan* is common in its basic meaning of "place" but, in my experience, rare in the meaning of "book". Also rare is *korasan* for book (from Arabic *kurrasa*, "quire, booklet, notebook, copy book", etc.).[11] The copy which we have of Mangkunagara's *Sěrat*

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[7] Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 186–7.

[8] See Gericke and Roorda, *Jav.-Ned. Handwoordenboek* (1901), Vol. ii, pp. 237–8.

[9] *BMang*, p. 1, Canto I (Mijil): 1. *Mijil ri Sang Wiranom murwani, wau kang cariyos*.... See further M.C. Ricklefs, "On the Authorship of Leiden cod.or. 2191, Babad Mangkubumi", *BKI* 127, 2 (1971): 264–73. There are some internal inconsistencies in the date at the beginning.

[10] See also Nancy Florida's discussion of terminology in her *Javanese Literature in Surakarta Manuscripts* (3 vols; Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993–2012), Vol. i, pp. 24–5.

[11] Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J. Milton Cowan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 820. Nancy Florida advises me that *kuras* frequently appears in 19th-century Mangkunagaran MSS in the meaning of "quire".

Babad Pakunĕgaran, which has so enriched this biography, says that it was copied in August 1779 and was "carried on in a different book, actually the story is the same, but in a different book".[12] An incomplete fragment of the same work begun, but not completed, in 1793 begins with the information that the work was copied out by four "women scribes of the female warrior class" of whom there were 60 and who were Mangkunagara's concubines; that it would describe the period after the decisive victory at Kasatriyan, Ponorogo (his defeat of Mangkubumi in August 1753); and that it was written in a "different book; the story is the same but the book is different". At the end of this fragment follows another fragment of the MS diary which we will turn to later when discussing the 1780s and 1790s.[13] Then, again, we will see explicitly that female soldiers were ordered to copy the work and that it was copied into a "different book".[14] This seems to be something of a formula, a trademark, found in MSS copied in Mangkunagara I's *prajurit estri* scriptorium.

One of Mangkunagara's first tasks on settling down, it seems, was to complete his autobiographical *babad*. The copy on which

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[12] Note the relevant terms underlined here: *SBPn* f. 1v., Canto I (Dhandhanggula): 1. *Pemut tatkala wiwit tinulis, watĕn panagari Salakarta, nuju ing Arwah sasine, nĕnggih ing taun Wawu, sinĕngkalan kang punang warsi, buta wiyat turongga, ngrat sĕngkalanipun, narĕngi ingkang tingalan Kangjĕng Gusti Jĕng Pangeran Adipati, kang saking anglalana*. 2. *Ingkang yusya sampun sekĕt warsi, pujul sagangsal sĕmana, …* 4. *Babad kalampahan kang tinulis, linajĕngakĕn asalin papan, sayĕkti tunggil urute, seos korasanipun*…. Ruwah AJ 1705 was equivalent to 14 August–12 September 1779; MN I's birthday fell on 4 Ruwah (17 August 1779 that year).

[13] Note the relevant terms underlined here: Radya Pustaka MS 48 B.1, p. 84, Canto I (Dhandhanggula): 1. *Sinĕkaran ingkang Manidu Manis, ingkang anĕrat carik wanodya, prajurit estri golonge, sawidak kathahipun, ingkang sĕlir Pangran Dipati, kang saking alalana, sakawan tinuduh, anĕrati sĕrat babat, wulan Sawal taun Dal densĕkalani, trus tunggal swaraningrat*. 2. *Urutipun babad kang tinulis, wusnya prang Panaraga Satriyan, saking kathah caritane, seos ing papanipun, urutipun carita nunggil, nanging seos korasan, yĕkti urutipun, sampunya prang Kasatriyan, Pranaraga Jĕng Gusti Pangran Dipati, prang lan rama Susunan*. The date converts to 12 May–9 June 1793. The MS is catalogued in Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. iii, pp. 72–3.

[14] Note the relevant terms underlined here: *BT* f. 1 left (this MS is foliated on left-hand rather than right-hand pages as is conventional): *pemut kinen nĕrat prajrit, carik estri kinon, anutugakĕn carita sĕrat babad tutur,…. papanipun seos, nurut carita seos papane … maksih carik estri, kang nĕrat nunurun*. Ditto in the romanisation of this MS in Mangkunagaran MS B 29 (Florida 696.2), p. 1; see Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. ii, p. 447.

we have relied in previous chapters was begun on 17 August 1779, on the prince's 55th birthday in the Javanese calendar.[15] As noted above, the formulaic statement at the beginning that this copy was "carried on in a different book, actually the story is the same, but in a different book" indicates that it was a product of Mangkunagara's *prajurit estri* scriptorium. At its end, the MS says that "the author of this story (*ingkang murwa carita*) was Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara], back from his travels during his time at war" and again that it had been copied anew "in a different book".[16] The MS does not, alas, tell us when he originally finished this work, but that he is said to be "back from his travels during his time at war" suggests that he was just back, i.e., that this was soon after he settled down as the most senior prince in Surakarta in 1757.

This personal memoir is a work of formidable detail and significant size—418 ff. (836 pages)—which, when it could be tested by comparison with other sources or by internal consistency of its dating, proved sound. It is no routinely self-praising work, but rather a memoir marked by candour and capable of self-criticism. We have noted that it is coy on some subjects, notably whether Mangkunagara ever made a claim for royal titles. Demonstrable errors are rare. When subjected to the usual standards of historical criticism, it has proved to be an invaluable source for Mangkunagara's view of events. It is impossible to imagine that he sat down in his new princely residence and composed it all afresh at such length and in such detail from memory. He must have relied upon records compiled as the days, months and years passed during his time at war (this is discussed further in Appendix 1). We have already seen him recording that he had copied out the Qur'an and religious books. We will encounter other writings by him below, and we will later see a literary format unique at this time in Java, an anonymous hybrid chronicle-diary also composed in verse in his palace. Mangkunagara was, we may say, a litterateur as well as a soldier and pious Muslim—and, of course, a lover of beautiful women and of Javanese high arts such as *wayang* and *gamělan*. It is possible that his autobiographical account of the

[15] See note 12 above.

[16] Note the distinctive terms underlined here: *SBPn* f. 418r., Canto 91 (Sinom): 28: *tinutugakěn salin papan, seos korasan tinulis, nanging tunggil kang carita, urute carita nunggil, kandělen papan yakti, mila salin papanipun, ingkang murwa carita, Kangjěng Pangeran Dipati, ingkang saking lalana andon ayuda*.

war years was already composed when he returned to Surakarta in 1757 and only needed final polishing. Our great regret must be that he did not thereafter continue to compile an autobiography, so far as is known. Perhaps he felt that, after all the drama, hardships, triumphs and defeats he had experienced in his first 31 years, whatever was to follow could not compare or be worth recording.

Of his religiosity we have already seen much and will see more. He was an exemplar of what I have elsewhere called the Javanese Mystic Synthesis.[17] His faith and practice rested within the wider (and very capacious) boundaries of contemporary Islamic Sufism (mysticism). We do not know which Sufi order (or orders) he may have followed. It seems, however, that the Shattariyyah was probably the dominant order of the time in Java, at least among *kraton* elites.[18] Within that Sufi setting, the Mystic Synthesis was marked by three distinctive characteristics:

- A strong sense of Islamic identity. Javanese identity was a subset of Islamic identity; to be Javanese was to be Muslim.
- Observance of the five pillars of Islamic practice—reciting the confession of faith, ritual prayer five times a day, giving alms, fasting in the fasting month, and undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca for those able to do so (who were very few in Java in this period).
- Despite the above, acceptance that indigenous Javanese spiritual forces were real and required respect and veneration—from the spectral denizens of caves, trees, road-crossings and other places to grand figures like the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul) and Sunan Lawu. Mangkunagara was evidently particularly close to the latter, probably because much of his life in rebellion had been fought in the environs of Mount Lawu; later he would be buried there.

Because of the nature of the sources that we have, we see the Mystic Synthesis most clearly in the lives of the nobility and further

[17] More on this may be found in my books *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamisation from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006); and *Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions c. 1830–1930* (Singapore: NUS Press; Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 5–6, 9–11 et passim.

[18] See Fathurahman, *Shaṭṭārīyah Silsilah*, pp. 49–80.

court elite. But it seems to have been widely observed in Javanese society before the reform movements of the mid-19th century.

Hartingh appears to have noticed something of this style of Islam but, not surprisingly, misunderstood it. "Java's inhabitants," he wrote, "excepting a few dignitaries, don't know much more of their religion than the ban on eating pork and to fast at the right time."[19] Several decades later, in 1822, the Dutch Resident in Gresik (East Java) usefully reported on the widespread observance of Islam's "five pillars" but also misunderstood their centrality:

> The Javanese observes just a few of the practices prescribed for him by the Qur'an. The main points of the Islamic faith, which are carried out by many, are the *Shahada* [confession of faith], the *sĕmbayang* [daily prayer], the *puasa* [fast], the *zakat* [alms], *fitrah* [contribution at the end of the fast] and *hajj* [pilgrimage]. … The *puasa* is carried out by most Javanese of all classes.[20]

This apparent formalism did not seem very like the emphasis on inner piety and sobriety that marked Dutch Calvinism (which was, in practice, widely abused in 18th-century Dutch society in Java, which consisted in large measure of a dissolute rabble). Nor was it what was later to be called *abangan* religion, for that lacked both of the first two features above. These were genuinely and self-consciously devout and observant Muslims who also accepted local spirits. This Mystic Synthesis was similar to the sorts of faith and practice found more widely in the Islamic world at the time.

This religiosity was shared with other members of the elite. One of the earliest steps in the development of Mangkubumi's capital city, Yogyakarta, was the establishment of a religious school. Such schools, in Javanese called *pĕsantren* (place of the *santris*, students of religion), expanded dramatically in the 19th century[21] until coming to be the ubiquitous phenomenon seen across the Javanese countryside today. But they seem to have been still rare in the mid-18th century. The earliest reference to such an establishment known to me is from Surabaya in 1718.[22] With the Third Javanese War of Succession over, one Kyai Jayanudin "established a place of instruction" in

[19] KV, p. 230.
[20] A.D. Cornets de Groot, "Bijdrage tot de kennis van de zeden en gewoonten der Javanen", *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië*, Vol. 14, Pt. 2 (1852), pp. 271–2.
[21] Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, p. 49 et seqq. passim.
[22] Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, p. 360n24.

an area where "hundreds" of blacksmiths and goldsmiths had settled (such crafts being thought to have spiritual significance) and where the mosque was crowded at Friday prayer. "Shanties for *santris* were already many, and there also arrived makers of *kris*-sheaths as good works, copper-smiths and turners, adjacent to the court city."[23]

It was time to establish names and titles, but there lingered some confusion about Mangkunagara's. Readers may already have wondered why his autobiographical *babad* should be titled *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* rather than … *Mangkunagaran*. The explanation lies in the complexities of Javanese usage at the time. The difference between the syllables /*pa*/ and /*ma*/ was sometimes ignored, and the distinction between /*ĕ*/ and /*a*/ was frequently so. This lingers in Javanese usage today, where the words pronounced *munika* (this, that) and *munapa* (what?) are still written *punika* and *punapa*. The words *buwana* or *bawana* (the world) and *nĕgara* or *nagara* (land, kingdom) were related in meaning and usage. *Mangku* (to hold on one's lap, to care for, from the root *pangku*) and *paku* (nail) differed in meaning, but in a literary culture which revelled in wordplay and riddling, they were candidates for interchangeability, particularly since in written texts the character /*ng*/ was frequently omitted. The preliminary syllable /*ha*/ or /*a*/ was sometimes added to a name and sometimes not. As a result, royal or aristocratic names such as Pakubuwana, Pakunagara, (Ha)Mĕngkubuwana or Mangkunagara were near to interchangeable. In the early 19th century this set was augmented by the creation of the first prince to bear the name Pakualam, *alam* being a synonym for *buwana*. In documents of the time, we find multiple examples of such looseness in nomenclature. At one point in *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, Mangkunagara's brother Mangkuningrat is called "Pakuningrat" and at another Mount Merbabu is called *Prababu*.[24] An early 19th-century Shattariyyah spiritual genealogy (*silsilah*) calls Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana II of Yogyakarta "Sultan Pakubuwana".[25]

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[23] *BG* Vol. xxi, p. 76, Canto 212 (Asmaradana): 47. … *atusan kang tumut wisma, pandhe miwah kĕmasan, wus agĕng Jumuwahipun, siti rata murah toya*. 48. *Kyai Dhongkol Jayanudin ngadĕgakĕn pamurukan, pondhoke santri wus akeh, miwah titiyang kang prapti, mranggi ngamalo ana, wong sayang miwah wong bubut, wus tĕpung lawan nagara*.

[24] *SBPn* ff. 76v., 257r.

[25] Fathurahman, *Shaṭṭārīyah Silsilah*, pp. 60–2.

When Mangkunagara wrote to Batavia after the Salatiga settlement, he called himself Pakunagara.[26] This version was regularly used in the early years after 1757. In fact, he continued to use this style from time to time himself even as late as 1790.[27] His official—if we may use that term—titles are found on a seal from 1790[28] where they are given as *Kangjĕng Pangeran Adipati Haměngkunagara Senapati Ingayuda*: Lord Prince Adipati Haměngkunagara, Commander-in-Chief on the Battlefield. Sometimes the title *Arya* is added in documents from his time. He was, and is, commonly known as Mangkunagara (or Mangkuněgara), and we will continue to use that form, as we have throughout this book.

Mangkunagara's position as the senior prince in Surakarta, *pangeran miji* directly under Susuhunan Pakubuwana III whom he was invited to "look after", was anomalous in Javanese political traditions. That Java was divided between two contending monarchs—the Susuhunan and Sultan Mangkubumi—was not unprecedented. Such partitions of the realm had occurred in the past, always being temporary and ending in the victory of one side over the other. There can be no doubt that the Sultan hoped that there would one day be an opportunity to reunite the realm under himself, after which he might seek an opportunity to deal with the Dutch. But there was no precedent—at least none that I can think of or that was ever cited by the principals at the time—for there to be a third figure like Mangkunagara: not a King but not an ordinary prince, either; a man with a special role in Surakarta and one who had inflicted serious defeats on Mangkubumi in the past. Here was a figure certain to complicate Mangkubumi's aspirations and to give Surakarta greater weight than it had had in Javanese politics since its founding in 1746.

But if, as was certainly the case, the Javanese elite and the general populace were exhausted by war, and if the VOC was determined to get out of its Javanese military entanglements as far and as rapidly as possible, then the principal players had to find another

[26] Png. Ad. Pakunagara, Surakarta, to Batavia, n.d. (but with other letters of March 1757), in VOC 2910 (OB 1758). There is also a letter here from HB I, dated 5 Rějĕb [AJ 1682] [26 Mar. 1757 CE], in which he styles himself "Sultan Pakubuwana".

[27] See the examples in Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 93n70.

[28] AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790", containing a *geschrift* of 1790 with this seal.

way to pursue their objectives. Their first attempts were to employ the well-established techniques of marriage politics. The main objective was to control the succession in Surakarta.

New Circumstances for the VOC

For the VOC, the settlements of 1755 and 1757 represented the defeat of the Company's primary strategic objective over the previous eight decades: to keep Java united under the rule of its favoured monarch and to destroy his opponents. Instead, the Dutch had been forced by military defeat and stalemate to concede half of the realm to Mangkubumi and to allow Mangkunagara—of the three principals, the one they continued to fear most in future years—to settle in Surakarta as a grand prince. But from the defeat of this strategy another was born: by balancing and playing off the main characters as far as possible, by doing what they could to avoid any one of them gaining overwhelming power, the Dutch found a means to avoid war, to encourage commerce and to enjoy peace while saving an immense amount of money. This could not, however, prevent the bankruptcy that ended the Company's existence at the end of the century.

Hartingh summed up his view at the end of the wars in this way:

> There was no better means to maintain peace in the languishing land of Java than to divide a power that was otherwise too strong [for the VOC to manage] and to partition the kingdom—previously under the rule of a single monarch—between two rulers (although to many this seemed impossible). However closely bound to each other they may be by marriage or blood relations, they will always look upon each other with a jealous eye, while, by offering our support to the one or the other side, the party we favour will come out on top.[29]

Hartingh's years among the Javanese had not endeared them to him. At the end of the war, he regarded Javanese as:

> a nation that hates us in their hearts and was only compelled with repugnance and superiority of weapons to permit us to

[29] KV, p. 250.

> settle in their lands. Indeed, they only look for an opportunity to take away from us what we occupy, to put their foot upon our neck and, if possible, to eradicate us root and branch.[30]

His lack of affection for the Javanese was reciprocated, and the term "repugnance" was appropriate. We recall *Babad Giyanti*'s description of Hartingh as "big and tall but not good looking, with a face rotundly bulbous and squinting eyes, his belly bulging out everywhere, folded over itself, big and dishevelled". Javanese said of him, "This is a pig that's been replaced by a demon" and compared him to the *wayang* ogre Terong with a nose like an eggplant.[31]

The financial benefits of peace were enormous for the Company. In future years, as its finances became more troubled and it stumbled towards bankruptcy at the end of the century, the last thing it wanted was any more war in Java. Hartingh provided a year-by-year reckoning of the costs of the war from 1745/6 to 1757/8, which totalled 4,286,006 florins.[32] To set that in context, we may note that the total losses of the VOC over the seven years 1743/4 to 1749/50 amounted to 6,528,905 florins.[33] In other words, a significant part of the money that the VOC was haemorrhaging was attributable to the Third Javanese War of Succession.

In 1757 both the Dutch and the Javanese hoped that future years would leave them a lot less involved in each other's affairs. Certainly, their family concerns were something in which the Javanese wanted no Dutch interference. In the wake of the Ratu Bĕndara episode described below, when Mangkubumi told the Company that she was going to remarry, he said that this was all done in accordance with Islamic law and that it was a matter solely for the Javanese to deal with.[34] This was a matter about which, for their part, the Company's officers had little understanding or interest, beyond the fact that marriages were occasions for good parties. So here was some coinciding of interests. Unfortunately for the VOC, in the 1760s

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[30] KV, p. 249.
[31] *BG* Vol. xvi, p. 24; text cited on p. 149 above.
[32] KV, p. 253.
[33] J.P. de Korte, *De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), table 10C. These figures are chosen solely for the purpose of providing context and scale.
[34] HB I, Yogyakarta, to Vos, Semarang, Nov. 1765, and HB I, Yogyakarta, to Batavia, 22 Jumadilakir Alip 1691 (6 Dec. 1765), both in VOC 3157 (OB 1766).

the Ratu Bendara divorce crisis brought Java again to the brink of hostilities, and, not surprisingly, Mangkunagara was at the centre of it all.

Family Affairs and the Defeat of Marriage Politics

Sultan Mangkubumi was not present in person at the Salatiga conference in March 1757, but he sent his daughter Ratu Běndara, Mangkunagara's wife, a gift of trousers in fine silk (*cindhe*) and a new title: Raden Ayu Arya Mangkunagara, according to Hartingh.[35] If his report of this is correct, it reflects the ambiguities in the new realities of the divided Javanese kingdom. She was the Sultan's daughter, and he giving her a title on those grounds may have seemed unremarkable. But she was not his subject, for, as Mangkunagara's wife, she was a subject of the Susuhunan in Surakarta. Perhaps we should not be surprised, therefore, that that title is not encountered again in sources from the time, so far as I am aware. In turn, she and Mangkunagara informed the Sultan that she was three months pregnant and asked from him a personal appanage in Magetan for her maintenance. We noted in the previous chapter that, in refusing to contribute to the lands that Mangkunagara would have, Mangkubumi explained to Steenmulder that fealty relations went with appanage grants.[36] The Sultan wanted no such relationship with Mangkunagara and now was evidently reluctant to create one for his wife, notwithstanding that she was his own daughter.[37] Ratu Běndara's request for an appanage was granted only later, as we will see below. The pregnancy seems to have failed; at least it is not recorded in the main source of royal genealogical material.[38] We saw earlier that in 1752 Ratu Běndara had given birth to a daughter named R. Aj. Supiyah, who died in infancy.[39] No more children survived from this marriage, which would soon end in divorce; both filial and fealty relations would then be simplified.

Mangkunagara now had children coming of sufficient age to be married. In March 1757 he married one of his daughters to a

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[35] KV, p. 243.
[36] *BG* Vol. xx, pp. 75–6.
[37] KV, p. 243.
[38] Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 267.
[39] *SBPN* ff. 285r.–287v. The report in Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 267, that she died before being named is wrong.

son of Kudanawarsa, cementing the closeness of that relationship. In April his eldest daughter, R. Aj. Sombro, and her husband, R.M. Guntur, had a "renewed" marriage ceremony. They had already been married a year before as they were being pursued through the wilds, so there had been no proper festivities. Now they received many gifts, including from Pakubuwana III, from the Company's Surakarta Resident J.H. Abrahams and from Hartingh in Semarang.[40]

Mangkunagara's only surviving sibling in Java other than Png. Mangkuningrat was his elder brother Png. Tirtakusuma. He had remained behind in Batavia when Mangkunagara the Elder was exiled to Sri Lanka, becoming known also as Png. Pancuran after the Batavia district where he then lived. When Mangkunagara the Elder's body was returned to Java in 1753, Tirtakusuma went to Semarang with the body but then remained there with the VOC. He got no farther in his lifetime. Before he could join his brother in Surakarta and sample the wealth and comforts which might flow to him there, he died in Semarang in May 1757. His body was transported to Mataram for burial.[41]

The key fact in Java's marriage politics in this period was that Pakubuwana III had several daughters but not yet a son who might succeed him. Javanese conventions allowed for succession to an office through the female line, although all previous Mataram monarchs had descended through the male line. If Mangkunagara—or, of course, Mangkubumi, too—could arrange a marriage either for himself or for a son with one of the daughters of Pakubuwana III, there was a chance of controlling the succession in Surakarta and, in the Sultan's case, even reuniting the realm under a son's authority in the next generation.

Mangkunagara's marriage politics inevitably ran athwart Sultan Mangkubumi's. While Pakubuwana III had yet no sons, Sultan Mangkubumi had several. By the end of his life he had more than 30 children, at least 16 of them sons. In 1757 his current Crown Prince, R.M. Ĕntho, was proving to be a rather turbulent character. In late 1755 he made an excursion to Kedu and there plundered

[40] *BG* Vol. xxi, pp. 42–3. The daughter married to Kudanawarsa's son was R. Aj. Sawi; the boy was named Bagus Budhal.

[41] *BG* Vol. xxi, pp. 44–9. There is some internal confusion in the date here: Saturday, 8 Siyam [AJ 1682]; Thursday, 8 Siyam (Thursday calendar = 26 May 1757), Friday, 8 Siyam (Friday calendar = 27 May 1757), Saturday, 9 Siyam (Thursday calendar) or Saturday, 10 Siyam (Friday calendar) (both = 28 May 1757) are possible.

local Chinese, killing seven of them. Such animosity towards Chinese was not universal in this period.[42] Mangkunagara's relations with Chinese communities appear to have been positive, as we have seen in earlier chapters. But the same was not always true of Mangkubumi's side. *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* and *Babad Giyanti* both record Mangkubumi's troops plundering Chinese settlements at Ngasem, Pati and Juwana in 1747–48.[43] As we saw in Chapter 4, however, during Mangkubumi's campaign on the north coast in 1752, he spared Chinese and their properties. Now, with peace returning, it seems that plundering of this community, who were essential to the economic reconstruction of Java, was not acceptable to the Sultan. He marched to Kedu to compel his son's submission. Further activities by Ĕntho led the Sultan to decide that this young man was unsuitable to be his successor, one of the most important things that any King must arrange. Hartingh described him as "mentally ill, or at least [he] carried out many objectionable acts". In late August 1758, Mangkubumi invited Ĕntho to dine with him. Thereafter the Crown Prince fell seriously ill, poisoned by his father according to Hartingh. Mangkubumi visited the sick young man each day for eight days, until he died after receiving his father's blessing and forgiveness. Hartingh observed that this showed that "His Highness is not to be played with".[44]

The Sultan skipped over other offspring to name his youngest son, then known as R.M. Sundara or R.M. Timur, as Crown Prince. He was then eight to ten years old and would eventually succeed as Sultan Haměngkubuwana II (r. 1792–1810, 1811, 1826–28). Initial European impressions of the boy were favourable, although his later reign was to be full of conflict. He was circumcised in early 1759, and Mangkubumi immediately set in train his plans for eventual reunification of the realm by marriage. Mangkubumi's intermediary in this was a major figure from the past. Mangkubumi had asked the VOC to return to Java the *patih* of Pakubuwana II who was exiled in 1742 named Natakusuma. After considerable hesitation and misgivings, the Company complied. On his arrival in Yogyakarta in May 1758, Natakusuma was renamed Png. Juru by Mangkubumi and became a respected senior member of the Sultanate aristocracy.

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[42] On this matter, see also Carey, "Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese".
[43] *SBPn* ff. 143v.–144r.; *BG* Vol. iv, p. 67.
[44] Hartingh, *Memorie*, Semarang, 26 Oct. 1761, in dJ x, p. 365.

Png. Juru and his wife both paid visits to Surakarta, charged by Mangkubumi with securing a marriage between his new Crown Prince and a daughter of the Susuhunan. Pakubuwana III declined, however, on the grounds that his daughters were too young for marriage. There is no doubt that they would have been young—he was himself only 28 in 1760—but "hung" child marriages were well known in Java, as we saw earlier, and the Yogyakarta Crown Prince himself was still a child. Java's contesting marriage diplomacies had not yet, however, escalated to the point of crisis.

Nicolaas Hartingh was succeeded as the VOC governor of Java's northeast coast in 1761 by W.H. van Ossenberch. We first encountered him in Chapter 3 as commanding officer of the VOC's hussars in 1748, as the man whom the Javanese called *Sakebĕr* and compared to the evil King Rawana from the *Sĕrat Rama*. As was customary, Hartingh wrote a *Memorie* for the information of his successor. This gives us a picture of the three Javanese principals, whom he had dealt with intimately for several years. He depicted Pakubuwana III as "good-natured" but rather "doting and dishevelled". His principal wife was a Madurese princess named Ratu Mas whom he greatly loved. She had borne him a son who had, however, died, and Hartingh doubted that she would bear any more children given her corpulence. She was "a crafty woman" who kept the Susuhunan under her thumb. "But I must say," he wrote, "that since the year 1754, when he was buried in debt and had nothing, he rather more resembles kingly splendour", for he now had a beautiful court and was surrounded by courtiers.[45] Hartingh could not know how little time was left for this marriage.

We have already quoted some of Hartingh's depiction of Sultan Mangkubumi in Chapter 3, but it is worth revisiting:

> He is … courteous, steeped in knowledge and extraordinarily able to dissemble. He doesn't easily let himself be talked out of his ideas unless there are solid reasons that persuade him. He is haughty but splendid and holds money in no great regard; at least, he spends it impetuously, mainly on his courtly entourage, which is superb, particularly his household troops.

Mangkubumi was "a great lover of constructions, the making of fountains, grottos and watercourses". "He keeps his word," wrote

[45] Ibid., pp. 360–2.

Hartingh, but accused the Dutch of not doing so, which Hartingh denied. In general, said Hartingh—whose *Memorie* betrays the exhaustion of a man who had spent many hard years in Java—"I hold him in high regard."[46]

Hartingh's description of Mangkunagara—nearly five years after the end of his rebellion—is evocative of the man whom we have come to know in earlier chapters:

> Although small of stature, fire and vivacity radiate from his eyes. He has … a reasonable income … with which he can easily maintain his retinue. He is married to the Sultan's daughter … but the aforesaid prince and Sultan still live in distrust and, so it seems, in bitterness, which is no bad thing. Indeed, it is good as a means to keep the dagger more firmly in its sheath. Truly one must always above all keep an eye on this lord, for he will allow no affront or appearance of affront. If the opposite were to occur, it will unleash the hounds upon the stage and he'll find no shortage of support from among the many princes, the more so because he is of close descent from the Pangeran Adipati [Amangkurat III must be meant] who was banished by the Company [in 1708] and his mother [Rd. Ay. Wulan] was a daughter of Png. Blitar [d. 1721]. And certainly (because of) his father Png. Ar. Mangkunagara [the Elder], elder brother of the late Susuhunan [Pakubuwana II], who was banished to the Cape [actually to Sri Lanka] in 1728, who is still much loved in this island and is held in honoured memory. The prince was more than excessively inspired and incited to [claim] the respect and presumptions that flow from all of this by his foster-father Kudanawarsa, who recently passed away.
>
> He certainly cherishes the hope one day to have the crown upon his head when the King dies, imagining that he has a right to it.[47]

When Van Ossenberch visited the two *kratons* in May 1762, he found that the Sultan had not given up any of his animosity towards Mangkunagara. Believing that Mangkunagara was intriguing to get the succession in Surakarta for one of his sons—doubtless by marriage to one of the Susuhunan's daughters, and doubtless true—Mangkubumi wanted the Dutch to exile Mangkunagara. Van Ossenberch refused, of course, since such differences contributed to the

[46] Ibid., p. 365.
[47] Ibid., p. 363.

precarious standoff between Javanese principals that guaranteed their continued disunity, which, as Hartingh put it, kept "the dagger more firmly in its sheath". Mangkubumi was displeased at this rejection, as he was at the Company's refusal to place certain of his courtiers in charge of coastal districts under VOC control.[48] Mangkunagara had not yet, however, achieved a politically potent marriage linking his descendants to the throne of Surakarta.

Another figure of significance was R.M. Guntur, who had allied with Mangkunagara in the later stages of the war and was married to his daughter Sombro. He settled in Surakarta when Mangkunagara did in 1757, but his ancestry made people nervous about him. To understand this, we need to review some dynastic history.[49] When Amangkurat III ascended to the throne of Kartasura in 1703, his uncle Png. Pugĕr resisted him. The VOC had its own reasons to distrust Amangkurat III. In 1704 Pugĕr fled to Semarang, where the Company recognised him as the new Mataram King. Thus commenced the First Javanese War of Succession (1704–8), ending with Amangkurat III on his way into exile—taking with him many of the royal *pusakas*—and Pugĕr on the throne as Susuhunan Pakubuwana I. This constituted a diversion of the direct line of monarchical descent from Amangkurat II and III's line to Pugĕr's, from whom all subsequent monarchs have descended down to the present. It is clear that there lingered in the minds of at least some Javanese the feeling that this had been a usurpation with foreign intervention, diverting the monarchy from a more legitimate to a less legitimate line. Amangkurat III died in Sri Lanka in 1734. Three years later his body, surviving family members who had been with him there, and at least some of the royal *pusakas* were returned to Java. Among those family members were his sons Pngs Tĕpasana and Wiramĕnggala. Both were executed at the court after becoming entangled in the *kraton* conspiracies preceding Pakubuwana II's July 1741 attack on the VOC garrison at Kartasura. Tĕpasana left behind a son, R.M. Garĕndi, who was some 12 years old and was adopted by the Chinese rebels as their titular leader, known as Sunan Kuning. Kuning's elder brother R.M. Wiratmĕja was murdered in the court, leaving behind a son who was R.M. Guntur. Thus, this young man carried a powerful set

[48] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1762, in dJ x, pp. 386–7.

[49] Details of the period discussed here may be found in my books *War, Culture and Economy* and *Seen and Unseen Worlds* or, more briefly, *History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 103–5, 115.

of legacies: (a) what he no doubt regarded as grave injustices done to himself and to his forebears, a murdered father and grandfather and an exiled great-grandfather, all having been victims of *kraton* conspiracies; and (b) a sense of frustrated legitimacy that attached to the usurped line of Amangkurat III. Little wonder that he was found among the many lesser rebels plaguing the Javanese countryside during the Third Javanese War of Succession. His marriage to Mangkunagara's daughter Sombro linked him to another man with (a) deep embitterment at the treatment of his father, Mangkunagara the Elder, on the male side; and (b) a tradition of rebellion on the side of his mother, R. Ay. Wulan, the rebel Prince Blitar's daughter. This was a pair of men for whom nothing could seem more novel than that they might live in peace and encounter justice.

Babad Mangkubumi records that "there was a descendant of the Mangkuratan line, indeed, Mas Guntur by name, who, considering that he shared in possessing Java, intended to change its inheritance by going to war".[50] In August 1761 Guntur and Sombro—he some 20 years old and she about 16, and what an adventurous life she had already led—slipped away from Surakarta in the night and easily assembled a following. We may think that his and her ancestries were behind this ability to attract others; the VOC, however, dismissed their followers as mere highwaymen. The reason for Guntur's rebellion was unclear to the VOC, which was told by some that it was because he had been overly familiar with one of Mangkunagara's concubines but by others that he found his income inadequate. The latter may well have been a version of *Babad Mangkubumi*'s statement that he sought to claim his share of Java. Unfortunately, we have no sources from Guntur or Sombro which might help to clarify their intentions. They reduced the towns of Blora and Jipang to ashes, in the latter killing one of the Sultan's governors. Mangkubumi's troops pursued them into the Blora region. Both the Sultan and the Susuhunan were determined to be rid of Guntur and dismissed or executed some senior figures in the countryside for laxity in pursuing him. Guntur and Sombro continued eastwards and survived into 1762. Early in that year, Guntur wrote to Van Ossenberch in Semarang seeking an appanage in VOC-controlled coastal territory. The VOC, needless to say, had no interest in such a proposal and left Guntur's hoped-for destruction to Mangkubumi's troops. In

[50] *BMang*, p. 150: *ywantĕn trah ing Mangkuratan nĕnggih, Mas Guntur ran ing wong, engĕt nagri Jawi tumut darbe, yun gĕnti waris ngrĕbaseng jurit*.

April of that year (as the wet monsoon came to an end), however, Guntur attacked through Cengkalsewu and towards the village of Prawoto, between the Grobogan and Demak areas. Under pressure from *kraton* forces, he withdrew to the Madiun area, where Surakarta forces attacked him. He retreated then into the forests of Blora. From there he wrote to Van Ossenberch again asking his help to obtain authority over the lands to the east of Mount Lawu. Van Ossenberch sent Guntur's three emissaries to Pakubuwana III, who thanked him, cut off their heads and impaled them on bamboo stakes on the *alun-alun*.[51]

Already in 1761 there were suspicions that Mangkunagara was secretly supporting Guntur and his daughter. When his brother Mangkuningrat was sent out to pursue them, he did nothing of significance. By August 1762 Van Ossenberch concluded that there was "incontrovertible evidence" of this conspiracy, allegedly because Mangkunagara saw here a chance to disrupt Java again and to fish in troubled waters. Soon the governors of Kediri and Wirasaba were refusing to pursue Guntur or to appear at Surakarta on the grounds that they had to stay in their lands to defend against him. In August 1762, however, one of Guntur's main commanders surrendered to the Susuhunan's troops and was rewarded with the governorship of half of Blora. Finally, Guntur was killed in a battle with Pakubuwana III's troops on 15 September of that year. Sombro was captured alive and was returned to Mangkunagara.[52] She was subsequently married to R. Tg. Yudanagara, the governor of Banyumas and son of Mangkubumi's *patih* Danuréja.[53] So far as I am aware, she had a quiet life thereafter, although we will see in the next chapter that her husband was suspected (probably wrongly) of pernicious designs in league with Mangkunagara in 1772. There was no further evidence that Mangkunagara had secretly endorsed Guntur's rebellion, although it is not hard to imagine him taking some pride in the depredations of his son-in-law and daughter.

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[51] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 16 Aug. and 15 Sept. 1761, in VOC 3028 (OB 1762); Hartingh and Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1761, in VOC 3028 (OB 1762); Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 Apr. and 23 July 1762, in VOC 3065 (OB 1763).

[52] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 July, 19 Aug. and 9 Sept. 1762, in VOC 3065 (OB 1763); Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1762, in dJ x, pp. 385–6. Guntur may have had two royal *pusaka krisses*, but the evidence on this is confusing; see Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 125.

[53] Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 267.

Mangkunagara was cementing his position as an influential senior figure in Surakarta. The *patih* Mangkupraja was elderly and generally rather languid and incompetent, so Mangkunagara faced no competition from that direction. Pakubuwana III's domineering queen was shortly to be removed from the stage, which would give Mangkunagara even more enhanced prospects of "looking after" the ruler. Van Ossenberch depicted the situation in this way, shortly before the queen was divorced:

> Although at first blush Mangkunagara still seems somewhat wild, in fact in all his dealings he shows shrewd judgement, so that he does almost nothing without design. He relates to the Susuhunan almost entirely however he wishes, even down to small things. I am myself a witness to this.…
>
> When this is combined with other circumstances, to wit a King who doesn't know how to manage his own affairs and is effectively dependent upon the whims of his wife and a *patih* who displays little regard for his master's orders, then it is not difficult to conclude that a prince like Mangkunagara, who constantly wishes and hopes for the throne, will easily know how to take advantage of these circumstances and take measures to achieve his goal. That will be detrimental to Java and against the Sultan's designs. That monarch [Sultan Mangkubumi] reckons that he [Mangkunagara] has already set this in train, with his enticing [the Susuhunan] to the drink that he gives him, the trivialities that he subjects him to, his discourses about these and the scoffing about the Susuhunan's small authority.
>
> [Mangkunagara] thereby seeks a closer link with the people so as to win for himself a right to the succession. And finally, [Mangkunagara's] offering him pretty girls, which he knows [Pakubuwana III's] wife will not allow him to have, is only to bring the Susuhunan into contempt among the masses and thereby to gain greater esteem and love for himself, which indeed he already enjoys among both great and small.[54]

Van Ossenberch reported that he was trying to rid Sultan Mangkubumi of his "melancholy thoughts", while also keeping Mangkunagara in a good mood. Through Resident J.C. Beuman (in office 1761–September 1767), Van Ossenberch also sought to dissuade Pakubuwana III from his "offensive lifestyle and all-too-great familiarity"

[54] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 July 1762, in VOC 3065 (OB 1763).

with Mangkunagara by showing him the contempt he thereby attracted to himself.[55]

Pakubuwana III was growing more interested in running his own affairs and, to that end, decided to be rid of his domineering wife, who was a half-sister of the Paněmbahan of Madura Cakraningrat V. The possibility of Madurese meddling in Javanese affairs was welcomed by no one, so there were no regrets when the Susuhunan divorced her in August 1762. He accused her of multiple adulteries and evidently nearly murdered her on the spot when she demanded that one of his other women be killed. The Surakarta-Madura royal family link was thereby terminated. There was some difficulty in deciding what to do with the lady. She was eventually married to the governor of Kudus and died there in 1788, having outlived her former royal husband by some six weeks. She was replaced as principal wife by a daughter of Natakusuma/Png. Juru, recently returned from Sri Lanka, a girl who had originally been promised to the Yogyakarta Crown Prince. Mangkubumi seems to have agreed to this rearrangement.

After divorcing his queen in August 1762, Pakubuwana III almost immediately created another marriage alliance that further improved Mangkunagara's prospects of influencing the Surakarta succession. It was therefore unwelcome to the Sultan. In September Pakubuwana III married his daughter R. Ay. Kadhaton (later named Ratu Alit) to Mangkunagara's eldest son, R.M. Sura (later known as Png. Ar. Prabu Amijaya). Thus, Mangkunagara succeeded in forming a marriage alliance with the son-less Susuhunan, which Mangkubumi had failed to achieve. This took the Dutch, and no doubt the Sultan, by surprise.[56] Any son born of this marriage would be a prime candidate to succeed in due course as the next Susuhunan. Van Ossenberch worried about this alliance and would have preferred to postpone it, but he was reassured when Mangkubumi said that he intended to arrange a marriage between his Crown Prince and a younger daughter of the Susuhunan (which never, in fact, came about). Mangkubumi instead kept pestering Van Ossenberch with requests that Mangkunagara be exiled from Java.[57]

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[55] Ibid.

[56] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 19 Sept. 1762, in VOC 3065 (OB 1763); Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Dec. 1762, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764).

[57] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 July and 11 Nov. 1762, in VOC 3065 (OB 1763).

The most dramatic family affair involving Mangkunagara was the ending of his marriage with the Sultan's daughter Ratu Bĕndara. Although the Sultan had a clear male heir in his new Crown Prince, it was nevertheless the case that this marriage gave Mangkunagara some potential for influence in Yogyakarta. It had represented a matrimonial sealing of the original alliance between Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara in 1747. The marriage had become anomalous in that respect amidst their animosities since 1752–53 and must have been a constant irritant to Mangkubumi. The marriage was childless and, as noted previously, perhaps loveless.

Shortly after Mangkunagara's settlement in Surakarta in 1757, the Sultan asked his daughter to visit him in Yogyakarta. Mangkunagara, however, would not agree to this.[58] In 1758 the VOC believed that Mangkunagara and Ratu Bĕndara would together visit Yogyakarta later in the year—however dangerous and unlikely that would be for Mangkunagara—but nothing came of this.[59] It then appeared that Ratu Bĕndara herself would go to Yogyakarta, but only if her father promised her in advance an appanage of 600 *cacahs* in Magetan, as previously requested. Mangkubumi said that he would not give her the appanage until she came to Yogyakarta, observing that this was an excessive price to pay for a visit from his daughter. Within a week, the VOC Resident in Surakarta, Duurveldt, advised that Mangkunagara had rejected the visit because the Sultan would not promise the appanage in advance.[60]

In June 1763 a visit took place in the opposite direction when the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta visited Surakarta to see a daughter of Pakubuwana III who was a potential bride. Protocol conflict quickly arose over whether the Yogyakarta Crown Prince or Mangkunagara should have precedence. At a dance party, affront was given in both directions. Mangkunagara displayed his expertise at dancing and invited the Crown Prince to join him, but the latter refused, escalating to anger on both sides. Several glasses shattered at the feet of the Yogyakarta prince, "whether unexpectedly or intentionally", observed the VOC's chief administrative officer in Semarang, Hermanus

[58] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 June 1757, in VOC 2910 (OB 1758).
[59] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 Sept. 1758, in VOC 2939 (OB 1759).
[60] Duurveldt's advice is reported in Donkel, Yogyakarta, to Hartingh, Semarang, 2 and 9 Sept. 1758, in AN Djokjo 32 "Djokjo brieven naar Samarang 1756–61". Duurveldt's first name is not known.

Munnik, then visiting Surakarta.[61] The young girl herself seems to have found the appearance of the Yogyakarta prince intimidating.[62]

When the Crown Prince returned to Yogyakarta—no closer to a marriage with Pakubuwana III's daughter—he was followed by his sister Ratu Běndara. Munnik believed that Mangkunagara had no suspicions about her departure. A few days after her arrival in Yogyakarta, however, Mangkubumi declared that she had no intention of returning to Mangkunagara, on the grounds that he had a "private" (i.e., venereal) disease and did not provide sufficiently for her upkeep. Both charges would be grounds for releasing a woman from a marriage under Islamic law. We should note that there is no further evidence of Mangkunagara having a venereal disease. We will see in Chapter 9 that in his later years, it became clear that he was suffering from yaws. This is a bacterial infection found in tropical regions, closely related to syphilis, the early stages of which display visible lesions at various places on the body, including the genitals. It is probable, therefore, that what was claimed to be a venereal disease in 1763 was in fact a stage in yaws. Other symptoms include bone pain and swelling, which probably means that the earlier episodes described above as rheumatism or arthritis (*encok*) were also early signs of yaws.[63]

Throughout the sources on this crisis, there are references to the matter being placed before Islamic judges to ensure that all was being done properly.[64] A more general claim followed, that Mangkunagara's intentions were evil, something which Mangkubumi had long proclaimed and no doubt believed. On learning of this, Mangkunagara

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[61] Munnik, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 June 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764); *BMang*, pp. 205–11.

[62] *BMang*, pp. 200–1.

[63] Oriol Mitjà, Kingsley Asiedu and David Mabey, "Yaws", *Lancet* 381 (2 Mar. 2013): 763–73; also published online, 13 Feb. 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62130-8.

[64] E.g., Munnik, report of trip to Yogyakarta, 1 Aug. 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764). On Islamic divorce law, including measures whereby a woman may initiate proceedings through the methods known as *ta'liq, khul'* and *fasakh*, see J. Schacht, "Ṭalaḳ", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam: New [2nd] edition*, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, P.J. Bearman et al. (13 vols; Leiden: Brill, 1986–2009), Vol. x, pp. 151–5; Th. W. Juynboll, *Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohammedaansche wet volgens de leer der Sjâfi'itische school* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1930), pp. 207–14; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide geschriften (gesammelte Schriften)* (6 vols in 7; Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1923–27), Vol. 4, Pt. 1, pp. 300–1.

asserted that this was all the work of the Sultan, not of Ratu Bĕndara, and said that he would not rest until she was back with him. The Surakarta Resident Beuman tried to calm Mangkunagara, to no avail. Nor could Pakubuwana III achieve anything. As governor of the northeast coast, Van Ossenberch wrote to the Sultan and to Danurĕja, again without success. Anticipating hostilities, Mangkubumi put forces on alert.[65]

The VOC Resident in Yogyakarta, J.C. van der Sluijs (in office 1761–64), spoke to the Sultan on 25 June 1763 and came away convinced that nothing would move him to return Ratu Bĕndara to Mangkunagara. Furious at this attempt by the VOC to intervene in the matter, Mangkubumi thundered, with arms outstretched and his eyes as if shooting thunderbolts, "If the Company wants to name Mangkunagara as Sultan, take from me the half of Java's kingdom and give it to him, good luck!" This so loudly that the watchmen at the inner *kraton* gates came rushing in and the *patih* turned as pale as death, reported Van der Sluijs. At the subsequent Saturday tournament, as was customary Van der Sluijs asked Mangkubumi what he would like to drink, but the Sultan refused any Dutch drink. Subsequently, Danurĕja asked the VOC to find a means to relieve him of his position as *patih*—which by the contracts was a joint appointment of the monarch and the Company—since he could make no headway with this issue.[66]

Munnik again visited Yogyakarta in July 1763 and asked Danurĕja, who promised to do what he could to get Ratu Bĕndara returned to Mangkunagara, what her complaints about him were. He was told yet another tale. Danurĕja said that Mangkunagara had made Ratu Bĕndara commandant of his female soldiery (*prajurit estri*) and for this she was ridiculed and shamed when in Yogyakarta. It was said that she was the daughter of a Sultan but allowed herself thereby to be treated like a slave in a manner unworthy of her birth. So she had resolved to leave Mangkunagara of her own accord and not on the orders of her father. Thus was another—and perhaps more probable?—explanation given for the breakdown of the marriage. Danurĕja claimed that on several occasions, in his presence, the

[65] Munnik, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 June 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764) (also in dJ x, p. 394n2).
[66] Van der Sluijs, Yogyakarta, to Semarang, 25 June 1763, in AN Djokjo 33 "Djokjo brieven naar Samarang 1761–64".

Sultan had tried to get Ratu Bĕndara to return to Mangkunagara, but she was adamant. Munnik subsequently spoke to Ratu Bĕndara herself, but in the presence of Mangkubumi, on which occasion she insisted that her mind was made up. Munnik was uncertain what he could or should do about getting Ratu Bĕndara back to Mangkunagara. He considered bribing the Yogyakarta *pĕngulu* to give a legal judgement against Ratu Bĕndara's divorce but finally decided that there was simply nothing to be done.[67] Van Ossenberch feared that if Mangkunagara despaired of a peaceful settlement he would probably take up arms, a formidable prospect. He was of the view that if that were to happen, unless the VOC supported Mangkubumi, "the entire household of the Sultan will fall to pieces", wrote Van Ossenberch, "for he is hated by most of his senior courtiers, whereas to the contrary Mangkunagara is loved by his people and in the case of a rupture, there would be favourites enough at the court of Yogyakarta who would certainly go over to his side".[68]

In August Mangkubumi told Batavia directly that there was nothing to be done. Ratu Bĕndara was willing for her divorce to be conducted anywhere—Surakarta, Semarang or even Batavia—but not in person; instead, she would send a representative.[69] Pakubuwana III evidently adopted the position that he was unwilling to go ahead with a marriage of one of his daughters to the Yogyakarta Crown Prince so long as Ratu Bĕndara was not returned to her husband, so that was the end of that matter, too.[70]

Van Ossenberch visited Surakarta in September and found Mangkunagara still implacably opposed to the divorce. He put on a show of affection for the Company (no doubt a tactical positioning) and asserted that Ratu Bĕndara was being held against her will in Yogyakarta by Mangkubumi and pined for him every day. Van Ossenberch again expressed the fear that Mangkunagara's bitterness towards Mangkubumi over the matter might lead him to return to rebellion.[71] Subsequently the Sultan said that he would accompany Ratu Bĕndara to wherever the divorce would be confirmed, suggesting that Pakubuwana III's presence would also be desirable. *Babad*

[67] Munnik, report of trip to Yogyakarta, 1 Aug. 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764).
[68] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 Aug. 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764).
[69] HB I, Yogyakarta, to Batavia, 1 Aug. 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764).
[70] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 2 Aug. 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764).
[71] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 13 Sept. 1763, in VOC 3094 (OB 1764).

Mangkubumi's account has it that Pakubuwana III was indeed advising Mangkunagara to accept the divorce.[72] Van Ossenberch, however, thought this a dangerous proposal. While the presence of Pakubuwana III would be desirable, the Susuhunan would go nowhere without Mangkunagara—still being "looked after" by him, we may presume. Any proposal that thus put Mangkunagara face-to-face with Mangkubumi was too dangerous for Van Ossenberch to contemplate. Mangkunagara felt great bitterness towards Mangkubumi, he wrote, while the latter felt "a great grudge against Mangkunagara, or at least regards that prince as an obstacle to the Sultan's designs".[73]

Once again Van Ossenberch travelled to the courts in late October–early November 1763. Behind the courtesies displayed by the Sultan, "entirely other designs" were afoot. Small-scale hostilities were breaking out, although the governor could not say which side bore the greater guilt. Mangkunagara had usurped several villages in the Sultan's territories. As reprisal, the Sultan had taken several villages under Pakubuwana III and the latter was demanding satisfaction for that (undoubtedly with Mangkunagara's encouragement).[74] As the prospect of renewed warfare loomed, the Company had no options but to keep talking to the principals and hoping for the best. Military intervention was the last thing that the VOC might contemplate.

The divorce was formalised on 2 December 1763 by representatives of Pakubuwana III (Tgs Arungbinang and Mangkuyuda) and Mangkubumi (Pngs Pakuningrat and Natakusuma). Neither Mangkunagara nor Ratu Bĕndara was present. Nor was either monarch. Van Ossenberch believed that this divorce was on the condition that she not remarry so long as Mangkunagara lived.[75] Just two years later, however, he would find that he had been deceived. In fact, all he had was an assurance from Mangkubumi that "regarding the remarriage of Ratu Bĕndara, you need not worry, for up to now she is not inclined to marry".[76]

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[72] *BMang*, p. 341; text in Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 113n54.
[73] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 13 Oct. 1763, in VOC 3124 (OB 1765).
[74] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1763, in VOC 3124 (OB 1765).
[75] Van Ossenberch, Semarang, to Batavia, 2 Dec. 1763, in VOC 3124 (OB 1765).
[76] HB I, Yogyakarta, to Van Ossenberch, Semarang, 12 Oct. 1763, as part of Van Ossenberch's report of Dec. 1765 on Ratu Bĕndara's remarriage in VOC 3157 (OB 1766).

Mangkunagara had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Mangkubumi. Neither his supposed ally the VOC nor his sovereign Pakubuwana III had been able to deflect the Sultan from his path. Mangkunagara complained to the end of his days about the divorce, but there was nothing that could be done. This must have been a bitter reminder of his second-rank standing in Java's new divided state structure. Whether Ratu Bĕndara had genuinely wished to divorce him must remain unknown.

Stepping down as governor of the northeast coast in May 1765, Van Ossenberch expressed concern about the succession in the two kingdoms. If Pakubuwana III should die, he wrote, Mangkunagara would attempt to claim the throne. Mangkubumi would do all within his power to prevent that happening in the hope of reuniting Java under himself. If Mangkubumi should die, both Mangkunagara and the Yogyakarta Crown Prince would contend for the succession in Yogyakarta.[77] Batavia, however, saw uncertainty about the succession as a bridle with which to hold the monarchs in check.[78] That was a dangerous game to play for a Company so exhausted by years of warfare and financial losses. Batavia's opinions mattered little, however, as events unfolded beyond the Company's influence.

In December 1765 the Yogyakarta Crown Prince married a daughter of Png. Pakuningrat. At the same time, and over Van Ossenberch's objections, Ratu Bĕndara was married to Png. Dipanagara (not to be confused with either of two rebels of that name), both Pakuningrat and Dipanagara being princes of Yogyakarta.[79] Mangkunagara was furious at Ratu Bĕndara's remarriage.[80] In *Babad Mangkubumi*'s account of the festivities, Mangkubumi pointedly still referred to Mangkunagara as "Suryakusuma", the pre-princely name he had previously insisted people must use as a form of contempt.[81]

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[77] Van Ossenberch, *Memorie*, 13 May 1765, in VOC 3156 (OB 1766) (also in dJ xi, pp. 37–8).

[78] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1765, in dJ xi, p. 47.

[79] On the earlier Dipanagara, a son of Pakubuwana I who rebelled in 1718, see Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy* (consult the index); on the more famous Dipanagara of the Java War of 1825–30, see Peter Carey's masterwork *The Power of Prophecy*.

[80] Semarang to Batavia, 9 Dec. 1765, in VOC 3157 (OB 1766); Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1756, in dJ xi, p. 47.

[81] *BMang*, pp. 373–5.

These two marriages meant that Sultan Mangkubumi was giving up the idea of marrying his Crown Prince to Pakubuwana III's daughter. He thereby abandoned his attempt to see the succession in Surakarta in due course leading to both kingdoms being ruled by his son—a recipe for reunification under his line. It also meant that Mangkunagara would have no grounds for meddling in the succession in Yogyakarta.

The various manoeuvres to control the succession in Surakarta collapsed in the late 1760s. All previous calculations were thrown overboard when, in August 1768, a son was finally born to Pakubuwana III by a major wife. The child survived the many perils of childhood and early youth, eventually succeeding as Pakubuwana IV (r. 1788–1820). This was also a significant year for Mangkunagara. On 2 January the marriage between his eldest son, Png. Prabu Amijaya, and the Susuhunan's eldest daughter, Ratu Alit, produced a boy who would become Prince Mangkunagara II (r. 1796–1835).[82] If the Mangkunagaran domain was to be inheritable, there was thus both a next-generation and a further-generation heir in place. So it was that the Surakarta and Yogyakarta domains—already divided in so many ways—were also divided by marriage connections, or rather disconnections. Marriage politics had been defeated.

To replace Ratu Bĕndara as his principal consort (*garwa padmi*, whom we would call a Queen if he had been a King), Mangkunagara elevated a woman who had previously been a secondary wife (*garwa ampeyan*) from Mount Wijil (Wonogiri) named M. Ay. Kusumapatahati.[83] I have not found evidence when this transition took place. As the new *garwa padmi*, her name was changed to R. Ay. Mangkunagara, but we will continue to refer to her as Kusumapatahati—a most delightful name for a beautiful young woman, meaning "the flower that breaks your heart".

Kusumapatahati was descended from a lineage of spiritual importance, it seems, although the evidence for this is of uncertain value. A text in the Mangkunagaran library called *Sĕrat Wahanabrata* (meaning something like "The Means of Asceticism") is found in both a MS prose version on modern lined notebook paper, which is dated 1882, and a roneoed and romanised typescript version written

[82] Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 143.
[83] Ibid., p. 267.

in 1952.[84] The former is anonymous, while the latter was composed by one R. Ng. Sastrarĕjana ("Sastroredjono") of the Mangkunagaran. That name is also given as an acrostic in the first stanza, a practice known only from the mid-19th century onwards. Both texts are thus obviously of later 19th to mid-20th century origin. In this biography, which relies on evidence from, or at least close in time to, Mangkunagara I's life, we would be justified in ignoring a story such as is told in these much later documents. I describe the tale here for readers to make of it what they will.

Sĕrat Wahanabrata tells of one Bisman of the Laroh area in the time of Kartasura, that is, before 1746. He was the child of a divine (*kyai*) and engaged in strenuous meditations. When he married the daughter of one Ky. Nurkadim, he was renamed Kasan Nuriman. Three months later Ky. Nurkadim fell ill, asked Kasan Nuriman to see to the washing of his body after his death, and died. Kasan Nuriman washed the body as requested, but then a strange phenomenon occurred. He noticed movement and discovered that the body had an erection. Kasan Nuriman threw the covering aside, took the penis in his mouth and spat it out again, whereupon it subsided. This story will strike modern readers as strange and probably repugnant, but there are at least two similar precedents in Javanese tradition showing this to be a significant ritual. When the Mataram monarch Senapati Ingalaga died c. 1601, the surviving princes gathered to kiss the dead man's penis. Nothing more exotic occurred on that occasion.[85] When Susuhunan Amangkurat II died in 1703, however, as the same ritual was being observed, the penis is said to have stood erect. Prince Pugĕr—soon to usurp the throne from Amangkurat III's branch of the Mataram family—spotted "a radiant light as large as a peppercorn" on the tip of the penis and quickly sucked it up. This event was explicitly described as evidence that it was "the wish of God" that legitimacy should pass to Pugĕr's line.[86] Thus, to Kasan Nuriman, too, some sort of supernatural powers passed.

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[84] Respectively MN 527 and 527A in Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. ii, p. 349. The latter text has the fuller version of the story. At the end MN 527 is dated Jumuwah-Kliwon, 16 Rĕjĕb, Alip *gunane nayaka nujum bumine* [= 1882] and "(16-7/I-1882)", a confused attempt to render a hybrid AJ/CE date. The intended date was possibly Friday-Kliwon, 15 Rĕjĕb, Alip AJ 1811/2 June 1882.

[85] The story is found in the MS IOL Jav. 36 (A), f. 135v., and in *BTJ(BP)* Vol. vii, p. 47.

[86] Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, pp. 131–2.

According to the *Wahanabrata* story, still in the time of Kartasura, the rebel Mangkunagara saw Kasan Nuriman's 14-year-old daughter Rubiyah and asked for her hand, which was granted. She was then renamed Mas Ayu Patahati (Kusumapatahati). Kasan Nuriman then died. When Mangkunagara became commander-in-chief (*senapati*) of the Surakarta King, i.e., after 1757, she became his *garwa padmi* with the name Raden Ayu Sĕpuh Mangkunagara. She bore Mangkunagara two children, the elder being Prince Prabu Amijaya (from whom all successor Prince Mangkunagaras would descend down to the present) and the younger none other than R. Aj. Sombro, whose adventures from the age of one we have seen on previous pages.

The only remaining princely contender who might seek to reunite Java—however remote such a prospect had become—was Png. Singasari. He was in the mountainous Malang area, over which neither the Javanese monarchs nor the VOC exercised control. He was allied there with the descendants of Surapati, the Company's greatest enemy of the late 17th to early 18th century. He repeatedly refused the Sultan's offers to return to a settled life in Yogyakarta. There was some skirmishing with VOC and Javanese forces, but no major military action against Singasari until 1767–68, when the Company and Javanese forces launched attacks against Balinese in Java's Eastern Salient (Blambangan) and then marched against Singasari. He was captured by the VOC in the mountains along the south coast in July 1768. He said that he wanted to submit to the Susuhunan, but neither Pakubuwana III nor Mangkubumi wanted anything to do with him. He was taken to Batavia, where he died in imprisonment before he could be sent into foreign exile.[87] There would not be another significant princely rebellion in Java until that of Prince Dipanagara in 1825.

The two kingdoms of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, which could not be reunified by war, now were unlikely ever to be reunited by marriage. Nor was there any serious prospect remaining of some prince trying to reunify Java by rebellion. They have remained divided to today. In Mangkunagara's time, the general exhaustion of the land and people, the evident consensus among the elite that war must end, the presence of the Dutch East India Company as a makeweight in times of tension—all of this meant that the partition

[87] Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 129–36.

of Java between Surakarta and Yogyakarta was acquiring a permanence that may have surprised even the principal Javanese actors. This must have been a source of relief to Pakubuwana III and the VOC, but an irritating disappointment to Mangkubumi. For Mangkunagara, it must have been a reality he accepted only because he could figure out no way to overturn it, short of reigniting a war which would have left him in as difficult—or probably more difficult—circumstances compared to those he had faced in 1757. Not even his closest followers and confidants were likely to advise such a step. He adjusted to his new political environment by cultivating the VOC as an ally. In February 1766 he wrote a letter to the governor general and Council of the Indies that fairly dripped with obsequiousness, expressing pleasure that they were happy with his conduct, saying that he knew that whoever was true to the Company would always be helped by it, and so on[88]—all statements that must have awakened as much incredulity and scepticism in Batavia's minds as in ours today. We will see later that in fact he had not lost all of his fire. As he stepped down from his post in Semarang in May 1765, Van Ossenberch described Mangkunagara as showing complete submission to the Susuhunan and the Company. But he was, wrote Van Ossenberch, "still lively and hot-tempered of temperament" and might one day "let go" against Mangkubumi. The loss of Ratu Bĕndara remained a constant complaint.[89]

In the late 1760s to early 1770s, Java was becoming remarkably peaceful. In this new and unaccustomed environment—not experienced by two or three generations of Javanese—the court elite began to take specific steps to legitimise the hardening partition of the state. Mangkunagara, not being a King—indeed, it was not yet clear whether his senior princely status would even pass to his descendants—would be a marginal participant in this. He had been defeated in the complex marriage politics of the time. And now he was perhaps perplexed by the approaching challenge of the transition from the 17th to the 18th century in the Javanese calendar, the subject of the following chapter.

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[88] MN I, Surakarta, to Batavia, 5 Puasa AJ 1687 [error in the VOC translation for AJ 1691]/16 Feb. 1766, in VOC 3186 (OB 1767).

[89] Van Ossenberch, *Memorie*, 13 May 1765, in VOC 3156 (OB 1766) (also in dJ xi, pp. 32–3).

8

Dealing with Marginalisation as the Courts Faced a New Century, 1768–78[1]

The Javanese Courtly Cycle of Centuries

Babads record a cycle of *kratons* changing as centuries in the Javanese (AJ) calendar changed. In the later 1760s and into the 1770s CE, such a cycle came around again. Given a lingering sense that the partition of the kingdom between two *kratons*, if it was to be permanent, was something unprecedented and lacking in legitimacy, then something must be done. Susuhunan Pakubuwana III, Prince Mangkunagara I and Sultan Mangkubumi (Hamĕngkubuwana I) might all feel threatened by the changes which this cycle predicted. This was particularly an issue for the Sultan. It should not surprise us, therefore, that the evidence we have for defences being built against these threats comes particularly from Yogyakarta. Surakarta was a *kraton* with clear antecedents, leading directly back through the predecessor Kartasura *kraton* to the courts of Sultan Agung and his predecessors. But what was the courtly line of descent of Yogyakarta, the new *kraton* born of rebellion? Given that there was little or no prospect of reuniting the kingdom in the real world through renewed

[1] Only sources relating directly to MN I's experiences, new evidence not previously published, or direct quotations will be footnoted in this chapter. Otherwise, the general narrative rests upon my book *Jogjakarta*, Chapters 6 and 7.

warfare, then legitimacy of the partition between Yogyakarta and Surakarta would have to be sought in the supranormal realm which dominated so much of Javanese thought.

Mangkunagara, too, seems to have felt concern about the approaching turn of the century. His palace, however, was not a *kraton* at all, so he may have felt somewhat distanced from the matter. Nevertheless, we will see him taking steps which seem to have been related to a sense of ominous possibilities driven by supernatural calendrical rhythms. At least, we can imagine him watching to see if events would provide an opening for him to grasp the initiative. In fact, however, as the two-*kraton* state structure became more regularised, his position became more marginalised.

Readers will have to do some bi-calendrical thinking in this chapter. The most essential calendrical concordances to remember are these:

- AJ 1700 began on 14 March 1774 and ended on 3 March 1775 CE.
- AJ 1703 began on 9 February 1777 and ended on 29 January 1778 CE.

In Javanese chronicles we find a cycle going back to the fall of Majapahit, sometimes with earlier extensions, which says that at the '00 year of a century a kingdom would fall and at the '03 year of the following century a new kingdom would be established. In the late 1760s, members of the Javanese elite familiar with their historical traditions could look back upon the following sequence:

- AJ[2] 1400 (1478 CE): Fall of Majapahit (a date well established in Javanese texts, although we know it to be inaccurate historically)
- AJ 1403 (1481 CE): Founding of the kingdom of Demak
- AJ 1500 (1578 CE): Death of the last ruler of Demak[3]
- AJ 1503 (1581 CE): Investiture of the first ruler of Pajang

[2] The early dates here, before Sultan Agung's introduction of the Islamic AJ calendar in 1633, properly speaking were Hindu Śaka years.

[3] In *Jogjakarta*, p. 179, I wrote that this date was not found widely in Javanese sources. That was wrong, as I subsequently showed in M.C. Ricklefs, ed. and transl., *Modern Javanese Historical Tradition: A Study of an Original Kartasura Chronicle and Related Materials* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1978), p. 164n48.

- AJ 1600 (1677 CE): Fall of the Plered (Mataram) *kraton* to Trunajaya (Pajang and Mataram clearly being treated as a single phase in this cycle)
- AJ 1603 (1680 CE): Founding of the court of Kartasura

The AJ 1600/1677 CE–AJ 1603/1680 CE years are historically accurate. Amangkurat II's *kraton* fell to Trunajaya in AJ 1600, probably around 28 June 1677 CE, although some problems attend the details of this dating.[4] The Javanese dating of the foundation of Kartasura was in the month Ruwah of AJ 1603, which corresponds with the VOC dating of the same event in September 1680 CE. We might therefore be tempted to conclude that these events were the origin of the whole cycle. Yet we find this '00–'03 cycle also in the Middle Javanese *Pararaton*, of which we have MSS from Bali dated as early as Śaka 1522 and 1535 (1600, 1613 CE), so it seems to have earlier origins. There is indeed evidence in the chronicles that the existence of this cycle, in the chaotic circumstances of late 17th-century Java, may have impelled the fall of the *kraton* because everyone who mattered expected that to happen.

Kartasura fell to rebels on 30 June 1742 (= 25 Bakda Mulud AJ 1667), well before the year that was predicted by the cycle. The foundation of Surakarta on 9 February 1746 (17 Sura AJ 1671) was therefore also well ahead of the appointed time. We will see below how the Yogyakarta elite dealt with that inconvenient refusal of the real world to conform with the supernatural. There is no doubt that the Yogyakarta elite knew of this cycle, for it is preserved in chronicles from that court.

Kraton Actions to Promote Stability in the Face of the Challenge

As the late 1760s passed, the two *kratons* in Java seem to have taken measures to defend themselves against potential threats. Beginning in 1768 CE (AJ 1694), a series of agreements by the two *patihs* of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, sometimes with the mediation of the VOC, regularised relations between the two kingdoms and established means of dealing with problems that might arise, without requiring either monarch to deal directly with the other.

[4] See Ricklefs, *Tradition*, pp. 184–6.

A mess of conflicting land boundaries was the legacy of the Giyanti agreement and the subsequent *Sĕrat Buk Kalĕpu* (Book of Klepu, named after the village where the negotiations took place in 1756). It had been exacerbated by Mangkunagara usurping several Yogyakarta villages during the conflict over Ratu Bĕndara. During 1764 most of these were returned, but then Mangkunagara again took Yogyakarta villages in 1767–68. The need for clarifying land boundaries led to new negotiations and an agreement signed in Semarang on 28 November 1768 (18 Rĕjĕb AJ 1694). Further negotiations were still needed after that, leading to a new contract under VOC supervision on 28 November 1770 (9 Ruwah AJ 1696). Yet even now, village-level conflicts persisted. Both Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana III wrote to the VOC governor of the northeast coast, J.R. van der Burgh (in office 1771–80), asking for VOC help in finally resolving cadastral disputes. The result was a "New Book" (*Sĕrat Ĕbuk Anyar*) signed and sealed at Semarang by the two *patihs* and two VOC Residents on 2 November 1773 CE (16 Ruwah AJ 1699) and ratified by the two monarchs on 26 April 1774 CE (14 Sapar AJ 1700), those dates straddling the transition to the new century. The most remarkable thing about this agreement is that it finally settled most of the vexatious land questions. Occasionally issues arose, but when they did they were usually settled without violence by the two *patihs* and two Residents of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Mangkunagara played no role in these crucial negotiations.

There were also troublesome issues surrounding legal jurisdictions to be settled. How and by whom, for example, would a case be handled where a subject of the Susuhunan committed a crime against a subject of, or in the territory of, the Sultan? What about the issue of extradition if a criminal should flee from one jurisdiction to the other? Or what was to be done if a subject of one kingdom wore clothing that offended the sumptuary laws of the other? Between Sura AJ 1697 (April 1771 CE) and Sura AJ 1699 (April 1773 CE), two fundamental law codes were agreed between the *patihs*. These were the *Anggĕr Agung* (Great Law Code) and *Anggĕr Arubiru* (Law on Disturbing the Peace). These codes regularised relations between two independent kingdoms and dramatically reduced the risk of controversies arising that might lead to violence. Again, these negotiations simply ignored Mangkunagara.

Confirming the succession was important to both *kratons* at this time. Mangkubumi sought VOC confirmation that his Crown Prince would succeed to the throne, and he may have meant not at his death, but at the turn of the centuries. We may note that

his Crown Prince would reach the age of three *windus* (eight-year cycles), i.e., 24, in AJ 1700, which seems to have been regarded in such circles as equivalent to something like a majority, even though several monarchs had succeeded at younger ages without any need for regency arrangements. All Mangkubumi got from the Company, however, was assurance that it would support the succession of the young prince if he conducted himself well. The Company was, unsurprisingly, entirely ignorant that AJ calendrical matters might have made this an urgent issue. It is even possible that Mangkubumi contemplated abdicating in favour of his Crown Prince at this time. That he did not do so may have been because the Company's assurances seemed equivocal. Pakubuwana III, who was not in good health, also sought assurances about the succession of his Crown Prince, just seven years old. In April 1775 (early AJ 1701), he wrote to Batavia to say that he intended to install his son formally as Crown Prince and sought the approval of the Company. Batavia approved. That formal declaration was carried out in June 1775 (Bakda Mulud AJ 1701).[5] In both Surakarta and Yogyakarta, the last decade or so of the Javanese 17th century was also marked by a large number of important court buildings being constructed. This, too, may have been a way of asserting permanence.

Kraton Literary Responses to the Century Challenge

It is in the realm of literature, and especially in Yogyakarta, that we see the most elaborate efforts to circumvent the threat of a *kraton* falling in AJ 1700 (March 1774–March 1775 CE) and a new one being founded in AJ 1703 (February 1777–January 1778 CE). On 21 Jumadilawal AJ 1699 (the MS unusually employs the Islamic year AH 1187), as the century was drawing to a close (the date is equivalent to 10 August 1773 CE, but there are some inconsistencies in it),[6] the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta set out to compose the

[5] PB III, Surakarta, to Batavia, seen at Semarang, 11 Apr. 1775, in VOC 3445 (OB 1776); Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1775, in VOC 3470 (OB 1777); Batavia to H.XVII, 30 Dec. 1775, in dJ xi, p. 284.

[6] *BMang*, p. 1. The full date given there is Sunday, 21 Jumadilawal, Alip, *mongsa* Kaněm, *wuku* Wukir, AH 1187. If 21 Jumadilawal AH 1187 is correct (it is unusual to find an AH rather than an AJ year in a *babad*), then Alip is correct as the year, but Sunday is wrong (it was Tuesday) and the *wuku* is wrong (it should be Marakeh). The timing of *mongsas* before the mid-19th century is imperfectly known and seems to have been irregular, so no conclusions can be drawn in that regard; see Ricklefs, *Tradition*, pp. 229–31.

chronicle of his father's reign, titled *Babad Mangkubumi*. The emphasis in the text falls disproportionately upon the period before AJ 1699/1773 CE. Although there is no obvious point where the text might originally have ended, with another section added later, it is noteworthy that something like three-quarters of the MS covers only one-third of the reign, the remaining one-quarter of the text covering the remaining two-thirds of the reign. This suggests that the *babad* started in AJ 1699/1773 CE may have been a chronicle covering a reign that was expected to end soon, and that an addendum to cover the rest was added later. I therefore suspect that its writing was connected with the Sultan's idea of handing the reins of power to his son in AJ 1700, which, as we have seen, was not implemented.

As the year AJ 1700 began (in March 1774), the Yogyakarta Crown Prince composed a massive pseudo-history, an allegorical account of the kingdom of Yogyakarta and its future. Many years later, it was regarded as a work of such supernatural power that it became one of the holy regalia (*pusaka*) of the realm. The work is titled *Surya Raja* [The Sun of Kings] and opens with a proem in prose praising the Crown Prince and Sultan Mangkubumi in extravagant terms. Anyone looking at this book's two volumes with their wonderful illuminations would recognise its special standing. And anyone reading the proem alone would know that that it was something extraordinary:[7]

> Be it known, this is the *pusaka* of Kangjěng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Anom Haměngkunagara [the titles of the Crown Prince], the Illustrious, Royal Son of his father the Great King. That is, Kangjěng Sultan Haměngkubuwana Senapati Ingalaga Ngabdurahman Sayidin Panatagama Kalipatolah, of the island of Java, who adorns the city of Ngayogyakarta Adiningrat. And praised exceedingly in this book is the perfect heart of Kangjěng Sultan; may he receive the blessing of Allah the Most High in this world and in the world to come, and the blessing of the intercession of Kangjěng Nabi (Prophet) Muhammad—God bless Him and grant Him peace.
>
> Be perfect the praise of his heart when, indeed, Kangjěng Gusti [the Crown Prince], great of intent, creates the secrets of mystical knowledge (*ngelmu*) and of the ordering of the kingdom, contained in this book *Surya Raja*.

[7] *Kg. Ky. Surya Raja*, Vol. 1, p. 2. Javanese text in Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 196–7n60.

> And let there be no misunderstanding, for this book has many meanings, which are contained in this *Surya Raja*, yea which are rendered into verse, causing the withered heart to flower, and which are made a mirror, a reminder of mystical knowledge (*ngelmu*) and of the ordering of the kingdom….
>
> Indeed, he is destined to remain enveloped with the Attributes of the Majesty of God, the Beauty of God, the Perfection of God, the Omnipotence of God, and the [Divine] Attributes Omnipotent, Willing, Knowing, Living, Hearing, Seeing, Speaking, Being One.… It was written on Monday-Pon [error for Monday-Lĕgi], the eighth day of Muharram [the first month] of the year 1-7-0-0 [21 March 1774 CE].

Thus was this book cloaked in supernatural authority. Remarkably so, with even attributes of God being ascribed to the Yogyakarta Crown Prince in connection with the creation of the book. The first canto of the text itself repeats the date of writing, here given correctly as Monday-Lĕgi. There follows praise of Sultan Mangkubumi and of the Crown Prince, described as the Sultan's most beloved child, who would succeed as ruler and whose age of 24 is specifically mentioned.

The content of *Surya Raja* clearly allegorises Yogyakarta as one-half of a divided kingdom. In this complex mythology, after many great adventures, the two halves of the kingdom are eventually (after several hundred pages) reunited in war by a young hero who recognisably represents the Yogyakarta Crown Prince himself, supported by the Goddess of the Southern Ocean. Then foreigners intervene, who are readily identifiable as the Dutch East India Company: unbelievers who have taken the coast. On a Monday-Pon, 4 Muharram in the year Alip, the young prince accedes as King, but the numeral for the year is not given.[8] At the end of the second volume, as the spirit forces of the foreigners and the Javanese are equally balanced, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean tells the Javanese to recite the Qur'an and to pray to God for victory, which follows. Thereupon the foreign King falls ill. A disembodied voice tells him to convert to Islam, which he does and is cured. All the foreigners follow him in becoming Muslims. The Kings of the two sides—now united by their Islamic faith—meet and deliberate about mystical knowledge (*ngelmu*), and the war is over.

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[8] This is an entirely fictitious date. The date 4 Muharram in an Alip-year could not fall on the combination Monday-Pon in either the Friday or Thursday calendar.

How, or whether, the court elite of Yogyakarta imagined that these events might translate into events in the real world, how the prophesied victory of Yogyakarta under the Crown Prince and the domestication of the Dutch by their conversion to Islam might actually happen, is not evident. But it seems obvious that this massive, supernaturally powerful book was meant to play a role in the dangerous chronological transition as the century came to an end in AJ 1700 (March 1774). The evidence above about the Sultan contemplating installing the Crown Prince as his successor in AJ 1700 is consistent with that, a plan that did not go ahead because of uncertainty about whether the VOC would support the change. Again, as with the legal and land settlements, this supernatural book gave no regard to the role of a figure like Mangkunagara, an especially senior prince who was not a King.

AJ 1700 was just the start of an ominous transitional time that should end with the emergence of a new *kraton* in the month Ruwah AJ 1703 (4 September–2 October 1777 CE). On the 25th of Ruwah in that year (28 September 1777 CE), in keeping with such expectations, one of Sultan Mangkubumi's sons-in-law named R. Tg. Jayengrat commenced a history of Java, which I have referred to as *Babad Kraton* [Chronicle of the *Kratons*].[9] This goes from the earliest times, i.e., from Adam, to the fall of Kartasura, but with a massive error which led the writer to leave a lacuna omitting the years 1719–41 CE. That stumble aside, this was clearly meant to be an account of Javanese history of a conventional character, except that the ending tells a notable story. Or rather, the two endings tell their two stories, for they suggest concern about the century cycle. There was an original ending of the text which brought it to a close just after the foundation of Kartasura in AJ 1603 (1680 CE). This was a time when Java was still divided between the new court of Kartasura under Amangkurat II (where Surakarta now stood) and Mataram, where Yogyakarta now stood but where in 1680 the old court of Plered was still occupied by his brother Png. Pugĕr. He lost out in this competition (but 24 years later found better fortune in usurping the throne, becoming Pakubuwana I). Readers were then admonished to consider the date of its completion on Tuesday-Kliwon 19 Muharram AJ 1704 (17 February 1778 CE).

[9] BL Add. MS 12320. Also published in transcription in Pantja Sunjata, Supriyanto and Ras, ed. and translit., *Babad Kraton*.

If Jayengrat was searching for a precedent favourable to Yogyakarta in AJ 1703–4, it must soon have been realised that this first ending in *Babad Kraton* in AJ 1603/1680 CE was an uncomfortable one. It was a precedent for a divided, not a unified, kingdom, and for a temporary partition which ended with the victory of the Kartasura side over that of Mataram. So Jayengrat wrote a new final section which would have flowed smoothly from previous pages once the earlier ending was cut out of the MS. By some oversight, however, the earlier ending was never removed, so we have been left with the two endings as evidence of a change of plan. Now the story proceeded to the fall of Kartasura on June 1742 CE, equivalent to 25 Rabingulakir AJ 1667—over 30 years before its prophesied time, to be sure, but offering a better precedent for Yogyakarta in 1778 CE. Indeed, Jayengrat completed this new ending on 25 Rabingulakir AJ 1704 (23 May 1778 CE), on the very date of the fall of Kartasura 37 AJ years before.[10]

Was *Babad Kraton*'s new ending a way of reconciling the cycle of centuries with the existence of the court of Yogyakarta, and thereby legitimising the latter? I think it reasonable to believe that the Yogyakarta *kraton* elite could take the view that the '00–'03 cycle was still working, with its threat of the fall of a *kraton* in AJ 1700 (March 1774–March 1775 CE) and the founding of another in AJ 1703 (February 1777–January 1778 CE). On the 25th of Ruwah in the latter year (28 September 1777 CE), just when a new court should have been founded, *Babad Kraton* began to be written. The *babad* now ended with the fall of Kartasura in Rabingulakir 1704, even on the same date (25 Rabingulakir AJ 1704; 23 May 1778 CE) as the fall of Kartasura 37 years before. The implication seems to be that, in a universal history of the courts of Java written at a crucial time in the transition from the 17th to the 18th century AJ, the fall of Kartasura could be taken as the last major court to fall—as indeed it should have been. Although it was well known that Kartasura had in fact perversely fallen 37 AJ years before its due time, it had nevertheless fallen. And by omitting all events thereafter—above all by omitting the founding of Surakarta—the view could be taken that Yogyakarta was its successor. The new ending implied that, in the

[10] There is a one-day internal discrepancy in the date of the kind that is not uncommon in this period. See Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 216n92.

new century, when a new court should have been founded, Yogyakarta stood in Mataram as Kartasura's rightful successor. A precedent for the supernatural legitimacy of Yogyakarta had been found, one buttressed by the real military strength of the Sultan's domains. It did not justify the existence of two *kratons*. Rather, the *babad* ignored that. The cycle was intact, although its observance in *Babad Kraton* lacked the verve, flamboyance and mystical subtleties of *Surya Raja*, which had greeted the start of this threatening calendrical transition in Yogyakarta.

We have no evidence of such literary activity from the court of Surakarta in these years. Something may yet come to light, but it is more likely that Pakubuwana III's *kraton* felt no need to struggle with the issue of its legitimacy. It was clearly the heir to Kartasura, founded after its fall and still standing where it was founded in 1774–78, having narrowly escaped collapse during the Third Javanese War of Succession.

For Mangkunagara, this was a curious time. He did not control a *kraton*, so in a sense a cycle of *kraton* succession had nothing to do with him. He must have felt uncomfortably sidelined and reminded of his secondary status by the negotiations that led to the new land and legal settlements between Surakarta and Yogyakarta, and by courtiers' discussions of the century cycle. In all societies, of course, people tend to see time as correlative to the entirely artificial numbers we use in counting its passage. Even without a formal cycle such as we have discussed in Java, the change of centuries tends to carry with it an expectation of changes in society. We should not be surprised, therefore, that Mangkunagara, too, displayed concern for what the new century might mean for him and his principality.

Mangkunagara Looking Back and Looking Forward as the Centuries Changed

In mid-1695 AJ (October 1769 CE) Mangkunagara set out to write a history which would lead to an explanation not of how *kratons* might change, but rather of how history more broadly flowed, ending in his own experiences in rebellion and where he stood when the new century opened.

Javanese historical traditions recognised two lines of royal descent beginning in mythical times, the right (*panĕngĕn*) and the left (*pangiwa*). The former began with Adam and Islamic figures, the latter with Hindu-Javanese gods and notables. In this MS, Mangkunagara

described both lineages. The main part of the volume says clearly that it was written by Mangkunagara himself, and it seems that it is indeed in his own hand. It looks like the draft of a work, with blank pages, various notes and other interruptions, suggesting that it awaited the professional copying skills of the ladies in Mangkunagara's scriptorium. On the other hand, it already has coloured decorations on headings (known as *pada*, "foot" in Javanese literature), perhaps done by Mangkunagara himself as he went along.

The first text in the volume[11] is in verse and called *Sějarah wiwit Nabi Adam dumugi ratu-ratu tanah Jawi* [History from the Prophet Adam to the Kings of Java]. It opens with the date when its writing was begun on Thursday-Kliwon, 10 Jumadilakir, *mongsa* Katiga, Dal AJ 1695 (12 October 1769 CE). The year is expressed in the chronogram *tata trus rasa tunggal*: "always in order, feeling as one"; the choice of words here perhaps reflected how Mangkunagara thought his relationship with Pakubuwana III should be: founded on unity of feeling and purpose. The opening also confirms that Mangkunagara wrote the work in Sala (Surakarta). All are admonished to praise God, who loves his servants, cares for his creation and sent his prophets. In the third stanza there is an interruption of two blank pages before the text proceeds to tell of God's creation of the world. This is a standard cosmogony known in Javanese, and other, versions of Sufism. The creation-word (*ěkun*), as prescribed in the scriptures, produced the lamp (*kandil*) hung upon the divine throne, from which a spark fell and created the Prophetic Spirit (*roh nabi*), the origin of the world. This Spirit was the Prophet Adam, the first man, who begat Ěsis. There ends the first short canto of only five stanzas.

The second canto[12] says that from Adam, through his descendants—Ěsis, and 40 more generations to Ngabdulah—to the birth of the Prophet Muhammad passed 7,977 years. Muhammad was the final prophet (*Nabi panutup*). Mangkunagara began a third canto,[13]

[11] MN MS 192 (Florida 222.A), pp. 1–17. The volume is catalogued in Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. ii, pp. 140–2. Florida identifies 13 texts in all in this volume, many of them fragments, some in different hands, some very brief, some upside down and/or added later than MN's time, some in Arabic. Her identification of individual texts in the midst of these confusions is open to discussion.

[12] MN MS 192 (Florida 222.A), pp. 6–9.

[13] Ibid., pp. 9–17. On p. 11 a different hand appears, then there is a blank p. 12, and the original hand—which we believe to be MN's—reappears on p. 13.

beginning with the conventional invocation of God the Compassionate and Merciful (*Bismillah irahman irakim*). Then he set out the names of Adam's descendants: Ĕsis, Yanas, Kenad, Malik, and others, including the Prophets (*nabi*) Ibrahim, Ismangil and others. Again the writing is interrupted by blank pages. It ends abruptly on p. 17, followed by two blank pages; we may conclude that this work was left incomplete at this point.

Mangkunagara then began a new text in prose—perhaps a draft awaiting versification by the lady scribes of his scriptorium.[14] It opens with numerals for the year AJ 1696 (April 1770–April 1771 CE) and the statement *punika sajarah ing tĕdhak-tumĕdhak ing para Nata ing Tanah Jawa sadaya* ("This is the history of the descent of all the Kings of the land of Java"). Here we encounter the left (*pangiwa*) line of descent. It, too, begins with Adam and his son Ĕsis, but then the names are those of Hindu-Javanese and *wayang* figures, eventually the names of the semi-mythical Kings of the Mataram dynasty, followed by historical personages. Thus, we find, among others, such familiar figures from Javanese legendary and semi-legendary history as Nurcaya, Nurasa, Sang Yyang Wĕning, Guru, Brama, Abiyasa, Arjuna, (A)Bimanyu, Parikĕsit, Udayana, Sang Jayabaya, the Kings of Janggala and Kediri, Panji, Banjaransari, the King of Pajajaran, R. Susuruh who established Majapahit, Brawijaya who was its last King, Nyai Agung Tarub, Nawangsih, Ki Agĕng Tarub, Bondhan Kajawan, Ki Lĕmbupĕtĕng and Ki Agĕng Sela (the progenitor of the dynasty, whose grave Mangkunagara's troops desecrated in 1754, as we saw on pp. 162–3 above).

Mangkunagara then went on to the history of the Mataram dynasty, growing more detailed as his text advanced in time, but always far more concise than the fully fledged *babads* which have been the mainstays of this book. He lists Ki Pamanahan, who became Ki Agĕng Mataram, the founder of the dynasty in its geographical heartland. He was succeeded by Senapati Ingalaga (r. c. 1584–1601), then by Seda Krapyak (c. 1601–13, the year his reign ended being known with confidence). Then Mangkunagara named the greatest of the Mataram Kings, Sultan Agung (r. 1613–46): "at that time Java was all under control, and he went on the pilgrimage to Mecca"—which he did not do—"who had his *kraton* at Plered"—which was

[14] Ibid., pp. 20–38.

also wrong: his court was at Karta—"and is buried at Imogiri".[15] He was succeeded by the last King to rule in the Mataram district, Amangkurat I ("he who is buried at Tĕgalwangi").[16] The fall of Plered to Trunajaya's Madurese is dated on the eve of Sunday, 18 Mulud, a year Be, *sirna ilang rasaning rat* ("gone, destroyed, the feeling of the world", AJ 1600, equivalent to 21 May 1677 CE). This is the date usually given in 18th-century Javanese *babads* and was central to the Javanese elite's perception of the century cycle of *kratons*. The date itself has some internal complications about it, however, and there are problems with its accuracy. De Graaf concluded that the kraton probably fell in late June 1677.[17] Nevertheless, it was the date which Mangkunagara inherited in his historical traditions.

There follows a brief account of Amangkurat II's occupation of the new court of Kartasura, followed by his death and burial at Imogiri. Then occurred the First Javanese War of Succession (1704–8 CE), briefly told and ending with Pakubuwana I on the throne, with the help of the Dutch. Nearing his own family history, Mangkunagara now wrote that Pakubuwana I begat Sunan Amangkurat IV and, among others, Princes Purbaya and Blitar. Amangkurat IV's son was Pakubuwana II, who was buried at Laweyan but "who has already been moved and laid to rest at Imogiri",[18] confirming that this transfer from the wartime grave to the royal graves of Imogiri had taken place by AJ 1696 (April 1770–April 1771 CE).

Then Mangkunagara proceeded to his own lifetime. He used the terms he always used for his father and himself—Pangeran Arya for his father Mangkunagara the Elder, and Pangeran Dipati for himself. He depicted briefly but clearly the good and ill fortune he believed

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[15] Ibid., p. 26: *Kaj*ĕ*ng Sultan i[ng] Mataram,, inggih punika nagri Jawi sampun radin, sadaya sarta mĕgah* [sic; meaning *minggah*] *kaji dhat*ĕ*ng M*ĕ*kah,, i[ng]kang ngadhaton i[ng] Palered //0// sumare ing Magiri*. The double commas in this and following quotations replicate a standard form of punctuation in Javanese. Note MN's idiosyncratic spellings found throughout the MS. While Sultan Agung did not go to Mecca himself, he did evidently send others there on his behalf; H.J. de Graaf, *De regering van Sultan Agung, vorst van Mataram 1613–1645* [sic]*, en die van zijn voorganger Panembahan Séda-ing-Krapjak 1601–1613*, *VKI* Vol. 23 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), pp. 266–7.

[16] Ibid., pp. 26–7: *ingkang sumare ing i[ng] T*ĕ*nggalwangi*.

[17] See Ricklefs, *Tradition*, pp. 184–6.

[18] MN MS 192 (Florida 222.A), p. 29: *Sunan Pakubuwana Seda Lawihyan, nanging sampun dipunalih,, sumare Magiri*.

had attended his life, as he looked back from the turning of the centuries. He referred to his father as Amangkurat IV's eldest son by a secondary wife (*ampeyan*), "Pangeran Arya who died overseas, in Ceylon [Sri Lanka], but who has already been moved and laid to rest in Imogiri, who was sent overseas because he was slandered by his younger brother Susuhunan [Pakubuwana II] who was buried at Laweyan".[19] Amangkurat IV had many children from secondary wives, he wrote, listing Princes Ngabei, Danupaya, Dipanagara and Adiwijaya, who died in war against the Dutch. Then is mentioned Png. Mangkubumi, who became King in Mataram at Kabanaran. Mangkunagara wrote further, mentioning his own mother and father (both lost to him by the time he was two years old, as we saw in Chapter 1, the first by death, the second by exile):

> He [Mangkubumi] was declared King by the son of his elder brother Pangeran Arya who died on Ceylon [Sri Lanka] [i.e., by Mangkunagara himself]. It was a child of Pangeran Blitar [named] Raden Ayu Wulan who was married to this Pangeran Arya and gave birth to him who was named Raden Suryakusuma, then named Pangeran Prangwadana, then named Pangeran Mangkunagara. It was he who declared his uncle Pangeran Mangkubumi to be King.[20]

Mangkunagara then described the final stage of his war experience, beginning with his crushing August 1753 victory over Mangkubumi at Kasatriyan, described on pp. 139–41 above. The defeat which he himself suffered at Tugu in October 1754, which heralded his hardest days, was among the many events that he omitted. This passage gives a succinct description of Mangkunagara's view of how events unfolded and, in the end, the nature of his position in Surakarta. His contempt for Mangkubumi is well illustrated here. The passage is worth quoting in full:

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[19] Ibid., p. 29: *Putra pabajĕng kang sĕpuh,, kang saking ampiyan, Pangeran Arya seda ing sabrang,, Selong,, nanging sampun dipunalih,, sumare Imagiri ,,0,, mila dhumatĕng sabrang dipunpitĕnah,, dening kang rayi Sunan, Seda Lawiyan*. I am not using "sic" at every example of MN's idiosyncratic spellings.

[20] Ibid., p. 30: *kang angkat nata kang putra kang raka Pangeran Arya,, Seda Selong,, patutan saking Pangeran Balitar, Den Ayu Wulan, na krama angsal Pangeran Arya,, apuputra kang nama Raden Suryakusuma,, nu[n]tĕn angalih nama Pangeran Aprangwadana,, nu[n]tĕn agalih nama Pangeran Dipati Mĕngkunagara, punika kang ju[n]jung nata dhatĕng kang paman Pangeran Mangkubumi*.

Then Sunan Mangkubumi went to war against his "son" Pangeran Dipati Mangkunagara in Ponorogo, at Kasatriyan. Sunan Mangkubumi lost the battle. He fled for refuge to and submitted to the Dutch, and was named Sultan in Ngayogya[karta] in Mataram. The land of Java was divided in two by the Company. One half went to the Sultan in Ngayogya[karta] and one half to the son of the King who was laid to rest at Laweyan [i.e., to Pakubuwana III, who was the son of Pakubuwana II], who was named King by the Company, named Raden Mas Suret, a child of the Purbaya line,[21] who reigned in the *kraton* in Sala [Surakarta] and was named Sunan Pakubuwana [III] of Sala. Now, the north coast went to the Dutch entirely, but each year the Company pays for the north coast in advance tens of thousands of young [*reals*]: 10,000 to the Sunan and 10,000 to the Sultan.[22]

Pangeran Arya who died in Ceylon [Sri Lanka] begat Pangeran Dipati Mangkunagara who roamed about, whose foes were the Sultan and the Susunan [*sic*] and the Company, attacked by all three. Eventually Pangeran Dipati Mangkunagara was called by his "younger brother" the Susunan of Sala [Surakarta], because the Sunan [*sic*] in Sala was outdone in competition with his uncle the Sultan of Mataram. So Pangeran Dipati Mangkunagara was prepared to enter the city of Sala [Surakarta]. He was received by the Susunan himself at Tunggon, along with a senior Company officer. Therefore he was prepared to march into the city of Sala to complete the agreement: all swore to this, the senior officer of the Company, secondly the Sunan and thirdly Pangeran Dipati, so that their hearts should be happy. If the Sunan is sick, he [Mangkunagara] also is sick. If the Sunan prospers, he also prospers; if matters should be bitter, then they are bitter for both; if they are sweet, then they are sweet for both: the Sunan in his *kraton* and Pangeran Dipati outside it. Already it is proverbial:

[21] This refers to PB II's marriage at his accession in 1726 (at the age of 16) to the 14-year-old daughter of his uncle Png. Purbaya, subsequently named Ratu Mas or Ratu Kĕncana, arranged in order to fulfil a prophecy of 1720. This marriage produced PB III. See Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, p. 5.

[22] The amount is correct. The Javanese drew a distinction between the Spanish and Dutch *reals*, the former being called the "old" *real* (*reyal sĕpuh*) while the latter was the "young" version, also known as the *rijksdaalder*. See Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, p. 239.

> each takes care for the other and the other takes care for each, together adhering to their word. This was because of God. This was why Pangeran Dipati was prepared to enter the city of Sala.[23]

Then we read the date of the meeting at Tunggon, given correctly as Thursday-Paing, 4 Jumadilakir, Jimakir AJ 1682 (given in numerals rather than a chronogram), equivalent to 24 February 1757 CE. There follows another floral decoration and the observation that when Mangkunagara arrived at Surakarta he was 32 years old and that the Sunan was 27 (two blank pages interrupting these statements). The AJ year 1682 then appears again in a decorated heading, followed by the statement that "Sultan Mangkubumi" of Yogyakarta begat R. Sudara, who became the Crown Prince of Mataram. Another

[23] MN MS 192 (Florida 222.A), pp. 30–4 (I am preserving the idiosyncrasies of MN's spellings here): *anutĕn Sunan Mangkubumi aprang lan kang putra Dipati Mangkunagara,, watĕn i Pranaraga,, Kasatriyan,, kawon aprange Sunan Amangkubumi,, angungsi sarta tundhuk dhatĕng Walandi,, kajĕnĕngakĕn Sultan watĕn i Ngayogya,, Matawis,, nagri Jawi dipunpalih,, ing Kumpni,, kang sapalih Sultan i Ngayogya,, kang sapalih kang putra Sunan Seda Lawiyan,, kajĕnĕngakĕn Nata ing Kumpni,, wasta Raden Mas Suret,, patutan Kapurubayan,, jumĕnĕng ngadhaton ing Sala,, kakasih Sunan Pakubuwana,, ing Sala,, dening nagari pasisir wotĕn ing Walandi,, sadaya,, nanging Kumpni saběn taun angaturi yatra panĕbas ing pasisir,, yatra lĕksa anem,, kang dhatĕ Sunan salĕksa, kang dhatĕng Sultan salĕksa.* [Floral decoration] *Pangeran Arya kang Seda Selong,, apuputra Pangeran Dipati Mĕngkunagara,, kang lalana kang dipunmĕngsah i Sultan, lan Susunan,, lan Kumpni, dikarubut tiga,. ,,0,, ing lami-lami Pangeran Dipati Mĕngkunagara,, dipuntimbali dhatĕng kang rayi Susunan, ning Sala,, sawab Sunan i Sala katit,, amamaru lan kang paman Sultan ni Mataram,, punika Pangeran Dipati Mĕngkunagara purun lumĕbĕt,, ting nagri Sala,, dipunpapag ing Susunan tiyambag, watĕn i Tugon,, lan pangagĕng i Kumpni,, mila kalampahan purun lumĕbĕt nagri Sala dening anĕlasakĕn prajangji,, sami supata,, pangagĕng ing Kumpni kalih Sunan,, katiga Pangeran Dipati ecaa ingkang manah,, Sunan sakit tumuta sakit,, Sunan mukti tumuta mukti,, supami pait sami paitipun,, ing manisipun sami manis,, Kajĕng Sunan ing kadhaton,, Pangeran Dipati jawi,, sampun watĕn paribasan sigen, sinigen,, sami amatĕp pangandika sapisan,, karana Allah,, mila Pangeran Dipati purun alampahi,, lumĕbĕt nagri Sala //0//.* Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. ii, p. 140, says that there is an "apology" for MN's return to Surakarta in 1757 to be found here, which is not the case. She has confirmed (email of 24 May 2017) that she intended "apologia": in MSS over 200 years old we must watch out for scribal errors; in modern computer-created texts we must watch out for feral spell-checkers and impudent auto-correctors.

floral decoration then separates that from another list of family connections, this time starting with Mangkunagara himself, whose son Pangeran Arya Prabu Amijaya was married to a daughter of Pakubuwana III of Surakarta. Prabu Amijaya begat R.M. Sadat, who succeeded to the name and title of Pangeran Prabu Prangwĕdana. Then Pakubuwana's son the Crown Prince of Surakarta is mentioned along with his elevation to that position in the year AJ 1701—a correct date, as we saw above and one that was probably associated with concern about the cycle of centuries in Surakarta.[24]

Here again, as we saw in Mangkunagara's autobiographical *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, he drew a distinction between the settlements of 1755 and 1757. In the former, Mangkubumi first made an agreement with the VOC, which he depicts (in a fashion considerably at odds with the military-political realities of the time) as Mangkubumi surrendering. Thereafter Mangkubumi met with Pakubuwana III. In 1757, however, Mangkunagara was called to Surakarta to "look after" his younger relative Pakubuwana III. A senior Company officer supported their reconciliation. As in his *babad*, he evidently thought the subsequent formal agreement with the VOC at Salatiga not worthy of mention.

At this point—38 pages into this MS—the hand that we believe to be Mangkunagara's own comes to an end. Following notes are in other hands, such as the one that records Mangkunagara's death in Jumadilakir AJ 1722 (December 1795 CE).[25] Most of these notes are related to Islam.[26]

There is, however, one more short fragment by Mangkunagara I himself and again in his hand, bound upside-down and back-to-front. This is an account of *Sipat ing manusya*, the attributes or characters of humankind, solidly located in Javanese Sufi speculative traditions. It is in verse and begins with a declaration of his authorship and of the date of its writing which may evoke the AJ 1701–3 cycle:

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[24] Ibid., pp. 34–8. MN I's grandson R.M. Sadat, who became Png. Prabu Prangwĕdana, ultimately succeeded as MN II (r. 1796–1835). Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 267, gives his name as R.M. Slamĕt rather than Sadat, but I think that we can assume that MN I's contemporary account records a reliable version of the youthful name. The same name is given at the start of MN I's autobiography *SBPn* (passage cited below, p. 267n4).

[25] MN MS 192 (Florida 222.A), p. 38.

[26] See the description of the remaining contents in Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. ii, pp. 141–2.

1. Note: Lord Pangeran Dipati,
when he composed this poem *sipat ing manusya*,
on the spiritual body within the heart,
was on the eve of Saturday,
the 15th of Siyam, the [fasting] month,
in the year Dal,
the chronogram for the year
"three skies were the voice of the earth" [AJ 1703; 18 October 1777 CE].
He was in the city of Surakarta when this was composed,
seated in a gazebo.[27]

The text ends abruptly, clearly incomplete.

This MS gives an invaluable picture—the last one which we can say with reasonable confidence was a product of Mangkunagara's own thinking—of how he looked at his situation. It conveys a historical sense which is consistent with what we have learned from his autobiographical *babad*. Its timing, however, is of interest, although one must take care not to ask the evidence to bear more analysis than it can. The main work's composition, which began in AJ 1695 (October 1769 CE), as the old century was drawing to a close, suggests that Mangkunagara was thinking about his place in the broader sweep of history—in the Islamic world, in the great legendary and semi-historical events of Javanese history, and in his own time—and of where he stood in those grand perspectives as the century drew to a close. In his depiction, he had not surrendered to the Company, as Mangkubumi had, but instead had been called to Surakarta to look after Pakubuwana III, to strengthen the Susuhunan in competition with the Sultan. That the succession in Surakarta was now fixed (barring unforeseen tragedy, of course) by the naming of the new Crown Prince was an event of AJ 1701 (1775 CE) worth recording.

[27] MN MS 192 (Florida 222.A), pp. 151–3 (Dhandhanggula): *1. Pemut Kangjĕng Pangeran Dipati, duk rumpaka sipat ing manusya, badan roh jĕro kalbune, kala ing malĕm Sĕptu, gangsalwĕlas Siyam kang sasi, nuju ing taun Ĕdal, sĕngkalaning taun, tri anggana syaraning rat, watĕn nagri Salakarta duk kinawi, munggeng ing papanggungan*. The date the eve of Saturday (what we would call Friday evening), 15 Siyam Dal AJ 1703, is internally consistent, equivalent to 18 October 1777. The word *anggana* with the value of "0" seems to be a mistake. The words *anggana* and *gana* have the value "6" in chronograms. Since the value has to be "0" to be consistent with the rest of the date, MN must have intended a (perhaps fancified) version of *gagana* (sky, etc.), which has the value "0". *Salakarta* is the version of "Surakarta" common throughout MN's personal writings, notably in his *SBPn*.

And then, when the fasting month of AJ 1703 (October 1777 CE) arrived with neither *kraton* destroyed, no new *kraton* founded and his own position undisturbed, he found the leisure to sit in a gazebo in the grounds of his palace and compose Sufi speculations. For Mangkunagara, as for Pakubuwana III and Sultan Mangkubumi, a potential time of crisis had been managed and passed by in safety. Perhaps these three lords were the "three skies" he had in mind when choosing the chronogram words for AJ 1703 (1777 CE). If so, it was an attempt to ignore the fact that Mangkunagara's metaphorical sky was demonstrably more constricted than those of the Susuhunan and the Sultan.

A *gamĕlan* set in Mangkunagara's palace also suggests that he was bearing the century cycle in mind. *Gamĕlan* orchestras were more than just sources of musical pleasure (although they were, and remain, certainly that). They may have names and may be venerated as sacred *pusakas*. In this case, we find in his palace a *gamĕlan* charmingly named Ky. Kanyut Mesĕm ("Lord Swept along by Smiles"). It is inscribed with the phrase commonly used to describe Mangkunagara I in literary works, *satriya saking lĕlana* ("the warrior prince back from his travels") and the year (AJ) 1700.[28]

As we would expect of our fiery prince, outside the realm of literature and culture he was also active in what we may call the real world—although the distinction was perhaps moot in a society so steeped in ideas of the supernatural. In January 1772 CE (late in AJ 1697), Mangkunagara opened a correspondence with the VOC that soon gave rise to Dutch fears of deadly conspiracy. He thanked Van der Burgh for his New Year wishes but said that he would feel better if Ratu Bĕndara were returned to him. He also asked for help to gain control of certain districts, to compel Mangkubumi to settle a debt which he claimed he was owed (for returning a daughter of the *bupati* of Pekalongan, whom he had captured during the war years) and to regain Magetan. The last had been Ratu Bĕndara's appanage which had returned to her father's control when she divorced Mangkunagara, so these two issues were entangled with each other.[29] Pakubuwana III told the Dutch that he opposed these claims.[30]

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[28] Carey, *Power of Prophecy*, p. 128n3.

[29] MN I, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, 25 Jan. 1772, attached to Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Mar. 1772; Van Straalendorff, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang; all in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).

[30] Van Straalendorff, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, 16 Mar. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).

By March 1772 the Surakarta Resident F.C. van Straalendorff (in office 1767–84) was receiving reports that Mangkunagara was plotting treason. Others were said to be in league with him, among them Tg. Yudanagara, who was the governor of Banyumas and the son of Mangkubumi's *patih* Danurĕja—which made the supposed conspiracy improbable—but he was also the husband of Mangkunagara's daughter Sombro—which lent the idea some credibility. Mangkunagara was also supposed to be conspiring with rebel remnants in Blambangan. Van Straalendorff feared that he would be in personal danger at the *Garĕbĕg Bĕsar* celebrations on the following day (10 Bĕsar AJ 1697, beginning in the evening of 14 March 1772 CE). He decided to feign illness to avoid attending, claiming that he did so on the advice of Pakubuwana III. The Susuhunan, too, declared that he would not attend.[31] Instead, Van Straalendorff sent his hapless adjutant to inform Mangkunagara of this.

> Whereupon the prince had enquiries made (of the adjutant) what he had come to do, whether he was bringing major or minor orders. The adjutant replied that he had to speak with the prince in person. Thereupon he, the adjutant, was obliged to enter [Mangkunagara's palace grounds]. First he had to pass through two rows of pikes, then found the prince dancing all on his own at the front of his people. In the presence of the adjutant, he ordered his people, who were armed with carbines, blunderbusses and pistols, simultaneously to prime their weapons. The aforesaid adjutant then having delivered his message and also having advised that the King would not attend, the prince replied that this was a sudden illness and as it seemed to be so, he said further that he also would not attend, because the King would not attend on his throne.[32]

In the afternoon of 15 March, Van Straalendorff had an audience with Mangkunagara to deliver a letter from Van der Burgh. This told the prince that Van der Burgh would support his requests for the various areas so long as he remained loyal to the VOC. He made it clear to Mangkunagara (or so he told Batavia) that his designs were

[31] Van Straalendorff, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, 13 and 14 Mar. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773); Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Mar. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).

[32] Van Straalendorff, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, 14 Mar. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).

known without being specific, for example by saying that there were persons at the prince's palace with evil intentions to destroy the peace.[33] Mangkunagara undoubtedly knew of the attenuated state of the Company's military and was hardly likely to be intimidated by such a letter. He expressed surprise that the Resident's illness allowed him to deliver this letter in person. Van Straalendorff's accompanying adjutant—having endured the disturbing experience of the previous day at Mangkunagara's palace and evidently lacking any sense of either irony or humour—replied that the Company's orders were to be obeyed whether one was ill or not. Mangkunagara told Van Straalendorff to go home since he wasn't well; he would send his reply in due course. The following day he sent his son with a letter expressing attachment to the Company and thanking Van der Burgh for saying that he would reflect favourably upon Mangkunagara's land claims.[34]

By the following day, Van der Burgh was suspecting that Mangkunagara was in league with Sultan Mangkubumi—as improbable as that was—and that their target was the life of Pakubuwana III. The Resident in Yogyakarta, Jan Lapro (in office 1764–73), with perhaps a cooler head, denied that this was so. One of the reasons for Van der Burgh's panic about a possible Mangkunagara plot was the weakness of the Company's garrison at Semarang. The dragoon company was even devoid of a single officer to command it.[35] In a secret letter of 27 March 1772, Batavia decided that it was necessary to arrest Mangkunagara[36]—perhaps a sensible precaution if seen from the safe distance of Batavia but a risky enterprise for the Company to contemplate on the ground in Central Java.

Spies were sent out to the countryside to see what was afoot, and one supposed conspirator was interrogated. By late March the VOC was concluding that all these rumours were untrue.[37] A cadastrally

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[33] Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Mar. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).
[34] Van Straalendorff, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, 16 Mar. 1772, and MN I, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, received at Semarang 18 Mar. 1772, both in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).
[35] Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Mar. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).
[36] Referred to in Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 5 July 1777, in VOC 3499 (OB 1778).
[37] Lapro, Yogyakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, 26 Mar. and 8 Apr. 1772; Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 Apr. 1772; "Relaas van den Samarangsche mantrie Kieij Kerti Djoijo & Kerta Nadie", 9 Apr. 1772; Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1772; all in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).

confused and much peeved Governor Van der Burgh told off Van Straalendorff for not telling him at the start that Magetan was the Sultan's land. Had he known so, he said, he would not have promised Mangkunagara that he would help him to gain control of it.[38] Utterly disingenuously, Mangkunagara himself protested that he had not known this, either. The very picture of innocence, he wrote, "I have been not a little disturbed by the gossip going around among the people and I have no doubt that the Company will have heard these rumours, too. They are all untrue. I rely entirely on the Company for it is my father and mother in life and death." He finished his letter with a request that he might be free to attend or not to attend upon Pakubuwana III, contrary to his commitments of 1757 to appear at court on particular days.[39] He was learning one avenue to manipulating his new political environment: tease and worry the Company's officers, making them nervous about what he might be up to, while protesting his attachment and seeking to gain his objectives with their support. The brouhaha was all over by April 1772. One cannot, however, avoid the suspicion—given what we know of Mangkunagara's character and history—that something was probably afoot, that some possibility was being tested and probed. Van der Burgh wrote that "sooner or later" Mangkunagara would run riot (*uitspatten*): although he had given signs of friendliness, that was not to be relied upon.[40] Despite the VOC's understandable concerns, Mangkunagara must have been beginning to realise—if he had not done so before—how serious were the constraints upon his freedom of action.

In about May 1772, two pilgrims (*haji*) returned from Mecca to Surakarta, where one died. Among his possessions were three letters which seemed to be addressed to the Susuhunan, the Sultan and Mangkunagara.[41] They urged them to defend Islam against infidels. The writer seemed rather confused about the political structures and titles of the Javanese potentates. The letters' most significant aspects

[38] Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Van Straalendorff, Surakarta, 4 Apr. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).
[39] MN I, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, received at Semarang 12 Apr. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).
[40] Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).
[41] English translation of the Dutch translation from the Arabic letters is in Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 151–2; and in Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis*, p. 172.

were two. First, the author was identified (in the Dutch translation via the Javanese from the Arabic) as *den Palembangar Abdul Samat thans te Mecca* (Palembang person Abdul Samat now in Mecca). This was clearly a reference to one of the foremost leaders of Sufi-based revival movements in the Indonesian archipelago and a confirmed enemy of European *kafirs*, the renowned Sumatran Sufi ʻAbd al-Samad al-Palimbani (c. 1702–89).[42] Thus, this was no trivial correspondent.[43] Second, the most incendiary of the letters was addressed to Mangkunagara—called Pakunagara in the address but Mangkunagara in the text—clearly urging him to consider Holy War. It was accompanied by an amulet (*jimat*) in the form of a battle standard promising to guarantee victory over his enemies. It is not clear, however, whether Mangkunagara knew anything about these letters or the flag. They were confiscated by the Surakarta *patih* R. Ad. Sasradiningrat (in office 1770–82), given secretly (so the Dutch reported) to Van Straalendorff, translated from the Arabic into Javanese by the translator Kartabasa, from that version into Dutch by one of the VOC's translators, and finally burned, along with the *jimat*.[44] This letter does, however, at least suggest that Mangkunagara's reputation as a devout Muslim and fearsome warrior was known in senior circles in Mecca. And he may have known something of the letters, for the second returning *haji* survived. This was one Muhammad Idris, who had been sent to Mecca on behalf of Sultan Mangkubumi. There he

[42] See P. Voorhoeve, "ʻAbd al-Ṣamad b. ʻAbd Allāh al-Palimbānī", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New [2nd] Edition*, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, P. Bearman et al., Vol. i, p. 92; Azyumardi Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern* ʻulamāʼ *in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Crows Nest and Honolulu: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin and University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2004), pp. 112–4; G.W.J. Drewes, ed. and transl., *Directions for Travellers on the Mystic Path: Zakariyyāʼ al-Anṣārī's* Kitāb Fatḥ al-Raḥmān *and Its Indonesian Adaptations, with an Appendix on Palembang Manuscripts and Authors*, *VKI*, Vol. 81 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 222–4.

[43] At one point in this document, there is reference to the writer as Seh Muhammad. In the original Arabic text, this may have been a reference to Muhammad al-Samman, ʻAbd al-Samad al-Palimbani's teacher and the founder of Sammaniyya Sufi order; see Voorhoeve, "ʻAbd al-Ṣamad b. ʻAbd Allāh al-Palimbānī".

[44] Arabic letters seen at Semarang, 22 May 1772; Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 3 June and 22 Aug. 1772; all in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).

indeed studied with ʻAbd al-Samad al-Palimbani. He returned safely to Yogyakarta and became a senior religious figure at the Sultan's court.[45]

Van der Burgh made the customary trip to the courts as the VOC's new governor of the northeast coast in July and August 1772.[46] At his first interview with Pakubuwana III he was treated to the Susuhunan's complaints against Mangkunagara. He said that Mangkunagara failed to show him the appropriate respect and that for nearly seven years he had not attended at court or on the *alun-alun* on the allotted days, as agreed in 1757. Furthermore, if Mangkunagara did appear at the *kraton* or the Company's Residency building, he took an armed entourage far greater than he was allowed. Van der Burgh was asked to bring Mangkunagara to heel, a task the Company had found singularly difficult for the last three decades.

When told of the *kraton*'s complaints against him, Mangkunagara reciprocated with his own objections. He claimed that Pakubuwana III and his senior ministers took no note of his status, ancestry and age—thereby asserting again (1) his unparalleled standing in the Surakarta hierarchy as *pangeran miji*, directly called to the service of the Susuhunan, as we saw in Chapter 6; (2) his descent from his storied and unjustly exiled father Mangkunagara the Elder; and (3) his seniority in age to the Susuhunan. Instead, they subjected him to frequent minor insults, he said, attempting to bring him into disrepute with the masses. Van der Burgh spoke to him of his oath of submission to Pakubuwana III and the VOC in 1757.

> Whereupon he first movingly lamented his loss of Ratu Bĕndara, as well as his and his family's unhappy lot. As further extenuation, he said that not a single one of the points now brought against him had been put to him before. Instead, shortly after the loss of his wife [Ratu Bĕndara], he was given permission to attend at court or not, at his discretion.

[45] Peter Carey, "Satria and Santri: Some Notes on the Relationship between Dipanagara's Kraton and Religious Supporters during the Java War", in *Dari babad dan hikayat sampai sejarah kritis: Kumpulan karangan dipersembahkan kepada Prof. Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo*, ed. T. Ibrahim Alfian et al. (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1987), p. 314.

[46] The following account of this trip rests upon Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 28 Aug. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).

Mangkunagara reasserted his loyalty to the VOC, even claiming that in 1757 he would rather have come to terms with the Company than with either Javanese monarch—a view rather at conflict with the evidence from the time. He then asked that he retain the right he claimed, to appear or not at court on audience days at his discretion. This would have confirmed, perhaps even reinforced, his senior standing as the sole *pangeran miji*. Van der Burgh said that this request would not be granted. The prince thereupon said that he relied more and more on the Company's protection and favour "for himself and especially for his children"—a sign that Mangkunagara, like his contemporary monarchs, had an eye on the future. He asked also that Ratu Bĕndara return to him (he must have known even as he spoke that this was impossible), that the Susuhunan and his senior officers show him greater respect, and that they and the VOC Resident approach him cordially if they had complaints before drawing negative conclusions about him. On audience days, the Susuhunan should publicly recognise Mangkunagara's standing above all others. Finally, he asked for two areas in the Susuhunan's lands to come under his authority so as to increase his income.[47] Van der Burgh told Mangkunagara that if he would attend at regular court gatherings; appear with an entourage no greater than his status allowed (a matter

[47] These are called, in the Dutch documentation, *Panjerlan en Pamadijn*. We may guess that the first is a misunderstanding of the Javanese *Panjer lan*, i.e., "Panjĕr and". Panjer is the name of two villages; the relevant one is evidently that in *kecamatan* and district Kebumen, Bagelen. But it is also possible that "Panjĕr" is what would now be called Banjar, just as 18th-century "Pagĕlen" is the current Bagelen. Schoel, *Alph. register*, pp. 42–6, lists ten places called Banjar and, in all, over 150 with that name or a variation of it. There are also two places called Pamarden (or Merden); the relevant one must be that in district Prembun, also in *Kabupaten* Kebumen, Bagelen (Schoel, *Alph. register*, pp. 233, 270). How much of an enlargement of MN's domains this represented is difficult to know. A list of households (*cacah*) in dJ xi, pp. liv–lvi, based on 1774 figures, gives 504 for Pamarden, but that is said to be the modern district Kalirejo in Banyumas, not Bagelen. It also gives a "Banjar, contemporary regency of Banjar Negoro, Residency Banyumas" with 1,180 *cacahs*. Bertram Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke* (2 vols; The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955–7), Vol. 2, pp. 366–7, gives a version of the same list, with Pamĕrden at 504 and "Panjĕr (?)" at 1,180. Ann Kumar, "Javanese Court Society and Politics in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Record of a Lady Soldier. Part I: The Religious, Social, and Economic Life of the Court", *Indonesia* 29 (Apr. 1980): 27, cites the Schrieke version and ignores the complications.

which, I think, had never been regulated before)[48] and, above all, with no more armed followers without special permission; be satisfied with a grant of the two villages; give up claims on the Sultan's land of Magetan; and abandon a claim for 200 Spanish *reals* annually for having released the daughter of the governor of Pekalongan, whom he had captured, then Van der Burgh would do his best to satisfy him on the other matters under dispute, which were largely matters of public protocol. Mangkunagara agreed and repeated these pledges before the Susuhunan, the Resident and other dignitaries. Pakubuwana III promptly placed the two villages under Mangkunagara's control. A separate matter was also settled during Van der Burgh's visit: a daughter of Rongga Prawiradirja, Sultan Mangkubumi's brother-in-law, senior military commander and head of the eastern outer districts (*moncanĕgara*), had fled from Yogyakarta and taken refuge with Mangkunagara, for reasons which are not clear. She was returned to Yogyakarta.

For Mangkunagara, the whole process of seeking Dutch support and publicly making pledges in the presence of the VOC must have been deeply humiliating. When he wrote fawning letters to the Company while at war, neither side gave them much regard. Now, however, he was composing menial epistles seeking to enlist the VOC as his guarantor in an environment where he could no longer rely on much domestic support, even from the Susuhunan, unless the VOC backed him. But such were the practical realities for a prince living in Java at peace, even one as flamboyant, independent-minded and vital as Mangkunagara. Peaceful living was also taking another toll. In 1771 Van der Burgh described Mangkunagara as 46 years of age [correct in AJ years], "still strong but very heavy in bodily constitution".[49] No doubt a princely diet coupled with relative inactivity was to blame.

By late 1774 CE (AJ 1700), however, to Mangkunagara's humiliations and increasing corpulence, there was added illness—perhaps the yaws infection discussed in the next chapter—just at the time when Javanese traditions predicted that momentous dynastic changes

[48] The matter remained vague. In the written form of the final agreement, MN promised to be accompanied by no greater entourage than "old Javanese usage permits"; the agreement, dated 17 July 1772, is attached to Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 28 Aug. 1772, in VOC 3364 (OB 1773).
[49] Van der Burgh, *Memorie*, 29 July 1771, in dJ xi, p. 169.

were possible. Van der Burgh was not confident that Mangkunagara would live much longer. It was more to this illness than to any natural inclination that he ascribed the prince's quiet conduct and evident satisfaction with his status at court.[50]

So for Mangkunagara, as for Pakubuwana III and Mangkubumi, the question of succession loomed large. The principal difference between the prince and the two sovereigns was that he was not an equal ruler of Java. He had a palace, not a *kraton*, and there had been no determination by anyone that his domains and status would descend to his heirs. He wrote twice to Van der Burgh in late 1774 CE (Ruwah AJ 1700—the month when Mangkunagara turned 50) asking that the VOC should look after his children and grandchildren. At the head of a list of his children—consisting of 16 sons and 15 daughters—he mentioned "Png. Ar. Prabu Amijaya, 24 years old. Of him I ask the Company that he may assume my place." He asked for others to be placed in positions in VOC-held territory and that two of his daughters be married to the heads of areas under VOC authority on the coast. Van der Burgh advised Batavia that Pakubuwana III would never agree to Mangkunagara's title of Pangeran Adipati or his domains—all of which were carved out of Surakarta territories—being handed down to his descendants. Nor was the Company prepared to place his sons in Company territories. Van der Burgh did, however, arrange the marriage of Mangkunagara's daughters as requested in early 1775. For the rest, Mangkunagara was told that he should be satisfied with the assurances of the Company's goodwill that he had already received.[51] Such were the circumstances in which the fearsome warrior now found himself,

[50] Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1774, in VOC 3445 (OB 1776).
[51] MN I, Surakarta, to Van den Burgh, Semarang, received 23 Oct. 1774; Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1774 and 17 Apr. 1775; List of children of MN I, received Semarang 28 Dec. 1774; all in VOC 3445 (OB 1776). Also Batavia to H.XVII, 30 Dec. 1775, in dJ xi, p. 283; Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1775, in VOC 3470 (OB 1777). According to Van der Burgh, MN's daughter R. Aj. Soblĕm (aged 12) was promised to the *bupati* of Jepara, Tg. Citrasoma, while R. Aj. Srĕndĕl (aged ten) was married to a son of the lord of Pati, Citradiwirya, named R. Ng. Mangkukusuma. Citrasoma died in late 1776; Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 15 Mar. 1777, in VOC 3499 (OB 1778). Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 268, records that Soblĕm was married to the *bupati* of Tegal named Rĕksanagara; this was presumably the necessary subsequent marriage. These were undoubtedly "hung marriages" in 1775.

that even the VOC, with its slender military resources, could tell him what to do.

Mangkunagara's son Prabu Amijaya was just 24 years old in AJ 1700, i.e., three *windus* (eight-year cycles), as was the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta, an age which seems to have been regarded in princely circles as equivalent to what we would call his majority. Mangkunagara was clearly seeking a promise that the Company would support his domain passing to his son. He possibly meant that Prabu Amijaya should be formally recognised as his successor and perhaps even that he succeed then, in AJ 1700. He got no such assurance. Nevertheless, Mangkunagara responded to all of this as if he had received much more than in fact he had. He wrote to Van der Burgh expressing his thanks and attachment to the VOC. He went on, as if he had received some new confirmation of his standing:

> It is true that when I was still roaming about I had the titles of Pangeran and Dipati, but they were then of no use to me. But now that I am finally confirmed in those titles and protected therein, I find that things are going rather better with me than before.

He closed his letter with a request for 400 Spanish *reals*.[52] He also wrote directly to the governor general in the same terms, adding that now that he was confirmed and protected in his rank (*waardigheijd*), he not only felt better but "trust that when one day I die, my children shall succeed me".[53] No such assurance had been given.

The Company could see that the status—inheritable or non-inheritable—of the Mangkunagaran domains was likely to be an ongoing issue and that Mangkunagara himself might still become a destabilising player, upsetting the regularity that was progressively attending Central Java's state structures. Batavia was particularly concerned about what might happen if Pakubuwana III or Sultan Mangkubumi should die before Mangkunagara. The potential for a *putsch* by him in such circumstances must have caused bad nights of sleep in Dutch quarters, given the weakness of the Company's forces and the ever-volatile nature of the prince. On 27 November 1772,

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[52] MN I, Surakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, received 11 Apr. 1775, in VOC 3445 (OB 1776).
[53] MN I, Surakarta, to GG, Batavia, in VOC 3445 (OB 1776) under date 11 Apr. 1775.

the governor general and Council of the Indies had therefore taken formal decisions about the succession in Surakarta and Yogyakarta, sent to Van der Burgh in sealed envelopes that were not to be opened except in the case of serious illness or death of one of the monarchs. These letters are no longer to be found, it seems.[54]

As the potentially threatening period AJ 1701–3 came to an end in January 1778 CE, there had been no change of *kratons* as the century cycle predicted. The two principal courts had taken various measures to protect themselves and, in doing so, acted to strengthen the partition of the Mataram kingdom between themselves.

Mangkunagara had taken several steps, too, to persuade himself and others of his place in history as a warrior, as the most senior prince of Surakarta, and as a literary and Sufi figure of note. As humiliating as it must have been, he had also sought assurances of VOC protection in his position and of its inheritability. He got no unconditional assurances in this regard, and his pretence that he had must have been as transparently empty to Mangkunagara himself as it was to the Company.

A potentially threatening time had passed. Mangkunagara was arguably in a worse position than he had been in 1757, or certainly than he might then have expected to be, 20 years after settling in Surakarta. It his hardly surprising that others remained nervous about what he might do in response to that discomfiting truth.

[54] Batavia to H.XVII, 31 Dec. 1772, in dJ xi, p. 336 and note 2 on that page.

9

Mangkunagara's Later Years: Piety, the Arts, Illness and Loss, c. 1779–88[1]

As the years passed, Mangkunagara became progressively more sidelined from affairs of state. He had settled in Surakarta in 1757, as he understood it, to "look after" (*momong*) the young Susuhunan Pakubuwana III in his competition with Sultan Mangkubumi. As the Susuhunan grew older, more experienced and more confident, however, this was an understanding increasingly at variance with reality. It became even more detached from reality as there came to power both in Surakarta and in Yogyakarta a younger generation of aristocrats. Except for the Crown Prince (later Sultan Haměngkubuwana II) of Yogyakarta, who was born c. 1749–50, the younger generation had never seen Java mired in civil war, not even as children. They had never observed VOC forces on the march or Mangkunagara's and Mangkubumi's martial capacities on bloody display. These young aristocrats were more schooled in court intrigues and the arts of the bedchamber than in the arts of war. They were aware of the VOC's declining condition and had little reason to take the Company seriously in their calculations. To them, the ageing Mangkunagara's

[1] The general background narrative in this chapter rests upon my book *Jogjakarta*, Chapter 8. Other sources, particularly those relating directly to MN I's experiences, new evidence not previously published, or direct quotations will be footnoted in this chapter.

position as the senior *pangeran miji* in Surakarta was an anomaly, something that would come to an end when he died.

Recognising this, Mangkunagara evidently drew the conclusion that he could only achieve his last remaining objective—to secure his principality for his heirs—by courting the favour of the VOC. The Company, for its part, could see the benefits such an alliance would bring, as the Europeans tried to balance the interests of the Susuhunan and the Sultan in ways that would benefit the Company, while facing the reality of the VOC's decline. Mangkunagara's fearsome reputation from earlier years was no doubt more alive—and therefore more politically efficacious—in the minds of Company officers than was the case with younger Javanese aristocrats. Thus it was that the Company's great and bitter enemy of the war years became in the end the Europeans' reliable ally in Central Javanese affairs. As already noted in Chapter 2, Javanese leaders were guided as much as European ones by the sentiments that inspired Viscount Palmerston's famous description of British policy in 1844, that "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies" but only "interests", which were "eternal and perpetual". Nevertheless, for Mangkunagara this calculation of realpolitik must have been a bitter pill to swallow. He did not know how close he would come to being declared Susuhunan of Surakarta in 1790.

Perhaps it was because of Mangkunagara's awareness of passing time and of how far he was now removed from past adventures and high dramas that his 55th birthday (in the Javanese calendar) was something of a turning point for him. This fell in the month of Ruwah AJ 1705. We know that he was born on 4 Ruwah in AJ 1650 (7 April 1726) so can date his 55th birthday more precisely on 4 Ruwah in AJ 1705, equivalent to 17 August 1779.[2] It was then that the copy was made of his autobiographical *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, the work that described the war years in vivid detail and which has so enriched Part 1 of this book. As noted in Chapter 7, its opening used characteristic terms marking it as a product of the scriptorium in the female soldier's quarters.[3] Its first stanzas, after giving Mangkunagara's age, described Mangkunagara's generosity to all of his courtiers and officials, male and female, and to the religious scholars (*ulama*) and (*santri*): "none was bypassed". It then reflected the

[2] Ricklefs, "Origin of Prince Mangkunagara I's Appellation", p. 545.
[3] The Javanese text is cited on p. 208n12.

changing dynamics in his family, specifically the sidelining of his son Prabu Amijaya, who was not mentioned. Instead, Mangkunagara's grandson R.M. Sadat was named and his age given as 12 at that time.[4] In this way, this copy of the autobiography looked both back upon Mangkunagara's greatest years and forward to the hoped-for succession of his grandson. In fact, the former was now rather far in the past and the latter was far from assured in the future. Meanwhile, the present was full of disappointments.

Humiliations and Illness

Among the humiliations that Mangkunagara had to suffer in these years was the defection of subjects from his domain to Mangkubumi's. Sometimes the traffic was in the other direction, but the majority of defections was from Mangkunagara to Yogyakarta. The defectors included musicians and *dhalangs* (puppeteers), the latter being people of particular significance, for the *wayang* puppeteers of Java were believed to bear supernatural powers. The motivation for these defections is not clear in the sources, and we are obliged to speculate about them. We may reasonably think, however, that they arose mainly from two interconnected root causes, both of which reflected Mangkunagara's secondary and restricted status. First, his lands and consequent income were far smaller in scale than that of the Sultan or Susuhunan, so dependants may have found more lucrative positions in Yogyakarta.[5] Connected with that, Mangkunagara's constricted income, lesser status and necessarily more modest display of grandeur when compared to that of the Sultan may have impelled some followers to seek the greater legitimacy and brighter lights of the Sultan's court.

There were also people who moved between the Sultan's and the Susuhunan's courts, but they were returned readily to their

[4] A second grandson, R.M. Subadya, then aged 11, was also mentioned. *SBPn* f. 1 v. Canto 1 (Dhandhanggula): 2. … *sasab lawon pan agung/myang jajagit tanapi dhuwit, dinum mapan warata, sakawulanipun, wong estri jalu sadaya, myang bĕbĕkĕl, ulama myang pana* [sic, i.e., *para*] *santri, tanana kaliwatan.* 3. *Raden Mas Sadat Arwah kang sasi, ingkang yusya kalihwĕlas warsya, Raden Subadya yusyane, nĕnggih sawĕlas taunya,*….

[5] A point that Kumar is right to make in her "Javanese Court Society", Part 1, pp. 20, 35.

former overlords. When Van der Burgh asked Mangkubumi to return several of Mangkunagara's subjects, however, he refused. "I can't agree to this," he wrote, "for you and the Company know well enough what trouble there is between me and Mangkunagara."[6] Mangkubumi subsequently suggested that Mangkunagara should come to visit him in Yogyakarta for one or two nights "in order to renew the old friendship". "I don't think this is advisable," wrote Van der Burgh (an understatement, to say the least), fearing that there was "a snake in the grass" behind this proposal. Mangkunagara said that he would rather die than swear loyalty to the Sultan.[7] Had he gone to Yogyakarta he might have been obliged to endure both. Two young trumpeters who subsequently fled from Mangkunagara to Yogyakarta were, however, put out of the Sultan's court but not actually turned over to the VOC or Mangkunagara. The Company went in search of them.[8]

In 1780 Van der Burgh advised his successor as governor of the northeast coast, Johannes Siberg (in office 1780–87), with regard to Mangkunagara, "It is not evident to me that he is guilty of all that the Mataram [i.e., Yogyakarta] court has accused him of and blames him for from time to time. And I am speaking from personal knowledge to the contrary."[9]

Mangkunagara's son Prince Prabu Amijaya, whom Mangkunagara had once sought to have confirmed as his successor, was in an even more anomalous position than his father. By normal Javanese rules of declining aristocracy at each generation, his claim even to the Pangeran title might have been questioned by others. His conduct was also giving rise to concerns. We saw in the preceding chapter that in 1774 CE (Ruwah AJ 1700, the month when Mangkunagara turned 50), Mangkunagara had asked the Company to confirm him as successor. But five years later, as we noted above, at the start of the 1779 copy of *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, he was not even mentioned.

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[6] "… weetende broeder benevens de Compagnie immers wel, wat tusschen mij en Mancoenagara hapert"; HB I, Yogyakarta, to Van der Burgh, Semarang, 15 Rĕjĕb Wawu 1705/29 July 1779, in VOC 3556 (OB 1780).

[7] Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 Aug. 1779, in VOC 2556 (OB 1780).

[8] Van Rhijn, Yogyakarta, to Siberg, Semarang, 7 Nov. 1780, and Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Dec. 1780, both in VOC 3586 (OB 1781); Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1781, in VOC 3602 (OB 1782).

[9] Van der Burgh, *Memorie*, 19 Sept. 1780, in dJ xi, p. 406.

The details of his activities are not clear, but in 1782 Siberg ordered the Resident at Surakarta, F.C. van Straalendorff, to keep an eye on this "bad and evil subject … although he is currently behaving calmly".[10]

Mangkunagara's hopes for the future now focussed on his grandson R.M. Sadat. In 1780 he wished him to be raised to the level of a prince (again, rather a stretch of the normal rules of aristocracy, so this was a confirmation of Mangkunagara's special standing) with the name Surya Mataram ("Sun of Mataram"), a grand name not previously known. The Dutch feared that this would give offence and raise suspicions in Yogyakarta, so they intervened. Siberg asked Mangkunagara to find another name for his grandson. This happened, but I am not clear what name or title he used instead at this time; in 1788 he was renamed Prabu (sometimes Surya) Prangwadana (or Prangwĕdana) and ultimately succeeded as Mangkunagara II (r. 1796–1835). There was not yet, however, any confirmation of such a succession. Instead, Siberg assured Mangkunagara that he would support the prince's most recent will, passing his goods—including his palace—to this grandson, but told him that this could not include the lands and people he held as a fief from Pakubuwana III. Mangkunagara accepted this.[11]

Not long thereafter, Mangkunagara conceived the bizarre idea of marrying the elderly widow of the grandfather of the current Sultan of Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan). The Dutch opposed this, it all seemed quite mad, and nothing came of the matter. It seems that Mangkunagara thought she would bring significant wealth as a dowry, but the VOC told him that she had little money. He accepted this advice and professed extravagant loyalty and affection for the Company.[12] In other family and marriage matters, however, things were going somewhat better for Mangkunagara.

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[10] Siberg, Semarang, Eerbiedig antwoord, to Batavia, 9 Feb. 1782, in VOC 3627 (OB 1783).

[11] MN I, Surakarta, to Siberg, Semarang, received 18 Oct. 1780; Siberg, Semarang, to MN I, Surakarta, 30 Oct. 1780; Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Dec. 1780; all in VOC 3586 (OB 1781).

[12] MN I, Surakarta, to Siberg, Semarang, received 31 Jan. 1781; MN I, Surakarta, to Siberg, Semarang, received 17 Feb. 1781; Siberg, Semarang, to MN I, Surakarta, 20 Feb. 1781; Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 15 Mar. 1781 and 5 Sept. 1781 (also in dJ xii, pp. 1–6); all in VOC 3602 (OB 1782).

When Pakubuwana III's Queen Ratu Kĕncana gave birth to a son in early 1780, the Susuhunan took a step common in aristocratic circles in giving the child to another household to raise, in this case to Mangkunagara.[13] We may assume that this reflected positive relations between them. Pakubuwana III also gave a position to one of Mangkunagara's sons under the office of the Crown Prince, gave appanages to two other sons, and allowed the marriage of yet another to one of his own daughters. All of these arrangements provided independent incomes to Mangkunagara's sons and thus relieved some of the financial pressures facing him, while also binding him and his family closer to the political status quo.[14]

Between Mangkunagara and Sultan Mangkubumi, however, there were no such positive relations. This drove Mangkunagara and the VOC closer together, given the context in which Yogyakarta was unquestionably the most powerful military force in Central Java and they were the weaker. In early 1785 Mangkubumi complained that one of Mangkunagara's sons had attacked a party coming to Yogyakarta from East Java for *Garĕbĕg Mulud* in January 1785, leaving one dead. On investigation, the Company concluded that the young man was too ill to have done any such thing. Then Mangkunagara is said to have turned to the Surakarta Resident, W.A. Palm (in office 1784–88), and "suddenly flew into a rage". He declared:

> Mr. Senior Officer, [he said], enough! I can no longer tolerate the Sultan's insults. From the very beginning of the Company's most recent war in Java, he has misled me. And now his main objective is to make me and mine black and hated by the Company. And thereby, with us detached and abandoned by the Company, if possible to bring to fruition his arrogant notions of independence and sole rule.

Palm said that he calmed Mangkunagara down, reassuring him of the VOC's protection and affection for him. In reporting this episode,

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[13] Van der Burgh, Semarang, to Batavia, 26 Apr. 1780, in VOC 3584 (OB 1781). The report in dJ xi, pp. 407–8, says this was a daughter, which is evidently an error.

[14] PB III, Surakarta, to Siberg, Semarang, 19 Sapar, Alip 1707 (= 14 Feb. 1781); Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 15 Mar. and 5 Sept. 1781; all in VOC 3602 (OB 1782). See also a partial version of the last in dJ xii, pp. 1–6.

Siberg added that Mangkunagara's irreconcilable hatred of the Sultan was well known but that he did not believe that the prince would take any action.[15]

In addition to suffering insults from Mangkubumi and the indifference of younger aristocrats, Mangkunagara was enduring serious physical illness. We have already seen him constrained by what was identified as arthritis or rheumatism (*encok*) during the war years. In the mid-1780s he fell ill with a disease that *Babad Mangkubumi* identified as *katrapan* (yaws, framboesia).[16] While this condition is rare in the developed world, it is still present in less-developed tropical zones, including Indonesia. It is a long-term bacterial infection characterised by joint and bone pain, fatigue, and skin lesions which may lead to physical deformities; its primary stage is most likely to occur in children. "Yaws can become a chronic, relapsing, and disfiguring disease and can lead to severe deforming bone lesions in the long term.… About 10% of patients develop tertiary stage lesions after 5 years or more of untreated infection."[17] In pre-antibiotic 18th-century Java, treatment rested on traditional herbal remedies. It is possible, even probable, that what was earlier identified in Mangkunagara as rheumatism or arthritis was in fact the early stage of yaws. The same was probably true with regard to the accusation in 1763 that Ratu Bĕndara was divorcing him because he had a venereal disease. Yaws produces lesions in the skin, including in the genital region, and the bacterium is in fact closely related to that which causes syphilis, although yaws is not sexually transmitted.

In July 1786 Siberg reported that Mangkunagara was ill with "a heavy attack of wasting and decline in powers, such that there seems little hope of recovery". In August, however, he had recovered

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[15] Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 Mar. 1785, in VOC 3705 (OB 1786). The *Garĕbĕg* (on 12 Mulud AJ 1711) fell on 24 January 1785. The Dutch translation of the outburst ascribed to MN I begins, *het is tijd* ("It is time"). I think that is almost surely a translation of Malay *sudah* or Javanese *wis/sampun*, which in this context is better translated as "enough". The son's name is given as Suryadimurta ("Soerio Dimorto"), but I cannot reconcile that with the list of MN I's sons in Padmasusastra, *Sĕjarah-dalĕm*, several of whom did, however, have names beginning with "Surya" (see ibid., pp. 267–9). Palm subsequently turned out to be a doubtful source of information about court affairs, but this report is believable.

[16] *BMang*, p. 481.

[17] Mitjà, Asiedu and Mabey, "Yaws", p. 766.

sufficiently that his survival seemed certain.[18] *Babad Mangkubumi*'s report of the same episode said that he had recovered but was not yet able to walk.[19] The diary kept in the Mangkunagaran palace (discussed below) records another episode in late 1790 when Mangkunagara was unable to attend a *kraton* gathering because "his body was still sick".[20]

Political and bodily realities were not treating the ageing prince well. But there was still a fiery spirit that, as we will see in the next chapter, in 1790 found a last opportunity to flare.

The Palace Diaries: Light on the Mystic Synthesis

Mangkunagara seems to have been a literary innovator in composing his autobiographical *babad* of his war years, the wonderful *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*. At least, no earlier autobiography in Javanese has yet come to light. In the 1780s and 1790s, we are treated to another innovative form of literature emanating from the Mangkunagaran palace: a hybrid *babad*-diary, an almost-daily account of events, composed in verse and preserved in several copies. The copies' contents overlap, together covering the years AJ 1707–20 (1780–93 CE). There is a detailed discussion of the various MSS in Appendix 1. The evidence that these copies were made in Mangkunagara's scriptorium of lady soldiers is discussed there and early in Chapter 7.

Ann Kumar has published a valuable survey of the contents of one of these copies. Following Pigeaud, she suggests that a female warrior/concubine was "the authoress" or "the diarist" but this is unsupported by the evidence.[21] The lady in question was (or, the ladies were) the copyist(s) only. We might wonder whether Mangkunagara himself kept this diary, but surely in that case he would have been named as its creator, as is the case with his autobiographical *babad*. Consequently, we must conclude that the author of the diary is unknown, but that it originated in Mangkunagara's palace is beyond

[18] Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 11 July and 2 Aug. 1786, in VOC 3738 (OB 1787).
[19] *BMang*, p. 481.
[20] *Babad Nitik Samběrnyawa* (SB PB A.99), p. 154: *kang salira maksih gĕrah*. Improvement is recorded on p. 158.
[21] E.g., Kumar, "Javanese Court Society", Pt. 1, p. 4, and Pt. 2, pp. 67, 74. Also Pigeaud, *Literature of Java*, Vol. 2, p. 832, describing *BT* as "daily happenings … described by a female scribe".

doubt. Readers will find Kumar's summary of parts of the diary of interest as a source for princely life in Surakarta in the 1780s.[22] The general picture there mirrors what we have described in this book.

An important aspect of the diary for our understanding of Mangkunagara's life in his later years is the light shone on his personal religiosity. We can recognise the Mystic Synthesis variant of Javanese Islam, which was dominant amongst the elite—so far as can be judged from the contemporary sources—and seems also to have been found widely at other levels of society. As set out in Chapter 7, there were three defining characteristics of this version of the faith: (1) a strong sense of Islamic identity; (2) practice of the prescribed ritual life of Islam, particularly the "five pillars" (the confession of faith, the fivefold daily prayers, giving alms, observing the fasting month, and the Mecca pilgrimage if possible); and (3) acceptance of local spirit forces. This local form of the faith had multiple idiosyncrasies. We have, notably, seen Mangkunagara and others enthusiastically offending against the Qur'anic ban on intoxicating beverages. The ban on gambling was also frequently offended at cockfights and other forms of animal combat.

A passage for early 1785 captures what life was like for the ageing and ailing Mangkunagara: festivities and piety mixed. He attended a reception at the VOC Residency in Surakarta, where there was feasting, drinking and the firing of cannon salutes. At sunset he was escorted by Company dragoons back to his palace in a carriage, rather drunk (*ragi wuru*). There, the *gamĕlan* accompanied him as he went to sleep. Then the diary recorded:

> 7. In the year Dal, its chronogram was
> "single in form was the voice of humans" [AJ 1711]....
> On the day Friday-Paing,
> the month still Mulud,
> the date the 17th [28 January 1785],
> 8. already 35 times
> had he prayed
> in the mosque,
> praising the Prophet and Caliphs,

[22] Kumar, "Javanese Court Society", Pt. i, pp. 36–46. There are also quotations and Indonesian translations from the same source in Zainuddin Fananie, *Pandangan dunia KGPAA Hamengkoenagoro I dalam Babad Tutur: Sebuah restrukturisasi budaya*, intro. Suyatno Kartodirdjo (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 1994), but the analysis there is mostly unpersuasive and ill informed.

the four Companions [of the Prophet] as well,
the eight *Walis* [saints of Islam in Java].
Nineteen in number were the rice dishes
and 140 were the *apĕm* [rice-flower cakes] lined up together
for the ritual meal,
for the well-being of Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara].

9. The number of those who prayed together
was 400, who showed their veneration,
plus 35.[23]

Mangkunagara promoted other forms of piety, including group readings of the Qur'an from start to finish in a night, a practice known as *katam Qur'an* (finishing the Qur'an). Groups of religious students (*santri*) were invited to do such readings. The *santris* would break into smaller groups, each member of a group reading a part of the Qur'an aloud (normally at full volume) in turns while other groups did the same with their sections of the book, all simultaneously. The result was a pious cacophony laden with religious merit. On one such occasion in 1791, Mangkunagara gathered 376 *santris* who read from 12 copies of the Qur'an. Another 100 *santri mĕri* recited half the Qur'an in the middle of the day. A performance of *wayang wong* followed.[24]

Congregational recitations and studies of the Qur'an (*ngaji Qur'an*) were recorded in the palace diary in several places. So also were group sessions of *dhikr* ("remembrance"), a Sufi practice of repeating holy formulae such as the 99 names of God, with associated movements of the head and body, as a path to achieving mystic

[23] *BT* f. 48 right: Canto 19 (Sinom), for the year Dal AJ 1711 (beginning 14 Nov. 1784): 7. *Taun Ĕdal sinangkalan, rupa eka syara jalma, … ing dina nuju Jumungah-Paing, tunggil sasi Mulud, tanggal ping pitulas.* 8. *Wus tigang dasa sagangsal, genira salat, mring masjid, mumule Nabi Kalipah, Sahkabat sakawan malih, sasanga para Wali, sangalas a[m]bĕng kehipun, lan satus kawandasa, tangkĕp apĕm kang kandhuri, salamĕta Kangjĕng [Pa]ngeran Dipatya.* 9. *Wong kang salat kabehira, kawanatus kang ngabĕkti, pujul tigang dasa gangsal.* The date is internally correct, but according to Proudfoot's Takwim it should be 16 Mulud; such differences of one day from standard dates in local usage are not remarkable.

[24] *Babad Nitik Samběrnyawa* (SB PB A.99), pp. 163–4. This is under the date Sunday-Manis, 10 Jumadilawal AJ 1717 (= 16 Jan. 1791 CE). *Santri mĕri* ("duckling *santri*") was a term for a *santri* who had not made a full commitment to the religious life, "who indeed observes the religious obligations but does not abstain from worldly pleasures"; Gericke and Roorda, *Jav.-Ned. Handwoordenboek*, Vol. ii, p. 479.

ecstasy. Mangkunagara's 61st birthday celebrations on a date equivalent to 12 June 1785 combined such forms of Islamic piety with Javanese princely display:

20. … Then came the celebration,
the annual birthday celebration of Pangeran Dipati
[Mangkunagara],
on Sunday-Paing, the date the 4th
of Ruwah, the year Dal.
Indeed, its chronogram
was "single in form was the voice of humans" [AJ 1711].
The prince's age
was already 60 years,
indeed, plus 1 year.
In the early evening,
the number of *santris* who recited
was 460.
22. Simultaneously they recited the Qur'an together.
Santri měri did *dhikr* on the field (before the palace).
They were invited in the middle of the night
to eat, from the middle of the night to just before sunrise.
Cash was distributed to the *santris*.
In the morning,
the *gamělan Munggang* sounded,
mixed with the thundering of cannon
as salvos were fired in turns,
the male *Saragěni* ["Fire Arrows", the name of a troop
company] individually,
not all together their firing.
23. Then the female *Saragěni*
mixed their cannon thrice,
firing all in unison.
Amazed were all those who watched.
He who commanded was Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara],
like Mintaraga
and his heavenly nymphs at war with Niwata[kawaca].[25]

[25] *BT* ff. 53 right–53 left: Canto 22 (Dhandhanggula) for the year Dal AJ 1711: 20. … *nulya kang tingalan.* 21. *tingalan agěng Pangran Dipati, Akad-Paing tanggal ping sakawan, ing Arwah Ědal taune, něnggih sangkalanipun, eka rupa syaraning jalmi, kang yusya Panjěněngan, wus sawidak taun, lěrěs pan pujul sawarsa, sontěnira kathahe santri kang ngaji, kawanatus sawidak.* 22. *samya ngaji ngaos Kur'an sami, santri měri dhikir palataran, kodangan těngah dalune, mangan anli[ng]sir dalu, siněbaran dhuwit prasantri, ejang mogang gamělan, wor mriyěm gumuruh, ganti-ganti*

The reference at the end of that passage is to a classic of Javanese literature. The *Mintaraga* story is the Modern Javanese adaptation of the Old Javanese classic *Arjunawiwāha* [Arjuna's Wedding], ascribed to the Surakarta courtier and Mangkunagara's contemporary Ng. Yasadipura I (1729–1803). There are, however, reasons to doubt such ascriptions.[26] In this story, Arjuna defeats and kills the demon Niwatakawaca and is given heavenly nymphs as wives.[27] So Mangkunagara's birthday celebrations combined symbols and sounds of Islamic piety with princely martial ethos and references to pre-Islamic literature.

Mangkunagara's personal religious practice, in addition to mosque attendance and observation of the "five pillars", also included making copies of the Qur'an. This tells us that he had at least a sufficient command of Arabic for this pious purpose. We already saw a reference to him doing this in his *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, c. 1755, in Chapter 6. The palace diary recorded in October 1787 that he never ceased writing out the Qur'an, while his troops danced to the sound of the *gamĕlan*. He wrote down also, it said, "guide books in Javanese and Arabic", which must have been lessons in Qur'anic recitation with Javanese glosses, as well as "writing the Javanese Qur'an and Arabic", perhaps meaning full copies of the Qur'an with a Javanese translation.[28] The diary also recorded that on a date equivalent to 5 March 1788, he completed making his sixth complete copy of the Qur'an.[29]

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barondongan, Saragni jalu pan pating kapancil, tan rĕmpĕg uninira. 23. *nulya kang Saragni pawestri, awor mariyĕm ambal ping tiga, arĕmpĕg barĕng ngunine, ebat sakeh kang dulu, kang ngabani Pangran Dipati, lir pendah Mitaraga, lan widadariku, prang lan raja Niwata*…. On *santri mĕri*, see the preceding footnote. The term *tingalan agĕng* (great birthday celebration) refers to the annual birthday in the month Ruwah. The diary also notes *tingalan alit* (small birthdays) which were observed every 35 days when the seven- and five-day week combinations of his birth (Sunday-Lĕgi) recurred. The *gamĕlan Munggang* was a smaller *gamĕlan* orchestra believed to be of great antiquity and owned only by senior princes and lords; see Kunst, *Music in Java*, Vol. 1, pp. 257–60.

[26] M.C. Ricklefs, "The Yasadipura Problem", *BKI* 153, 2 (1997): 273–83.

[27] The Old Javanese text with English translation is available in Stuart Robson, ed. and transl., *Arjunawiwāha: The Marriage of Arjuna of Mpu Kaṇwa* (Bibliotheca Indonesica 34; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008). A brief summary and discussion of the Old Javanese version is in P.J. Zoetmulder, *Kalangwan: A Survey of Old Javanese Literature* (KITLV Translation series 16; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 234–49.

[28] *BT* f. 124 right: *turutan Jawi lan Arab*…. *Pangran Dipati nĕnĕrat, Jawi Kur'an lan Arab.*

[29] Ibid., f. 140 left.

Yet none of this was inconsistent with continuing belief in indigenous supernatural forces, consistent with the Mystic Synthesis style of Islam. A diary entry for March 1789 records a crucial episode involving Sunan Lawu, the spirit of the volcano Mount Lawu, where Mangkunagara fought many of his battles. Sunan Lawu is still a widely honoured (and feared) local deity and is still given offerings by the courts of Surakarta and Yogyakarta. He is essentially the mountain counterpoise to Ratu Kidul, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, and a wind-god in origin. He has become, in recent times, a spiritual force that is generally seen as anti-Islamic,[30] but that was clearly not the case in the eyes of the Mangkunagaran diarist(s), as will be seen below. Rather, he was among the venerated local spirit forces that made up one aspect of Java's Mystic Synthesis.

The diary recorded that on a date equivalent to 24 March 1789, Mangkunagara's grandson (and later his successor) Prince Prangwadana travelled to the place selected for Mangkunagara's burial site at the village of Mangadeg, high on the western slopes of Mount Lawu. His task was implicitly to oversee the work there. Soldiers were constructing a mosque so that Friday prayers could be held. On the eve of Friday, 27 March, the soldiers danced and the "*kaum* [religious community] soldiers" (i.e., the Suranatan corps) engaged in *dhikr*. In the middle of the night there was feasting, and on the morning of Friday there was communal prayer and a ritual meal. A total of 461 people prayed for the welfare of Mangkunagara.[31]

Then the diary recorded miraculous events and set out the mandatory usage of the royal colour yellow at the gravesite:

45. Those who were doing the work on the mountain,
the men searching for sand:
in the river they gouged it out.
Those searching for limestone:
from the mountain they dug it up.
Then it was the will of God
46. that Sunan Lawu should assist:
Volcanic mud flooded the stream,
throwing up sand along the banks.
The mountain broke up into limestone.
Those searching for limestone quickly,
unworried, dug it out.

[30] See Ricklefs, *Seen and Unseen Worlds*, pp. 277–84.
[31] *BT* ff. 193 right–194 left.

47. Sand was not gathered from within the stream
but cheerfully gathered from the riverbanks,
carried down from higher on the mountain.
For the gravesite high on the mountain
many were the stones.
Then it was the wish of God:
48. lightning strikes swooped down on the stones,
striking down from the mountain,
striking as if drumming
and disintegrating from above, hitting the ground.
Great stones broke into pieces
as lightning strikes swept down.
49. When repeatedly they struck,
all who were doing the work
were amazed and frightened, beside themselves.
Eventually they saw
that lightning was like a fellow worker
and smooth stones were there to be gathered.
50. All cried out in joy, those who saw,
cheering at how (the lightning) struck.
And everyone who goes up (the mountain),
if they are not doing this work
will be assaulted by mountain rains;
if people are going up to do this work,
51. there will be no rain
and the work will be pleasant.
(If) Prince Prangwadana goes there,
(if) he goes up and encounters rain,
he burns incense and the weather clears.
And anyone who approaches the summit
52. where the grave is to be,
all must wear yellow.
Water buffalo, cattle and horses,
must approach in yellow (trappings).
Conveyances must be of yellow colour.
If approaching the gravesite, yellow (must be used).[32]

[32] *BT* ff. 194 left–right: Canto 59 (Kinanthi) for the year Alip AJ 1715: 45. *Kang nambut karya ing gunung, lakine kang mĕndhĕt wĕdhi, jroning lepen ginobowan, kang mĕndhĕt watu kang ngamping, ardi ingkang dhinudhukan, nulya karsanya Yyang Luwih.* 46. *Sunan Lawu ababantu, ladhu ing kang kali banjir, wĕdhi minggah papinggiran, gugur gunung watu gamping, kang mĕndhĕt gamping arikat, nora*

By late August 1789 the Mangadeg mosque was finished, Friday prayers began to be held there, and an official was installed in authority over the gravesite.[33] In March 1790 Mangkunagara rewarded those who had been constructing his grave, differentiated by rank. The two *pĕngulus* of the mosque received grand *krisses*; others received *wayang* puppets. Seven earned copies of a *babad*; this is unnamed in the diary but was possibly a copy of his "History from the Prophet Adam to the Kings of Java" (*Sĕjarah wiwit Nabi Adam dumugi ratu-ratu tanah Jawi*), which he wrote in 1769, and its companion, "History of the Descent of All the Kings of the Land of Java" (*sajarah ing tĕdhak-tumĕdhak ing para Nata ing Tanah Jawa sadaya*), dated 1770–71, described in Chapter 8. He also deposited at the mosque a copy of the Qur'an bound in 15 volumes written by himself and 200 rosaries of prayer beads.[34] A Qur'an of the kind called here *Kur'an mukadam* (Arabic *Qur'an muqaddam*) was a copy bound in portions (*juz'*). The Qur'an consists of 30 such portions, so each of the 15 volumes of Mangkunagara's Qur'an copy would presumably have contained two *juz'*, ready for reading aloud simultaneously through the night (*katam Qur'an*) by 15 groups of *santri* as an act of religious merit. Pious, and cacophonous, readings of this kind were regularly performed at Mangkunagara's palace on the eve of Fridays, as we noted above.

The prince suffered a grievous personal loss during these years. During the fasting month in mid-1788, his first and (since his divorce from Ratu Bĕndara) principal wife (*garwa padmi*), R. Ay.

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sumĕlang dhudhuki. 47. *wĕdhi tan mĕndhĕt jro banyu, ngeca pinggir ngamĕndhĕti, kang binawa ngingggil ngarga, pasĕkaran nginggil ngardi, akathah ing selanira, sĕmana karsaning Widi.* 48. *gĕlap kang namběri watu, kontal tiba saking ngardi, tibane lir kikitiran, rĕmuk ngandhap tiba siti, watu agĕng-agĕng pĕcah, balĕdheg gĕlap namběri.* 49. *duk lagi panamběripun, sakehe kang nambut kardi, kagyat jumbul sami niba, dangu-dangu aningali, yen balĕdheg kadi rowang, rata watu densamběri.* 50. *surak bungah kang adulu, sipat namběr densuraki, lan sitĕn ingkang aminggah, kalamun tan nabut kardi, mapan pinarag ampuhan, yen wong minggah ngambut kardi.* 51. *tan watĕn ampuhipun, eca genya nambut kardi, cacak Pangran Prangwadana, minggah ampuh andhatĕngi, kukutug anulya padhang, lan sing sapa pĕdhak wukir.* 52. *badhe pasĕkaranipun, sadaya warnanya kuning, kĕbo sapi lawan kapal, yen cĕlak warnanya kuning, titiyang kuning warnanya, yen cĕlak sĕkaran kuning.*

[33] *BT* f. 207 right–208 left.

[34] *BT* f. 232 left. I am grateful to Oman Fathurahman and Nico Kaptein for helping me to unravel the mystery of *Qur'an muqaddam*.

Kusumapatahati, fell seriously ill. We first encountered her in 1746 as the mother of Mangkunagara's one-year-old daughter R. Aj. Sombro, who was ill with fever. Like Mangkunagara himself and his surviving troops and followers, she had fled for refuge into the forest after his defeat at Papringan. In the midst of heavy rain, she and Mangkunagara found each other again and then took turns comforting the ill child. In subsequent years she stood by his side through ups and downs.

Kusumapatahati fell terminally ill simply from her advancing years, the Mangkunagaran diary recorded. As she neared her end, she was attended every day by her children and grandchildren. On a date equivalent to 11 June 1788, she died. Her body was taken to the Mangkunagaran mosque, where the Qur'an was chanted through the night to convey blessings for her. The next day her body was taken to Gunung Wijil (Wonogiri area), where she had come from and which was one of the territories under Mangkunagara's authority. Cannon salutes from the Mangkunagaran palace and the VOC fortress accompanied the cortège's departure from Surakarta.[35] Her grave at Gunung Wijil describes her as "Queen Mother of the senior members of the Mangkunagaran lineage, laid to rest in the month Siyam [AJ] 1714".[36]

Kusumapatahati's death struck Mangkunagara powerfully, according to the palace diary:

> 12. There was bitter weeping within his heart,
> within the prince's heart,
> at being left by his first wife
> through the death of Raden Ayu Nyai [Kusumapatahati].
> Many sad feelings were in his heart
> and in his ageing body.

[35] *BT* ff. 140 left–right. The Javanese date is given as Wednesday-Paing, 7 Ramadan, Jimakir *catur eka syaraning jalma* [1714], which is consistent in its details. The Qur'an reading here is again of the kind referred to as *Kur'an mukadam* (Arabic *Qur'an muqaddam*), meaning a copy bound in portions (*juz'*), so it could be chanted simultaneously by several groups until the entire Qur'an had been read out (*katam Qur'an*), as discussed immediately above.

[36] *Bandara Raden Ayu Mangkunagara, Sĕpuh, ibu suri krabat agung trah Mangkunagaran, saren ing wulan Siyam Jimakir 1714* (= 5 June–4 July 1788). The word *saren* is difficult to see in the photo I took, but this must, I think, be the correct reading.

Grave of Mangkunagara I's wife Kusumapatahati (d. 11 June 1788) at Gunung Wijil

> He was like a fish out of water,
> at a loss in his heart and anxious.
> Now, he hid his sadness so that it was not obvious to others.[37]

With such matters Mangkunagara passed his time as the years passed: piety of the Mystic Synthesis variety, performance of Javanese arts, advancing age, illness, and the personal loss of his first and principal wife. Meanwhile, the last major crisis of his lifetime was about to erupt in Surakarta, with religion playing a significant role.

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[37] *BT* f. 149 right: Canto 51 (Sinom), for the year Jimakir 1714 (beginning 13 Oct. 1787): 12. *Anglayung-layung ing driya, kang manah Pangran Dipati, tinilar garwa kawitan, seda Raden Ayu Nyai, kathah karaseng galih, sarta kang sarira sĕpuh, kaya kakap ing tawang, kewran ing manah prihatin, pan sinamur sĕdihye aja katara.*

10

Religion, the Crisis in Surakarta and Mangkunagara's Final Victory with His New European Allies, 1787–95[1]

The Final Crisis Looming

Religious matters occupied the minds of many members of the Javanese elite other than Mangkunagara. In a collection of mystical songs (*suluk*) compiled on the order of Susuhunan Pakubuwana IX in 1870[2] are found three ascribed to Pakubuwana III, plus others ascribed to soon-to-be Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV (1788–1820). It is not known when those ascribed to Pakubuwana III, if he was indeed their author, were composed. They discuss the seven grades of emanation,[3] perfect death and spiritual perfection, the last in a

[1] The general background narrative in this chapter rests upon my book *Jogjakarta*, Chapters 9 and 10. Other sources, particularly those relating directly to MN I's experiences, new evidence not previously published, or direct quotations will be footnoted in this chapter.

[2] *Sĕrat suluk jaman karaton-dalĕm ing Surakarta*, KS 244 Na (Florida 481), catalogued in Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. 1, pp. 260–4.

[3] For a Yogyakarta text on this subject, see A.H. Johns, ed. and transl., *The Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1965). The origin of the MS studied by Johns from Yogyakarta *kraton* circles is discussed in M.C. Ricklefs, "A Note on Professor Johns's 'Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet'", *BKI* 129, 2–3 (1973): 347–9.

form that breaks the bounds of the Mystic Synthesis. In this short work of nine stanzas, the importance of Islamic identity and the commitment to the "five pillars" of Islamic orthopraxy—two of the core elements of the Mystic Synthesis—are overthrown in favour of what Zoetmulder classified as "radical monism":[4]

> 6. … You are neither Muslim nor *kafir*.
> The manifestation of the reality of the Immaterial
> 7. people reflect upon, but do not recognise.
> And recitation of the Qur'an,
> the payment of the religious tax:
> these carry no blessing.
> Look upon the world—it exists not.
> You alone exist,
> derived from the creation,
> with divine acts and attributes.
> Yea, you are the source of praise and the source of veneration.
> You are the essence of worship.[5]

The Susuhunan's influence was clearly waning as his son the Crown Prince—soon Pakubuwana IV—became more and more influential in a court increasingly subject to disorder and intrigues. He, too, had strong mystical interests which were, like his father's, not always within the boundaries of the Mystic Synthesis. We will see him involved with *gurus* accused of heterodoxy below. Towards the end of his days he was even tempted into collaboration with Indian Hindu sepoys brought to Java during the British interregnum regime. This was on the basis of supposedly shared religious roots. He would only narrowly escape being deposed for that mercurial adventure.[6] In the collection of *suluks* mentioned above, there are six ascribed to him.[7] Again, it is not clear when they were written or whether the

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[4] P.J. Zoetmulder, *Pantheism and Monism in Javanese Suluk Literature: Islamic and Indian Mysticism in an Indonesian Setting*, ed. and transl. M.C. Ricklefs (KITLV Translation series 24; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995), Chapter 9.

[5] *Suluk sasmitaning sanjata cipta*, KS 244 Na (Florida 481.4): Dhandhanggula: 6. … *sira iki nora Islam nora kapir, nyateng jatining Suksma* 7. *Wong angetang-etang iku pangling, lawan amaca Kur'an tilawat, punika jakat pitrahe, tan ana sawabipun, tingalana jagat wis sĕpi, anging sira kang ana, asale ing makluk, pingillolah sipattolah, gih punika wit ing puji wit ing bĕkti, sira jatining sĕmbah*.

[6] See P.B.R. Carey, "The Sepoy Conspiracy of 1815 in Java", *BKI* 133, 2–3 (1977): 294–322.

[7] See Florida's discussion in *Javanese Literature*, Vol. i, pp. 261–2.

ascriptions are correct, but one is said to have been composed when he was still Crown Prince.

As he grew older, the future Pakubuwana IV is said to have begun living a dissolute and irregular life, perhaps disturbed by the death of his principal wife in childbirth in 1785 (the child lived to succeed as Pakubuwana V, r. 1820–23). He was just 17 when this happened, and reportedly settled down somewhat after remarriage in 1786. Among the children born of this second Queen were two daughters whom he named Satariyah and Kisbandiyah after the Shattariyya and Naqshabandiyya Sufi orders respectively.[8]

As the troubles in Surakarta developed, our understanding of what was happening is made difficult by a problem with VOC records. The developments were of great concern to the Company, of course, but its principal source in Surakarta itself, the Resident W.A. Palm, soon proved to be unreliable, as we will see below. His superior in Semarang, Johannes Siberg, seems to have been a more reliable reporter of events, if also an example of the sometimes spectacular corruption of VOC officers. We must therefore approach Dutch sources with even greater caution than usual just at this time when trouble was brewing. Javanese sources, both those which we have in Javanese and those preserved in Dutch translation in VOC documents, are also problematic, as we will see below.

On the marriage front, Mangkunagara was encountering obstacles. Over 1785–87, he failed to get daughters of the Susuhunan as wives for two of his sons. He was reportedly furious. Around the same time, a planned marriage between the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta and one of Pakubuwana III's daughters was also cancelled. Mangkunagara and the Susuhunan became increasingly alienated from one another, say the VOC documents. By now, however, the Surakarta court conspiracies, the increasingly chaotic state of the VOC's own bureaucracy, and the dubious role of Palm himself must make us more than usually sceptical about VOC reports on the inner workings of courtly politics. Semarang ordered Palm to intervene in the marriage issue—never an area in which Dutch interference was very welcome. Palm did as he was told, and the Susuhunan then

[8] Nancy K. Florida, "Shaṭṭāriyya Sufi Scents in the Literary World of the Surakarta Palace in Nineteenth-Century Java," in *Buddhist and Islamic Networks in Southern Asia: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. R. Michael Feener and Anne M. Blackburn (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, forthcoming 2018). Also Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, p. 162.

agreed to the marriage of his daughter R. Ay. Supiyah to Mangkunagara's son R. Suryakusuma (later named Png. Padmanagara), then head of Ponorogo.[9]

Palm then claimed not only to have restored cordial relations between Mangkunagara and the Susuhunan, but also to have persuaded the former to swear and seal "an act of submission to both the Company and the Susuhunan". The act is dated 6 January 1787. Confirming the crumbling state of the VOC's administration, Siberg believed that there had never before been such a written submission by Mangkunagara.[10] In fact, the prince had sworn submission in 1757, followed by a formal letter of submission to Batavia, and had signed a further such document in 1772. The principal purpose of this new agreement, from Mangkunagara's point of view, was no doubt to continue to bind the Company to his cause. It was doubtful that it was a novelty in his eyes, for he must surely have recalled the previous agreements tying him and the Company together. It was so far from newsworthy that it did not merit mention in the Mangkunagaran palace diary.[11]

The first sign of the Surakarta Crown Prince (soon to be Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV) becoming attracted to religious zealots involved a relative of Mangkunagara. First, some background. For some time, Mangkunagara had been asking the VOC to return to Java a brother named R.M. Kareta, who was not only in exile at the Cape of Good Hope but was incarcerated there for his "bad humour". Kareta had been born to Mangkunagara the Elder while in exile in Batavia and was sent with him when he was shipped farther to Sri Lanka. In 1751 he somehow made his way to the Cape of Good Hope, which explains why he was not returned to Java with other exiles who came from Sri Lanka in 1753. In 1778 he escaped from the Cape by stowing away on a ship to the Netherlands under the alias of "Jan van Ceylon". There he appealed for his freedom to the VOC's Enkhuizen Chamber, which sent him back to the Cape

[9] Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1785, in VOC 3705 (OB 1786); Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 Mar. 1787, in VOC 3763 (OB 1788).

[10] Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 23 Mar. 1787, in VOC 3763 (OB 1788); Siberg, *Memorie*, 18 Sept. 1787, in dJ xii, pp. 87–8; Batavia to H.XVII, 29 Dec. 1787, in dJ xii, p. 125.

[11] The passages covering this period are in *BT* ff. 98 right–99. On the former folio there is a reference to there being "no change in the promises" (*amasthi jangji tan owah*), but that is in the context of the various marriages then taking place.

with a recommendation for clemency. Batavia turned this down in 1780. In 1785, however, Pakubuwana III supported Mangkunagara I's request for Kareta's release and return to Java. With the island now at peace, Batavia relented. In 1787 he and other former exiles arrived in Surakarta.[12]

With Mas Kareta came his son—Mangkunagara's nephew—who no doubt had never before set foot in Java, named Wirakusuma. Both father and son arrived wearing European dress, complete to wigs. The Susuhunan allowed this to continue. But the Surakarta Crown Prince objected. He ordered them to throw away their wigs and to grow their hair long, to adopt Javanese dress and to take up a religious life. It is clear that Wirakusuma was a Muslim and that the European dress signalled nothing about his religious identity. The Crown Prince may nevertheless have had in mind the Prophetic saying (*Hadith*) that "whosoever imitates a group, belongs to it".[13] It soon appeared that Wirakusuma was able to claim Islamic authority, possibly even bolstered by his overseas adventures.

Wirakusuma did as he was told and grew close to the Crown Prince, who seemed to be more and more estranged from the Europeans in Surakarta.[14] He became the Crown Prince's chief administrative officer (*patih*). Around him gathered a group of devout Muslims,

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[12] I am grateful to my colleague Michael Laffan for information (by email 5 Oct. 2017) about Kareta's experience in South Africa and the Netherlands, based on his research in the National Archives of South Africa. For sources from the Java end of these matters, see Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Mar. 1783, in VOC 3653 (OB 1784); Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1785, in VOC 3705 (OB 1786); Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1785, in VOC 3703 (OB 1786); Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 26 Apr. 1787, in VOC 3763 (OB 1788); Semarang to Batavia, 28 July 1787, in VOC 3813 (OB 1789).

[13] This *Hadith* can be found in the canonical collections of Abu Daud and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. It was later used as an argument against Modernists who adopted European suits and ties; see Nico J.G. Kaptein, "Southeast Asian Debates and Middle Eastern Inspiration: European Dress in Minangkabau at the Beginning of the 20th Century", in *Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement and the* Longue Durée, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 186. I am grateful to Nico Kaptein for his advice on this matter.

[14] Events down to Wirakusuma's exile are described in Palm, Surakarta, to Siberg, Semarang, 19 Apr. 1787; Siberg, Semarang, to Palm, Surakarta, 21 Apr. 1787; PB III, Surakarta, to Siberg, Semarang, 5 Rějěb Wawu 1713 [23 Apr. 1787], received 25 Apr. 1787; Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 26 Apr. 1787; Palm, Surakarta, to Siberg, Batavia, 2 May 1787; Siberg, Semarang, to Batavia, 15 May 1787; all in VOC 3763 (OB 1788). Batavia to H.XVII, 29 Dec. 1787, in dJ xii, p. 124.

bearing titles such as *kyai* and *haji*, indicating senior religious standing and completion of the pilgrimage to Mecca. The VOC grew concerned at the Crown Prince's closeness to what seemed a cabal of religious zealots. Siberg described the prince's court as "swarming with priests". It was reported that this group had persuaded some villagers subject to the Crown Prince to seize Yogyakarta rice fields by force. (Remember that the source for most of this was Resident Palm, whose reports should be approached with suspicion.) Palm then persuaded Pakubuwana III that the Wirakusuma group was also a threat to him.

In April 1787 the Susuhunan agreed to Wirakusuma and eight others being arrested. Palm sent them to Semarang, whence they were sent to Batavia and then into exile in Sri Lanka. With them were confiscated a considerable collection of amulets and Wirakusuma's *babad* (chronicle). Wirakusuma's brief sojourn in his ancestral homeland was over. The Susuhunan sent others who had pledged allegiance to Wirakusuma to the usual place of internal exile, the wilds of Ayah (in Banyumas), where the abundant wild animals and generally unhealthy conditions rendered human life dangerous and usually short. A list of Wirakusuma's further adherents named nearly 50 such. It included Pangeran Kajoran, a potent religious figure, who had presented a *gamělan* set to Wirakusuma and whose ancestor had played a central role in the rebellion of Trunajaya over a century before.[15] The Mangkunagaran diary briefly recorded these events and said that the Crown Prince did not know why these men were arrested and exiled and "knew not the wishes of the King".[16] Needless to say, this episode did nothing to improve the future Pakubuwana IV's estimation of Palm or of Europeans generally.

The religious commotions at Surakarta had hardly begun. In December 1787 two letters were found in a *gamělan* pavilion at the *kraton*. They proclaimed that the grandly titled Susuhunan Ayunjaya Adimurti Senapati Ingalaga (a name without precedent in Mataram royal usage) would shortly arrive from Mecca, accompanied by supernatural signs, to depose Pakubuwana III, who was an unworthy King, a tool of the Europeans and an apostate. He would also drive

[15] Soodanige persoonen als Wirocoesoema homagie hebben gedaan, under date 15 July 1787, in VOC 3763 (OB 1788).
[16] *BT* ff. 111 right–112 left. Quote from f. 112 left: *tan wruh karsaning Narendra*.

the Europeans from Java if they misbehaved.[17] This naturally caused much disquiet on Pakubuwana III's part and that of the VOC. Palm searched for someone to blame and picked an obscure mystic called Ki Alim Dĕmak. The new governor of the northeast coast, Jan Greeve (in office 1787–91), seems to have been more astute than his predecessor Siberg (if no less corrupt—he retired in 1791 with a personal fortune said to exceed one million guilders).[18] He was doubtful about Kyai Alim Dĕmak's guilt, not least because he was illiterate and could hardly have written the letters himself. Greeve wanted to wait before punishing Ki Dĕmak (as he is called in the Mangkunagaran palace diary) to discover what persons might stand behind him. Palm wrote that at least one should not accuse Mangkunagara, who would not "involve himself with such twaddle".[19] Another person named Tanjung Anom (or Wringin Anom in the Mangkunagaran palace diary), said to be an expert in poisons, was also arrested. But there was no waiting: the "justice" exercised by Palm and Pakubuwana III was swift and probably unjust. In January 1788 Ki Dĕmak suffered death by torture, as his skin was flayed and the offending letters were burned in his face, after which he was left to die a lingering death. Tanjung Anom was burned alive.[20]

Ki Dĕmak and Tanjung (or Wringin) Anom were executed, but the Surakarta court did not return to a more settled state; rather, it stumbled into the last great crisis of Mangkunagara's life. A change in the VOC Residency at this time is crucial to our understanding (or lack of it) about unfolding events. In May 1788 the Dutch Resident in Surakarta, W.A. Palm, died suddenly. It is possible, even probable, that he was poisoned. After he died, from the Surakarta *kraton* there flowed a torrent of accusations, making it clear that Palm had distorted communications between the court and the Company for years and had been sending false reports to his superiors. One such was his claim that Mangkunagara was involved in an intrigue to regain his former wife Ratu Bĕndara, which seems to have been a complete fabrication on his part. Palm was also accused of extortion,

[17] My translation of the Dutch translation of these lengthy letters is in my *Jogjakarta*, pp. 288–91.
[18] dJ xii, p. xlvi.
[19] Palm, Surakarta, to Greeve, Semarang, 31 Dec. 1787, in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).
[20] Further to the discussion and sources cited in Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 294–5, these events are recorded in *BT* ff. 134 right–135 left.

both diverting *kraton* moneys from their proper recipients and demanding labour services never before demanded. He was also charged with introducing the execution of Tangjung Anom by burning alive, which was said to be a barbarity hitherto unknown in Java (where punishments such as fighting to the death against tigers, banishment to the wilderness, dismemberment or stoning were favoured).[21] One of those who objected to his conduct was Mangkunagara, as recorded in the palace diary.[22] The ageing and sick Susuhunan[23] protested also about the conduct of the Second Resident at Surakarta, E.A. de Wilde, who was said to be encouraging younger princes to drinking and night-time escapades in "bad places". Before Greeve could do anything about De Wilde, he, too, died suddenly in August 1788 after a brief illness. We must suspect poison as the cause of his death, coming so soon after Palm's. Palm's successor was Andries Hartsinck, who was in office from June 1788 to August 1790 but suspended from most duties after November 1789 for reasons which will become clear below. Just as major threats loomed in Surakarta, the VOC's bureaucracy represented a dubious source of information.

Greeve, the new governor of the northeast coast in Semarang, found himself facing renewed conflict between Sultan Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara in mid-1788, again over a name. The latter's grandson and chosen successor (who was also Pakubuwana III's grandson through his mother, Ratu Alit) was again renamed, this time being dubbed Prince Mangkubumi. The Sultan was furious; even though he was now formally Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana I, it is clear that he still regarded Mangkubumi as his own name and took this as an attempt to insult him. As in 1780, the VOC stepped in nervously to calm the situation and persuaded the Susuhunan and Mangkunagara to back down. The young prince now became

[21] The first three are found in multiple sources of the time. Stoning, called *rajam* (Arabic *rajm*), may have been rare or even an innovation by the Crown Prince who was about to become PB IV. It is noted in *BT* f. 135 left, in Jan. 1788, and is the prescribed punishment in *Hadith* collections (but not in the Qur'an) for unlawful sexual intercourse; see R. Peters, "Zinā or Zināʾ", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New [2nd] Edition*, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, P. Bearman et al. (13 vols; Leiden: Brill, 1986–2009), Vol. xi, pp. 509–10.

[22] Kumar, "Javanese Court Society", Pt. ii, p. 71.

[23] PB III was reported to be seriously ill in Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 12 June 1788, in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).

Pangeran Surya (sometimes Prabu) Prangwadana (or Prangwĕdana), a name that continued to be used in the Mangkunagaran house in subsequent generations. As noted above, this was the young man who was to succeed as Mangkunagara II (r. 1796–1835). With reluctance Mangkunagara accepted this renaming, while expressing the view that Surakarta was thereby shamed in the eyes of Yogyakarta. But it was immaterial to him what name was chosen, he said, so long as he could sit and sleep in peace. In response, Greeve wrote to him, praising his trust in the Company and assuring him of the VOC's protection.[24]

Pakubuwana III's health was now deteriorating seriously. In June 1788 Greeve reported his condition to be increasingly grave. He had an illness of the eyes which was causing the loss of his sight and "a sort of consumptive condition". By late August, it was suspected that his end was near.[25]

In this tense environment, in July–August 1788 Greeve made the customary visit to the *kratons* as the Company's new governor of the northeast coast. At a court gathering in Surakarta in late July, Mangkunagara made the surprising proposal that he should accompany Greeve as he proceeded to Yogyakarta so as to effect a reconciliation with the Sultan. Greeve reported that he immediately approved this to forestall any impression that the VOC was fearful of difficulties for itself or the Sultan from Mangkunagara. He believed that the prince only made this proposal "so as to express his arrogance in public and to make people look upon him as being still greatly feared", expecting it to be turned down. In private, he asked Mangkunagara whether he made the proposal in earnest. Mangkunagara, reported Greeve, replied that it was "mere banter to pass the time, with no other intention". On this occasion, Greeve admonished Mangkunagara about other matters of which he was accused: behaving arbitrarily, notably in forcibly freeing one of his men whom Pakubuwana III's people had arrested for horse-stealing, and—most significantly—corresponding with Ratu Bĕndara, as Palm had reported. Mangkunagara apologised for the former, but the latter

[24] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 12 June, 29 Aug. and 10 Sept. 1788; Hartsinck, Surakarta, to Greeve, Semarang, 26 Aug. and 5 Sept. 1788; Greeve, Semarang, to Hartsinck, Surakarta, 27 Aug. 1788; Greeve, Semarang, to HB I, Yogyakarta, 29 Aug. 1788; all in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).

[25] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 12 June 1788, in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).

charge threw him into a rage. With "outrage and wrath blazing from his eyes", he denied absolutely that he had done any such thing. Greeve reassured Mangkunagara that he believed him completely but advised him to drop his repeated requests to regain Ratu Bĕndara as his wife. Thereupon, reported Greeve, "he stood up from his chair, took my hand and in a most solemn fashion declared that it would never again occur to him to ask for Ratu Bĕndara to be his wife".[26]

On 21 September 1788, Pakubuwana III, recognising that his end was near, asked Greeve to come to Surakarta again. He arrived there on 25 September. The following day the Susuhunan died. The Crown Prince had already been discharging his father's public duties and now prepared to take over the throne. The VOC troops that were available secured the *kraton*, where the leading dignitaries of the realm were assembled and kept under watch—except for Mangkunagara, who had been discovered preparing to go to the *kraton* with an armed entourage. Greeve ordered him to stay in his palace, and he did so. Greeve was particularly moved to do this because the Crown Prince told him that Mangkunagara had sought to gain control of "the royal or state *kris*", which to Greeve indicated that Mangkunagara still had ambitions to claim the throne.[27] The Crown Prince must have been referring to one of the royal regalia (*pusaka*), but which one was intended and, indeed, whether the claim was true is unknown.

Greeve informed the Sultan of Pakubuwana III's death and assured him that the Crown Prince would succeed as Pakubuwana IV, both to relieve Mangkubumi of any hopes of a reunification of the *kratons* and to reassure him that Mangkunagara would not be allowed to claim the Surakarta throne. On the evening of 28 September, Greeve received a document from Sultan Mangkubumi making clear his ongoing hatred of Mangkunagara and uncertainty about whether the VOC's promises could be trusted. The Sultan expressed his pleasure that the Crown Prince would succeed in Surakarta and went on (in the Dutch translation of the Javanese original):

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[26] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1788, in VOC 3816 (OB 1789). The man whom Ratu Bĕndara had married after the divorce from MN in 1763, Png. Dipanagara (not to be confused with the later leader of the Java War), had died in July 1787.

[27] Greeve, Surakarta, to Batavia, 26 Sept. 1788, in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).

> But if Mangkunagara, his children or grandchildren should ask for a greater destiny from the Company, or for the *kraton* of my nephew [the late Pakubuwana III], that could not be welcome to me. This is because at Giyanti, His Excellency Hartingh himself said to me that so long as the earth remains and the sun and moon give light, he [Mangkunagara] and his family down to the seventh generation would be the Company's enemies.
>
> If I can compare myself in turn, indeed I will do the same, and Mangkunagara and his descendants down to the seventh generation will be my enemies, … for I compare Mangkunagara to the Company's enemy Surapati.[28]

The latter comparison was to the VOC's most famous enemy of the late 17th to early 18th century.

On 29 September the Crown Prince formally succeeded as the new Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV (r. 1788–1820). He confirmed his adherence to previous contracts with the VOC. Mangkunagara came to the *kraton* and swore allegiance to his new, just 20-year-old, liege lord. With a collective sigh of relief, the succession was thus achieved without the violence the Company, along with the general populace of Surakarta, feared from either Mangkunagara or Sultan Mangkubumi. The rice which farmers had hidden away in anticipation of trouble reappeared as local markets reopened.

Of the ongoing animosity between Mangkunagara and Sultan Mangkubumi there could be no doubt. Mangkubumi had not been represented at the accession of Pakubuwana IV. Early in October 1788, he proposed to the Company's Resident in Yogyakarta, W.H. van Ijsseldijk (in office 1786–98), that Danurĕja and Van Ijsseldijk should go to Surakarta to express the Sultan's pleasure at the new Susuhunan's accession. Greeve was opposed to this, fearing that something more sinister was behind the idea, and said that a mere

[28] HB I, Translaat Jav. Geschrift vorsien met cachet van den Sulthan te Djocjocarta, under date 1 Oct. 1788, and Greeve, Surakarta, to Batavia, 1 Oct. 1788, both in VOC 3816 (OB 1789). The letter makes exceptions for MN's "children born … to my daughter [Ratu Bĕndara]" and "his children born to Siberg". But this makes no sense to me. The long-dissolved MN-Ratu Bĕndara marriage was childless to the best of my knowledge. Siberg was presumably among the VOC officers who solicited Javanese women from aristocratic families, but I am not aware of him having a concubine who was a daughter of MN I. I have no further information about what is meant here and suspect translation error.

letter of congratulation would do. Two lesser emissaries did deliver a letter offering condolences at the death of Pakubuwana III and good wishes for the future of Pakubuwana IV. The latter replied, his letter (in the Dutch translation) including the temporising phrasing, "If I find that I need 'grandfather's' [i.e., the Sultan's] advice then, *if the Company approves*, I'll turn to 'grandfather' for refuge".[29]

In fact, both Mangkubumi and the Yogyakarta Crown Prince secretly sent emissaries to the young Pakubuwana IV without informing the Company. The purpose of these approaches was evidently to gain influence over the new Susuhunan and in particular to incite him against Mangkunagara, whose own influence over the new monarch the Yogyakarta side wished to forestall. Van Ijsseldijk spoke to the Sultan about this, telling him that he should continue to rely on the Company with regard to Mangkunagara.[30]

Although the inheritability of Mangkunagara's domains was not yet confirmed, the Company was forming the opinion that this could be desirable. While he was still in Surakarta overseeing the succession of Pakubuwana IV in September–October 1788, Greeve expressed the following view of the Central Javanese political realities faced by the declining Company:

> Mangkunagara, and after him his children, will always remain the boundary wall between the two rulers and a convenient means for the Company to make use of, as matters require, against the ascendancy of the Yogyakarta kingdom, which within a quarter-century stands to become rather considerable if that kingdom increases as greatly under the second and third rulers as it has under the present founder. At the least, if the present Susuhunan [Pakubuwana IV] does not take great pains as rapidly as possible to restore all that which has fallen into a pitiable decay because of the prolonged sickness of his father and other collateral reasons, then for certain will the kingdom of Surakarta always remain considerably inferior in power to that of Yogyakarta.[31]

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[29] Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, to Greeve, Surakarta, 2 Oct. 1788; Greeve, Surakarta, to Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, 3 Oct. 1788; PB IV, Surakarta, to HB I, Yogyakarta, 3 Oct. 1788; all in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).

[30] Greeve, Surakarta, to Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, 3 Oct. 1788; Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, to Greeve, Surakarta, 5 Oct. 1788; Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 15 Oct. 1788; all in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).

[31] Greeve, Surakarta, to Batavia, 1 Oct. 1788, in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).

Consistent with such calculations, the Company again gave Mangkunagara a partial assurance of the inheritability of his holding. At the end of October 1788, acting on Batavia's authority, Greeve gave him another written document to confirm that his "property" (*eigendom*) would pass to his heir upon his death. This was "set out in such a way", reported Greeve, "that it extends no further than that which truly belongs to him as his property".[32] This renewed assurance of the support of the VOC thus still went no further than that of October 1780, which gave the same assurance, excluding the lands Mangkunagara held in appanage as *pangeran miji* at the court.

Greeve was still thinking about the possible need for wider arrangements in the future. He told Batavia that he regarded it as

> not unlikely that the political needs of the Company will make it very necessary that the lands and numerous people of Mangkunagara should come to be permanently under separate governance as they are now, and directly under the Company. This would be by the prince, if we treat him appropriately, permanently placing and continuing to place more trust in the Company than in the Susuhunan, to whom he displays obeisance only at the express orders of the Company.[33]

We have already noted above the Company officers' ignorance of previous such agreements with Mangkunagara, which were lost somewhere in the archives in Semarang or Batavia. While Greeve thought this was a significant document which he had now given to the prince, the latter evidently knew better. The document was no doubt useful to Mangkunagara as further binding the Company to his cause, but, like Palm's vaunted agreement of January 1787, it was of too little significance to rate a mention in the palace diary.[34] As Pakubuwana IV's reign began, any alliance that bolstered Mangkunagara's position against precipitate action by Yogyakarta—clearly the preeminent military force in Central Java—would be attractive.

Greeve nevertheless remained cautious about Mangkunagara's intentions. In November 1788 a fire in the prince's palace destroyed 140 carbines, 60 other firearms fitted with bayonets, and 100 pistols.

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[32] Greeve, Semarang, to MN I, Surakarta, 31 Oct. 1788, and Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1788, both in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).
[33] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1788, in VOC 3816 (OB 1789).
[34] The relevant period is covered in *BT* f. 177.

Mangkunagara repeatedly asked the Company to sell him replacements, but Greeve temporised. He was expecting the Sultan, then in his early 70s, to die in the near future and thought it better to agree to Mangkunagara's request only after the succession in Yogyakarta, too, was successfully managed. Batavia approved this approach.[35]

Overview of the Crisis of 1789–90

The violence which was feared when the succession took place had not come about. Mangkunagara in particular had not sought to usurp the throne of Surakarta. For a few months after Pakubuwana IV became Susuhunan, contemporary observers might feel that Central Javanese politics were reasonably stable. But then the crisis which had been building since 1787 erupted in all its volatile mix of politics and religion.[36]

We should emphasise again the fundamental problem with sources for the episode which followed. This was a major crisis which brought Central Java again to the brink of civil war. There were vital interests of multiple actors involved. That the sources we have are therefore to be approached with even greater caution than is normal with all historical sources is unsurprising. But there are two special problems here. First, a group of religious figures was at the core of the crisis but all of the sources that we have are from their enemies, making it difficult to draw confident conclusions about their intentions and roles. Second, the VOC records are full of both information

[35] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Mar. and 24 July 1789, in VOC 3862 (OB 1790). *BT* ff. 182–3, describes this same episode, when fire destroyed MN I's arsenal. This prevented him from attending *Garĕbĕg Mulud* (12 Mulud AJ 1715/ 11 Dec. 1788 CE) and the following celebrations of the CE New Year in the VOC fortress. On the replacement of these weapons, see ibid., f. 186.

[36] This crisis has received scholarly analysis in three main publications: (1) my book *Jogjakarta*, pp. 308–40, published in 1974, rested on VOC and Javanese sources known to me then; (2) Kumar's "Javanese Court Society" added material from the Mangkunagaran palace diary in *BT*; (3) my book *Mystic Synthesis*, pp. 175–9, rested on (1) and (2) with the addition of further Javanese materials. The brief background account here down to the exile of the *santris* in Nov. 1790 rests on (3). Readers wishing more detail will find both (1) and (2) useful, but there is no point in revisiting the minor differences of interpretation between Kumar and me here. Only sources relating directly to MN I's experiences, new evidence not previously published, or direct quotations will be footnoted below.

and disinformation from Javanese informants and particularly plagued by the problem that the Surakarta Resident was Hartsinck, whose role remains obscure but was likely nefarious. In other words, while we certainly gain a general picture of the nature and depth of the crisis, none of the sources available inspire any great confidence.

Pakubuwana IV soon began to display a heightened level of religious devotion and aversion to European ways. A succinct summary of the issues is found in a Mangkunagaran chronicle composed only in the mid-19th century—and therefore not as close to the time of our subject matter as we normally wish—but it usefully sets out the developing crisis from a Javanese (if later) point of view. It says that Pakubuwana IV dismissed all the *kraton* soldiers who liked to wear European clothes and employed those who wore Javanese dress. We see here a repetition of the orders he had given when he was still Crown Prince to Mas Kareta and his son Tg. Wirakusuma to throw away the European clothes they wore on arrival in Java in favour of Javanese dress, to grow their hair long, and to take up a religious life. We noted above that this may have been inspired by the Prophetic saying (*Hadith*) that "whosoever imitates a group, belongs to it". The chronicle goes on to say that Pakubuwana IV regularly attended Friday prayers at Surakarta's Grand Mosque. At the Monday tournaments, he refused the customary wine offered by the VOC. He drew close to him new religious advisers, named here as R. Santri, Png. Panĕngah, Ky. Bahman and Ky. Nursaleh, whom he consulted daily. Later the names of R. Wiradigda and R. Kandhuruwan were added. Officials who were close to the Dutch and who regularly visited the VOC post were dismissed from their positions. Opium smoking and gambling were banned,[37] both being not only in violation of Qur'anic prohibitions but also entertainments that took place in the Company's fortress. Officials were ordered to feed the *santris* who daily gathered for congregational recitations (*ngaji*) of the Qur'an. Perhaps the most explosive passage in this source says that the Company's senior officer Hartingh intended to study Islam with Pakubuwana IV.[38]

[37] The opium prohibition was recorded also in VOC sources; Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 18 Apr. 1789, in VOC 3862 (OB 1790). Since opium was a VOC monopoly import, the Company was always alert to any threats to this trade.
[38] *Sĕrat Babad Panambangan* MN B 18a, (Florida MN 222), pp. 14–5, 24.

Hartsinck was indeed discovered going to the *kraton* at night in September 1789, clad in Javanese dress, although the VOC did not know his purpose in doing so. The contemporaneous Mangkunagaran palace diary recorded this visit—secret and at night by the Javanese-clad Resident—noting that Hartsinck's purpose was to ask Pakubuwana IV why he had elevated R. Santri to the rank of *bupati*. The Susuhunan replied that he had done this so as to know whether Santri was good or evil. If Greeve wished to know about R. Santri, then he would send him to Semarang, accompanied by Wiradigda.[39] We do not know if either of these Javanese sources was well informed about the purpose of the meeting. If Hartsinck's discussion was as consistent with his duties as the Mangkunagaran palace diary version implies, it is curious that I have found no report of it in VOC documentation.

From early 1789, even senior *kraton* figures were dismissed from their positions and replaced by the Susuhunan's new favourites, all men claiming religious standing. Their Javanese enemies collectively labelled them as *santris* (students of religion); the Dutch called them *paepen* (priests). That none of them bore the title *haji* tells us that these were not the first representatives in Java of the wave of reformism that was already forming in the Middle East and would soon be found in West Sumatra. Not until the mid-19th century was there a serious Islamic reform movement in Java. Rather, if we are to trust the chronicle that covers this episode, *Wicara Kĕras* [Strong Talk], these were purveyors of a deviant, and presumably localised, form of the Shattariyyah Sufi order.[40]

In Java, as we noted in Chapter 1, the Shattariyya was introduced by Shaikh Abdulmuhyi (d. c. 1715), who established himself at the West Javanese village of Karang after returning from Mecca, and was therefore referred to as Haji Karang. The Shattariyya was consequently known also as the mystical science of Karang (*ngelmu Karang*). *Wicara Kĕras* says this about the teachings of Pakubuwana IV's new *santri* favourites:

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[39] *BT* f. 208 right.

[40] *Wicara Kras* is ascribed to Yasadipura II in Poerbatjaraka, *Kapustakan Djawi* (Djakarta/Amsterdam: Penerbit Djambatan, 1952), p. 93. This reflects conventional Javanese literary tradition, but there is no evidence in the MSS to support this.

3. Entirely hazy was the thinking of those petty thieves,
   yet they were accepted in the capital.
   Moreover, their miracles were accepted.
   The mystical science of Karang was done with a whirling motion,
   but was not the true mystical science.
   It could hardly be compared to
   [the teachings of] the former Ki Agĕng
   'Abdulmuhyi of Karang.
   Their ideas were obscure, entirely wilful,
   inviting ruin,
4. such that they claimed to be descendants of warriors
   but did not care for discomforts,
   just wanting to sit around….[41]

The new *santris* surrounding Pakubuwana IV thus threatened the interests of the religious and political elite of Surakarta. Stories were soon told that they promised to be able to reduce Yogyakarta to the status of a subsidiary principality, thereby threatening Sultan Mangkubumi's interests, and that they would slaughter the Europeans, thereby threatening the interests of the Company. Having thus created enemies on all sides, with little more than claims to supernatural powers to deploy, the *santris* had ensured that an alliance would form against them. As noted above, all this information came from their enemies and is not necessarily to be taken at face value. In particular, the Javanese elite seems to have fed tales that may have been exaggerated to the VOC to induce the Company to act. Whatever the truth of the matter, in the end the threat was seen as so great that it even produced an alliance hitherto unthinkable, as Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara prepared to act together. They joined with the VOC in deploying several thousand troops to surround the Surakarta *kraton* in November 1790, supporting the VOC's demand that the new advisers be surrendered. In the end Pakubuwana IV had no way out. He turned over his new favourites,

[41] *Wulang Wicara Kĕras*, Neth. Bible Society MS 89 (vii), dated 16 Jumadilawal Be AJ 1744 (= 4 Apr. 1817 CE) (held in Leiden University Library), p. 166, Canto 2 (Sinom): 3. *Ting bĕliyur pikire wong util, iya tĕka denanggĕp nĕgara, lagi kabul istijrade, ngilmu Karang kinĕlun, dudu ngilmu ingkang sajati, tur ta mongsa mempĕra, Ki Agĕng rumuhun, Ngabdulmuhkhyi ing Karang, mung nalare anasag pating bĕlasik, rusak angajak-ajak*. 4. *Saingga wong ngaku trah prajurit, nora karĕm marang lara-lara, mung karĕm kudu mĕthengkreng.…*

and the five leading figures were soon on their way to exile. The established Surakarta *kraton* elite was back in charge, the Sultan was confident that his domain was free of threats and could continue to build up its strengths, and the VOC could turn its full concentration to approaching bankruptcy.

Mangkunagara's Part in the Final Crisis and His Final Victory

Mangkunagara probably wished to stand aside from the developing crisis, but that would have been an unrealistic hope. He clearly perceived the threat posed by Pakubuwana IV's new religious fervour and those who incited it. Although deeply religious himself, he did not share all their particular enthusiasms. His palace had always rung with the cacophony of *santris* chanting the Qur'an, as well as the *gamĕlan*'s sonorous tonalities and the gun- and cannon-fire salutes appropriate to a senior prince. He was not, however, about to give away such European-style practices as heavy drinking, to which he had long been devoted. We should not be surprised to read, given what we know of his tastes, that on an occasion when Greeve offered Mangkunagara wine (*anggur*), he reportedly said that he preferred *jenever* (*jenewĕr*). So that was drunk instead.[42] It seems therefore that Hartingh's effort to reform Mangkunagara's drinking preference in 1757, on the grounds that *jenever* was a drink of common folk and wine was more appropriate to a prince, had ultimately failed. So also, in the Mangkunagaran palace, had the Susuhunan's new fashion (consistent with Qur'anic prohibition) of rejecting all alcohol along with other European styles.

Mangkunagara made it clear to the Europeans that he was opposed to Pakubuwana IV and his new advisers, recognising that they were a political as well as a cultural threat. This was consistent with alliance with the VOC, which he had come to see as the best guarantee of his and his descendants' futures. Nevertheless, he could not break openly with the Susuhunan without threatening those futures. His son Png. Prabu Amijaya died on 12 May 1789 and was buried at Mangadeg.[43] Four days later Mangkunagara's grandson Prangwadana went to the *kraton* and received Pakubuwana IV's

[42] According to *Sĕrat Babad Panambangan* MN B 18a (Florida MN 222), p. 24.
[43] *BT* ff. 198 left, 200.

confirmation that it was he who would now be recognised in place of Prabu Amijaya as heir to Mangkunagara's personal property.[44]

In July 1789 Mangkunagara told Hartsinck (as the latter reported to Greeve) that it was necessary to organise secretly the murders of Santri and Bahman rather than trying to arrest them, as had been done in the case of Mangkunagara's nephew Wirakusuma in April 1787, for demanding their arrest would embitter the young Susuhunan. Mangkunagara also asked Hartsinck to assure Greeve of his attachment to the Company, to which he again swore. "So long as he lived", he was quoted as saying, "he would never allow anything malicious to be undertaken against the Company, for his obligations to the Company were so great that, for it, he would hazard his wealth and blood to its last drop". Greeve regretted that he could see no dexterous way to follow Mangkunagara's advice to murder the ruler's new *santri* advisers without the Susuhunan discovering who was responsible.[45] This may be the setting for a passage in the Mangkunagaran palace diary. On 25 July 1789, the diary recorded, the VOC's Resident came to the palace to consult the prince about Pakubuwana IV's new *gurus*. There was discussion followed by drinking and gifts. The diary did not record what was said. Then, the diary recorded, a secret letter was received from Greeve which said that the "Company truly trusted" Mangkunagara. "And in the future", this letter reportedly said, it was the view of Greeve that "Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara] will rise to a great name".[46]

In May 1790, however, Mangkunagara disturbed the growing alliance among the VOC, the Sultan and himself by making a claim for the throne of Yogyakarta. He wrote that he had twice been promised by Van Straalendorff on the authority of the governor general and Council of the Indies in Batavia that when Mangkubumi died,

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[44] *BT* f. 198 right. Kumar, "Javanese Court Society", Pt. ii, p. 81, misunderstands this passage as PB IV giving assurance of "hereditary succession in Mangkunĕgara's line". Such a longer-term commitment to the durability of the principality had not yet been made.

[45] Hartsinck, Surakarta, to Greeve, Semarang, 26 July 1789, and Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 3 Aug. 1789, both in VOC 3862 (OB 1790). By September 1789, Greeve advised Batavia that he was more and more persuaded that Hartsinck was incompetent and poorly informed about *kraton* affairs; Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 30 Sept. 1789, in VOC 3862 (OB 1790).

[46] *BT* f. 204 right: *Kumpĕni nga[n]dĕl satuhu, mring Pangeran Adipatya /0/ sarta Pangran Adipati, mangke mindhak nama bĕsar, anggĕpe Dĕler Jan Grepe*.

he himself would succeed to his throne. If he had himself died by then, his grandson was to succeed as Sultan. The two documents upon which these claims rested were dated 2 Jumadilakir AJ 1700 (10 August 1774 CE), a time when he was indeed much concerned about the succession (as seen in Chapter 8), and 26 Sapar AJ 1710 (20 January 1784). Greeve worried that this claim would produce a further threat to the peace of Central Java, particularly since the VOC was without "an adequate force" at its disposal. Given this lack of military credibility, Greeve was reluctant to deny Mangkunagara's claim outright. He feared that if he pushed Mangkunagara into action, the Company would face the same position as in 1757, with the countryside ruined, blood flowing and no means to defeat the prince except by giving him the lands he then possessed. Greeve sent Mangkunagara's messenger (identified here as "Piet"[47]) back to Surakarta with only an oral message which seemed to have the desired calming effect. The prince expressed some embarrassment about the matter, suggesting that—at the age of 64 and periodically unwell—rebellion was also not his preferred course of action. He did not, however, formally renounce his pretensions to Yogyakarta's throne.[48]

Mangkunagara's reputation as a fearsome warrior remained strong in the Company's calculations and complicated the Europeans' approach to the unfolding crisis in Central Java. Greeve's superiors ordered him from the safe distance of Batavia to deny Mangkunagara's pretensions. He replied that he presumed he was meant to do that only after sufficient military forces could be assembled to act if necessary. Batavia then left it to Greeve to decide when to inform Mangkunagara that he had no hope in this matter. Greeve informed Pakubuwana IV of Mangkunagara's claim to the succession in Yogyakarta, assuring the Susuhunan that the Company

[47] Later named in Greeve's diary of his trip to Surakarta dated 1 December 1790, under date 26 September, as MN's much-trusted orderly (*oppasser*) Corporal Pieter Bloemhart, who was a *casties*. In the complex, hair-splitting racial categories then in Dutch usage, a *casties* was someone whose ancestry was 7/8 white, 1/8 black. See https://www.dutchgenealogy.nl/mulat-mesties-casties-poesties-testies. I am grateful to Peter Borschberg for this reference.

[48] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 19 May 1790, with attached translations of MN I documents; Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 27 May 1790; all in VOC 3910 (OB 1791). The Javanese dates are internally consistent except that the first is said to be on Tuesday 2 Jumadilakir, which date was a Wednesday according to standard date information; such differences in local usage of one day are not unusual.

would continue to support the succession of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince. Hartsinck advised Greeve that, if necessary, Pakubuwana IV's forces would stand by the Company against Mangkunagara. Greeve, however, could hardly rely on this, for he found himself in a situation in which almost no sources of information were reliable. This was so not only because Hartsinck was incompetent (or possibly treasonous)[49] but also because so many senior officials had been replaced by the Susuhunan that there were hardly any Javanese sources whom he trusted. In his judgement, the successes Mangkunagara had in 1756–57 against the combined Surakarta-Yogyakarta-Company armies left him with little awe for Yogyakarta's soldiers.[50] Only in September 1790 did Greeve give a letter to Mangkunagara denying his pretensions "without detrimental consequences". Greeve hoped that this would settle the matter, but then Yogyakarta and Mangkunagaran forces became engaged in low-level skirmishes.[51]

Mangkunagara's armed forces were reported to total 1,380 professional troops. Within a short time he could levy 4,000 men (consistent with his appanage of 4,000 households) and, given two to three days, could assemble over 10,000. The VOC itself had just over 200 officers and men to attempt to break through to Yogyakarta if Mangkunagara should seek to deny passage. Yogyakarta had much greater forces, but Greeve was worried that if the Sultan should die and Mangkunagara attempt to intervene in the succession, many Yogyakarta princes and commoners would go over to Mangkunagara's side. Amongst the Yogyanese, he wrote, there were many malcontents, "both on account of the harsh government of the Sultan and because of the stern character of the Crown Prince".[52] He asked the Sultan for an accounting of his military forces, how they were armed and how much gunpowder he had. Consistent with his general attitude

[49] We noted above that in September 1789 Hartsinck was discovered going to the *kraton* in the night, in Javanese dress, to a secret meeting there. Hartsinck was discharged by the VOC in November but, remarkably, was allowed to remain in his post for nine months to conclude his personal affairs. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 317.

[50] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 11 June 1790, in VOC 3910 (OB 1791); Batavia to Semarang, 6 July 1790, in dJ xii, pp. 189–90.

[51] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 4 Sept. 1790, in VOC 3942 (OB 1792); also in dJ xii, pp. 191–5.

[52] Translated Javanese list of the "gewapend volk" of MN, 21 May 1790, in AN Solo 36 "Diverze Verklarings"; Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 19 May 1790, in VOC 3910 (OB 1791).

that the VOC was not to be allowed into matters of importance, the Sultan replied, "it is unnecessary for me to inform you about this", but if the Company needed support against Mangkunagara it could count on his help.[53] As an indication of how little regard both rulers had for the VOC at this time, when the Company began adding to its troops at the two *kratons* in July 1790, both simply refused to supply the needed provisions for them.[54]

For a time, this focus on Mangkunagara, his armed forces and his intentions regarding Yogyakarta may have deflected the VOC's attention—and perhaps the Sultan's—from the greater threat posed by Pakubuwana IV's *santris*. Later, Greeve came to believe that this had all been a contrivance of those advisers: they had wanted to set Mangkunagara against Mangkubumi as a means of weakening Yogyakarta. This would then make it easier to pursue their quixotic aim of enabling Pakubuwana IV to take over Yogyakarta when the Sultan died, or at least in other ways to establish Surakarta as the senior court.[55] The long-standing animosity between Mangkunagara and the Sultan would have facilitated such a scheme, if indeed that was what was going on. It is not at all evident how this was supposed to happen in the real world, but perhaps the real world was a secondary consideration for Pakubuwana IV and his parvenu entourage of mystics.

After considerable hesitation, in September 1790 Greeve decided to travel from Semarang to the courts to see if he could somehow engineer a solution to the unfolding crisis. He urgently sought military reinforcements from Batavia. One hundred of his soldiers were in the hospital in Semarang, as were many of the troops in Yogyakarta. On his departure, the defence of Semarang itself would be left in the hands of the "Burgers and Moors" (non-VOC Europeans and non-Indonesian Muslims).[56]

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[53] HB I, Yogyakarta, to Greeve, Semarang, 14 Dulkaidah Ehe AJ 1716 [26 July 1790], and Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 29 July 1790, both in VOC 3910 (OB 1791).

[54] dJ xii, p. xiiin2.

[55] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Nov. 1790, in VOC 3942 (OB 1792).

[56] Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 11 Sept. 1790, in VOC 3942 (OB 1792). Greeve's diary of the trip, covering 15 September to 1 December 1790, is in the same volume; selections are also published in dJ xii, pp. 209–28. Some sections of the archival copy of the diary are damaged, in which case the version in dJ is relied upon below. All references to the diary here will be by the date of the entry. Any other sources will be separately footnoted.

On 20 September 1790, Greeve and Mangkunagara met. The latter asked for the Company's blessing to do one of two things. One was to reconcile with Sultan Mangkubumi. A sign of the Sultan's goodwill would be the return of Ratu Bĕndara and two concubines who had also been taken from him. Failing that, he wanted to take up arms to avenge himself against the Sultan for the multiple insults he had suffered. By this time there were low-level hostilities in Pajang and the southern mountains. According to Greeve, Mangkubumi claimed that these conflicts had been initiated by Mangkunagara and that Mangkunagara's claims to the throne of the Sultanate were an offence to Mangkubumi. Greeve reminded Mangkunagara that in 1788 he had promised never again to speak of Ratu Bĕndara and now, in doing so, showed himself not to be a prince whose word could be trusted. Mangkunagara was also being held responsible for the deaths of two Yogyakarta aristocrats, one of whose bodies had been mutilated. Mangkunagara denied any responsibility for that and insisted that the Sultan had initiated the hostilities. Had that not been the case, he said, he would not have raised the issue of Ratu Bĕndara again. He continued to insist on either reconciliation with Mangkubumi or war.

In Yogyakarta on 21 September, Greeve asked the *patih* Danurĕja whether the Sultan would return Ratu Bĕndara to Mangkunagara. He would rather do anything but that, was the reply. If anyone tried to force him to do so, war was inevitable. Back in Surakarta on 25 September, Greeve tried to discuss a possible settlement between Mangkunagara and the Sultan with the former. Mangkunagara, however, said that he had drunk too much the night before to engage in such discussion. Nevertheless, Greeve met with him briefly. Mangkunagara continued to insist on the return of Ratu Bĕndara and the two concubines as the only acceptable sign of reconciliation with Mangkubumi. On 26 September Greeve learned that other members of Mangkunagara's family, notably his grandson and successor Prangwadana, urged Mangkunagara to maintain his demands, which were made on the advice of Pakubuwana IV. The palace diary also recorded this exchange, but, as in many other passages, it unhelpfully says more about who visited or spoke to whom than what anyone said. In this case, it records merely that on 25 September 1790 Greeve arrived from Semarang without troops. He went to see Pakubuwana IV and then arrived unexpectedly at the Mangkunagaran palace, without fanfare. He presented a letter from Sultan Mangkubumi, but Mangkunagara refused to receive it.

The following day he continued to refuse to become involved in this correspondence.[57]

Later on 26 September, Greeve received further information from the new VOC Resident in Surakarta, J. Fr. Baron van Reede tot de Parkeler (in office September 1790–September 1796), who was possibly the most corrupt person ever to serve in the Company, a status requiring truly colossal dishonesty. According to Van Reede, Pakubuwana IV had said that Mangkunagara would back down if he were given an appanage from the Sultanate such as he had from the Susuhunan's domains. There was further advice about what Pakubuwana IV reportedly said, but with the channel of information going through Van Reede, we can hardly know what to take seriously.

On 28 September a peace agreement between the two monarchs, Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana IV, mediated by Greeve, was sworn and sealed on their behalves by the two *patihs*. This was done in Surakarta, the plan being that Mangkunagara would subsequently add his agreement on 29 September. On that day he refused to do so, instead demanding either an additional appanage of 4,000 households such as he held from Surakarta or the return of Ratu Bĕndara and the two concubines. He was, however, willing to swear fealty to the VOC. On 30 September Mangkunagara complained that he was being forced to do the Susuhunan's will in order to protect the positions held by his children. Greeve's diary noted that, in his view, Pakubuwana IV was really behind all these troubles. Hostilities between Mangkunagara's side—evidently under command of Prangwadana—and the Sultan's continued in the countryside as of 3 October.

On 1 October Greeve advised Batavia that matters had taken on a new perspective. The Sultan, whom the Company at first suspected, was, he believed, entirely willing to accept the Company's assurances and to cooperate. The true source of all problems was in Surakarta, with Pakubuwana IV and Mangkunagara. At first the Company had sought to rely on them, but now their conduct proved that to have been a mistake, he advised.[58]

Assailed with contrary advice and contradictory information, Greeve hardly knew what to believe. His dilemma is, of course, ours

[57] *BT* ff. 253 right–254 right.
[58] Greeve, Surakarta, to Batavia, 1 Oct. 1790, in VOC 3942 (OB 1792).

228 years later. In many respects, this seems to have become a conflict amongst the younger generation—Pakubuwana IV, Prangwadana and the Crown Prince (soon to be Hamĕngkubuwana II) of Yogyakarta—in which Mangkunagara was trying to navigate a complex course in dangerous waters. The Susuhunan's religious entourage added a layer of pious plotting and bedevilment.

Continuing what would today be called "shuttle diplomacy", Greeve travelled again to Yogyakarta. In conversation on 7 October, with the Crown Prince and others present, Mangkubumi rejected Mangkunagara's claims and pretensions. Since Mangkunagara was a subject of the Company, he said, it was for the Company to see to his maintenance. That is, there would be no question of 4,000 households from the Sultan. On 8 October Greeve's diary recorded a conversation between Yogyakarta Resident Van Ijsseldijk and the *patih* Danurĕja. Mangkubumi was reported as holding the view that Ratu Bĕndara's divorce from Mangkunagara had been legal so she would not return to him. Nor would he provide Mangkunagara with 4,000 households from Yogyakarta. The Sultan demanded the return of the villages usurped by Mangkunagara (actually by Prangwadana, it seems). Mangkubumi himself told Greeve on 9 October that the two concubines whom Mangkunagara claimed could not be returned because the Yogyakarta Crown Prince had already had children by them. Mangkunagara could, however, submit a claim for compensation in that matter, which Mangkubumi said he would adjudicate fairly.

Greeve returned to Surakarta. There, on 11 October, news was received that Sultan Mangkubumi was seriously ill. The following day, Mangkunagara told Greeve that he was now even more offended than before. He would regain neither Ratu Bĕndara nor the two concubines and was instead being offered money. Greeve feared that war between Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi could erupt at any moment. On 13 October Mangkunagara again expressed his reliance on the Company. That same day it was reported that Mangkubumi had sent troops to recapture the southern mountain (Gunung Kidul) villages usurped by Mangkunagaran forces.

By 12–13 October, however, the machinations of Pakubuwana IV's religious entourage led Greeve—by now thoroughly rattled, it seems—to reassess the entire strategic situation. He told the Susuhunan that he intended to leave and return to Semarang. Pakubuwana IV insisted on a farewell feast in the *kraton*. Greeve began to fear that his life would be in danger there and, after much indecision,

decided to claim that he could not attend because he was ill. His diary records that he was suffering from haemorrhoids and fever—conditions which can rarely have been as welcome as they were on this occasion.[59]

Greeve's reassessment suddenly opened possibilities for Mangkunagara that he hardly dared dream of, as his continual protestations of reliance on the Company began to bear fruit. Greeve told his superiors in Batavia, who were receiving a copy of his diary in instalments, that the situation was so dangerous and so rapidly deteriorating that there was no time to await their orders. He noted on 12 October that if Pakubuwana IV refused to surrender his circle of religious advisers then the Company must join forces with Sultan Mangkubumi and together attack the Susuhunan. "In the meantime, whatever it costs, we must endeavour to ensure the help of Mangkunagara, even if that means giving him ample assurance of the Susuhunan's throne or other acceptable requital." On 13 October Greeve left Surakarta to return to Semarang. He was escorted by the Surakarta *patih* Jayaningrat (in office 1784–96), to whom he said that he was now convinced that Pakubuwana IV was the true author of all the problems with Mangkunagara.

So now Mangkunagara was—unknown to him—just a step away from the VOC supporting him to take over the throne of Surakarta. We may wonder what Sultan Mangkubumi might have thought of such an outcome, if hostilities might have followed. Whatever the case, it did not come to that. Instead, Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi were about to be reconciled for the first time since their breach in 1752–53.

There were two intertwined issues that had to be resolved before the VOC could be sure of an alliance with Mangkunagara and the Sultan against the Susuhunan: to reconcile Mangkunagara and Mangkubumi after decades of implacable hostility and to align Mangkunagara's interests with those of the VOC. The documentation is somewhat confusing, but the outcome was unmistakeably favourable to Mangkunagara as well as to the Sultan and the previously established Surakarta *kraton* elite, but at some cost to the VOC. The foundation document seems to be one dated 24 September

[59] I have noted in *Jogjakarta*, p. 329n96, that *Babad Pakĕpung*, pp. 7–8, says that he was faking his illness. That is entirely possible, but I remain uncertain how seriously to take this source.

1790, which survives only in its Dutch translation. This is from Sultan Mangkubumi to Mangkunagara, in which the Sultan refers to Mangkunagara as *Adipati Pakunagara*, abandoning his previous use of the latter's pre-princely name Suryakusuma, which he had used as a form of contempt. The Sultan affirmed that henceforth he would live in friendship with Mangkunagara and would withdraw his earlier curse against him and his descendants.[60] It seems that this document of reconciliation then lay on the table, bearing the Sultan's signature (and presumably his seal) but awaiting the swearing of oaths to maintain this reconciliation by Mangkunagara and the Yogyakarta Crown Prince. For the moment, it was thus like the 28 September peace agreement mentioned above between the two monarchs, Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana IV, sworn and sealed on their behalves by the two *patihs* but still awaiting Mangkunagara's signature. This latter document remained a dead letter until the crisis was resolved in November, but (as we shall see) the Mangkubumi-Mangkunagara reconciliation was soon brought to fruition.

At the end of September 1790, Mangkunagara presented a document to the VOC setting out his demands. Since he could not get back his wife (Ratu Bĕndara) and the two concubines, he wrote, the Sultan should provide him with 4,000 households, to be drawn from Magetan, Sukawati, Matesih, Wedi, Masaran and Gunung Kidul (the southern mountains), all areas where he had fought many of his battles during the war years. He said that he should hold these lands "as long as I live", making no mention on this occasion of his descendants. Only thereafter would he swear to the oath of reconciliation, as should the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta.[61]

Greeve recorded that, as of 16 October, the Sultan still refused to give any lands to Mangkunagara. That evening two of Mangkunagara's sons proposed an alternative solution. Princes Purbanagara, governor of Kediri, and Padmanagara, governor of Ponorogo, should be made governors of VOC-held coastal territories if they should

[60] HB I, Yogyakarta, to MN I, Surakarta, 14 Sura Jimawal AJ 1717/24 Sept. 1717 CE (the date is internally consistent, and the conversion is correct), in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790".

[61] There are two versions of this document found in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790": MN I, Surakarta, Geschrift (in Javanese with Dutch translation) (quotation from this document: *salamine kawula gesang*); ditto dated 20 Sura Jimawal AJ 1717/30 Sept. 1790 CE (the date is internally consistent and the CE conversion correct) in Dutch translation alone.

fall into the Susuhunan's disfavour and lose their present positions (a means to make them independent of pressure from the *kraton*). They sought, respectively, one-half of Pekalongan and one-half of Lasem. They further proposed that if 4,000 households were not given by the Sultan to their father, then he could be satisfied with 4,000 *reals* annually from the Company. Either way, this enhancement of income should pass to Mangkunagara's heirs at his death.[62]

On 20 October Sultan Mangkubumi was informed of the proposal by Mangkunagara's sons. The following day he and the Crown Prince absolutely rejected any idea of providing any satisfaction to Mangkunagara before the oath of reconciliation was sworn.[63] On learning of this, Van Reede tot de Parkeler reported that he had stopped further discussion with Mangkunagara's sons and told them to make no more proposals regarding Pekalongan and Lasem.[64]

Greeve thought it imperative to seize the opportunity to satisfy Mangkunagara with a promise of 4,000 *reals* annually from the Company and on 30 October ordered Van Reede to do so. The following day, Van Reede gave Mangkunagara a Javanese document promising him "an annual stipend of 4,000 *reals*, so long as he not only takes the oath, matching that of the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta, but also binds himself, his children and grandchildren by solemn oath to a henceforth unbreakable allegiance and faithfulness to the Company". Greeve wrote to Batavia that Mangkunagara had happily accepted this sign of favour.[65] We can imagine that he might

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[62] Van Reede tot de Parkeler, Surakarta, to Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, 19 Oct. 1790, and document from Pngs Purbanagara and Padmanagara, Surakarta, 11 Sapar Jimawal AJ 1717/19 Oct. 1790 CE, both in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790". The Javanese date's CE conversion would be 21 October 1790; the surrounding documentation, however, suggests that the Javanese document should be dated 6 Sapar (= 16 October 1790 CE) or 9 Sapar (= 19 October 1790 CE).

[63] Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, to HB I, 20 Oct. 1790; Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, to Semarang, 21 Oct. 1790; HB I, Yogyakarta, to Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, 11 Sapar, Jimawal AJ 1717/21 Oct. 1790 CE (the date is internally consistent and the conversion correct); all in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790".

[64] Van Reede tot de Parkeler, Surakarta, to Semarang, 23 Oct. 1790, AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790".

[65] Van Reede tot de Parkeler, Surakarta, to MN I, 21 Sapar Jimawal AJ 1717/31 Oct. 1790 CE (the conversion is correct), in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790"; Greeve, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 and 8 Nov. 1790, in VOC 3942 (OB 1792).

well have been delighted, for here was sign of an enduring alliance with the Europeans and an implied right of succession for his descendants. On 1 November Greeve received news that Mangkunagara had accepted the 4,000 *reals* and had given assurance that he would take the required oath and withdraw his soldiers from Yogyakarta villages. Greeve was certain now that Mangkunagara would aid in removing the Susuhunan's religious advisers, "being himself absolutely opposed to these priests". Mangkunagara's grandson Prangwadana, once thought to be an ally of the new *santris*, was also now at loggerheads with them.[66]

On 3 November Greeve received a document from the Sultan confirming his approval of the reconciliation with Mangkunagara and of the Crown Prince taking an oath to that effect. On 7 November the Yogyakarta Crown Prince took the oath of reconciliation which mirrored that already taken by Mangkunagara the previous day in Surakarta.[67] The following day Greeve notified the Surakarta Resident Van Reede tot de Parkeler and the VOC's Surakarta fortress commander Hartman that if Pakubuwana IV refused to submit, he would be deposed and replaced by Mangkunagara as Susuhunan.[68] Greeve noted in his diary for 13 November the receipt of a letter from the Sultan dated the previous day, confirming that, the oaths having been taken, he was content with the reconciliation with Mangkunagara. Hostilities between the two in the countryside ended.

Mangkunagara was not told how close he was to the ultimate victory of gaining the throne of Surakarta, according to Greeve's diary for 17 November.[69] We cannot help wondering, however, whether in the building stress and confusions of November 1790, with spies at work in all directions, some word of this did not reach his ears. Nevertheless, the palace diary makes no mention of this in its account of the final days before the ultimatum was delivered to Pakubuwana IV and his new *gurus* were surrendered.[70]

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[66] Greeve diary, under date 1 Nov. 1790, in dJ xii, p, 214; also entry dated 5 Nov. in dJ xii, p. 217.
[67] Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, to Semarang, 7 Nov. 1790, in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790".
[68] The text of this letter is in dJ xii, pp. 218–9n1.
[69] In dJ xii, p. 222.
[70] *BT* ff. 262–263 right.

Final preparations could now proceed for the investment of Pakubuwana IV's *kraton*. The Sultan wanted to act before *Garĕbĕg Mulud* on 20 November 1790. Surakarta was filled with the armed entourages of court dignitaries and regional lords for the *Garĕbĕg*, but few of those would have been prepared to defend Pakubuwana IV's new entourage. He was estimated to have only 2,650 professional cavalry and infantry at his command.[71] From Yogyakarta came the VOC's cavalry detachment there, and several artillerists.[72] By the end of October 4,000–5,000 Europeans, sepoys (VOC Indian troops), Madurese soldiers, troops from coastal Javanese governors as well as from Salatiga and Semarang, all under VOC command, were expected to be assembled at Boyolali, where the VOC had a fort.[73] The Sultan sent 4,500 soldiers, including nearly 3,500 cavalry, from Yogyakarta and his outlying *moncanĕgara* domains.[74] The presence of the Indian sepoys seems to have particularly agitated local Javanese. The Mangkunagaran palace diary noted that "on Monday morning [27 September 1790] arrived powerful Company Indians, infidels (*kapir*) the colour of Indian Muslims". There were some 300 of them, the size of Dutchmen. Along with the many other VOC forces arriving in Surakarta, "their purpose was to terrify the Javanese".[75]

The size of Mangkunagara's contribution to the impending attack is not clear, but as his was the only force normally present in the city of Surakarta, we may presume that every one of the 1,380 professional troops he was earlier reported to have who were not needed for the defence of his palace itself, and probably many of the 4,000 men he could levy in a short time, would be ready to join the action. It is difficult to know from the surviving records the total

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[71] "Bijlagen, dagregister 1790", under date 3 Nov. 1790, in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790".

[72] Van Ijsseldijk, Yogyakarta, to Hartman and Van Reede tot de Parkeler, Surakarta, 8 Nov. 1790, in "Bijlagen, dagregister 1790", in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790".

[73] Semarang to VOC posts at Ungaran, Salatiga and Boyolali, 31 Oct. 1790, in "Bijlagen, dagregister 1790", in AN Java's Noord-Oost Kust 162 "Bijlagen 1790".

[74] Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 335.

[75] *BT* f. 254 right: … *ejinge Sĕnen kadira, Kĕling Kumpni praptane, kapir warni kadi Koja, Kumpni kalongira, winatawis tigangatus, ginajih kadi Walada … /0/ Kumpni kathah praptane, watĕn nagari ing Sala, ing Dĕler gora gadha, wong Jawa pinrih atakut.*

number of troops involved in the impending siege of Pakubuwana IV's court, but it may have been something of the order of 15,000 men—cavalry, infantry and artillery. Against such a force, Pakubuwana IV's professional troop companies could not stand. Originally it was planned to present the Susuhunan with an ultimatum on 19 November, but that had to be postponed because of the late arrival of some of the besieging forces.

On the day before *Garĕbĕg Mulud*, on Friday, 19 November, the Mangkunagaran palace saw hundreds gathered for Friday prayers and a festive meal after. Their special purpose was to wish for Mangkunagara's well-being. Festivities carried on in the VOC fortress, the Mangkunagaran palace and Prangwadana's residence until everyone went home drunk. *Garĕbĕg Mulud* on 20 November was a tense affair. Pakubuwana IV did not appear at what was usually a grand occasion. The common folk were in tumult, and the markets were empty.[76] As Yogyakarta and VOC forces gathered, ready to besiege or attack, a portion were billeted in the passageways of the Mangkunagaran district. Mangkunagara himself, however, was again ill.[77]

On the eve of the denouement of this crisis, on 25 November, the Mangkunagaran diary records the receipt of the promised 4,000 *reals*:

> 37. … On the 17th of Mulud …
> Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara] received
> in cash the 4,000 *reals*
> 38. from the Company's Resident.
> It was promised that he would receive this every year,
> 4,000 in total.
> That was promised
> and never to be altered.…[78]

As the attack loomed, Pakubuwana IV tried to think of ways to avoid the obvious outcome, but in the end there was no way out. His uncle (Pakubuwana III's brother) Prince Purbaya persuaded the Susuhunan to surrender his five foremost *santri* favourites. On 26

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[76] *BT* f. 262 right.
[77] *BT* f. 263 left.
[78] *BT* f. 263 left: Canto 76 (Asmaradana) for the year Jimawal AJ 1717: 37. *… Mulud tanggal ping pitulas, ing Jimawal kang warsya, Pangran Adipati antuk, arta kawan ewu reyal*. 38. *saking ing Upruk Kumpni, jangji antuk saběn warsya, kawan ewu ingkang kathahe, wus jangji tan kĕna owah*.

November 1790 they were arrested in the VOC's fortress and were soon on their way into exile. The partition of Central Java between two *kratons*, with a subsidiary Mangkunagaran principality, had survived. There was no attack on the Surakarta court, no renewed civil war. The gathering forces were stood down, the former elite of Surakarta resumed control of *kraton* affairs, and a chastened Pakubuwana IV was left to contemplate how close he had come to disaster. The Company could heave a huge metaphorical sigh of relief.

Mangkunagara may have regretted that the opportunity to engage in a last battle had come to nothing. Perhaps that is why, in the palace diary for 15 October 1791, we encounter reminiscences about his pre-1757 years of warfare, focussing on the supramundane powers of his battle standard *Samběr Nyawa*: the Soul Catcher. This passage again makes one wonder whether this diary might have been kept by Mangkunagara himself, but against that remains the objection that it does not name him as its compiler. It is interesting that in recounting *Samběr Nyawa*'s potency in this passage, the enemies referred to are Mangkunagara's Javanese foes. His many battles against the forces of his erstwhile enemy and now ally the VOC were diplomatically passed over in silence.

11. … When ranging about, the [Mangkunagaran] troops
12. were steadfast, those troops.
    They frequently stormed fortified walls.
    They tested the enemy "father" monarch [Sultan Mangkubumi].
    The troops dared to stand firm against
    Pangeran Singasari
    and Pangeran Buminata.
    Daring to stand firm in battle,
    their shortcoming was being outnumbered by opponents.
    (Yet) not many were there who died and many lived.
13. They were engaged in battle by numerous enemies,
    but despite that, deaths were few.
    Even if there was no smell of enemy dead,
    many enemies died.
    The battle standard named
    old *Samběr Nyawa* (the Soul Catcher) by name:
    the reason it was named *Samběr Nyawa*
    was that rarely could anyone stand against it.
    If it snatched up (*anamběr*) the enemy, many died.
14. If very many were the enemies,
    [Mangkunagara] fled to the mountain forests for refuge.
    If the right number of enemy were separated [from the rest],

> down from the mountaintop they were snatched up (*sinamběr*).
> The enemy were startled that many died,
> if the enemy were summed up.
> Fled to the forest
> was Lord Dipati [Mangkunagara].
> His standard was for that reason named old *Samběr Nyawa*
> (the Soul Catcher).[79]

As we know, after his death Mangkunagara's posthumous appellation became *Pangeran Samběr Nyawa*.

Mangkunagara gained much from this crisis. He did not win the throne of Surakarta, but he won much else. Nearly 40 years of deep-rooted animosity between himself and Sultan Mangkubumi was declared over. Mangkunagara now had a firm tie with the VOC, with the Company committed to paying him and his descendants an annual stipend of 4,000 *reals*. He had sworn on behalf of himself and his descendants to an ongoing alliance with the VOC. That is to say, the principality that he occupied, while not yet formally declared to be hereditary, was implicitly so in the eyes of the Company. It only remained to confirm this new status.

A new contract[80] emerged from the crisis of 1789–90 which had two important aspects for Mangkunagara. First, it formally recognised him as part of the political structure of Central Java along with the *kratons* and the Company by including him as a signatory. Second, it confirmed the end of hostilities between him and Mangkubumi and settled outstanding issues. Article 14 established procedures for the peaceful settlement of any future disputes that might arise between the two: such complaints were to be communicated to the *patih* in

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[79] *BT* f. 300 right–301 left: Canto 87 (Sinom) for the year Je 1718. This passage dated in stanza 1 Sat.-Pon 16 Sapar (=15 Oct. 1791): 11. … *kang bala duk anglalana* 13. *wantĕr-wantĕr ingkang bala, asring ngra[ng]sang baluwarti, cacak mungsuh Rama Nata, kang bala purun nadhahi, Pangeran Singsari, Pangeran Bumineteku, purun nadhahi prang, cacade kathahĕn tandhing, batĕn kathah kang pĕjah kathah kang gĕsang* 13. *kapĕrang mungsuhe kathahe, prandene patine kĕdhik, tan mambu patining mĕngsah, kathah mĕngsahe kang mati, bandera denarani, pun Samběr Nyawa ranipun, mila ran ran* [sic; *ran* is erroneously duplicated] *Samběr Nyawa, pilih kang tahan nadhani, yen anamběr kang mĕngsah kathah kang pĕjah* 14. *yen langkung agĕng kang mĕngsah, m[a]ring wana ngardi ngo[n]cati, yen sĕdhĕng mĕngsah kapisah, sinamběr saking ing wukir, mĕngsah kagyat keh mati, lamun dengĕngi kang mungsuh, ngo[n]cati dhatĕng wana, Jĕng Gusti Pangran Dipati, kang bandera mila ran pun Samběr Nyawa*.

[80] Summarised in Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 341–4.

each court, who would investigate. If the *patihs* could not negotiate a satisfactory settlement, then the problem would be referred to the Company for decision. The contract also bound Mangkunagara to accept the succession of the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta and bound him and his descendants to cause no displeasure to the Sultan in the future.

All of these arrangements again implied that the Mangkunagaran principality was a permanent feature of the political structure of divided Java, and that was soon to become explicitly so. The new Company governor of Java's northeast coast, P.G. van Overstraten (in office 1791–96), travelled to the courts in late March 1792, mainly to oversee events in the wake of Mangkubumi's death in Yogyakarta on 24 March. He also met with Pakubuwana IV. He was, however, unable to meet Mangkunagara, who was suffering from a painful leg, presumably a consequence of the yaws infection which had long troubled him. Van Overstraten shared the view of his predecessor Jan Greeve that an enduring presence of the Mangkunagaran principality, allied with and dependent on the VOC for a substantial part of its income, served Company interests. If Surakarta should one day be threatened by Yogyakarta, the Mangkunagaran principality would constitute a valuable force in maintaining the partition of Java. And the Company was aware that this partition was essential to maintaining its own presence in Central Java. Van Overstraten pressed Pakubuwana IV to agree to the appanage of 4,000 households held by Mangkunagara being inherited upon his death by his grandson Prangwadana. The Susuhunan initially had objections to this but in the end agreed that that should happen.[81] So Prangwadana, who was soon to become Mangkunagara II, would have both 4,000 households from the Susuhunan and 4,000 *reals* annually from the Company. From this time onwards, the inheritability of the Mangkunagaran principality was taken for granted.

With the inheritability of his principality assured, Mangkunagara —now in his mid-60s and often ill—had no more battles to fight. His last victory had been won, in large part through smart manoeuvring, including notably sealing his alliance with the VOC. In March 1791 he sent a court official to prepare his grave at Mangadeg.[82]

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[81] Van Overstraten, Semarang, to Batavia, 25 Apr. 1792, in dJ xii, pp. 271–4.
[82] *BT* f. 275 left. The date is given as Thursday-Pon [18] Rějěb AJ 1717 (= 24 March 1791).

Final Days

We know little of Mangkunagara's life or thoughts from 1792 onwards. Both Dutch and Javanese sources become sparse. The surviving versions of the Mangkunagaran palace diary do not extend beyond 1793, and the latter sections tell us little of interest.[83] Mangkunagara attended Friday worship, and mass Qur'an recitations took place. He often stayed awake through the night before Friday as a spiritual exercise (*lek-lekan*). The prince received visits from VOC officers, visited the Company's Surakarta post or the *kraton*, paid his soldiers, exercised his horses, and held tournaments on the open square at the palace. He went out to observe rice harvests. Children were born or circumcised, and people were married or died. Officials were appointed or fired and criminals punished, sometimes in combat with tigers. Cock- or button-quail (*puyuh*) fights were staged as, more dramatically, were tiger-and-buffalo fights. The palace square was filled for tiger-sticking (*rampog macan*) events. *Wayang* performances were held. In a palace built largely of wood, buildings burned down and were rebuilt, or new buildings were constructed. Mangkunagara's periods of illness and absences from state occasions at the *kraton* were recorded. There were many sicknesses that might afflict an ageing person in 18th-century Java, but in this case we can reasonably assume that yaws was an ongoing problem.

The series of VOC letters which have been so useful to us also ended in 1793, with the last volumes arriving in Amsterdam in 1794, as the VOC's bureaucratic processes disintegrated amidst what F.S. Gaastra has called the Company's "long drawn-out death agony".[84] Presumably there were more letters sent from the courts to the VOC coastal headquarters at Semarang between 1793 and 1795, but most

[83] Sonobudoyo MS PB A.99 (Behrend S122), *Babad nitik Sambĕrnyawa*, is a copy of the palace diary which extends the coverage to Jumadilawal AJ 1720 (December 1793). The earlier portions overlap with *BT*. If one adds 56 to the PB A.99 MS canto number, one has the *BT* canto number.

[84] G.L. Balk, F. van Dijk and D.J. Kortlang, with contributions by F.S. Gaastra, Hendrik E. Niemeijer and P. Koenders, *The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta)/Arsip-arsip Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) dan lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan kota Batavia (Jakarta)/De archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) en de locale instellingen te Batavia (Jakarta)* ([Jakarta:] Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia; Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2007), p. 26.

of that archive was lost when the Semarang town hall burned down in 1850.[85]

We do know, however, that one of Mangkunagara's last acts was to order his scribes of the scriptorium in the female soldiers' quarters to make another copy of part of his *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*. This selection began with his victory over Mangkubumi at Kasatriyan in August 1753, one of the prince's greatest triumphs. But only a brief fragment was begun in 12 May–9 June 1793 and never completed. When one turns the page, instead of the next page of the *babad* one finds a fragmentary copy of the palace diary.[86]

Mangkunagara's interest in preserving his own story thus continued. For the rest, we must speculate, but can do so based on our knowledge of a life that was fulsomely documented in earlier years. Age and very possibly the disabling ravages of yaws—the "chronic, relapsing, and disfiguring disease" with its "severe deforming bone lesions" described above[87]—probably limited his activities. We may imagine his palace still ringing with Qur'anic recitations by hundreds of *santris*, the sounds of the *gamĕlan* and *wayang* performances, and cannon salutes on special occasions such as his birthdays. His regular attendances at Friday prayers no doubt continued so far as his physical condition allowed. Not a little *jenever* probably flowed in the palace, not only because it was one of Mangkunagara's chief pleasures but because it may have helped him to manage his illness. We may doubt, however, that he any longer took part himself when young women arrived for dancing parties. The preparation of his gravesite at Mangadeg was complete under the supervision of his grandson and successor Prangwadana, as we saw above.

On 28 December 1795, Mangkunagara died. For aficionados of Java's complicated calendrical system, the full Javanese date is recorded on his grave at Mangadeg and elsewhere[88] as Monday-Pon,

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[85] Van der Chijs, *Inventaris*, p. 155n1.

[86] Radya Pustaka MS 48 B.1, pp. 84–5; see the opening passage quoted above, p. 208n13.

[87] Mitjà, Asiedu and Mabey, "Yaws", p. 766.

[88] E.g., MN MS 192 (Florida 222.A), p. 38, obviously by someone other than MN, who authored the main texts in this MS. *Windu* Adi here refers to the 32-year cycle rarely used except in divination; see Ricklefs, *Modern Javanese Historical Tradition*, p. 234. MN's death date is also recorded in Rouffaer, "Vorstenlanden", p. 267.

Mangkunagara I's grave at Mangadeg

View from Mangadeg, 1996

16 Jumadilakir, *windu* Adi, *wuku* Pahang, *mongsa* Kapitu, Jimakir AJ 1722. He was 69 years old by CE reckoning, 71 in Javanese years.

Mangkunagara's character was made up of many strands—warrior to the tips of his fingers, devout Muslim of the Mystic Synthesis style, lover of Javanese culture, father (of 25 children)[89] and grandfather, frustrated and sick prince, devotee of beautiful women and Dutch gin. We may wonder, as Mangkunagara drew his last breaths, what thoughts were in his mind. Was he able to reflect upon the fact that, notwithstanding the many disappointments he had suffered, he had outlived his bitterest enemies, Pakubuwana II (d. 1749) and Mangkubumi (d. 1792), and had come out of the crisis of 1789–90 with significant gains? Did he perhaps think to himself, "I have survived the years of war, I have won victories and survived defeats; I have in the end established a principality and arranged for it to pass to my descendants"? Or perhaps, more bitterly, would he have said to himself, "It has been a hard time since I left the ways of war, with many humiliations to suffer at the hands of my enemies, and I wish that I had died as a warrior"?

Or did this man, who exemplified the Mystic Synthesis of Javanese Islam—committed to his faith, a student of its scriptures and practices but also close to local spiritual forces—look forward to being received by Sunan Lawu, the spirit of the mountain where he was about to be laid to rest? Perhaps, having himself copied out the Qur'an at least six times, he contemplated Qur'an 4: 74, 77–8:

> Let those of you who are willing to trade the life of this world for the life to come, fight in God's way. To anyone who fights in God's way, whether killed or victorious, We shall give a great reward.… [Prophet,] do you not see those who, … when fighting was ordained for them, some of them feared men as much as, or even more than, they feared God, saying, "Lord, why have you ordained fighting for us? If only You would give us just a little more time." Say to them, "Little is the enjoyment in this world, the Hereafter is far better for those who are mindful of

[89] Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*, pp. 267–9. All children born to Javanese aristocrats such as MN, regardless of the size of their seraglio, were legitimate, thanks to Islam's easy rules for marriage and divorce. When a concubine became pregnant, MN married her until the child was born, thereby making the baby's birth legitimate. There are several references to such marriages in *BT*. There were thus no "royal bastards" in Java.

> God: you will not be wronged by as much as the fibre in a date stone. Death will overtake you no matter where you may be, even inside high towers."[90]

Historians may wonder how these various strains that made up the remarkable character of Mangkunagara came together at the end of his days, but there are some things that we can never know. Perhaps in our speculations we are being too philosophical and all that Mangkunagara wanted at the end was a glass of *jenever*.

[90] Abdel Haleem's translation, pp. 57–8.

11

Mangkunagaran Legacies

As the 18th century drew to a close, Central Javanese affairs stood on the brink of a major transformation. The VOC had been in decline for years, losing money as an enterprise—not least because of the cost of its military activities in Java—while its officers filled their personal pockets. At the end of the century the bankrupt Company was wound up, and its posts in Indonesia were taken over by the Netherlands government. By this time the wars of the French Revolutionary period were under way. The *stadhouder* (chief executive) of the Dutch Republic, the Prince of Orange William V, fled to Britain in 1795 as French forces conquered his homeland. There he issued what were known as the "Kew letters" ordering Dutch colonial officials to turn their territories over to the British in order to keep them out of the hands of the French. Local officers were not always willing to comply. The British, always a more powerful force in Asia than the Dutch, had already occupied Padang over 1781–84. In 1795 they proceeded to occupy Padang once again, along with Malacca. Thereafter they took control of Ambon and Banda in 1796. From 1795 the British blockaded Batavia. Java was the most important target in their mind.

A Formula for a Colonial Age

Mangkunagara II took over his late grandfather's palace and estates at the start of 1796 and reigned until 1835. At the beginning, he continued to use the name Prangwadana (Commander in War), a title reflecting the ongoing military tradition of the principality. Thereafter each successor to the princedom used the name Prangwadana until his 40th birthday, after which he adopted the name Mangkunagara.

Alliance with the Europeans—initially with the Company, then from 1800 with the colonial government—was a foundational legacy from Mangkunagara I. The relationship was, however, tested in the first years after his death. The Dutch Resident at the court of Surakarta in 1790–96, J. Fr. Baron van Reede tot de Parkeler, whom I characterised in the previous chapter as possibly the most corrupt official ever to serve in the Company, immediately confiscated the moneys inherited by the 28-year-old Mangkunagara II. The latter initiated legal proceedings to recover his inheritance. Van Reede went on to become governor of the northeast coast (1796–1801) and continued to resist Mangkunagara II's claims. Robert Van Niel describes Van Reede as "unusually grasping and greedy" and "leaving no stone unturned to increase his personal wealth". An embittered Dutch contemporary depicted him "reading the Bible and praying in the midst of a dozen Makassarese and Javanese harlots, who encouraged his lechery". Even after his death in 1802 the legal case continued. Only in 1809 did Mangkunagara II recover his inheritance, amounting to Rds. Sp. (or *reals*) 39,800. This was a substantial amount, equivalent to approximately ten years' worth of the 4,000 *reals* paid annually by the Dutch to Mangkunagara I and his descendants.[1]

The Mangkunagaran alliance with the European colonial power survived this challenge and others that followed. In 1806 Napoleon placed his younger brother Louis Napoleon on the throne of the Netherlands. In 1808 this regime sent Marshal H.W. Daendels to Batavia as the new governor general (1808–11). He approached the Javanese rulers with the view that they were truly colonial subjects rather than allies, and built up enough military power to make such a claim credible. The Surakarta *kraton* accepted this new formula, but Yogyakarta resisted. For Mangkunagara II, here were opportunities.

In 1808, on Daendels' orders, Mangkunagara II's military was reorganised into the Mangkunagaran Legion. This initially consisted of infantry, cavalry and artillery totalling 1,150 men—there was no room here for the female soldiers of Mangkunagara I's time—supported with colonial government funding of over 10,000 *reals*

[1] Robert Van Niel, *Java's Northeast Coast 1740–1840: A Study in Colonial Encroachment and Dominance* (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2005), pp. 58, 119; Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500–1920*, transl. Wendie Shaffer (Singapore: NUS Press; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), p. 70.

per annum. Mangkunagara II received the rank of colonel in the service of the Netherlands King. The Legion saw much action on the colonial side over the coming years. It joined in the failed resistance to British conquest of Central Java in 1811.[2] Thereafter it loyally supported the interim British government of Java, including in the conquest of the Yogyakarta *kraton* in 1812. For the Legion's role in that action, Mangkunagara II received Rds. Sp. 7,000 in prize money and the Mangkunagaran lands were increased by 1,000 households.[3] After the restoration of Dutch rule in 1816, Mangkunagara II returned to loyalty to the Dutch crown, and the Legion shortly thereafter saw action in Bangka. It was involved in multiple engagements in support of the colonial power during the Java War of 1825–30. As a reward for this loyalty, the Mangkunagaran lands were increased by a further 500 households, so that they totalled 5,500, which remained the case into the 20th century (during which time the population of Mangkunagaran territories increased, of course).[4] The Legion was also sent into combat against Acehnese attempting to maintain their independence in 1873.[5] The Javanese newspaper *Bramartani* expressed the hope that the Mangkunagaran soldiers going off to Aceh would fight bravely to "repay the love of the Honoured Government that governs and defends the island of Java, amen" and reported with pride that they were being issued with new breech-loading rifles.[6] In 1896 the colonial government rewarded the Mangkunagaran princes for their loyalty by making their principality independent of any administrative or political links with the Susuhunan of Surakarta.[7]

We may note *en passant* that in one respect, Mangkunagara II did not follow the precedent of his grandfather. Unlike the hard-drinking Mangkunagara I, Mangkunagara II was reportedly a teetotaller.[8]

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[2] H.F. Aukes, *Het Legioen van Mangkoe Nagoro* (Bandung: A.C. Nix & Co., 1935), Chapter 2.

[3] Carey, *Power of Prophecy*, pp. 332, 347; A.K. Pringgodigdo, *Geschiedenis der ondernemingen van het Mangkoenagorosche rijk* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 21.

[4] Pringgodigdo, *Geschiedenis*, p. 22.

[5] Aukes, *Legioen Mangkoe Nagoro*, Chapters 3–5.

[6] *Bramartani*, 17 July 1873, cited in Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, p. 152.

[7] George D. Larson, *Prelude to Revolution: Palaces and Politics in Surakarta, 1912–1942*, *VKI* Vol. 124 (Dordrecht and Providence: Foris Publications, 1987), p. 73.

[8] Carey, *Power of Prophecy*, p. 438n10.

The Mangkunagaran palace also cooperated with its European overlords in producing the crops that made Java, at long last, a profitable enterprise for the Netherlands in the 19th century. This already began under Mangkunagara I with the cultivation of indigo, one of the crops most hated by Javanese cultivators because it depleted soil nutrients, required arduous work and stained workers' skins.[9] Although the arrangements of the Cultivation System (*cultuurstelsel*) did not formally apply to the indirectly ruled principalities of Central Java, of which the Mangkunagaran was one,[10] the princes introduced similar arrangements. Mangkunagara IV (r. 1853–81), in particular, laid the foundations for European-style estate management in his lands, mainly for sugar and coffee, largely employing non-Javanese managers. He slowly replaced the system of appanages for payment of his officials with salaries. But for the Mangkunagaran lands, as for many European-run estates, this involvement in overseas trade meant exposure to international market conditions. When coffee disease spread in Java and sugar beet began to be produced in Europe, competing with tropical cane sugar, Mangkunagaran finances were devastated. From 1888 to 1899, the principality's finances were taken in hand by the Dutch Residents of Surakarta, until they were restored to the princes' control.[11]

In cultural and religious affairs, too, Mangkunagaran princes played a significant role throughout the 19th century. Mangkunagara IV was a prominent contributor. He was a prolific writer of Javanese verse.[12] I was told that in his time, writing-boards were fixed

[9] Van Niel, *Java's Northeast Coast*, p. 158.

[10] By this time there were four such: the two kingdoms of the Sultan of Yogyakarta and Susuhunan of Surakarta, the subsidiary Mangkunagaran principality, and the subsidiary Pakualaman principality established by the British in Yogyakarta in 1812. For an authoritative account of the relationship between the colonial government and the Yogyakarta and Surakarta monarchies in the period 1830–70, see Vincent J.H. Houben, *Kraton and Kumpeni: Surakarta and Yogyakarta 1830–1870*, *VKI* Vol. 164 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994).

[11] A comprehensive account of the Mangkunagaran business enterprises down to 1937 is to be found in Pringgodigdo, *Geschiedenis*.

[12] His collected writings are published in Mangkunagara IV, *Sĕrat-sĕrat anggit-anipun-dalĕm Kangjĕng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Arya Mangkunagara IV*, 4 vols (Jakarta: Kolĕp [Kolff], 1953). A useful overview of his writings is in Soebardi, "Prince Mangku Nagara IV: A Ruler and a Poet of 19th Century Java", *Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia* (Dec. 1971): 28–58. This is, however, now rather outdated with regard to historical background and contexts and, in my view, exaggerates the influence of al-Ghazali.

Bronze bust of Mangkunagara IV (1853–81)

throughout the palace so that if an idea for a poem struck him he could write it down immediately.[13] His most famous poem, still celebrated in certain literary circles, was *Wedhatama* [Superior Wisdom], possibly written in the later 1870s. At the time, some doubted that he was really the author of the work. Its latest editor and translator, Stuart Robson, discusses the questions about authorship and adopts a rather agnostic position.[14] While this issue is probably not capable of confident resolution, it is clear that Mangkunagara IV was part of a productive circle of authors in his time, including Ronggawarsita, often dubbed the last great court poet, although his claim to fame, too, was disputed at the time.[15]

Wedhatama is an example of the enduring Mystic Synthesis style of Islam common to many Javanese in the later 19th century,

[13] A Mangkunagaran oral tradition, according to R. Ay. Hilmiah Darmawan Pontjowolo, who was of the Mangkunagaran lineage. She was wonderfully helpful to me in my research in the Mangkunagaran library until her untimely death while on the *hajj* in the tragedy at Mina in 2004, when over 200 pilgrims died.
[14] Stuart Robson, ed. and transl., *The Wedhathama: An English Translation*, KITLV working papers 4 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990), pp. 4–6.
[15] Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, pp. 45, 149.

Al-Wustha mosque, Mangkunagaran, today. Local information suggests that this was begun in the time of Mangkunagara IV (d. 1881) or MN V (r. 1881–96) and completed c. 1918. It is commonly said that the famous Dutch architect Thomas Karsten (1884–1945) played a role in designing this mosque, but there is no solid evidence to support this.* The Arabic inscription on the outer gate bears the *Hadith* that no other faith is superior to Islam and the Confession of Faith (*Shahada*) that there is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God. The inner gate bears the Qur'anic quotation (4:103) that "prayer is obligatory for the believers at prescribed times" (Abdel Haleem's translation) and the *Hadith* that communal prayer is superior to individual prayer. Identification of Arabic quotations thanks to Oman Faturahman.

especially in aristocratic circles.[16] It was framed as Mangkunagara IV's admonitions to his sons "in the hope that they may prosper in the practice of the noble sciences (*ngelmu*) that are found in the land of Java". "Whoever gains God's inspiration," said the text, "is skilled at grasping the ways of gathering up the scattered pieces of himself." The prince's sons were told to take as their example Panĕmbahan

* Hugh O'Neill in Joost Coté et al., *The Life and Work of Thomas Karsten* (Amsterdam: Architectura & Natura Press, 2017), p. 215.

[16] The following brief quotations are from Robson's translation, with a few minor departures by me. The entire Javanese text and translation are in Robson, *Wedhatama*.

Senapati Ingalaga (r. c. 1584–1601), the founder of the Mataram dynasty. "However, at the present time, what the youth are obsessed with is taking as a model and example the Prophet, Guide of the World, the Messenger of God." "If you insist on imitating the Prophet," the young men were told, "O, my boys, you overreach yourself.… Seeing that you are Javanese, just a little is enough." This was in part a response to the reform movement gathering momentum in Javanese Islamic circles from about the middle of the 19th century, which was antithetical to the Mystic Synthesis. That was not the only profound social and cultural change under way.

Social and Cultural Change from the Middle Years of the 19th Century to c. 1900[17]

The period after the end of the Java War in 1830 to the earlier years of the 20th century was the high point of Dutch colonialism in Java. For the first time, the Europeans faced no serious challenges to their authority, a circumstance that brought about significant social change. The colonial government relied on the preexisting Javanese aristocratic elite—collectively known as the *priyayi*—across the Javanese countryside to organise the compulsion essential to its authority and rewarded them with status and financial benefits so long as they remained loyal. The Javanese principalities were subject to indirect-rule arrangements, but there, too, status, symbols and rewards flowed. For some ordinary Javanese there were opportunities, but for many it was a hard time. The consequence of all this was, not surprisingly, a tendency for the elites to become distanced from their people, to see themselves as dependent upon their colonial overlords rather than as leading their people. Opportunities for oppression, extortion and other forms of corruption were rife. This was a circumstance far removed from the relationship between Mangkunagara I or Sultan Mangkubumi and their followers. The Javanese elite was also demilitarised, except for the Mangkunagaran principality with its Legion.[18]

This *priyayi* elite and nobility like the Mangkunagaran princes were attracted to modernity of the kind represented by the Dutch.

[17] This section relies on my book *Polarising Javanese Society*. Only direct quotations or references to other sources will be footnoted.

[18] A small Pakualaman Legion was also formed, but it was insignificant and was abolished in 1892.

Hybrid forms of dress and social styles increased their separation from their surrounding society. Dutch-led archaeological work was discovering much about Java's pre-Islamic past, which inspired members of this elite to think of pre-Islamic culture as the foundation of true Javanese identity. They did not see this as antithetical to Mystic Synthesis-style Islam. But it did incline some of them to be attracted to the esotericism of Theosophy and to Masonry, which seemed to offer bridges between East and West.

In the 19th century, profound change also arose within the world of Islam. Reform movements had spread in the Middle East from the 18th century. Their first major impact in the Indonesian archipelago was felt in the Padri movement in Minangkabau (West Sumatra), which led to the Padri War of 1821–38 and Dutch occupation there. In Java, the first signs of Islamic purification movements appeared in the middle years of the 19th century. The colonial period allowed for a small but growing Javanese commercial middle class to emerge, people who were based largely in the towns and often in contact with Arab traders. It was this middle class that most embraced Islamic reform. These were not people who had much regard for Javanese princes or for their Mystic Synthesis style of religion.

The Islamic reform movement was particularly strong in the commercial centres of Java's north coast, especially where there were significant Arab communities, such as in Surabaya, Semarang, Cirebon, Pekalongan and Gresik. In such places the royal and princely elites of Central Java had effectively no social or cultural influence, although in Cirebon there was a local dynasty that still did.

There were also religious schools (*pĕsantren*) scattered across the countryside whose numbers increased dramatically in post-1830 Java. In 1882 there were over 5,000 religious schools teaching nearly 81,000 students recorded in Java and Madura (those regions normally being amalgamated in Dutch statistics by then). In 1893 there were nearly 11,000 such schools recorded, with over 272,000 pupils. Many of these schools taught older, Traditionalist forms of Islam, relying on the interpretive traditions of the four Sunni schools of Islam, but some embraced reformist ideas.

The advent of steam shipping facilitated links with the Middle East and, in particular, eased the conduct of the pilgrimage. Whereas a mere 48 pilgrims were recorded by the Dutch leaving for the *hajj* from Javanese-speaking areas in 1850, by 1858 the number was 2,283. In 1911 the number of pilgrims from Javanese areas and

Madura was 7,614, and in 1914 it was just over 10,000. Although we must be cautious in accepting these colonial-era numbers in detail, they confirm that there was a major expansion in the number of *hajis* in Javanese society, among whom many were influenced by Middle Eastern purification movements.

As a result of such religious changes, the complexity of which we can only hint at here, the pious Islamic community became increasingly estranged both from the European colonial overlords and from those aristocrats and *priyayi* who claimed to be the summit of the Javanese social hierarchy. Even Sufism in Java became more orthoprax (and more anti-Christian), as the Naqshabandiyya order and the combined order Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya tended to displace the previously dominant, and more relaxed, Shattariyya.

Thus, two forms of modernity were in competition in Java by the later 19th century. One was the revolutionary modernising style of 19th-century Europe, represented by the Dutch.[19] The other was represented by the newer, more orthoprax, more stylistically Arab, more demanding versions of Islam.

Many Javanese peasants found the new forms of Islam unattractive. Thereby emerged a group who still regarded themselves as Muslims but only nominally so. The pious Muslims, who called themselves (among other terms) the *putihan* (the white ones), began to denigrate such non-observant or nominally Muslim villagers as the *abangan* (the brown ones). That term first appears in the historical records from the 1850s. The usage of this term spread across Javanese-speaking areas of Central and East Java as the reform movement spread and commoners' rejection of it followed. By the turn of the century, *abangan* evidently represented a majority of ordinary Javanese villagers. They seem to have attenuated their concern for Islamic orthopraxy and faith, abandoning observation of the "five pillars" and focussing their attentions on local spirit forces. The Dutch missionary-scholar Carel Poensen wrote in the 1880s that the *abangan* were "beginning to become less religious and pious".[20] Not for them

[19] Any reader who, from the vantage point of the 21st century, imagines that truly revolutionary change is a monopoly of our own time would be advised to read Osterhammel's magisterial survey of the "transformation of the world" in the 19th century: Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011).

[20] Quoted in Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, pp. 99–100.

the Arabic-laden pieties of the reformers. Nor were the metaphysical speculations of Javanese aristocrats and their Mystic Synthesis of relevance. What mattered to these ordinary folk was the spirit in the tree at the centre of the village; demons haunting the crossroads, on the nearby mountain or in the sea; the spectral denizens of caves and the spirits that stole children in the night.

From the 1860s and 1870s there arose also anti-Islamic books in Javanese. The most prominent were *Babad Kĕdhiri*, *Suluk Gatoloco* and *Sĕrat Dĕrmagandhul*. Here Islam was ridiculed and the Islamisation of Java was depicted as a cultural tragedy imposed by perfidious Muslims. These works appear mainly to have originated in *priyayi* circles in Kediri. This was in East Java, where there had been plenty of fighting during the wars of the 18th century but which, from the colonial age onwards, was detached from the domains of Central Javanese monarchs and princes and largely immune to their influence.

From 1848 the colonial government opened schools where Javanese of upper-class origin could learn the skills required by modern administration, such as arithmetic, surveying and geography. The students were taught in Javanese. These colonial schools were enthusiastically embraced by the elite. In 1859 Mangkunagara IV, the famous poet and moderniser of his domains, became both a Knight of the Order of the Netherlands Lion and chairman of the commission for the Javanese teacher-training school set up in Surakarta in 1852. Graduates of these schools became a new colonial elite, detached by their education, professional roles, attitudes and achieved status from the graduates of *pĕsantrens*, pious Islamic reformers, ordinary *abangan* villagers and the upper levels of the older elite, with their ascribed status.

Thus it was that a polarisation of Javanese society was increasingly evident by c. 1900. In the opening decades of the 20th century, these divisions became politicised and thereby still more divisive, even violent.

The Mangkunagaran princes were ill equipped to deal with changes brought by the new century. They had embraced some of the legacies of Mangkunagara I, but not all and not the most important for changing times.

The Challenges of the 20th Century

A change in colonial policy, rapid population growth, further developments in Islam, the emergence of modern-style political parties and

economic crisis propelled Javanese society more deeply into politicised and destabilising polarisation in the period down to the Japanese conquest and occupation of 1942–45. This dramatic story has been told in multiple sources and need only be briefly reviewed here.[21]

The new colonial policy inaugurated in 1901 was dubbed the Ethical Policy. It aimed to raise welfare throughout the Netherlands' Indonesian territories. Education, health and welfare measures were at the centre of these efforts, but against the scale of Java's population and the wider geographic scope of the archipelago, effects were limited. One extreme example will suffice: at the top of the educational system, in 1930–31 there were 178 Indonesians in university-level institutions: 3 ten-thousandths of 1 per cent of the total Indonesian archipelago population. Despite these limitations, however, the Ethical Policy was crucially important in producing a small modern-educated elite who became the leaders of the first anti-colonial and nationalist organisations. Modernist Islamic educational institutions, described below, also made an important contribution.

Javanese-speaking areas of Central and East Java were becoming significantly overpopulated in this period, placing further pressure on resources and welfare. Significant population growth had already begun in these areas in the peaceful period after 1757. The population there in 1800 can only be estimated: it might have been anywhere between about 3 million and 5 million. By 1890 it was approaching 24 million. Poensen reported from Kediri in 1886 about "the alarming increase in population".[22] In 1930, when the only reasonably reliable census of the colonial period was held, the indigenous population of Central and East Java, including the principalities, was about 30 million (today the number of ethnic Javanese is around 100 million). The vast majority were rural dwellers in 1930. Semarang, Surabaya, Yogyakarta and Surakarta were the only cities with populations over 100,000.[23]

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[21] There is a massive literature on this period. Of particular relevance here are Larson, *Prelude to Revolution*; Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, Chapter 8; and M.C. Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present* (Singapore: NUS Press; Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012), Chapter 2. A brief overview with references to further literature as of 2008 is found in Ricklefs, *History of Modern Indonesia*, Chapters 14–16.

[22] Quoted in Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, p. 15.

[23] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, p. 22.

Within the internally divided world of Islam, a new style emerged in the form of Modernist Islam. This denied that the four Traditionalist schools of Sunni Islam—among which the Shafi'i school was dominant in Java—were authoritative guides to understanding Islam's revelation. Instead, Modernism relied principally on the human intellect in its approach to the Qur'an and *Hadith* and was therefore receptive towards modern forms of education. It was at least suspicious of, and often downright hostile towards, Sufism. For the particular form of Sufism found in the Javanese Mystic Synthesis, with its belief in local spiritual forces, Modernists had only contempt. From the early years of the century Modernists created schools and later higher-education institutions which produced modern-educated and devout leaders, many of whose members became active in political movements. In 1912 they created Muhammadiyah, the largest Modernist organisation in Indonesia, which is still influential today. From the 1920s, Traditionalists formed their own organisations, of which the most prominent was (and still is) Nahdlatul Ulama, established in 1926. Relations between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama were frosty at best.

Modern-style political parties emerged from the first decade of the century. The honour of being the first is conventionally ascribed to Budi Utomo, established in 1908. This was founded amongst the students at the new educational institutions in Java for doctors and administrators, whom scholars usually describe as the "new" or "lesser" *priyayi*. It is hardly appropriate, however, to see Budi Utomo as a nationalist organisation. It was always focussed on the Javanese rather than having an archipelago-wide vision. It was principally interested in education and cultural issues of benefit to the Javanese *priyayi*, and a sense of Javanese superiority was barely concealed. It never had a mass base, peaking at some 10,000 members in 1909, and stagnated almost from the beginning. Several of its founding fathers saw Javanese culture as being primarily Hindu-Buddhist in inspiration, looked upon the Islamisation of the Javanese as a cultural tragedy and thought that the keys to restoring Javanese culture to its rightful place were to be found through Dutch education.[24]

More radical organisations with significant mass bases soon arose and truly represented the forerunners of popular, even revolutionary,

[24] Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, pp. 217–9.

nationalist movements. Prominent among them were Sarekat Islam (established in 1912) and the Indonesian Communist Party (established in 1920). These two came to bitter conflict over pan-Islam vs. Communism in the early 1920s. Trade unions also flourished for a time. In this period there was significant village-level conflict, as well as burning of cane fields and warehouses, even a few bomb attacks, along with police penetration and suppression. In the "self-governing" principalities, these more radical movements sometimes reflected and encouraged hostile attitudes towards the governing princes and rulers.

This was a time of disruption, politicisation and conflict. The Dutch colonial regime crushed popular movements after an abortive Communist uprising of 1926–27. Thereafter, a colonial policy of suppression and depoliticisation prevented the emergence of large-scale popular organisations. In the 1930s the impact of the Depression thoroughly disrupted Javanese society down to grass-roots level. The terrible hardships of the Japanese occupation of 1942–45 disrupted Javanese society further, repoliticising it and laying the groundwork for the Indonesian Revolution to follow.

Legacies and Lessons Not Learned: A Recipe for Disaster

The Mangkunagaran house was led in most of this tumultuous period by Mangkunagara VII (r. 1916–44). His response to the changes going on around him was emblematic of the principality's problems. He maintained the Mangkunagaran Legion and the palace's close association with the colonial power. He went for his higher education to Leiden, where he joined an army reserve regiment. When World War I broke out he became a junior officer in the Netherlands regular army. He was an able administrator who, on his return to Java in 1915, associated himself with the Javanist conservatism of Budi Utomo. He briefly became chairman of that organisation in 1915. He did display democratic and nationalist inclinations, but when the colonial government named him as Mangkunagara VII, it was conditional upon him resigning from Budi Utomo and from his Dutch reserve army commission. At that point he became commandant of the Mangkunagaran Legion with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In 1932 a senior Dutch administrator wrote that of the four "self-governing" lords—the Sultan and Prince Pakualam of Yogyakarta and the Susuhunan of Surakarta being the other three—

Mangkunagara VII was "undoubtedly the most modern and the most active".[25]

George Larson describes Mangkunagara VII as "a modern renaissance man of letters and of action, a ruler renowned for his patronage of the arts and for his efforts to foster the rebirth of the Javanese language and culture".[26] Laurie Sears noted how in the 1920s–30s, devotees of *wayang* emphasised its mystical aspects "because of the values that were placed on mysticism by groups of Javanese and Dutch intellectuals influenced by Theosophical thought". It was Mangkunagara VII who wrote (in Dutch) "the key representation of shadow theatre in the 1930s", in which he suggested that "every Javanese shadow play was a re-enactment of a spiritual search for mystical knowledge".[27] Since the obviously Hindu-Javanese roots of the great *wayang* stories were also being emphasised, this was a message unpalatable to Islamic purification movements. For most ordinary Javanese villagers who loved *wayang* theatre, this would probably have seemed highfalutin humbug.

When World War II came to Java early in 1942, the Mangkunagaran palace continued its policy of loyalty to the governing authority. The Dutch having been removed from power by Japanese conquest, the Mangkunagaran leadership had to deal with new colonial masters. Larson depicts the situation during those desperately difficult years:

> During the Japanese occupation both palaces in Surakarta declined. Unlike the *kraton* in Yogyakarta, the royal houses in Surakarta made no effort to distance themselves from the Japanese occupation authorities. The estate economy also collapsed, ending a major source of royal funds. Inflation also seriously eroded the buying power of the salaries of royal officials. In 1944 the feeling of disintegration was heightened by succession crises in

[25] Larson, *Prelude to Revolution*, pp. 49, 55, 57–75; quotation from p. 68.
[26] Ibid., p. 65.
[27] Laurie J. Sears, *Shadows of Empire: Colonial Discourse and Javanese Tales* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), p. 15. Sears is referring to MN VII's essay originally published in *Djåwå* Vol. 13, 1933, and available in English translation in Mangkunagoro VII, *On the Wayang Kulit (Purwa) and Its Symbolic and Mystical Elements*, transl. Claire Holt (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Study Program data paper No. 27, 1957).

> both palaces.… Mangkunagara VII died prematurely and … left a youthful successor who was dominated by elderly and conservative court officials.[28]

This was the end of the Mangkunagaran Legion as well, which was disbanded by the Japanese.

When the Indonesian Revolution was declared in 1945, Surakarta rapidly became one of the most radical cities in Java, which it has remained to this day. Larson rightly depicts it as a "centre of communist activity, class warfare, kidnappings and general anarchy".[29] Neither the Susuhunan's *kraton* nor the Mangkunagaran was prepared to respond positively. Both Susuhunan Pakubuwana XII (r. 1944–2004) and Mangkunagara VIII (r. 1944–87) were overthrown by radical popular action. They retained their palace grounds but lost all their outlying lands. Surakarta ceased to be a princely domain.[30] The city and its outlying districts are today ordinary parts of the province of Central Java. The Surakarta princely and royal elite entered a time of family squabbles, scandals and further deterioration in their social standing. There are still people in Surakarta who retain respect for the Mangkunagaran or Susuhunan line, but they are few.

This disastrous outcome for the Mangkunagaran line contrasted with the outcome in Yogyakarta. There Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX (r. 1939–88) adroitly positioned himself as a leader of the Revolution, even welcoming the Republican government to move to Yogyakarta as the Dutch reoccupation of Batavia (Jakarta) proceeded. His *kraton* and the palace of his lieutenant Pakualam VIII (r. 1938–98) thus survived. The Sultan's special role in support of the Revolution meant that, in the midst of the Republic of Indonesia, with no place for crowned heads anywhere else, Yogyakarta became a Special District (*Daerah Istimewa*) governed by its Sultan.

The Mangkunagaran house had clung to major legacies bequeathed by Mangkunagara I, above all the military ethos which was a core element in Mangkunagara I's character. The alliance with the

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[28] Larson, *Prelude to Revolution*, p. 185.
[29] Ibid., p. 187.
[30] An authoritative account of these Revolution-era events is in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–46* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 347–66.

governing colonial authority had been maintained. The cultural commitment to Javanese arts and identity had been preserved. The devotion to the Mystic Synthesis continued. All of this well into a time when the colonial authority became the target of popular movements and was defeated in the Revolution; when, for the main political activists, Javanese identity became subsumed under Indonesia-wide nationalism; when the Mystic Synthesis became the belief system of a Javanist minority and seemed a quaint conservative Orientalism to many young activists; and when the people of radical Surakarta had had their fill of Kings and aristocrats.

There were, however, two crucial lessons that the Mangkunagaran line had failed to learn from the example of Mangkunagara I.

The first unlearned lesson was that changing times required changing policies. Mangkunagara I did not finish his life as the ally of the VOC because he admired the Company or the Europeans. He fought them as his bitter enemies throughout his youth and early adulthood. To him, the Europeans were *kafir* interlopers in Javanese affairs who thwarted his ambitions. In battle he killed as many as he could and suffered the loss of people close to him at their hands. His battle standard, and the posthumous name by which he was known, was the Soul Catcher, which swept up his enemies, Javanese and European. After settling in Surakarta in 1757, however, it became clear that his position as the most senior but still subsidiary prince there exposed him to insult and injury, particularly from the most powerful player in Central Javanese politics, Sultan Mangkubumi. His role to "look after" (*momong*) Pakubuwana III became increasingly unrealistic as the young King grew older and took greater—but never very competent—charge of his own affairs. When Pakubuwana IV came to the throne in 1788 it was obvious that Mangkunagara I was in a weak position which threatened his heirs and the future of his principality. The VOC's decline meant that it, too, was far from the dominant player, even if it could briefly assemble a larger force as it did in 1790. Alliance between these two thus made sense in the context of the later 18th century. It was confirmed in the crisis of 1790 and thereafter. But it was an alliance born of *Realpolitik*, not of affection. This alliance existed because the times changed and Mangkunagara's judgements changed with them. When again times changed dramatically in the 20th century, however, Mangkunagara's descendants forgot this crucial lesson and sat puzzled about what to do until the Revolution swept them aside.

The second unlearned lesson was that the people mattered. There are circumstances in which people's obedience can be compelled, but their loyalty and affection must be won. Throughout the ten chapters above covering Mangkunagara I's life, we watched him courting and winning the affection of followers. He began with the advantage of inherited affection as the son of Mangkunagara the Elder, abandoned as a child because of the injustice dealt to his exiled father. Prophetic expectations attended him. Royal ancestry was capable of winning respect, awe and devotion in 18th-century Java, but they could be powerfully enhanced or undermined by personal qualities. As Mangkunagara I grew older, his personal qualities gave him that charismatic aura that attracted and inspired followers. His dashing military exploits won the admiration and loyalty of many from all levels of society. His people came to believe that he had a special link with Sunan Lawu. On campaign, he sought opportunities to rest his men, to see that women and children accompanying them were sent to safe quarters, that there were food and entertainments, that open discussion and consultation preceded campaign decisions. His troops' morale was always a priority for him. He was, in short, a great general and his followers recognised that. From this all flowed loyalty and affection. This was a lesson not learned by his 20th-century descendants, who assuredly faced difficult times and situations, but who seem not to have realised how profoundly times were changing in the radical city of Surakarta and Indonesia more broadly.

We cannot fault Mangkunagara I's descendants for not seeing the future, since none of us can. Nor can we blame Mangkunagara I for the failures of his descendants. But those descendants might have read the past of their great founder better and learned these two lessons. As Larson observes, "there was nothing inevitable about the demise of the courts in Surakarta",[31] given that matters turned out very differently for the courts in Yogyakarta. There, Mangkubumi's descendant the able young Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX read the changing environment astutely, inspired loyalty among his people and rode the Revolutionary wave with success.

Mangkunagara I was a great man, a fiery and flamboyant prince in war and peace, suited to his turbulent times. He fought hard, won battles with *brio* and suffered defeats with courage. He met

[31] Larson, *Prelude to Revolution*, p. 5.

setbacks and the loss of those close to him with perseverance. He promoted Islamic piety, being perhaps the most perfect exemplar among princes in his time of Java's Mystic Synthesis style of faith. He looked after his followers, their welfare and morale. He drank hard, partied hard, bore illness and insult, loved much and won much. When realpolitik required a change in policy, he read the times and changed policy. In the end, he formed an alliance with the Europeans who had been his bitter enemies and bequeathed to his heirs an enduring principality of significance. We could not ask more of this extraordinary man, who although "small in stature" had "fire radiating from his eyes".[32]

[32] KV, p. 237.



The Indonesian Archipelago



Central and East Java

Key sites of Mangkunagara I's life

Genealogy of Principal Members



This genealogy is based on various contemporaneous Javanese and VOC sources, as

of the Mataram Dynasty



well as Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm* (which is not free of error).

Appendix 1

Detailed Discussion of Principal Primary Sources

The Most Important Javanese Sources

In this book, pride of place belongs to three Javanese sources which shed the most light on Mangkunagara I's life: his autobiographical *Sĕrat Babad Pakunagaran* (abbreviated *SBPn* in the footnotes and here); *Babad Giyanti*, which is both a masterpiece of Javanese literature and one of the finest examples of Javanese historiography (abbreviated *BG* in the footnotes and here); and the hybrid chronicle-diary covering the 1780–93 period, particularly the MS called *Babad Tutur* (abbreviated *BT* in the footnotes and here). Other Javanese works are discussed and consulted in the pages above, but the discussion here will focus on these three sources. Then we will turn to the Dutch documentation.

This is not, I should emphasise, a discussion of the "are-*babads*-reliable?" variety. Opinions have been expressed on that topic since the 19th century, when John Crawfurd (in Java, 1811–16), in a fine display of judgementalism, opined that "In the sense of a rational narrative of public events, history is a species of composition unknown to the most civilised nations of the Asiatic Archipelago. They may, indeed, be said to have no more idea of it than they have of the mechanism and construction of the steam engine." The Javanese, he believed, came the nearest to having "a chronicle of events" but even such works, he wrote, had "more or less the cast of romance, their object being to amuse and not to instruct".[1]

[1] John Crawfurd, *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries*, intro. M.C. Ricklefs, Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints (Kuala Lumpur, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1971); originally published, London, 1856), p. 151.

Since Crawfurd's time, similar judgements have been expressed by several scholars—all too often with limited knowledge of the wide range of *babads* and with ideas resting on the assumption that works called *babads* are all of a kind. They are not. These discussions have, collectively, probably shed rather more heat than light on the matter. An exception to this rule is the work of Peter Carey—like me, a trained historian. We should note how his assessment differed between two of the *babads* concerning the early 19th century which he used in his work. Of the Surakarta court version of *Babad Dipanagara* which he published (LOr 2114, dated 1825), he wrote that "the degree of historical reliability is remarkable and throughout his work, the *babad* writer has shown a grasp of accurate detail which can be confirmed time and again in the other Javanese and European sources".[2] His judgement of a draft *babad* (*sĕrat babad ngengreng*) written by Prince Panular (c. 1772–1826) of Yogyakarta and now held in the British Library (Add. MS 12330), however, was different: "Panular's *babad* was never intended to give an overview of contemporary events from the vantage point of *Realpolitik*. Quite the contrary, it was always conceived as a vehicle for projecting the prince's intensely personal interpretations of affairs and assuaging his frequently wounded *amour propre*".[3]

Here we are discussing only *SBPn* and *BG* (followed by a discussion of *BT* below). My observations are shaped by detailed familiarity with both of those *babads*, as well as my experience in cataloguing Javanese MSS and 50 years of reading *babads* and other works of Javanese literature of various kinds.[4]

To begin our discussion, we must address the crucial question of how works such as these were compiled. Knowing the provenance, date and authorship is important in assessing the value to historians

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[2] Peter Carey, ed. and transl., *Babad Dipanagara: An Account of the Outbreak of the Java War (1825–30); The Surakarta Court Version of the Babad Dipanagara with Translations into English and Indonesian Malay* (Kuala Lumpur: Art Printing Works for the Council of the MBRAS, 1981), p. xi.

[3] Peter Carey, ed., *The British in Java 1811–16: A Javanese Account: A Text Edition, English Synopsis and Commentary on British Library Additional Manuscript 12330 (Babad Bĕdhah ing Ngayogyakarta)* (Oxford, etc.: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1992), p. 8.

[4] See the discussion by Nancy Florida of a rather different sort of *babad* in her *Writing the Past, Inscribing the Future: History as Prophecy in Colonial Java* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995).

of any source; these questions will be discussed with regard to each of *SBPn* and *BG* below. But we must admit that we are obliged to deal with circumstantial evidence when we ask how they were compiled in such overwhelming detail. There is no definitive answer to the question, but in the sources used in this book there are valuable hints.

In testing *SBPn* and *BG*, I have adopted historians' standard approach of comparing their accounts with other sources on the same episodes. That has meant comparing them with each other and, where possible, with VOC sources. Here we have found that dates generally agree, a valuable, virtually mechanical, point of comparison beyond the risk of bias by either side. Names of persons and places of events often overlap and confirm each other, although sometimes (as exemplified in Appendix 3) the Dutch and Javanese sources refer to the same place in different ways that proved irreconcilable. But there are limitations to this procedure. Dates are disappointingly infrequent in *BG*, although that is less of an issue in the later parts of *SBPn*, so that form of comparison is not as available as one would wish. The worlds of the VOC and the Javanese were often so separate from one another, especially in time of war, that developments on the Javanese side—the matter of greater interest in this book—were unknown to the Europeans, so comparison was impossible. Moreover, Dutch sources are not free of bias, distortions, falsehoods and mistakes. Witness the 1746 report that Mangkunagara's brother Png. Pamot and M. Guntur had both been killed, which turned out to be false. This led Hartingh to comment in his memoir, "So one is often misled and more is made of the exaggerated battles than they really were".[5]

Much can, nevertheless, be tested in this way. Such comparison of *SBPn* and *BG* with each other's accounts—written from differing standpoints—and with VOC evidence has often provided mutual confirmations. This justifies us in having considerable confidence that the passages that are incapable of being compared should also be taken seriously.

That returns us to the question of how such voluminous detail in *SBPn* and *BG* came to be recorded. Readers will, I hope, have realised that there is a great deal of such detail lying behind the narrative flow of this book which, for the most part, could only be hinted at and only occasionally quoted verbatim. How did such material come to be recorded in massive works of Javanese verse?

[5] KV, pp. 131–2.

Sceptics might wish to reply that such *babads* are, in effect, long historical novels: imagined characters interacting with people who actually lived, made-up details hung on a framework of actual events, and the thoughts of actors imagined in ways that faithfulness to historical documentation would make impossible. We could perhaps ask masters of that genre how they put their works together. In his *1876*, Gore Vidal wrote, "I have mixed real people with invented ones" but all the real ones said and did "pretty much what I have them saying and doing".[6] In his *Lincoln*, he wrote that he had introduced fewer "invented figures" than in some other of his historical novels. "All of the principal characters really existed," he again wrote, "and they said and did pretty much what I have them saying and doing" with some exceptions.[7] In his masterpiece *War and Peace*, Tolstoy captured the period of the Napoleonic Wars as viewed from Russia, giving us some of the finest writing known to me about that age. At its end, he said the following of the work: "*War and Peace* … is not a novel, still less an epic poem, still less a historical chronicle. *War and Peace* is what the author wanted and was able to express, in the form in which it is expressed." He said that he juxtaposed "non-historical characters with other characters who are historical", changing names or using ones that "resemble well-known Russian names". "Wherever in my novel," he wrote, "historical figures speak and act, I have not invented, but have made use of the materials, of which, during my work, I have formed a whole library … for which I can always give the reference."[8]

There is nothing comparable in a *babad* like *SBPn* or *BG*, where there is no sign of invented figures. There are very many people mentioned in the chronicles of whom the VOC knew, or reported, nothing. Given Dutch ignorance of so many aspects of Javanese life, however, that proves nothing. The person described in Appendix 4, Yasadipura I, is a case in point. I do not think that any scholar of Javanese literature would seriously argue that this famed writer never existed; yet, to my knowledge, there is no reference to him in European sources from his lifetime. European sources do, of course, sometimes offer crucial corroboration. If we did not have European records to confirm the existence of Seh Ibrahim (discussed

[6] Gore Vidal, *1876* (London: Panther, 1977), p. 359.
[7] Gore Vidal, *Lincoln* (London: Panther, 1985), p. 861.
[8] Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, pp. 1217–22.

in Appendix 2), I think it would be hard to credit that such an extraordinary character actually existed and played the role that he did in Java. He was no invention of Javanese authors.

Nor is there any sign in all the collections of Javanese MSS of some sort of pre-digested or more polished historical records upon which framework a *babad* like *SBPn* and *BG* could have been composed as if it were a historical novel. These *babads* are themselves the records that we have. Their use of dates is important. Although dating is infrequent in much of these works, it is notable that dates which are internally consistent in the complicated Javanese system—citing seven- and five-day week days, 35-day cycle, lunar month, year in the eight-year cycle, chronogram for the year and sometimes further complexities—would have been difficult to concoct long after the events. So they must have been recorded at the time, as is exemplified in the hybrid *babad*-diary *BT* discussed below.

Having pondered this question for five decades, I can only conclude that in the case of *SBPn* and *BG*, the voluminous accounts of events, dates, consultations and conversations can only have been preserved in such extensive detail if they were recorded at the time when they occurred or shortly thereafter. We know that there were always scribes present in the entourages of Kings and aristocrats, and they must have been at the side of various actors, compiling records. We cannot imagine Mangkunagara I himself recording the details of battles as he fought them. But we can certainly imagine a professional scribe in his entourage recording how clashes of arms unfolded, or even the prince himself recording them at the end of the day, when memory was fresh. Then at some time of greater leisure, in the interstices between times of action, he could have done the writing and versifying that became *SBPn*. We have seen accounts above of him writing out the Qur'an; writing his *babad* would have been no more difficult. Perhaps we should picture our *babad* composers at their work in the evenings, as others enjoyed *wayang* and other entertainments or were busy making shot for the next day's fighting.

I must, however, enter a caveat about direct speech. Since *babads* were written in verse and Javanese actors presumably spoke in prose, there must have been editorial freedoms taken to make direct speech fit the requirements of Javanese poetic metres.

Babads such as *SBPn* and *BG* generally proceed in chronological sequence, with events following one another in time. Causation and consequences are frequently ascribed. Because of X, then Y occurred, they tell us. Chronology is sometime abandoned in order for a

narrative thread to be pursued to a logical stopping point, then a "flashback" takes us back to pick up another narrative thread, just as in modern historians' writing. The *babads'* cultural context is of course the spirit-filled context of the time. So events are sometimes ascribed to spiritual actors, to God or Ratu Kidul or Sunan Lawu or some other supernatural force. This was no different from European accounts of the time which ascribe events to divine intervention.

SBPn and *BG*, in my view, therefore exemplify a writing tradition which we may properly call "historical". They do not have the discussions of conflicting sources or contending interpretations that we historians may employ, so using the term "chronicle" seems appropriate. But these sources are historical in character, just as are the better-known historical traditions of their time, the Islamic, Chinese and Western records. They must rest upon a recording of events, actions, statements and feelings recorded at or near their time of occurrence, polished to fit the literary demands of Javanese literature. *SBPn* and *BG* are thus sources without which the history of their time cannot be written.

They must be subjected to the rigorous analysis that all sources demand, needless to say, in order to answer the core questions that historians direct to all sources: where does this information come from, did the compiler have an interest in presenting a particular version of developments, for whom was this source written, when was it written, was it contradicted in other sources, how was it transmitted to us, and so on? In the case of *babads* we often find it difficult to answer such questions, but in the cases of *SBPn* and *BG* we know enough to recognise their value as historical accounts of the times.

Having looked at the general character shared by these two most remarkable works, *SBPn* and *BG*, we now turn to the particularities of each.

Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran

SBPn is a MS held in the British Library (Add. 12318), having originally been acquired from John Crawfurd in 1842. The beginning of the text is shown on p. xx of this book. It is written on European paper watermarked "Honig & Zoonen", one of the famous Dutch paper manufacturers of the time. The text is finished in that it has both a beginning and an end. As will be seen in the frontispiece, however, the stanzas had received their rubrication but there were

still blanks in the canto-headings awaiting their decoration, so the decorating of the MS is incomplete. There are also several blank openings perhaps intended for grander illuminations (ff. 144v.–145r., 230v.–231r., 248v.–249r.).

We have already discussed the issue of Mangkunagara's authorship and when this MS was written early in Chapter 7. We noted that at the end (f. 418r.) the MS reads, *ingkang murwa carita, Kangjĕng Pangeran Dipati, ingkang saking lalana andon ayuda* ("The author of this story was Pangeran Dipati [Mangkunagara], back from his travels during his time at war"). This seems to me to imply that it was composed or finished by him shortly after settling in Surakarta in 1757. The copy that we have, however, was begun on 17 August 1779, on the prince's 55th birthday in the Javanese calendar (f. 1v). The distinctive wording at the beginning and end of the MS indicates that this copy was made in the scriptorium in the female soldiers' quarters in his palace.

John Crawfurd (1783–1868) was in Java during the British interregnum administration and served as Resident at the Yogyakarta *kraton* from 1811 to 1814 and again in 1816. He built up a major collection of Javanese MSS now in the British Library. Some were acquired at the sack of Yogyakarta in 1812, while others were bought or copied from MSS loaned to him. The *SBPn* MS Add. 12318 appears to have been loaned to him from the Mangkunagaran palace. He then had a copy made by one of his scribes, named Sĕtrawijaya, which became Add. MS 12283; Add. 12296 is another MS copied by this scribe.[9]

A note is attached to the scribe's copy Add. 12283. The note reads "History of Mangkunagara, composed by the prince himself", further confirming Mangkunagara I's authorship. Inside the original MS Add. 12318, (f. 1r.) is another note which reads, "History of the wars and rebellions of Mangkubumi [*sic*] written under his own superintendence and taken from the original manuscript". These notes confused me when I first catalogued these MSS in 1969, leading me to think that Add. 12283 was the original MS and Add. 12318 the

[9] See M.C. Ricklefs, P. Voorhoeve† and Annabel Teh Gallop, *Indonesian Manuscripts in Great Britain: A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Indonesian Languages in British Public Collections; New Edition with Addenda et Corrigenda* (Jakarta: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia, Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2014), pp. 45, 47.

copy; all that was needed was a second look to see that their relationship was the other way around. I conclude that Crawfurd borrowed the 1779 copy of the work which we have relied upon from the Mangkunagaran (Add. 12318), had a copy made (Add. 12283), and then failed to return the original. A misleading note about "the wars and rebellions of Mangkubumi" was then added to Add. 12318.

Another very short fragment of the *babad* is found in the Radya Pustaka MS 48 B.1, p. 84; see Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. iii, pp. 723, and the discussion on p. 208 above. This is dated Sawal, Dal AJ 1719 (= 12 May–9 June 1793) and begins with Mangkunagara's victory over Mangkubumi at Kasatriyan in August 1753. It is another product of the scriptorium in the Mangkunagaran palace. When one turns the page, however, one encounters a copy of the hybrid *babad*-diary discussed below.

Babad Giyanti

BG is one of the finest works of Javanese literature known to me as well as one of the most impressive works of history written in Javanese. Like *SBPn*, it has a rather complicated history.[10] The German scholar-missionary J.F.C. Gericke (1799–1857) was sent to Batavia in 1827 by the Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap and lived there until his death. At some point, he acquired a copy of *Babad Giyanti* in six large volumes. Volumes 2–6 entered the collection of the Bijbelgenootschap in Amsterdam, which subsequently became part of the Leiden University collection (NBS 29–33).[11] The first volume, however, evidently was left behind in Java, perhaps because the title *Babad Kartasura* was written on it.

The later scholar J.L.A. Brandes (1857–1905) went to Java in 1884. Somehow he acquired that first volume of *BG* formerly in Gericke's possession. To complete the work, Brandes ordered a copy of Volumes 2–6 from Leiden (NBS 29–33). This complete set then entered the collection of the Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen in Batavia, so that there was again a complete copy in Batavia/Jakarta, in fact the only complete MS

[10] Here I follow the discussion in my article "*Babad Giyanti*: Sumber sejarah dan karya agung sastra Jawa", *Jumantara: Jurnal Manuskrip Nusantara* 5, 2 (2014): 23–5.

[11] Pigeaud, *Literature of Java*, Vol. ii, pp. 13, 719–20.

copy. That is now in the Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia as BR 22b-f and BR 643, amounting to 2,338 pages. From these volumes the colonial government publishing house Balai Pustaka published *BG* in 21 small volumes over 1937–39.[12] That published version confirms at the start of each volume that it "follows the original kept in the Kon. Bat. Gen. v. K. en W." (*miturut babon ingkang sumimpĕn ing* Kon. Bat. Gen. v. K. en W.). A transcription from that Balai Pustaka text (and others) is now also available on the website of Sastra.org.

The authorship of *BG* is not certain. No MS establishes this, but it is generally accepted that it was composed by the Surakarta poet Yasadipura I (1729–1803), a contemporary of the events it describes. There are three published lists of Yasadipura I's works, the earliest being in concocted Javanese conversations by C.F. Winter, Sr. (1799–1859) used for language instruction.[13] The lists disagree amongst each other and contain works that demonstrably cannot have been written by Yasadipura I.[14] Nevertheless, all agree in ascribing the authorship of *BG* to him. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we can accept that *BG* was probably written by Yasadipura I.

When it was written is also at issue. In the opening section of this Appendix, I suggested that *babads* with the extraordinary detail and level of accuracy we find in *BG* and *SBPn* must rest on records compiled as developments occurred. But when they were turned into refined works of Javanese verse is a separate question. In *BG*'s case, we have one intriguing hint in Vol. xiv, p. 19, where the emerging breach between Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara c. 1752–53 is under discussion. *BG* quotes Png. Purbaya, who was Mangkunagara's uncle and Mangkubumi's younger brother, referring to Mangkubumi as *ingkang raka Jĕng Sultan* (elder brother Lord Sultan). Since Mangkubumi did not have the Sultan title until 1754–55, we may take this as an indication that this part of *BG*, at least, was composed after that period. If the ascription to Yasadipura I is correct, then *BG* must have been finished by 1803.

BG tends to see events from Mangkubumi's point of view, despite being written in Surakarta (if, indeed, Yasadipura I was its author).

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[12] Behrend, *Katalog induk*, Vol. iv: *Perpustakaan Nasional*, pp. 52–3, 112.

[13] C.F. Winter, Sr., *Javaansche zamenspraken*, Vol. i, ed. T. Roorda (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1911 [5th printing]), pp. 352–4.

[14] For a fuller discussion, see my paper on "The Yasadipura Problem".

It may also be that *BG*, like *SBPn*, originally ended with Mangkunagara's settling in Surakarta, followed by his peace with the VOC at Salatiga in 1757. At that point in *BG* (Vol. xxi, pp. 39–45) there is a notable change in style. There is an explosion of dates equivalent to the period from March to April 1757 concerning mainly marriages. Then the text proceeds quickly to the early 1760s, with some errors in dates. I am left with the feeling that from about Vol. xxi, p. 42, or thereabouts, we are dealing with an addendum added after an original ending of the text.

The Mangkunagaran Chronicle-Diary and Its Authorship

The Mangkunagaran hybrid chronicle-diary is an important source for the years 1780–93. It is witnessed in several MSS and in three main versions. (Version 1:) KITLV Or. 231, a MS on *dluwang*, covers AJ 1707–18 (1780–91 CE). Summaries of this MS are available in KITLV Or. 232 and MN B29a (Florida MN 696.1); a typed transcription is MN B29b (Florida 696.2). This is the version called *Babad Tutur* (here abbreviated *BT*) and is the one usually referred to above. (Version 2:) Sonobudoyo PB A.99 covers AJ 1715–20 (1788–93 CE), and is also written on *dluwang*. (Version 3:) A version covering the years 1784–90 CE, which appears to be identical with the parallel sections of KITLV Or. 231, is found in Radya Pustaka RP 48 B.1; as noted above with regard to *SBPn*, on p. 84, this MS also contains a short fragment of a version of *SBPn* dated in 1793.

The work is called variously *Babad Nitik Mangkunagaran, Babad Nitik Samběr Nyawa* or *Babad Tutur*. In Chapter 7—where the opening passages of these copies are quoted—we have seen that these MSS seem to be copies made in Mangkunagara's scriptorium of lady soldiers.

The question of authorship is important and has been confused. In cataloguing *BT*, Pigeaud described it as "daily happenings … described by a female scribe"[15]. Florida catalogued RP 48 B.1, titled *Sĕrat Babad Nitik Mangkunagaran*, as a "daily journal of events in the Mangkunagaran court recorded by a female court poet/scribe or court poets/scribes".[16] In her article "Javanese Court Society and Politics", Pt. i, which is based on version 1, Kumar writes (p. 4)

[15] Pigeaud, *Literature of Java*, Vol. ii, p. 832.
[16] Florida, *Javanese Literature*, Vol. iii, p. 72.

that the *prajurit carik estri* mentioned at the start of the MS is "the diarist" or "the authoress". I have also described the work as a "diary kept by a female soldier of the Mangkunagaran".[17] We were all wrong, misled by the information that we should have understood as identifying these MSS as copies produced in the scriptorium in the female soldiers' quarters in Mangkunagara I's palace.

What KITLV Or. 231 says in a note before the start of the text proper is, *Pemut kang anĕrat prajurit carik estri, anutugakĕn carita sĕrat Babad Tutur*. The first stanza of the text (which is faulty, having two additional lines) refers to *carik estri, kang nĕrat nunurun* the text. This tells us that the female scribe wrote out or copied (*nĕrat, nunurun*) this work down to its end (*anutugakĕn*). The beginning of her task is dated 22 Siyam AJ 1717 (26 May 1791). Note that this date is found *at the start of* the MS diary that extends to 1791, confirming that the diary existed in its entirety down to 1791 *before* the *carik estri* began to make her copy.

MN B29b (Florida MN 696.1) has an interesting variation on the opening passages, reading (in correct Javanese orthography rather than the antiquated style of the transcription) *Pemut kinen nĕrat prajurit, carik estri kinon*, *anutugakĕn carita Sĕrat Babad Tutur* …, with the first stanza again mentioning *carik estri kang nĕrat nunurun*. So this copy of the diary says that the *carik estri* was ordered (*kinen, kinon*) to write out/copy the work. Suroso, who did the transcription in MN B29, may have had access to a photocopy of KITLV Or. 231 (Nancy Florida advises me that such a copy was held in the Mangkunagaran palace in the early 1980s) but might also have been working from another MS which was available to him. It is not clear whether he misread what is found in KITLV Or. 231 or had a copy which differed from it. Whatever the case, his reading was that the *carik estri* was/were ordered (*kinen, kinon*) to write out/copy the work. In RP 48B.1 we also find the brief fragmentary copy of Mangkunagara I's autobiographical *SBPn*, already referred to above, which begins with a statement about four female scribes (*carik wanodya*) from among the corps of 60 female soldiers (*prajurit istri*) being ordered (implicitly by Mangkunagara I) to copy out (*tinuduh anĕrati*) that work in the month of Sawal, Dal 1719 (May–June 1793).

The copy of the diary in Sonobudoyo PB A.99 does not help us here for it is missing its initial pages. Its first full canto is equivalent to KITLV Or. 231 canto 57.

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[17] Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis*, pp. 239, 241.

This evidence suggests that Pigeaud's, Florida's, Kumar's and my earlier depictions of the female writer of the MS as its "authoress" or "the diarist" (to use Kumar's terms) are unsupported by the evidence. The lady in question was (or, the ladies in question were) the copyist(s) only. The author of the diary remains unknown.

We might suspect that it was Mangkunagara I himself who kept these regular notes of events and versified them, just as he was the author of his *SBPn* and other works. Furthermore, we cannot imagine who other than he would be in a position to give orders to his lady scribes to copy something. But if he were the author, it seems to me inconceivable that he would not be identified as such, as is the case with his other works.

We are therefore obliged to conclude that *BT* and the related MSS are records from within the Mangkunagaran palace but that their authorship remains unknown.

The Principal VOC Sources

Dutch sources are as indispensable to the study of 18th-century Java as are Javanese sources. And they are, if anything, even more voluminous for a period as long as that covered in this biography. They suffer from cultural distance from and often limited understanding of Javanese affairs, in which we are most interested here. Remember that only a handful of the VOC's Europeans had even met Mangkunagara I in person before his reconciliation in 1757. For the period after 1757, when Mangkunagara and the many other Javanese actors became better known to the Europeans, the Dutch sources become considerably more valuable. The most commonly cited Dutch sources are those discussed below.

Kort verhaal

"Kort verhaal van de Javasche oorlogen welke met onderscheidene prinsen gevoerd zijn sedert den jare 1741 tot den algemeenen vrede gesloten in den jare 1757" [Short account of the Javanese wars conducted with various princes since the year 1741 to the general peace concluded in the year 1757], in the footnotes and here abbreviated KV, is an insider account in the form of a memoir, an invaluable record for the period of the Third Javanese War of Succession, which was published in 1830.

KV conveys the understandings of Nicolaas Hartingh, a major actor in these events. It is remarkably like many a Javanese *babad*:

sparsely dated, sometimes getting events out of order, its authorship questioned by some, but nevertheless an invaluable insider account from a senior Dutch participant. KV refers to Hartingh throughout in the third person, just as Mangkunagara refers to himself in his *SBPn*. The similarity in such matters reminds us of the cultural parallels that could exist between Dutch and Javanese literary cultures in the 18th century.

There has been uncertainty about the authorship of KV. Hartingh's 1761 *aide-memoire* for his successor as governor of Java's northeast coast, W.H. van Ossenberch, refers near the end to having attached "an extract covering all that happened on this coast since the year 1741 with some brief reflections, etc., compiled in my empty hours" which perhaps Van Ossenberch might care "one day to have a look at".[18] J.K.J. de Jonge, the compiler of that volume of documents published in 1878, commented in a footnote to that page, "Hartingh here refers to the 'Kort verhaal van de Javasche oorlogen welke met onderscheidene prinsen gevoerd zijn sedert den jare 1741 tot den algemeenen vrede gesloten in den jare 1757', which was published in … 1830. Up to now this 'Kort Verhaal' has been ascribed to Mr. de Munnik [Hermanus Munnik], Hartingh's secretary."[19] P.J.F. Louw discussed uncertainty about this ascription in 1889.[20] In 1910 De Haan surveyed the various opinions on the matter and decided that Hartingh himself was unlikely to have been the author, largely because "the style of this piece is much more polished but at the same time less pithy" than Hartingh's usual style and it was "not in his character to praise himself" as in KV.[21] In 1974 I accepted the ascription to Munnik.[22] As will be seen below, the closer study of this source which I necessarily did for this book has led me to change my view. In 1981 it was G.W. Van der Meiden's conclusion that KV "was almost certainly written by Hartingh himself".[23]

Set against the doubts about Hartingh's authorship is other evidence. Hartingh clearly did compile such reports himself. He said of his 1756 "Short Report over Java's Northeast Coast", sent to

[18] Hartingh to Van Ossenberch, Semarang, 26 Oct. 1761, in dJ x, p. 373.
[19] Ibid., note 1.
[20] Louw, *Successie-oorlog*, pp. 3–4n.
[21] De Haan, *Priangan*, Vol. i, Pt. ii: *Personalia*, p. 56.
[22] Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 46n24, 436.
[23] Van der Meiden, "Turkish Mediator", p. 100n32.

Batavia in November 1756, "I myself am the compiler."[24] There is also internal evidence in KV. On pp. 125, 183, we encounter several uses of the first person *ik*. On p. 197, too, we read "I won't detain myself [sic: *Ik zal mij niet ophouden*]" with various details, "for this is all fully described in the daily account (*dagregister*)" concerning the settlement with Mangkubumi. I presume that Munnik would not refer to himself in such a memoir in the first person if he was merely its scribe, so these can only be cases of Hartingh's voice speaking.[25] In 1761 Hartingh described Mangkunagara as "Although small of stature, fire and vivacity radiate from his eyes",[26] which is closely paralleled in KV's description of him as "small in stature but amazingly animated and nimble of foot, with fire radiating from his eyes".[27] There is also a revealing personal comment when KV reports (p. 183) that when Hartingh was chosen to replace Van Hohendorff in 1754, he had to give up his position in charge of native affairs in Batavia, "in which post he would, however, have preferred to remain". In the KITLV collection (now in Leiden University Library), there is a MS—H 141 (c)—which is a copy of KV. On it is found a roughly scribbled note in an old hand that reads "door Nicolaas Hartingh gezaghebber van Java's Noord-Oost Kust" (by Nicolaas Hartingh, governor of Java's northeast coast).

From all of this assertion and argument, I believe that it is appropriate to conclude the following:

- Nicolaas Hartingh was most probably the author of KV.
- Even if he was not the writer of the document, whoever wrote it did so at his direction and instruction, conveying Hartingh's understandings and recollections.
- It is in the nature of a memoir but must rest upon records compiled at the time as events unfolded, with Hartingh's later observations and judgements.
- Even if some uncertainty may linger about whose hand wrote the document, it is appropriate to regard it as Hartingh's document, a valuable insider's account of affairs.

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[24] Hartingh, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 Nov. 1756, in dJ x, p. 311.
[25] Munnik is mentioned in KV, p. 236, where he is reported as playing a role at Salatiga in 1757.
[26] Hartingh, *Memorie*, Semarang, 26 Oct. 1761, in dJ x, p. 363.
[27] KV, p. 237.

The Unpublished VOC Archive

The correspondence written by officers of the Company exists in formidable volume, held in the Netherlands National Archives in The Hague and in the Indonesian National Archives in Jakarta. Documents—almost entirely in the form of letters—are here referred to by their authors, recipients, and dates and places of writing. These records give us not only immense detail about events as understood from the Europeans' point of view but also dating, which is essential to getting often confusing accounts of events into their temporal relationships. For the entire period of this study, these sources are essential. They are particularly valuable for the years of peace after 1757, when Europeans' contacts with the principal Javanese actors were closer and better informed.

Most of the citations in this book are to documents sent to Batavia from the area described as Java's northeast coast, found in the sub-series *Batavias inkomend briefboek* [Batavia's Incoming Letter-book] held in the Netherlands National Archives. This is part of the larger series *Overgekomen brieven en papieren* [Letters and Papers Received, i.e., sent from the VOC's various offices to the Netherlands]. References give the number of the volume in the VOC series, followed by the year that volume was received (*Overgekomen*) in the Netherlands (OB …). Documents from Indonesia's Arsip Nasional are listed in the system in use in that archive; I should warn, however, that my notes were made a considerable time ago and I cannot guarantee that the documents are still organised with the same terminology.

Because of the massive volume of these documents, one is obliged to skim them in search of relevant matters, a procedure carrying inherent risks of missing something significant. The alternative, however, would be to employ a small army of research assistants with the right linguistic and historical training (what research grant would pay for them and their training?) or commit oneself to several decades of painstaking study, in the midst of all the other personal and professional demands of life. So we must skim with what is, we hope, a trained and experienced eye.



Sample page of VOC documentation, from VOC 2825 (OB 1754)

Appendix 2

Who Was Seh Ibrahim?

We have seen in Chapter 5 that a Turk named Seh Ibrahim played a significant role in mediating between Mangkubumi and the VOC. In the 1970s G.W. van der Meiden of the Netherlands National Archives encountered this man in Dutch sources: a Turk named Ibrahim, bearing the title *sayyid*—a descendant of the Prophet—with a most interesting history. I, too, had run across him in my research on later 18th-century Java, and concluded that he "must remain one of the more mysterious and romantic characters" of the time.[1] In 1981, after we had corresponded about Ibrahim, Van der Meiden published an authoritative account of what was known about him at that time.

In attempting to identify this enigmatic Turk, we begin with Van der Meiden's 1981 analysis of the Dutch archival information,[2] repeating some of the discussion in Chapter 5 as we do so. In January 1753 Ibrahim arrived in Batavia and informed Governor General Mossel that he was prepared to negotiate between the VOC and Mangkubumi. Remarkably, he asked for no remuneration for his services. In February the governor general and Council of the Indies considered this proposal. They decided to send Ibrahim to Semarang. Van Hohendorff was ordered to receive him, to take care not to reveal any classified information, but to see what he might be able to achieve.

Not much more is known from Dutch material (we will turn to Javanese information below) until October 1753. Then, after his

[1] Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, p. 59.
[2] Van der Meiden, "Turkish Mediator", pp. 92–9.

devastating defeat at Mangkunagara's hands, Mangkubumi wrote to Mossel, saying that he had complete trust in the man he called (in the Dutch translation of his letter) "Bapa Serif Besaar" (presumably the Malay term *bapak Sarip Bĕsar*, "father" the Great *Sharif*). Mangkubumi believed that Ibrahim had been sent with the authority of the King of Mecca, which may well be a Dutch translator's misunderstanding in rendering *Sultan Rum*, meaning the Ottoman Sultan. A subsequent letter asked that Ibrahim be accepted as a mediator between Mangkubumi and the Company. So Mangkubumi as well as the VOC appear to have accepted Ibrahim's claims to some sort of superior spiritual standing and authority to play a role in the conflicts in Java.

In early 1754 Van Hohendorff finally allowed Ibrahim to travel back to Batavia. He took letters from Mangkubumi as well as a gilded *kris* and four horses as gifts for the governor general. Because there was then no one in Batavia who could read a letter written in Javanese, Ibrahim had to convey Mangkubumi's views orally. This suggests that he was perhaps able to speak Malay, the *lingua franca* of the archipelago (along with Portuguese) also used by Europeans.

Babad Giyanti records further information about Ibrahim from a Javanese perspective.[3] This material presumably rests largely on what Ibrahim said to the Javanese about himself. The *babad* tells us that he was a wealthy Turk named Ki Seh Ibrahim who arrived in the archipelago as a ship's captain (*nangkoda*) seeking to trade, along with a younger brother named Ki Seh Iskak. The latter soon disappears from the *babad* narrative. Their ship's mast broke and their sail was torn away, stranding them at *Pulo Drus* (Onrust Island, in Batavia's harbour). There, Ibrahim was told that the place was governed by the *Jendral* (i.e., governor general) in Batavia who has "a skin like yours, but your turban is different from his hat; both of you gentlemen have the same white skin". (In Javanese usage of the time, Europeans, Chinese and, in this case, Turks were commonly regarded as having white skin.)

Ibrahim and his brother set off by sampan to Batavia, leaving their crew to guard their ship. They enquired about the location of the governor general's residence and proceeded directly there. The

[3] *BG* Vol. xiv, pp. 61–73. Quotations from p. 62: *akulit kadi tuwan /0/ nanging kaot sĕrban lawan topi, kalih tuwan sami kulit pĕthak*; p. 63: *pan ingsun iki Rum Turki, iki cape rajengwang*.

latter was amazed at this encounter. Ibrahim then showed *Jendral Jakup Musĕl* (Governor General Jacob Mossel) a document and said, "I am a Turk from *Rum* (Istanbul) and this is the seal (*cap*) of my King." Mossel examined what is described as the seal of Sultan Muamat Likan and a second from Sultan Mustapa Rumi. He then consulted with the other members of the Council of the Indies, telling them that this was a great ship's captain who bore the true seal of *Sultan Rum*.

Multiple mysteries lurk in these accounts. Let us look first at the "Sultans" who are said to have given Ibrahim some form of written authority, with a seal (*cap*). Ottoman Sultans' documents are known not for their seals, but for their elaborate monograms (*tughra*). We might imagine that Ibrahim's document was some form of *laissez-passer* for a merchant. Or it might have been what Ottomans called a *berat*, from Arabic *bara'*, a confirmation of someone's appointment or privileges. Whatever it was, if Ibrahim's document was in Ottoman Turkish, it would have been difficult to find anyone in Java who could read it and thereby confirm its contents. We are told that a Makassarese named Kaji (Haji) Duljaki mastered *Turki Arab*, which suggests Ottoman Turkish, and that he therefore became Ibrahim's translator.

But were his documents from an Ottoman Sultan at all? Who was the person called in Javanese *Sultan Muamat Likan, Rum ingadli ratu*? The Ottoman Sultan at the time was Mahmud I (1730–54). I am advised[4] that in the relevant period there were no members of Ottoman royalty named Muhamat/Muhammad Likan (also Lekin or Leken) or anything like it. Since in Javanese script the character *nga* was normally used for the *'ain* in Arabic script, *ngadli* was probably the Javanese rendering of the Turkish word *'adli*, from the Arabic root *'adl*, having to do with justice, the law, etc. Thus, *Rum ingadli ratu* could derive from the title *Sultan-i 'adl*, which was sometimes used by Ottoman Sultans as well as other Muslim rulers, conveying the idea of the just ruler of *Rum*.

Later in *Babad Giyanti*, we find a translated letter from Ibrahim to Mangkubumi, which was rendered into Javanese by religious figures claiming to be competent in Arabic. It mentions "*Sultan*

[4] By my colleague Jack Fairey, to whom I am grateful for all of the Ottoman information here.

Mustapa Rumi, who made the *cap*".[5] This raises the question of the second *cap*, mentioned earlier, by *Sultan Mustapa Rumi* (Sultan Mustafa of *Rum*), also not the name of a Sultan of this period.

A possible author of this second document by Sultan Mustapa Rumi could have been the contemporary Ottoman Grand Vizier (1752–55) Çorlulu Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha, who was in office at the right time for our tale. He would have had the authority to issue a document bearing the Sultan's imperial seal or his own personal one—could such a seal be the *cap* referred to in *Babad Giyanti*? But this could also have been an older, still-treasured document (of unknown purport) issued by, or in the name of, Sultan Mustafa II (r. 1695–1703), one of the most famous Ottoman Sultans.

If we draw a distinction between the two documents, we may conclude that no Ottoman Sultan named Muamat Likan/Lekin/Leken had given Ibrahim a written document. It is important to note, however, that we only know the term *Sultan* from Javanese texts. No VOC source suggests that Ibrahim claimed to be an emissary of the Ottoman Sultan. Javanese Muslims were self-consciously a part of a wider Islamic world, within which the Ottoman Sultan played a major role. We noted in Chapter 5 how the figure of *Sultan Rum* was of great importance in Javanese mythology, a universal monarch responsible for the peopling of Java and the subduing of its powerful spirits. Javanese Muslims had made the *hajj* to Mecca—in small numbers in this age—but direct knowledge of contemporary Turkey is likely to have been rare. That being the case, it seems to me possible that if Javanese encountered the term *pasha*, which was used for dignitaries such as the grand vizier or the governor of an Ottoman territory, they might have confused it with the term *padshah* employed by the Ottoman Sultans themselves. So if Ibrahim presented himself as having the authority of a *pasha* behind him, his Javanese interlocutors might have misunderstood this *pasha* to be the *padshah*, the Sultan himself.

The term *Likan/Lekan/Leken* remains mysterious but could be consistent with the suspicion that Ibrahim's document came from an Ottoman governor or some such potentate. Such a dignitary—

[5] *BG* Vol. xv, pp. 35–6: *Sultan Muhamad Leken, Rum Ngadli kang ngĕbayani, wĕwĕngkone Rum sadaya, sagung kang para Narpati Sultan Mustapa Rumi, ya gawani ĕcapipun*.

a *pasha*—might also have called himself *qul-i khan*, the "slave of the emperor", although this form was more associated with the Iranian Safavid empire. So perhaps *qul-i khan* became *likan* in Javanese. But that does not take us any closer to an Ottoman potentate who might have issued Ibrahim's document. This speculation brings us to no confident conclusion, except that the document the Javanese believed to be from Sultan Muamat Likan was from no Ottoman emperor at all, but might have been from some other Ottoman potentate.

The second document by Mustapa Rumi leads in a more—but not much more—promising direction. It could have been genuinely a document of some sort issued by the Grand Vizier Çorlulu Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha, who could certainly be described as Mustafa Pasha from *Rum—Mustapa Rumi* in Javanese. Or it could have been an old document in the name of the famous Sultan Mustafa II (d. 1703).

Van der Meiden asked:

> Why should the Turk have spent so much time and gone to so much trouble to bring the Javanese war to an end? Were his motives of a seriously pacifist nature? Was he an idealist, or was he really an emissary of some Muslim prince concerned about the inhabitants of Java? Or was he just hoping to acquire glory and riches? Why did he so suddenly disappear? These are difficult questions about a fascinating personality who is very much of an enigma.[6]

If our speculations above, inspired by the Javanese records, are correct, then some Ottoman dignitary—perhaps the Grand Vizier Mustafa Pasha—knew (probably via Mecca pilgrims) of the civil war in Java. He may have given a document to a Turkish merchant, a noble descendant of the Prophet (*sharif*), on his way to the East, authorising him to resolve the civil war if possible. That Ibrahim refused payment for his services strengthens the idea that he was not some adventurer who saw an opportunity to advance himself, but rather a Turkish subject of the Ottoman Sultan bent on doing the right thing. If he expected reward, it was from the Ottoman side, not the Javanese or Dutch. Or from God. In declining payment, according to *Babad Giyanti*, he told the Dutch, "If I can bring a halt

[6] Van der Meiden, "Turkish Mediator", p. 102.

to the people's conflicts, my reward will already be great in the eyes of God."[7] Perhaps that genuinely explains his activities in 1753–54.

But there is more to tell about this man, for Ibrahim's later adventures were also rather remarkable, if less successful.[8] With the negotiations between Mangkubumi and Hartingh under way, Ibrahim travelled to Batavia in June 1754. From there he informed Mangkubumi that, with the governor general's agreement, he was going to travel to Mecca and return to Java within seven months. Van der Meiden believed that Ibrahim probably never in fact returned to Java.

In late 1755 or early 1756 Ibrahim turned up in Istanbul, where he called upon the French ambassador Charles de Vergennes. The latter described him as "Shereef [*sharif*] Ibrahim" from "Rumealia" (*Rumelia*, the land of *Rum*). This term suggests that Ibrahim might have been—or presented himself as being—of Balkan origin. He claimed to have lived in Java and Sumatra for 25 years and to have been employed as an agent on behalf of the VOC to negotiate with "Indian" (i.e., Indies, what we would now call Indonesian) princes. He was carrying letters which he said came from such potentates. He claimed to have had a confidential conversation with the Sultan of Java—either Pakubuwana III or Mangkubumi may have been meant—who sought help in getting rid of the Dutch. Ibrahim had advised him that the French King, rather than the Dutch, was the foremost European friend of the Ottoman Sultan. So Ibrahim had been sent as emissary on behalf of the Sultan and other princes from Java, Sumatra, Malaya and Malabar to seek French support to free them from the Dutch presence. Ibrahim sought De Vergennes' assistance to travel to Paris to pursue these princes' cause with Louis XV. De Vergennes doubted this tale and advised that travel to Paris would be very dangerous in the middle of the Seven Years' War (1756–63). Again, Ibrahim asked for no money from the ambassador. In Paris, the French minister of foreign affairs took advice from the French East India Company; neither was inclined to take Ibrahim's information seriously. In March 1757 the French rejected Ibrahim's proposition. By this time, Ibrahim had left Istanbul for a trading trip to the Black Sea.

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[7] *BG* Vol. xiv, p. 66: *yen amurungakĕn wong tukaran, pan wus gĕdhe ganjaran, mugguh Hyang Mahaluhur*.

[8] Van der Meiden, "Turkish Mediator", pp. 100–7.

In 1771 he appeared again in Istanbul, this time to contact the Dutch chargé d'affaires Frederik de Weiler. The latter judged Ibrahim then to be about 65 years old. If that was a reliable estimate, then he would have been born c. 1706 and was thus in his late 40s when negotiating with the VOC and Mangkubumi in 1754. He now claimed that he had lived for more than 16 years in Java. He described himself with the Malay terms *Tuan Sayyid Bĕsar* alias *padre grande* (perhaps a Dutch translator's attempt to render *Sayyid Bĕsar*). He claimed to have acted as the VOC's agent in negotiating trade matters and was now in Istanbul seeking further orders. He claimed also to have a letter of recommendation from Batavia but refused to show it to De Weiler. He then commenced what Van der Meiden describes as "a long and obscure harangue, claiming that the princes of Java, Malaya and Sumatra distrusted the government in Batavia and wanted a guarantee from the Company in Holland before entering into any agreement with Batavia". When this material was sent on to the government (the States-General) in the Netherlands, it sought the advice of the Amsterdam chamber of the VOC. The latter replied that it knew nothing of such a person. As Van der Meiden comments, "they were not aware of the information, scant as it was, on the Turk's role in 1753–54, buried in their vast archives". So they were unwilling to pay for Ibrahim to travel from Istanbul to Amsterdam. That is the last that is known of Ibrahim's remarkable adventures.

We may quote Van der Meiden's conclusions about Ibrahim, to which we will add some further observations:

> His motives were not financial. He wanted instead to become important in the world, to put himself in the forefront of events, and above all to travel. It is clear that he wanted to recreate his brilliant stroke of the year 1753. Then he had been able to achieve something notable, although he disappeared before the denouement.… A voyage to Europe was evidently a dream he harboured into old age. His first endeavour in Constantinople was much better prepared for than his last one in 1771, which suggests that he had, by then, lost track of time. He must have, to some extent, lived in a dream-world, in a fantasy of his own creation.… Said Ibrahim, Tuwan Said Bĕsar, made his mark, even if not all he endeavoured met with success.

With the further insights from *Babad Giyanti*, we can add to Van der Meiden's views: Ibrahim seems to have been a wealthy Turkish

merchant, a descendant of the Prophet, whose background brought him superior standing in the Muslim societies of Southeast Asia, notably in Java. It is possible that, in addition, in 1753–54 he bore a document of some sort from a contemporary Ottoman dignitary (Muamat Likan) plus another (by Mustapa Rumi) which might have been in the name of the contemporary Grand Vizier Mustafa Pasha, but could also have been an older one bearing the *tughra* of Sultan Mustafa II. One or other, or both, of these documents may have authorised him to take steps to end the civil war in Java if opportunity presented itself.

As was clear in Chapter 5, Ibrahim's contribution to the Mangkubumi-VOC reconciliation appears to have been significant. His intervention put an end to Mangkunagara's negotiations with the VOC. His influence over Mangkubumi was considerable and materially contributed to the suspension of hostilities between him and the VOC, and thus to the eventual peace settlement of 1755. Hartingh later claimed the success for himself and dismissed Ibrahim's role, but Batavia held Ibrahim in higher regard.[9] In the turbulent, bloody history of mid-18th-century Java, Ibrahim seems to have played a part that was without self-interest—except insofar as it increased his self-belief and pious standing—and which improved the lives of Javanese and Europeans. But we will probably never know for sure who wrote his mysterious letters of authority.



Tughra of the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa II (d. 1703)

[9] Ibid., pp. 101–2.

Appendix 3

Site of the Battle at Tugu, October 1754

It was common for Dutch and Javanese records to refer to the same location of events with different terminology. For example, the site of the important rebel victory of December 1751 was described as being at the Bogowonto River by the Dutch but as occurring at the village of Jenar by the Javanese, as seen in Chapter 2. In that case, there is no difficulty in identifying the village of Jenar on the Bogowonto River. Different place names were also used with regard to the battle of October 1754, but in that case there is no easy resolution.

The VOC referred to the October 1754 engagement as taking place at the "Samongko" River. The Javanese called it the battle of Tugu (*paTugu*). Reconciling these locations and identifying them in modern topographical terms are difficult. I have been unable to locate a river named Samangka or similar. There are several places called Tugu (meaning a stone monument or marker), but I can locate none in the right area. It is clear that the fighting took place in Sukawati, which corresponds to present-day *Kabupaten* Sragen. *SBPn* ff. 344v.–346v. says that after the looting of Selo, Mangkunagara I crossed the local river to Jětis (a common name; 35 such are listed in Schoel, *Alph.reg.*, pp. 98–9) and then marched south intending to fight the VOC east of Bangawan (River) Solo at the village of Paseban(?). He arrived in Sukawati and stopped at a place called Pajok in Sukawati (which must be modern Pojok near Mondokan, Sragen). Prince Mangkubumi was to the west of Majenang (in Sukawati, also in *kecamatan* Pojok, Sragen) with VOC troops; they marched to the east side of the river of Tugu. Mangkunagara was by then at Ngara-ara (the location of this Ngara-ara remains unclear), and the VOC was

at Sidakarsa (perhaps present-day Sidoharjo, a *kecamatan* within Sragen). The following day battle commenced at Tugu. *BG* Vol. xvii, pp. 5–7, also refers to the Sultan Mangkubumi-VOC forces being at Majenang, whence they crossed the Běngawan (Solo) and advanced on Tugu (further confusing locations).

I conclude from all this confusion that the place then called Tugu was probably in the lowlands north of the town of Sragen, with the Kendeng hills to the north of it.

Appendix 4

A Glimpse of Yasadipura I in 1788

In the Mangkunagaran palace diary covering the last troubled months of Pakubuwana III's reign, a famous figure from Javanese literary history appears. I noted above that Ng. Yasadipura I (1729–1803) was one of the most famous of Javanese authors, but that there are reasons to doubt that he composed some of the works ascribed to him. A life of Yasadipura I published by his descendants claims for him a senior role in the *kraton* just at this time of developing crisis. The chronicle *Babad Pakĕpung* does the same; it was evidently composed by Yasadipura I's son and is of doubtful historical value.[1] I have expressed doubts about these claims in my 1997 article on the "Yasadipura problem".[2] It is therefore of interest to discover in the Mangkunagaran palace diary the following entry in January 1788:

> 14. On Tuesday afternoon [13 Rabingulakir AJ 1714 = 22 January 1788 CE], to Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara] came emissaries of his "son" the Crown Prince.

[1] Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. xxi–xxii.

[2] See Ricklefs, "Yasadipura Problem", pp. 277, 282; Yasadipura's life is described in Sasrasumarta, Sastrawaluya and Yasapuraya, *Tus Pajang: Pengĕtan lalampahanipun swargi Raden Ngabehi Yasadipura I, abdi-dalĕm Kaliwon Pujongga ing Surakarta Adiningrat* (Surakarta: Pangĕcapan Budi Utama, 1939), pp. 5–18, which is the basis for the account in S. Soebardi, ed. and transl., *The Book of Cabolek: A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation and Notes, a Contribution to the Study of the Javanese Mystical Tradition*, Bibliotheca Indonesica 10 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 18–20.

Two in number were dispatched,
one of them named Yasadipura, the other
Kartadiwirya.
They sought his approval
to appear at court on
the next Thursday.
The Crown Prince, representing his father the King [Pakubuwana III]
wished to sentence persons:
15. first, Ki Dĕmak who had been captured,
who was to be flayed.
Then the Gadhing folk [a category of court servants]
would burn
the one whose crime was that he was suspected of black magic,
Wringin Anom by name.
Pangeran Adipati [Mangkunagara]
said that he would attend
and left the matter up to the King.
The two emissaries offered their *sĕmbah* and took their leave,
having been given money.[3]

This depicts Yasadipura in the role of a court messenger—what was known as a *gandhek*. As was normal with *gandheks*, he carried his message as one of a pair. Such a role was consistent with Yasadipura being a poet, for *gandheks* needed literate skills, but it is inconsistent with the claim that he was an influential senior member of the court.

[3] *BT* f. 134 right: Canto 47 (Dhandhanggula) for the year Jimakir AJ 1714: 14. *Salasa sontĕn Pangran Dipati, dhatĕng putusane ingkang putra, Pangran Adipati Anem, wong kakalih pinutus, wasta Yasadipura malih, lan Kartadiwirya, nuwun idinipun, bejang Kĕmis sinewaka, Adipati Anem makili Ramaji, arsa ngukumi tiyang.* 15. *Ki Dĕmak kang cinĕkĕl rumiyin, tinĕngkĕr-tĕngkĕr ing badhenira, wong Gadhing ngabong badhene, dosa tinarka nĕluh, Wringin Anom, ingkang wawangi, Pangeran Adipatya, ature anurut, mongsa barong karsa Nata, kang putusan kakalih, ngatur sĕmbah amit, sinangonan ardana.*

Appendix 5

Senior Officers of the VOC in Java during Mangkunagara I's Life[1]

Governors General, Based in Batavia

Mattheus de Haan	1725–29
Diederik Durven	1729–32
Dirck van Cloon	1732–35
Abraham Patras	1735–37
Adriaan Valckenier	1737–41
Johannes Thedens	1741–43
Gustaaf Willem Baron van Imhoff	1743–50
Jacob Mossel	1750–61
Petrus Albertus van der Parra	1761–75
Jeremias van Riemsdijk	1775–77
Reinier de Klerck	1777–80
Willem Arnold Alting	1780–96

Governors of Java's Northeast Coast, Based in Semarang, 1748–96

Joan Andries Baron van Hohendorff	Feb. 1748–Apr. 1754
Nicolaas Hartingh	Apr. 1754–Oct. 1761
Willem Hendrik van Ossenberch	Oct. 1761–May 1765

[1] It has not been possible to remove all uncertainties in these lists. They rest upon volumes in the VOC archive in the Netherlands Nationaal Archief; documents in dJ; Louw, *Successie-Oorlog*; Rouffaer, *Vorstenlanden*; and Appendix 1 in my *Jogjakarta*, pp. 426–7.

Johannes Vos	May 1765–July 1771
Johannes Robbert van der Burgh	July 1771–Sept. 1780
Johannes Siberg	Sept. 1780–Sept. 1787
Jan Greeve	Sept. 1787–Sept. 1791
Pieter Gerard van Overstraten	Sept. 1791–Oct. 1796

First Residents at Surakarta, 1741–96

Joan Andries Baron van Hohendorff	1741–Feb. 1748
Balthasar Toutlemonde	Feb. 1748–52
J.H. Abrahams	1752–Oct. 1757
Duurveldt	Oct.[?] 1757–61
Jan Christoffel Beuman	1761–Sept. 1767
Frederik Christoffel van Straalendorff	Sept. 1767–84
Willem Adriaan Palm	1784–11 May 1788
Andries Hartsinck	June 1788–31 Aug. 1790 (relieved of many of his duties after Nov. 1789)
J. Fr. Baron van Reede tot de Parkeler	Sept. 1790–Sept. 1796

First Residents at Yogyakarta, 1754–99

C. Donkel	Sept. 1754 (at Pĕdagangan)–early 1761
Jacob Cornelis van der Sluijs	Early 1761 (May or before)–1764 (after March)
Jan Lapro	1764–Oct. 1773
Jan Mathijs van Rhijn	Oct. 1773–Sept. 1786
Wouter Hendrik van Ijsseldijk	Sept. 1786–early 1799

Acknowledgements

It has taken me a long time to research and to write this book, and I've piled up many debts of gratitude along the way. I first became interested in Mangkunagara I while doing my doctoral thesis and first book, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi*, in the later 1960s (published in 1974). I had by that time catalogued Mangkunagara's *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* in the British Museum (now in the British Library) and realised that it was an important source. At some point, I decided that I would try to do a biography of this flamboyant character, which would mean reading voluminous Javanese sources, notably *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* and *Babad Giyanti*, and going through thousands of pages of VOC archival material, some (but not all) of which overlapped with what I also read for other studies. Since other research topics seemed to me more pressing, I made a secret promise to myself—and of course to Mangkunagara I—to give him the biography he deserved when I retired. Over the years, while doing what academics do, teaching, researching, publishing and taking on leadership roles, along with the normal activities of life whenever there was a free moment—often when overseas on my own in a hotel room—I read whatever Mangkunagara-related documentation I had. I gathered any other Mangkunagara material I came across in researching other topics. Since retiring from my last job at the National University of Singapore in 2011, the research and then the writing became more full-time activities.

I had long pictured myself doing this book at leisure, in the spirit of the quotation from the Tang dynasty's Liu Yuxi that hangs on the door to my study:

> In my humble study I am the most virtuous …
> I strum my plain old zither, read Buddhist *sutra*,
> No music to grate my ears,
> No office papers to tire my mind and my soul.

I am pleased to report that Mangkunagara I has proved a worthy companion in my retirement, not least because I have no zither to strum. I hope that readers of this book will also find him a rewarding object of their attention.

In writing this book, I have received crucial help from three people who read drafts and gave me invaluable comments. In the first place, my wife, Margaret Ricklefs, supported me as an editor and in a thousand other ways. My dear friends and academic colleagues David Chandler and Peter Carey read chapters and made many suggestions for improvement. Other friends and colleagues answered detailed questions, and I thank them all: Nancy Florida for advice on MSS held in Surakarta and other matters, Barry Hooker for matters of Islamic law, Michael Laffan for information on R.M. Kareta from his work in the South African archives, Jack Fairey for advice vital to Appendix 2, Nico Kaptein and Oman Fathurahman on Arabic and Islamic matters. Others are thanked in footnotes. Stuart Robson generously offered his formidable scholarly expertise to back up my proofreading. It is impossible to thank all the libraries, librarians, archives, archivists and universities that have supported my research on Mangkunagara I over the last 50 years. It will be clear from the bibliography that the Netherlands National Archives, the Indonesian National Archives, the Leiden University Library, the British Library and the Reksa Pustaka library of the Mangkunagaran palace have pride of place in this regard. It has been a pleasure to work with Paul Kratoska, Peter Schoppert and Lena Qua of NUS Press on this and previous books, and I am most grateful to them. Sunandini Arora Lal was a superb copy editor, smoothing out multiple slips and inconsistencies, for which I thank her. The index was compiled by Alan Walker to his usual high standard; for this, readers should be as grateful to him as I am.

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M.C. Ricklefs
Melbourne
October 2017

Illustration Credits

Opening folio of Mangkunagara's autobiographical *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* (BL Add. MS 12318, f. 1v.), reproduced courtesy of the British Library Board.

Javanese "warlike weapons" from J. Crawfurd, *History of the Indian Archipelago* (3 vols; Edinburgh: Archibald Constable & Co., 1820).

Gamĕlan orchestra, Yogyakarta, 1888; *bĕdhaya* dancers, Yogyakarta, 1884; *wayang topeng*, Yogyakarta, 1888; and w*ayang wong*, Yogyakarta, 1899; all photographed by Kassian Cephas (1845–1912).

Photograph of *wayang kulit* performance with *gamĕlan* performers in the foreground, taken on 31 December 2016 in the Bangsal Sri Manganti of the Yogyakarta *kraton* by Erlijn Sie.

Depiction of the *wayang* character Buta Terong from Hardjowirogo, *Sedjarah wayang Purwa* (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1952).

Engraving of Governor General G.W. van Imhoff in 1744 by P. Tanjé after a painting by Ph. van Dijk, from N.J. Krom, *Gouverneur Generaal Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff* (Amsterdam: P.N. van Kampen & Zoon N.V., 1941).

Mangkunagara I's grave at Mangadeg. Photo by Sunaryo Haryobayu, Oct. 2017, with the kind permission of the *lurah juru kunci*, KRMT Lilik Priarso Tirtodiningrat.

Bronze bust of Mangkunagara IV (1853–81), from A.K. Pringgodigdo, *Geschiedenis der ondernemingen van het Mangkoenagorosche rijk* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950).

Sample page of VOC documentation, from the Netherlands National Archives, Den Haag, Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), nummer toegang 1.04.02, inventarisnummer VOC 2825 (OB 1754).

Tughra of the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa II (d. 1703), from Wikipedia Commons.

Engraving of Batavia c. 1750 by Giuseppe Filosi, from the author's collection.

All other photographs by the author.

The maps and genealogical chart were prepared from my rough drafts by Lee Li Kheng.

Glossary

abangan	nominal or non-practising Muslims; literally, "the red ones"
Adipati	combined with Pangeran as a senior princely title
alun-alun	great field before the court or a regional lord's residence, where tournaments, tiger-baiting, etc., took place; there was normally one such on the north of a court or lordly residence and another on the south
babad	Javanese chronicle, normally written in verse
bĕdhaya	the most sacred dance in the court, performed in stately unison by seven or nine young women. The most sacred forms, the *Bĕdhaya Kĕtawang* and *Bĕdhaya Sĕmang*, commemorate the meeting between Sultan Agung and the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, who is believed to be immaterially present in the performance.
bĕndhe	small military gong
bupati	high official in the court or the countryside; a governor
Dĕmang	mid-rank official
Dipati	the same as Adipati
cacah	households; more generally, counting units
dhikr	literally "remembrance"; the recitation of the names of God or other pious formulae as a mystical exercise
gamĕlan	Javanese orchestra consisting mainly of percussion instruments

Garĕbĕg	thrice-annual court festivals. They consisted of *Garĕbĕg Mulud* (on 12 Mulud) celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, *Garĕbĕg Puasa* or *Pasa* (on 1 Sawal) celebrating the end of the fasting month, and *Garĕbĕg Bĕsar* (on 10 Bĕsar) commemorating Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son and the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Hadith	traditions concerning the life of the Prophet
haji	one who has performed the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca
jenever	"Dutch gin", also spelled *genever*, a strong alcoholic drink flavoured with juniper
kapir, kafir	infidel; non-Muslim
kaum	the pious, professional religious community
kraton	court; the palace of the King (*ratu*)
moncanĕgara	literally the "foreign" or outer lands, the districts to the east of the court
Panĕmbahan	a high Javanese title, but the conventions for its usage are not clear
pangeran	prince
patih	chief administrative officer of the kingdom or of a particular lord
pĕngulu	the chief religious officer in a mosque, in an administrative district, or in a court
pĕsantren	Islamic boarding school
pradikan	"free village", describing villages that were free of the usual corvée and tax obligations, being sites of holy graves and/or centres of religious study
pranakan	a person of foreign ethnic background but with local roots as well
priyayi	members of the Javanese administrative-aristocratic elite
pusaka	heirloom, especially a royal heirloom with supernatural properties
putihan	pious Muslims; professional religious; literally "the white ones"
Ratu, *ratu*	royal title, used mainly for women; also a term for the King
santri	student of religion; follower of a religious way of life

sarengat, shari'a	the law; the first stage of the Sufi path
sayyid	a title for descendants of the Prophet Muhammad; in the Indonesian Archipelago usually used for those descended through his grandson Husain
sĕmbah	gesture of respect or veneration performed by placing the palms of the hands together in front of the nose
senapati	commander-in-chief
Shaikh	spiritual guide
Sharif	a noble descended from the Prophet
Sufi, Sufism	Islamic mystic, mysticism
Susuhunan, Susunan, Sunan	titles of the monarchs of Kartasura and Surakarta; Sunan is also used for early bringers of Islam to Java (the *wali sanga*)
Tumĕnggung	high administrative rank
wali	semi-legendary apostle of Islam in Java, of which there are usually said to have been nine (the *wali sanga*)
wayang	Javanese puppet or dance theatre. The principal versions are the *wayang kulit* shadow theatre which employs flat parchment puppets, the human dance drama called *wayang wong*, the masked dance drama *wayang topeng*, and *wayang krucil* (or *klithik*), which uses small flat puppets of wood or leather.

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to Mulud AJ 1718 [Nov. 1791 CE]. Anonymous but clearly copied in the Mangkunagaran palace. A final page has a crude drawing of fornication with the caption *punika Wĕlandi gambaripun* (this is a picture of a Dutchman). 303 ff. Now held in the Leiden University Library.

BL Add. MS 12308. *Babad*, beginning with Adam and ending abruptly in the reign of Senapati Ingalaga. Done in the Mangkubumen, Yogyakarta, and dated AJ 1740 [1813 CE]. Several cantos are individually dated from AJ 1736 to 1738 [1809–11 CE]. Ff. 1-210. From the collection of John Crawfurd, acquired in 1842.

Carita Nabi Yusuf. RP MS no. 261 carikan. Dated Rabiyulakir-Jumadilawal AJ 1654 [Oct. 1729–Jan. 1730 CE]. Created by (*ingkang ayasa*) Ratu Pakubuwana of Kartasura. i + 206 pp. New call number (as of 1994) 808.8014/Ser/S.

Carita Sultan Iskandar. RP MS no. 262 carikan. Dated Rabiyulawal-Jumadilawal [error for Rabyulakir] AJ 1654 [Sept.–Oct. 1729 CE]. Created by (*ingkang ayasa*) Ratu Pakubuwana of Kartasura. ii + 134 pp. New call number (as of 1994) 808.8014/Ser/S.

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KITLV Or. 232 Uittreksel uit het dagboek van KGPAA Mangkoenagara I te Soerakarta/Pratelan isinipoen serat Babad Nitik Mangkoenagaran. Compiled in 1930 by Mandrasastra. Typescript Javanese précis of KITLV Or. 231, *Babad Tutur*. 183 pp. Now held in the Leiden University Library.

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AJ 1695 [Oct. 1769 CE]. It contains a standard Sufi cosmogony and discusses Adam and his descendants. There follows (pp. 20–38) a related text, opening with numerals for the year AJ 1696 [Apr. 1770–Apr. 1771 CE] and the statement *punika sajarah ing tĕdhak-tumĕdhak ing para Nata ing Tanah Jawa sadaya*, extending from Adam to Mangkunagara I's own time. Both of these texts are believed to be in Mangkunagara I's own hand. There are several other texts and fragments of texts in the volume in other hands; the whole is 214 pp.

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Index

'Abd al-Samad al-Palembani (also Abdul Samat) (c. 1720–89), 258–9
Abdul Samat, *see* 'Abd al-Samad al-Palembani
Abdulmuhyi (Shaik) (d. c. 1715), also named Haji Karang, 20–1, 297–8
Abdurrauf Singkili (c. 1615–93), 20–1
(A)Bimanyu, 247
Abiyasa, 247
Abraham (Prophet), 29, 247
  Garĕbeg Bĕsar, 29, 97, 124, 154, 255, 379
Abrahams, J.H. (Resident at Surakarta, 1752–57), 193, 195–6, 217, 373
Aceh, 323
  map, 339
Adam (Prophet), 3, 145, 243, 245–7, 279
Adiprakosa (Susunan), *see* Mangkunagara I
Adirana (hermit), 68
Adisana (hermit), 68
Adiwijaya (Png.), 85, 89, 95, 108, 110–1, 118, 130, 133, 249
  genealogy, 342–3
Agung (Sultan) (r. 1613–46)
  bĕdhaya, 378
  dating systems, xi
  genealogy, 342–3
  tradition (1726–42): MN's early life, 8, 17, 19–20, 27
  tradition (1743–46): civil war, 43
  tradition (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 88, 144
  tradition (1768–78), 236–7, 247–8
Aji Saka, King of Java, 146
al-Ghazali, 324
alcohol
  Catholics, 36
  Islamic law, 152, 160, 273, 299
  jenever, *genever* ("Dutch gin"), 379
  Mangkubumi, 170, 195, 228
  Mangkunagara I's habits, 56, 58, 154, 160, 196, 273, 299, 304, 312, 323, 338
  Mangkunagara I's preference for *jenever*, 190, 198, 317, 319–20
  Mangkunagara II, 323
  Pakubuwana III, 170, 196
  Pakubuwana IV, 296, 300
  princes, 289
  soldiers, 64
Alexander the Great (Iskandar), 18
Alit (Ratu), earlier R. Ay. Kadhaton, daughter of Pakubuwana III, 225, 232, 289
  genealogy, 342–3

Alting, Willem Arnold (Governor General 1780–96), 372
'Alwi (Sayyid), 40
Amangkurat I (r. 1648–77), 54, 248
  genealogy, 342–3
Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1703), 96, 194, 221, 233, 243, 248
  genealogy, 342–3
Amangkurat III (r. 1703–8, d. 1734), 37, 181, 220–2, 233, 238
  genealogy, 342–3
Amangkurat IV (r. 1719–26), 8, 11–2, 15, 17, 81, 248–9
  genealogy, 342–3
Amangkurat (Ratu), mother of Pakubuwana II, 10, 13, 24–5, 36
  genealogy, 342–3
Ambarawa, Java (also Bahrawa, Rawi or Sitiwari), x
Ambiya, son of Mangkunagara the Elder, *see* Pamot (Png.)
Ambon, 64, 321
  map, 339
Amdo, *see* Pamot (Png.)
Amsterdam, *see* Netherlands
Angger Agung (Great Law Code), 239
Angger Arubiru (Law on Disturbing the Peace), 239
Anom (Kĕtib), 22, 24
Anom (Png.), *see* Guntur (R.M.)
appanages
  Bĕndara, 216, 226, 254
  Guntur, 222
  Mangkubumi, 62, 180
  Mangkunagara, 33, 197–200, 205, 260–1, 294, 302, 305–6, 308–9, 315
  Mangkunagara the Elder, 11
  Mangkunagaran principality, 323–4
  Mangkunagara's followers, 56
  Mangkuningrat, 193
  military corps, 65
  Pamot, 84–5
  Suradiměnggala, 137
  Surakarta, 174
aprang Sabil, *see* Holy War
Arabia, 22, 155
Arabic language
  inscription, 326
  Islamic reformers, 330
  Javanese literature, 246, 362
  letters translated, 257–8
  MN's knowledge, 276
  teaching to children, 162, 276
  words translated, 22, 47, 105–6, 144, 207, 279, 289, 362
Arabic literature, 18
Arabs, 40, 47, 328–9
aristocracy, *see* nobility and elites
Arjuna, 247, 276
Arnold, Joseph, 32, 385
Arungbinang (Tg.), 106, 111, 125, 195–6, 205, 230
Asia, 321
assassination, 65
astana, 162, 205
Astana Wedi (*pradikan*), 87
Ayah, Java, 287

Babad Dipanagara, 345
Babad Giyanti (*BG*)
  abbreviation, xv
  bibliography, 384
  history (1726–42): Kudanawarsa and Pakubuwana II, 16–7
  history (1743–46): civil war, 52, 54
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 63–4, 66–85, 87–96, 98–101, 103–9, 218

Babad Giyanti (*BG*) (*continued*)
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110–5, 117–8, 121–7, 130–1, 133–4, 136–7, 139–41
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 144–9, 151–66, 170–1, 361–6
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 40–1, 176–86, 188–9, 191–9
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 205, 212, 215–8
primary source, 2–3, 344–9, 351–3, 384, 392
Babad Kartasura, 351
Babad Kĕdhiri, 330
Babad Kraton (*BK*), xv, 3, 36, 38–9, 243–5, 381, 384; *see also* Yogya[karta], Java
Babad Mangkubumi (*BMang*)
abbreviation, xv
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 170, 180, 183–4, 195
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 207, 222, 227, 229–31
history (1768–78), 240–1
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 271–2
primary source, 3, 381
Babad Nitik Mangkunagaran, *see* Mangkunagaran principality
Babad Nitik Samběrnyawa, *see* Mangkunagaran principality
Babad Pakĕpung, 307, 370
Babad Pĕcina, 44
Babad Tanah Jawi [Chronicle of the Land of Java], xvi, 3, 145, 381–3; *see also* Surakarta Major *Babad*
Babad Tutur (*BT*), *see* Mangkunagaran principality
babads (Javanese chronicles), *see also* the names of individual babads
authorship, 345, 350, 352–5
bibliography, 381–4, 386–7, 389–90, 392
glossary, 378
history (1726–46): MN's early life, 12, 51, 53, 57
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 70–1, 84, 87, 96
history (1768–95): MN's later years, 236, 247–8, 279, 287, 297
primary sources, 4, 344–55
Bacheracht, B. (Capt.), 125
Bagelen, Java (earlier, Pagĕlen), 52, 89, 95–6, 102, 106, 118, 160, 250
maps, 340–1
orthography, x
Bagus Budhal, 217
Bahman (Ky.), 296, 300
Bahrawa, *see* Ambarawa, Java (also Bahrawa, Rawi or Sitiwari)
Bali
century cycles, 238
dancing, 187
gamĕlans, 92
krisses, 105, 193
maps, 339–40
Sultan Rum and, 146
wayang, 156
Balinese troops
in Eastern Salient, 234
with Madurese soldiers, 45, 50
with Mangkubumi, 73, 118, 131

with Mangkunagara, 50, 154
with VOC, 64, 107, 159, 163
Balkans, 365
Banaran, *see* Kabanaran, Java
Banda, 161, 321
map, 339
Bangawan River, 368
Bangka, Java, 323
Bangsri, Java, 57–8
map, 341
Banjar, Java, 260
Banjaransari, 247
Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan), 45, 269
map, 339
Banten, Java, 102, 121, 125
map, 339
Banyudono, Java, 91, 120–1, 126
Banyumas, Java, 107, 158, 168, 223, 255, 260, 287
map, 340
Bapa Serif Besaar, *see* Ibrahim (Seh, *shaikh*)
Barija, Java, 133, 135, 155
Batang, Java, 111
map, 340
Batavia, Java (later, Jakarta)
history (1700–25): VOC correspondence, 8
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 10–1, 15, 24, 31–3, 35, 40
VOC correspondence, 14, 25, 34, 38
history (1743–46): civil war, 45
VOC correspondence, 43–4, 46, 48–9, 52–5
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 75, 90, 102
VOC correspondence, 66, 72–4, 76, 79–80, 82, 88–9, 91, 93, 95, 103–5, 107–8
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 111, 119
VOC correspondence, 110, 112, 114–5, 118, 120–1, 125–6, 131–3, 135–6, 138–9, 142
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 148–9, 152–3, 360–2, 366–7
VOC correspondence, 147, 150, 157–9, 161, 163, 167, 172
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase: VOC correspondence, 173, 176–88, 193, 196–7, 200, 357
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217, 234
VOC correspondence, 213, 215, 221, 223–31, 235
history (1768–88): VOC correspondence, 240, 255–7, 259, 261–4, 268–72
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 287, 307
VOC correspondence, 265–86, 289–96, 300–13, 315
history (19th and 20th centuries), 321–2, 335
map, 339
population, 31
sources, 351, 357–8
Bayat (Sunan), 43
bědhaya (dance), 27–8, 56, 123–4, 128–9, 138, 155, 378
Běndara (Ratu), daughter of Mangkubumi, wife of Mangkunagara I, divorced 1763
genealogy, 342–3

Bĕndara (Ratu) (*continued*)
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 71–2, 83, 116, 119, 123–4, 157, 197
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 215–6, 220, 226–32, 235
history (1768–78), 254, 259–60
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 271, 279
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 288, 290–2, 304–6, 308
Bendung, *see* Bendungan, Java
Bendungan, Java (also Bendung), 52
Bĕngawan River, 369
Berg, L.W.C. van den, 15
Bĕthok (Ky.), 170
Beuman, Jan Christoffel (Resident at Surakarta, 1761–67), 224, 228, 373
Bible, 322
Bicak (Ky.), 75
Bielefeldt, C.F. von (Capt.) (Pekalongan, 1752), 111
Bieleveld (Capt.) (d. Jenar, 1751), 107
Bimanyu, *see* (A)Bimanyu
Bintara, *see* Buminata (Png.)
Bisman, *see* Kasan Nuriman
BK, *see Babad Kraton* (*BK*)
Black Fire-Arrows (*Saragĕni Cĕmĕng*), 84, 275
Black Sea, 365
Blambangan, Java, 234, 255
map, 340
Blitar (Png.) (d. 1721), brother of Amangkurat IV, x, 11–2, 220, 222, 248–9
genealogy, 342–3
Bloemhart, Pieter (Corporal), 301
Blora, Java, 46, 182, 186, 222–3
maps, 340–1
Bogowonto River, 107, 125, 368
maps, 340–1
Bondhan Kajawan, 247
Borneo, *see* Kalimantan
Boyolali, Java, 64, 151, 182, 311
map, 341
Brakas, Java, 125
Brama, 247
Brandes, J.L.A. (1857–1905), 351
Brawijaya, King, 247
Brebes, Java, 112
Britain, 49, 96, 266, 321
interregnum regime in Java (1795–1816), 283, 321, 323–4, 350
Bruno, Java, 106
BT, *see* Mangkunagaran principality
BT(JBP), *see* Surakarta Major *Babad*
Buddhism, 332
Budi Utomo, 332–3
Bugis, 64, 78, 107, 110, 159, 163
Bugis troops, 107
Bulupitu (Dyah) (spirit wife of Arungbinang), 112
Buminata (Png.), earlier Bintara (surrendered 1755, d. 1783), rebel brother of the King
genealogy, 342–3
history (1743–46): civil war, 46, 54–6
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 66–8, 72, 81–4, 88, 126–7, 135, 160–1, 313
troops, 160
Burgh, Johannes Robert van der (governor of northeast coast, 1771–80), 239–40, 254–7, 259–64, 268, 373
Byzantium, *see* Ottomans

Cabolek, Java (also Cĕbolek), 21–4
maps, 340–1

Cakrajaya (official) (also Cakrakarti) of Yogyakarta (1756), 189
Cakrajaya (Tg.) (also Cakranagara) of Pemalang (1752), 112
Cakrakarti (official), *see* Cakrajaya (official)
Cakranagara, *see* Cakrajaya (Tg.)
Cakraningrat IV (r. 1718–46, d. 1753), 31, 35–6, 38, 45, 58
Cakraningrat V (r. 1745–70), 45, 124, 225
Cakraningrat line (Madura), 7, 45
calendars, 237, 246; *see also* Javanese calendar
  European, 188
  Islamic, xi, 237, 240
Calvinists, 36, 211
Candhini, Java (also Cendhani), 188
cannibalism, 96, 157
Cape of Good Hope, 11, 45, 220, 285–6
Carey, Peter, 2, 345, 386
Catholics, 36
Cěbolang (Dipati); *see* Sawunggaling (Tg.)
Cěbolek; *see* Cabolek, Java
Cendhani; *see* Candhini, Java
Cengkalsewu, Java, 78, 118, 223
  map, 340
Central Java
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 20, 33
  history (1743–46): civil war, 42–3, 51, 58
  history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 80, 95, 138, 150, 156, 167, 173
  history (1768–78), 256, 262, 336
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 266, 270
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 293–5, 301, 313–5
  history (1796–1899), 321, 324, 328–31
  history (from 1900 CE), 335
  map, 340
  Sufi tradition, 20
Ceylon, *see* Sri Lanka (earlier, Ceylon)
"Ceylon, Jan van", *see* Kareta (R.M.)
child marriages ("hung" marriages), 157–8, 185, 216, 219, 262
Chinese community
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 34, 36–7, 39–40
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 71, 73, 78–9, 89–90
  history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 111–2, 118
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 361
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 179, 181, 187
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 218
  troops, 39
Chinese sources, 349
Chinese War (1740–43), 33–41, 71, 111, 132, 181, 221
Christians, 35–6, 64, 329; *see also* Calvinists; Catholics
chronicles, Javanese (*babads*), *see babads*
Cirebon, Java, 73, 328
  map, 339
Citradiwirya, 262
Citrasoma (Tg.) (d. 1776), 262
Clausewitz, Carl von, 90, 121, 165, 200, 386
Clercq, H. de (Maj.), 102, 107–8
Cloon, Dirk van (Governor General 1732–35), 32, 372
Coen (Lt.), 72

coffee, 324
Colombo, *see* Sri Lanka (earlier, Ceylon)
Communism, 333, 335
concubines
  genealogy, 342–3
  history (1743–46): civil war, 57
  history (1745–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 76, 83, 97–8, 124, 128, 159, 185
  history (from 1757), 206, 208, 222, 272, 292, 304–6, 308, 319
Condrajaya (converted Dutchman), 104
Condrayuda (converted Dutchman), 104
Constantinople, *see* Ottomans
Council of the Indies, *see* Batavia, Java (later, Jakarta)
courts, *see kratons*
Crawfurd, John (1783–1868), 9, 344–5, 349–51, 381–3, 387
Cultivation System (*cultuurstelsel*), 324

Dada, *see* Daha, Java
Dadaha, *see* Daha, Java
Daendels, H.W. (Marshal), governor general 1808–11, 322
Daha, Java (also Dědaha, Dadaha, Dada), 176, 182–3, 185–7
  map, 341
dalěm, 205
dancing; *see also bědhaya*; *wayang* (puppet or dance theatre)
  Haměngbukuwana II (as Crown Prince), 226
  Kartasura, 30
  Mangkubumi, 83, 97, 128
  Mangkunagara
    early life, 27, 56
    history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 72, 76–7, 82–3, 97, 100–1
    history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 116, 123–4, 138
    history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 154, 167
    history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 187
    later life, 226, 255, 317
  martial, 27, 29–30, 76–7, 276–7
dancing girls, 27–8, 56–8, 76, 82, 100–1, 123–4, 138, 155, 187, 317; *see also bědhaya*
Danupaya, Prince, 249
Danurĕja I of Yogyakarta (earlier, Yudanagara) (r. 1755–99)
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 158, 168, 197
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 223, 228
  history (1768–78), 255
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 292, 304, 306
Danurĕja (*patih*) (d. 1745), 10, 12–7, 24–5
Dědaha, *see* Daha, Java
Delanggu, Java, 76, 93
  map, 341
Demak, Java, 35, 72, 179, 181, 223, 237
  map, 340

Dĕmak (Ki Alim), also Kyai Alim Dĕmak, 288, 371
Depression (1930s), 333
Dhandun Martengasari (Sultan), *see* Buminata (Png.)
dhikr, 20, 133, 274–5, 277, 378
Dhu'l Qarnayn, *see* Alexander the Great
Dipanagara (Png.) (d. 1787), husband of Ratu Bĕndara, 231, 249, 291
Dipanagara, Prince (1785–1855), 2, 231, 234, 291
Dipanagara, son of Amangkurat IV, 249
Dipanagara, son of Pakubuwana I, rebel 1718, 231
Dipaningrat, formerly Ky. Ngabdullah, 87, 106
Dipayuda (*bupati*), 108
Disturbing the Peace, Law on, *see Angger Arubiru*
divorce, *see* marriage politics and diplomacy
Donkel, C. (Capt.) (Resident at Yogyakarta, 1754–61), 153, 161, 226, 373
dress, Javanese, *see* Javanese dress
drinking, *see* alcohol
Druju, Java, 69
  map, 341
Duljaki (Kaji, Haji) Makassarese, 362
Durven, Diederik (Governor General 1729–32), 372
Dutch costume, *see* European dress
Dutch East India Company, *see* VOC (Dutch East India Company)
"Dutch gin", *see* alcohol
Dutch language
  measurements, 115
  philological studies of Javanese literature, 1
  sources, *see* Netherlands; VOC
  translations into, 147–8, 168, 181, 271, 284, 291–3, 308, 361
  treaty (1749), 86
Dutch people, *see* Netherlands; VOC
Dutch *reals*, 250
Dutch Republic, *see* Netherlands
Dutch sources, *see* Netherlands
Duurveldt (Resident at Surakarta, 1757–61), 226, 373

East Java
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 31, 35–6
  history (1743–46): civil war, 42, 51, 57
  history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 78, 116, 121–5, 137–8, 153, 173
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 211
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 270
  history (1796–1899), 329–31
  map, 340
Eastern Salient, Java, 61, 234
education, 331–3
Egypt, 18, 155
English language, 257, 276
English people, 45, 116; *see also* Arnold, Joseph
Ĕntho (R.M.), Crown Prince of Yogyakarta 1749?–58 (d. 1758), 83, 92, 124, 138–41, 189, 217–8
Ĕsis, 246–7
Ethical Policy, 331
Europe and Europeans; *see also* VOC
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7, 19, 33, 35
  history (1743–46): civil war, 42, 47, 57

Europe and Europeans (*continued*)
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 64, 77–8, 80, 85, 88–90, 92–3, 104–5, 107
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 113, 116, 118, 120–1, 134
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 147–9, 170, 361, 365–7
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 190–1, 196
history (1757–88), 218, 258, 260
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282, 286–8, 296, 298–9, 301, 303, 310–1, 336, 338
history (1796–1899), 322, 324, 327–30
troops, 57, 64, 78, 104, 107, 311
European calendar (CE), 188
European dress, 11, 286, 296
European paper, 349
European sources, 345–7, 349, 355, 358
Europeans, *see* Europe and Europeans
exile (from Java)
Amangkurat III, 181, 221–2
Buminata, 161
Cakraningrat, 45
Javanese princes (1749–50), 85, 88, 95
Kareta and Wirakusuma, 285–7
Mangkunagara I (proposed), 225
Mangkunagara the Elder
1728 exile, 13–5, 25, 38, 43, 197, 217, 220, 285, 337
1738 death, 15, 73, 132, 249, 259
1753 return of remains, 131–6, 217, 249
Natakusuma, 37, 40, 218, 225
rebels (Purbaya and Blitar), 11, 22
santris (1790), 295, 299, 313
Singasari, 234
Tepasana, 222
Urawan, 26, 132

Falck, C.G., 12, 110, 115
Faure, H.P. (Maj.), 75, 79, 84, 89–90
Feber, 130
female soldiers (*prajurit estri*), 65, 68, 157, 206, 228, 275, 322
scriptorium, 3–4, 174, 206–10, 246–7, 266, 272, 317, 350–1, 353–5
finance; *see also* trade and commerce
coinage, 166
Mangkunagara, 270
Mangkunagaran principality, 322, 324, 330
VOC, 214–5, 231, 265–6, 299, 321
fishing, 158, 160
Florida, Nancy
acknowledgement, 375
babads, 345, 351
bibliography, 382–3, 387, 392
Mangkunagaran chronicle-diary, 353–5
manuscript catalogue, 208, 233, 246, 248, 251, 253, 282, 296, 299, 317
manuscript terminology, 207
suluks, 283
Surakarta Palace, 284
Forster (Lt.), 106–7
France, 32, 98, 206, 321, 365
Freemasonry, 328
Freijer, Diderik, 181

Gaastra F.S., 316
Gading, Java, 55–6
  map, 341
gambling, 82, 273, 296
gamĕlan orchestras
  glossary, 378
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 26–8
  history (1743–46): civil war, 56, 58
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 74, 78, 83, 86, 91–2, 97–8
  history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 116–7, 121, 123–4
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 155, 167
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 195–6
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 209
  history (1768–78), 254
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 273, 275–6
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 287, 299, 317
Garĕbeg, 29–30, 85, 379
  Bĕsar, 29, 97, 124, 154, 255, 379
  Mulud, 29, 155, 270–1, 295, 311–2, 379
  Puasa, 29, 97, 158, 379
Garĕji (Bok), *see* Gĕrji
Garĕndi (R.M.), *see* Kuning (Sunan)
Gebang, Java, 66
Gemantar, Java, 76–7
Gĕmblung, Java, 195
genealogy (Mataram dynasty), 216, 342–3
genever, *see* alcohol
Gericke, J.F.C. (1799–1857), 351, 392
Gĕrji (or Garĕji) (Bok), 192
Germans, 351
gin, *see* alcohol
girls, *see* women and girls
Giyanti, Java, 161, 167–74, 176–7, 189, 198, 239, 292
  maps, 340–1
  treaty (1755), 167–72, 176, 192
God
  dhikr, 378
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 10, 18–20, 22–3, 36, 38, 40
  history (1743–46): civil war, 50, 55
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 66, 69, 92–3, 101
  history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 124, 128, 140
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 145–6, 162, 167, 364–5
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 175, 182–3, 188–9
  history (1768–78), 241–2, 246–7, 251
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 274, 277–8
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 319–20
  history (1796–1899), 326–7, 349
Goddess of the Southern Ocean, *see* Kidul (Ratu), Goddess of the Southern Ocean
Godean, Java, 56
Goens, Rijklof A. van, 65, 78

Gondang, Java, 99–102
map, 341
Gondangwinangun, Java, 133
governors general; *see also* Batavia; VOC
list, 372
governors (northeast coast)
list, 372–3
Gowong, Java, 106
Graaf, H.J. de (1899–1984), 2, 248, 385, 387
Great Law Code, *see Angger Agung*
Greengrass, Mark, 77, 387
Greeve, Jan (governor of northeast coast, 1787–91), 288–97, 299–310, 315, 373
Gresik, Java, 54, 57, 211, 328
map, 340
Grobogan, Java
history (1743–46): civil war, 45, 48–9
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 95, 120, 153, 160–2, 167, 174
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 223
map, 341
Gulang-Gulang (cavalry unit), 189
Guntur (R.M.), also Png. Anom (d. 1762)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 65, 158, 180–1, 199
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217, 221–3
sources, 346
troops, 181, 222–3
Gunung Kidul; *see also* southern mountains, Java
history (1743–46): civil war, 50, 52, 55, 57
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 82, 95, 104, 109
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 118
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 157
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 185, 193, 198
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 306, 308
maps, 339–41
Gunung Wijil, *see* Wijil, Mount
Guru, 247

H.XVII (Heren XVII, governors of the VOC, in Amsterdam), *see* Netherlands; VOC
Haan, F. de, 149, 356, 387
Haan, Mattheus de (Governor General, 1725–29), 372
Haas, de (Cornet), 107
Hadith, 67, 286, 289, 296, 326, 332, 379
Hageman, J., 169
hajj, *see* pilgrimage to Mecca
Haměngkubuwana I (Sultan), *see* Mangkubumi
Haměngkubuwana II (also Pakubuwana; earlier R.M. Sundara, R.M. Timur) (b. c. 1749–50; Crown Prince 1758–92; Sultan, r. 1792–1810, 1811–12, 1826–28)
Babad Mangkubumi (*see Babad Mangkubumi* (*BMang*))
genealogy, 342–3
history (1757–88): MN's later years, 207, 212, 218–9, 225–7, 229, 231–2, 239–44, 265

history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 284, 291, 293, 302, 306, 308–10, 315
Haměngkubuwana IX (Sultan, r. 1939–88), 335, 337
(Ha)Měngkubuwana (name), 212; *see also* Pakubuwana
Haměngkunagara, *see* Mangkunagara
Hamilton, Alexander, 7–8, 385
Hardjowirogo, 149, 387
Hartingh, Nicolaas (governor of northeast coast, 1754–61), 372
history (1743–46): civil war, 42–3, 49, 346
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 63–5, 74, 91–2, 94, 108
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 119, 124, 142
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143–4, 148–54, 157–61, 163–5, 167–72, 365, 367
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 178–83, 185–7, 190–1, 193, 195, 197–8, 200
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 211, 214–21, 223
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 292, 296, 299
Kort verhaal (*KV*), 112, 355–7, 385
bibliography, 385
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 16, 40
history (1743–46): civil war, 42–3, 45, 49, 51
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 63, 65, 68, 73, 75, 82, 95, 102, 107
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110, 112, 119, 124, 127, 130, 133, 135–6, 139, 142
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143–4, 148–9, 154, 157, 159, 161, 163–4, 166–7
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 177, 179, 181–3, 185–6, 191, 193, 195–6
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 211, 214–6
primary source, 3–4, 346, 355–7
Mangkubumi and, 152–3, 160–1, 163, 167–72
Mangkunagara and, 40–1, 163, 179, 181–3, 185–7, 190–1, 197–8, 216
Memorie, 218–20, 356–7
sources, 3
Hartman (commander), 310–1
Hartsinck, Andries (Resident at Surakarta, 1788–90), 289–90, 296–7, 300, 302, 373
health and illness; *see also* yaws
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 8, 11, 31–2
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 68, 124–5, 140, 148, 154, 157, 166, 168

health and illness (*continued*)
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 185, 218, 227
history (1768–78), 241, 256, 261–2, 264
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 267, 270–2, 280–1
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 287, 289–90, 293, 301, 303, 306–7, 312, 315–7
hermits, 24, 68–70, 117
Hinduism, 64, 237–8, 245, 247, 283, 332, 334
Hoff, J.D. (Maj.), 112
Hohendorff, Johan Andries, Baron van (Resident at Surakarta, 1741–48; governor of northeast coast, 1748–54), 372–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 37–8
history (1743–46): civil war, 43–4, 46–7, 50–1, 53–4, 56, 58
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 71, 73–4, 76, 79–81, 84–9, 91–3, 95, 102–4, 106–8
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110–2, 115, 118–22, 125–6, 129–36, 138, 141
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 147–8, 159, 357, 360–1
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 273
Holland, *see* Netherlands
Holy War (*jihad al-akbar*, *aprang Sabil*), 20, 35, 37, 44, 62, 101, 182, 258
homosexuality, 26
households, *see* appanages
"hung" marriages, *see* child marriages
Husain, 380

Ibrahim (Pĕkih), 21
Ibrahim (Prophet, *nabī*), 29, 247
Ibrahim (Seh, *shaikh*) (also Tuwan Sayid Bĕsar, Sarip Bĕsar), 142, 144–8, 150–2, 154, 156–7, 192, 347–8, 360–7
Ijsseldijk, Wouter Hendrik van (Resident at Yogyakarta, 1786–99), 292–3, 306, 309–11, 373
illness, *see* health and illness
Imajaya (converted Dutchman), 104
Iman, Ki (*pĕngulu*), 127
Imayuda (converted Dutchman), 104
Imhoff, Gustaaf Willem, Baron van (Governor General, 1743–50), 53, 59, 61–3, 148, 180, 372
Imogiri, Java, 11, 133, 248–9
map, 341
Indians, 283, 311; *see also* Malabar
indigenous spirits, *see* Javanese myths and traditions
indigo, 324
Indonesia
19th- and 20th-century history, 321–37
ethnic groups, 2, 331
marriages with Europeans, 105
sources, 1–2, 273, 344, 352, 358, 384
Sufism, 258
troops, *see* troops
Indonesian Archipelago
Islam (*sayyid*), 380
lingua franca, 361
map, 339
Indonesian Revolution (1945), 333, 335–7

Ingalaga (Panĕmbahan Senapati) (r. c. 1584–1601), 54, 162, 233, 247, 326–7
Ingalaga (Susuhunan Ayunjaya Adimurti Senapati), 287
Iongh, D. de, 388
Iran, 364; *see also* Persia
Iskak (Ki Seh), 361
Iskandar, *see* Alexander the Great
Islam; *see also* Java; Mystic Synthesis (Islamic style); mysticism; *pĕsantren* (religious schools); Qur'an; Sufism; Sunni schools
  abangan, 211, 329–30, 378
  arrival and history in Java, 1–2, 43
  calendar, xi, 237, 240
  converts to, 35, 88, 104–5, 242–3
  divorce law, 227, 229, 319
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 10, 16–26, 29, 33, 35–7, 40
  history (1743–46): civil war, 43–4
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 65–6, 73–4, 88, 96, 101, 105–6
  history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110, 113, 133, 137
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 144, 146–7, 152, 155, 160, 162–3, 170, 361–4, 367
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 174–5, 178, 187, 194
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 203, 205, 209–12, 227, 229, 240, 242–3, 245–8, 252–4, 257–8
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 273–81
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282–3, 285–7, 295–9, 303, 306–7, 310–2, 316–9, 338
  history (from 1796), 2, 324–34
  putihan, 329, 379
  reform movement, 297, 327–8, 330, 334
  sources, 349
  titles, 287
  wali, 170, 274, 380
Ismangil (Prophet, *nabī*), 247
Istanbul, *see* Ottomans

Jabung, Java, 93
Jakarta, *see* Batavia, Java (later, Jakarta)
Janggala, Java, 247
Japanese occupation (1942–45), 331, 333–5
Jatisari, Java, 169–70, 192, 195
  map, 341
Jatisrono, Java, 46, 54
  map, 341
Java
  Central, *see* Central Java
  cities, 331
  East, *see* East Java
  Eastern Salient, *see* Eastern Salient, Java
  exile from, *see* exile
  history (pre-Islamic times), 1, 3, 12, 22, 32, 74, 276, 328
  history (14th century), 1
  history (1704–8): 1st Javanese War of Succession, 7–8, 221, 248
  history (1719–23): 2nd Javanese War of Succession, 11, 16

Java (*continued*)
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7–8, 11–4, 16–9, 22–6, 30, 33, 41
history (1743–46): civil war, 40, 42–5, 50–2, 58–60
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession
1st Phase (1746–51), 40, 61–109
2nd Phase (1752–53), 110–42
3rd Phase (1753–55), 143–72, 360, 362–7
final phase (1755–57), 4, 173–200
sources, 355
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 211, 215, 222, 358
history (1768–78), 238–64, 270, 358
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265–81, 358
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282–320, 336, 358
history (1796–1899), 321–30
history (from 1900 CE), 330–8
maps, 339–41
north coast, *see* north coast (Java)
northeast coast, *see* northeast coast (Java)
place names, 346, 368
population, 2, 31, 111, 122, 145–6, 168–9, 330–1, 363
VOC in, *see* VOC
West, *see* West Java
Java Sea, 45
maps, 339–41
Java War (1825–30), 2, 51, 231, 323, 327
Javanese calendar
BMang, 207, 240
BTP(BP), 12
centuries, 236–48
Friday calendar
BG, 104, 171, 180, 217
Mangkubumi (until c. 1755), 109
SBPn, 139, 141, 159, 188, 195
Mangkunagaran palace diaries, 272, 275–7, 280
Mangkunagara's birthday, 266, 268
Mangkunagara's correspondence and literary works, 235, 251–4, 261–3
Mangkunagara's death, 317, 319
primary sources, 348, 350–1, 353–4
SBPn, 129, 155–6, 186, 188, 209
Sĕrat Wahanabrata, 233
Thursday calendar
BG, 87, 109, 115, 180, 217
SBPn, 110, 130, 164, 166, 171, 175, 178, 185, 188, 195
VOC translations, 301, 309
Wicara Kĕras, 298
Javanese chronicles, *see babads*
Javanese culture; *see also bĕdhaya*; *gamĕlan* orchestras; *wayang* (puppet or dance theatre)
European perceptions, 4
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 8–9, 27, 30, 33, 38, 41
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 149–50, 152, 157, 160, 170, 177, 184, 193
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 209–14
history (1768–78), 237, 246–7, 250, 254

history (1779–88): MN's later years, 267–8, 271, 275–7, 279–81
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 299, 319
history (1796–1899), 324–7
history (from 1900 CE), 330–4, 336–8
primary sources, 347–9, 355–6
Javanese dress, 193, 198, 286, 296–7, 302, 328
Javanese language
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 22–3
history (1743–46): civil war, 42
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 81, 105
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 142
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 147–8, 150, 154, 361, 363, 368
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 181, 186–7, 198
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 206, 212
history (1768–78), 258, 260
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 271–2, 276
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 284, 291, 308–9
history (1796–1899), 329–30
history (from 1900 CE), 331, 334
primary sources, 351–2, 354
Javanese literature; *see also babads*; Old Javanese literature; Pakubuwana (Ratu)
authorship, 206–7, 325
babads as, 3, 344–9, 351–2, 355, 378
classics, 276
cultural parallels, 4, 356
kraton, 30, 240–5
Mangkunagara I, 26, 205, 209, 246–54, 272
Mangkunagara IV, 324–5, 330
Mangkunagara VII, 334
philology, 1
Surakarta, 245
Tirtawiguna (Tg.), 16
Yasadipura I, 21, 370–1
Yasadipura II, 297
Javanese myths and traditions; *see also* supernatural realm
19th and 20th centuries, 329–30, 332
babads, 145–6, 349
Mangkunagara, 54, 100, 163, 245–7, 319
Mystic Synthesis, 210–1, 273, 277, 319
Pakubuwana II, 32
Pakubuwana III, 170
Pakubuwana (Ratu), 17
Sĕrat Wahanabrata, 232–4
Sultan Rum, 145–7, 361–3
Surakarta Major *Babad*, 3, 12
Surya Raja, 242, 245
Javanese names, 104–5, 113, 169, 269, 290, 321, 346
Javanese people
Dutchmen becoming, 113, 139
history, 2
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 14, 16–9, 34–6, 39–41
history (1743–46): civil war, 64, 73, 75, 84–9, 93, 95–6, 98, 106–7
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 115–6, 137, 149, 180, 190

Javanese people (*continued*)
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 214–5, 221
history (1768–78), 237
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 266, 273–4
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282, 292, 296–8, 302, 311, 313, 319
history (1796–1899), 322, 325, 327
history (from 1900 CE), 331
Mangkunagara's relations with, 337
Javanese sources; *see also babads*
bibliography, 381–4
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 12, 38
history (1743–46): civil war, 54–5
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 68, 70–1, 82, 90–2, 94, 100, 103, 108–9
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110, 112
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 144, 159, 360, 364, 368
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 190, 196
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 222
history (1768–78), 237, 248
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 284, 295, 297, 302, 316
primary, 1–4, 344–55
Javanese titles, 212–3, 216, 262–3, 287, 321, 378–9
Javanese troops, *see* troops
Jayabaya (Sang), 247
Jayaningrat (Ad.) of Pekalongan, dubbed Natakusuma (1752), 111–2, 114, 127
Jayaningrat (R. Ad.), *bupati* of Mataram, 158, 185, 190
Jayaningrat (R. Ad.), *patih* of Surakarta (1784–96), 307
Jayanudin (Kyai), 211–2
Jayawinata (Tg.), 81
Jayengrana (Ng.), *bupati*, 112
Jayengrana (R.), MB's son-in-law, 156–7
Jayengrat (R. Tg.), 243–4
Jekawal, Java, 74–5, 79–80
map, 341
Jen, Seh, 22
Jenar, Java, 107–9, 113–4, 368
maps, 340–1
jenever, *see* alcohol
Jepara, Java, 64, 262
maps, 340–1
orthography, x
Jětis, Java, 368
jihad al-akbar, *see* Holy War (*jihad al-akbar*, *aprang Sabil*)
Jimbung, Java, 155, 158–60
map, 341
Jipang (Bok Aj.), 124, 137–8
Jipang, Java, 73–4, 80, 137, 222
maps, 340–1
Jogjakarta, *see* Yogya[karta], Java
Jogorogo, Java, 141, 176
map, 341
Jombang, Java, 137
map, 340
Jonge, J.K.J. de, 356, 385
Joseph, *see* Yusuf (Joseph) (Prophet)
Juru (Png.), *see* Natakusuma (R. Ad.) Kartasura *patih*
Juwana, Java, 35, 72, 78–9, 218
map, 340

Kabanaran, Java (also Banaran)
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 91, 93–4, 97, 104, 109, 114, 117
history (1768–78), 249
map, 341
Kadhaton (R. Ay.), *see* Alit (Ratu)
Kadilangu, Java, 87
map, 340
Kadipaten (Ratu) (d. 1803), wife of Mangkubumi, 20
genealogy, 342–3
Kadipaten (Ratu), mother of Singasari and Buminata, 66–7
genealogy, 342–3
Kaduwang, Java, 66, 121, 156–7, 176, 178, 188, 191–3, 198
maps, 340–1
Kaduwang (Ny. M.), 39
Kajen, Java, 22
map, 340
Kajoran, Java, 87
map, 341
Kajoran (Pangeran), 287
Kalijaga (Sunan), 170
Kalimantan (Borneo), 269; *see also* Banjarmasin
maps, 339, 341
Kalirejo, Java, 260
Kamalon, *see* Pamalon, Java (also Malon, Kamalon)
Kanduruwan (R.), 296
Kanyut Mesĕm (*gamĕlan* orchestra), 254
Kapĕdhak (cavalry unit), 189
Karang (Haji), *see* Abdulmuhyi (Shaik) (d. c. 1715), also named Haji Karang
Karang, Java, 296, 298
Karang (mystical science, *ngelmu Karang*), 297–8
Kareta (R.M.) (b. Batavia), 285–6, 297
genealogy, 342–3
Karsten, Thomas (1884–1945), 326
Karta, Java, *see* Karta[sura]
Kartabasa (translator), 258
Kartadiwirya, 371
Karta[sura], Java; *see also* Surakarta, Java
Babad Kraton, 3
history (1680), 236, 238
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7–8, 11–5, 20, 24–5, 29–33, 35–40, 65, 105, 132
history (1742–45): after fall, 44–52, 54, 56, 58
history (1745): relocation of court, 59
history (from 1746): later references, 86, 93, 148, 221, 233–4, 243–5, 248
maps, 340–1
Susuhunan, *Susunan*, *Sunan*, 380
Kasan Nuriman (earlier, Bisman), 233–4
Kasatriyan, Java, 139–40, 208, 249–50, 317, 351
Katangie, Java, 125
Kawandasa (cavalry unit), 189
Keblokan, Java, 14
Kebuman, Java, 260
Kĕdhiri, *see* Kediri, Java (also Kĕdhiri)
Kediri, Java (also Kĕdhiri)
history (1743–46): civil war, 50–2, 57
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 115, 161, 167, 177–8
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 223
history (1768–78), 247
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 308
history (1796–1899), 330
history (from 1900 CE), 331
map, 340
orthography, x

Kedu, Java, 51, 80, 89, 95, 102, 130, 177, 180, 217–8
maps, 340–1
Keijser, Hendrik Jan (Capt.), 51, 57, 93
Kelud, Mount, 115–6
map, 340
Kembangarum, Java, 87
Kemiri River, 93
map, 341
Kenad, 247
Kĕncana (Ratu) (d. 1738), wife of Pakubuwana II, 11, 17, 26, 175, 197, 250
genealogy, 342–3
Kĕncana (Ratu), wife of Pakubuwana III, 270
Kendal, Java, 112
map, 340
Kendeng hills, 48, 70–1, 74, 163, 180–2, 369
maps, 340–1
Kĕngser, *see* Keijser, Hendrik Jan
Kertosono, Java, 130
map, 340
Kidul (Ratu), Goddess of the Southern Ocean, 12, 27, 81, 146, 210, 242, 277, 349, 378
kingdoms, partitioned
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 25
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 61, 88, 114, 142, 148, 151, 153, 167–9, 171, 194
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 213–4, 216, 231–2, 234–5
history (1768–78), 25, 236–7, 242–5, 264
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 313, 315
kingship
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 19–21, 24
history (1743–46): civil war, 43, 46–7, 53, 55–6
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 70–1
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 112, 120, 127–8, 131, 134–7, 142
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143, 146, 155–6, 162
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 186, 199
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 205, 224, 235
history (1768–78), 243
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 287, 291, 295, 300–4, 307, 310, 314
names and titles, 209, 212
scribes, 348
kirtya, *mangirtya*, *pangirtya*, 206–7
Kisbandiyah, 284
Klaten, Java, 155, 159
map, 341
Klepu, Java, 239
Klerck, Reinier de (Governor General, 1777–80), 372
Kopek (Ky.), 170
korasan, 207–9
Krapyak, Java, 106
map, 341
Krapyak (Seda) (r. c. 1601–13), 247
kratons (courts); *see also* Karta[sura]; Pabrĕkan; Surakarta; Yogya[karta]
meaning of *kraton*, *kĕdhaton*, 205

krisses (daggers)
Balinese style, 105, 193
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 8–9, 29
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 72, 76, 81, 88, 98
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 115, 127
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 147, 170, 361
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 187
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 212, 223
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 279
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 291
Kudanawarsa (foster father of Mangkunagara I)
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 16, 26
history (1743–46): civil war, 49, 58–9
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 114, 119, 121, 127–8, 131, 136, 140
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 157, 165
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 176–8, 182, 186, 188–9, 196
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217, 220
Kudus, Java, 22, 46, 71, 78, 181, 225
maps, 340–1
Kukusan, Mount, 46
map, 341
Kumar, Ann, 267, 272–3, 295, 300, 353–5, 388
Kumpĕni Islam, 36, 64, 109
Kuning (Sunan) (earlier, R.M. Garĕndi) (r. 1742–3), 37–40, 43, 45, 53–4, 73, 181, 221
genealogy, 342–3
Kunst, J., 26, 388
Kusumapatahati (M. Ay.), earlier Rubiyah and M. Ayu Patahati, later R. Ay. Mangkunagara (d. 1788), wife of Mangkunagara I, 68, 127, 232, 234, 280–1
genealogy, 342–3
Kusumarĕja, Java (also Sumarĕja, Sumarĕjadimulya), 155–6, 159

Lapro, Jan (Resident at Yogyakarta, 1764–73), 256, 373
Laroh, Java, 176, 180, 184–5, 198, 233
map, 341
Larson, George D., 334–5, 337, 388
Lasem, Java, 309
maps, 340–1
Laurens (Lt.), 107
Law Code, Great, *see Angger Agung*
Law on Disturbing the Peace, *see Angger Arubiru*
Laweyan, Java, 194, 248–50
Lawu, Mount
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 38
history (1743–46): civil war, 46, 54
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 66, 68–70

Lawu, Mount (*continued*)
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 115, 117, 122, 167
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 167
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 176, 182, 184, 188, 210
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 210, 223
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 277
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 319
maps, 340–1
Lawu (Sunan), 38, 277, 319, 337, 349
Lĕbu, Java, 155
legal jurisdiction, 239
legal proceedings, 322
legends, *see* Javanese myths and traditions
Lĕmbupĕtĕng (Ki), 247
Lipuro, Java, 54–5
map, 341
Losari, Java, 111
map, 340
Louis Napoleon, King of the Netherlands, 322
Louis XIV, King of France, 206
Louis XV, King of France, 365
Louw, P.J.F., 67, 74, 101, 159, 356, 388

Madiun, Java, 122–3, 139, 156, 176, 178, 223
maps, 340–1
Madiun River, 43, 123, 138, 141, 177, 179
maps, 340–1
Madura and Madurese
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7, 31, 35–8
history (1743–46): civil war, 45–6, 50, 54, 57–9, 182
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 64, 66, 69, 89–91, 93–6, 102
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 124, 138
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 158, 169
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 177–9, 182–4, 193
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 219, 225
history (1768–78), 248
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 311
history (1796–1899), 328–9
maps, 339–40
troops, 35–6, 45–6, 89, 93–4, 138, 177–8
Magetan, Java, 122, 156, 216, 226, 254, 257, 261, 308
maps, 340–1
Mahmud I (Ottoman Sultan 1730–54), 362
Majapahit (pre-Islamic kingdom), 32, 74, 162, 183, 237, 247
Majenang, Java, 163, 368–9
Makassar and Makassarese, 64, 78, 110–1, 118, 322, 362
map, 339

Malabar, 365; *see also* Indians
Malacca, 321
map, 339
Malang, Java, 124, 234
Malay language, 148, 198, 271, 361, 366
Malay literature, 18
Malaya, 365–6; *see also* Malacca
map, 339
Malays, 64, 78
Malik, 247
Malon, *see* Pamalon, Java (also Malon, Kamalon)
Mangadeg, Java, 277–8, 299, 315, 317–8
map, 341
mangirtya, *see kirtya*, *mangirtya*, *pangirtya*
Mangkubumi (name), 289
Mangkubumi (Png.) (Sultan Haměngkubuwana I, r. 1749–92) (b. c. 1717, d. 1792) (MB)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 8, 10, 17, 20–1, 23–5, 37
history (1743–46): civil war, 47–9, 58, 60
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61–75, 78–85, 87–98, 100–9
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110–31, 136–42
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143–8, 150–8, 160–72, 360–2, 365, 367–9
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173–82, 184–97, 199–200
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 208, 211, 213–32, 234–5, 336
history (1768–78), 236, 239–43, 245, 249–59, 261–3
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265–8, 270–1
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 289–93, 295, 298–311, 313–5, 317, 319, 337
history (1796–1899), 327
sources, 1, 3, 350–2, 357
troops, *see* troops
Mangkubumi, Prince, *see* Mangkunagara II
Mangkudiningrat, *see* Mangkuningrat (Png.)
Mangkukusuma (R. Ng.), 262
Mangkunagara I (1726–95, r. 1757–95) (MN I) (Prince *Samběr Nyawa*, the Soul Catcher; also R. Suryakusuma, Png. Prangwadana, Pangkunagara)
autobiography (*Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*, *SBPn*)
abbreviation, xvii
bibliography, 4, 383
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 12
history (1743–46): civil war, 43–5, 48, 51–4, 57–8
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 63, 66, 69–71, 74–5, 79–82, 84–5, 90–1, 93, 99–107, 109
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110, 113–4, 117–8, 121, 123, 126–7, 130, 133–4, 136–41

Mangkunagara I (*continued*)
autobiography (*continued*)
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 153–64, 166–7, 170–1
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 174–81, 183, 185–93, 195–7
history (1757–95): MN's later years, 203–14, 216, 218, 252–3, 266–8, 272, 317
opening folio, vi
primary source, 4, 344–55
battle standard (*Samběr Nyawa*), 2, 98–9, 190, 313–4, 336
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7–8, 10–7, 21, 23–7, 30, 33, 38, 40–1
history (1743–46): civil war, 42–60
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 63, 65–78, 80–5, 87–93, 95–106, 108–9
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 111, 113–4, 116–42
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143–4, 147, 150–67, 170–2, 367–8
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173–200
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 203–10, 212–4, 216–35
history (1768–78), 236–7, 239, 243, 245–64
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265–81, 370–1
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282, 284–320
legacies, 321–38
literary interests, 206–9, 212
map of key sites, 341
military prowess and generalship
early life and battles, 12, 17, 24, 41, 43, 49–50, 54, 166, 169
later life and reputation, 203, 258, 265, 301, 319, 335–7, 348
personal names, ix, 12, 308
primary sources, 1–2, 4, 296, 344–59
troops, *see* troops
VOC and, *see* VOC
Mangkunagara II (b. 1768, r. 1796–1835) (earlier names R.M. Sadat; [R.M. Slamět?]; Surya Mataram; Prabu [sometimes Surya] Prangwadana [or Prangwědana], Prince Mangkubumi)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 205, 232
history (1768–78), 252
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 267, 269, 277–8
history (1796–1835), 290, 299–301, 304–6, 310, 312, 315, 317, 321–3
Mangkunagara IV (r. 1853–81), 324–6, 330
Mangkunagara V (r. 1881–96), 326
Mangkunagara VII (r. 1916–44), 333–5
Mangkunagara VIII (r. 1944–87), 335

Mangkunagara (name), 212–3; *see also* Pakubuwana
Mangkunagara (R. Ay.), *see* Kusumapatahati (M. Ay.)
Mangkunagara the Elder (Png. Ar.) (b. c. 1702; d. 1738), father of Mankunagara I
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 10–6, 24–5, 36, 38, 40, 337
history (1743–46): civil war, 43
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 73, 131–4, 183, 197, 199
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217, 220
history (1768–78), 248–50, 259
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 285
history (1796–1899), 321–38
Mangkunagaran Legion, 322–4, 327, 333, 335
Mangkunagaran line, 222, 290, 325, 333, 335–6
Mangkunagaran principality
establishment in Surakarta (1757–68), 199–200, 203–6, 232–4, 272, 280, 319
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 272, 280
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 299, 304, 312–5
history (1796–1899), 321–30
history (from 1900 CE), 330–8
palace chronicle diary (1780–93) (*Babad Tutur*, *BT*, *Babad Nitik Mangkunagaran*, *Babad Nitik Samběr Nyawa*, *Babad Nitik Sambĕrnyawa*)
abbreviation, xvi
bibliography, 381–2
copying, 208
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 272–81, 370–1
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 285, 287–9, 294–5, 297, 299–300, 304–5, 310–7, 319
primary source, 3, 344–5, 348, 350–1, 353–5
Samběr Nyawa (the Soul Catcher), 100, 314
succession, 266
Mangkunĕgara, *see* Mangkunagara
Mangkuningrat (Png.), brother of Mangkubumi (also Pakuningrat), 151, 230–1
Mangkuningrat (Png.), brother of Mangkunagara; earlier, R. Sabar; later, Png. Timur; also Pakuningrat (b. c. 1728, d. 1741)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 33, 38, 132
history (1743–46): civil war, 52, 57
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 65, 72–3, 76, 83–5, 93, 102
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 117, 121, 130, 132, 139
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 155, 165–7
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 181–3, 191–3, 195–6, 199
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 205, 212, 217, 223

Mangkupraja (R. Tg.), 106, 180, 195, 224
Mangkuyuda (Tg.), 196, 230
mantri miji, *see miji*
Margawati, Java, 106
Marioněng (earlier, Pun Sampět), 123–4, 138, 155
Marquett (Capt.), 179
marriage politics and diplomacy, 203, 214–35, 262, 269, 284–5, 291–2, 319, 353; *see also* child marriages ("hung" marriages)
Martapura (Tg., Png.), also Paněmbahan or Png. Pugěr, 45–9, 58, 66, 71–2, 95, 118
Mas (Ratu), wife of Pakubuwana III, 219, 224–5
Mas Rongga Wirasantika, *see* Rongga Prawiradirja
Mas Said, *see* Mangkunagara I
Masaran, Java, 85, 308
  map, 341
Masonry, 328
Mataram area
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 12, 32
  history (1743–46): civil war, 44, 46, 51, 54–6
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 76, 81, 89–90, 92, 102
  history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 112, 114, 117–8, 124, 126, 129
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 151, 154, 158, 160, 162–3, 167, 170
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 185, 189–90
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217
  history (1768–78), 243, 245, 247–50, 264
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 268
  maps, 340–1
Mataram dynasty; *see also* kingship
  Crown Prince, 11, 251
  genealogy, 342–3
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 8, 12–3, 17, 19, 32
  history (1743–46): civil war, 42, 54
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 84, 88, 102
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 144, 151, 162–3, 167, 170
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 183, 187, 194
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217, 221, 233
  history (1768–78), 238, 244, 246, 250–1, 264
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 269
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 287
  history (1796–1899), 327
Mataram (Ki Agěng), also Ky. Pamanahan, 162, 170, 247
Mataram (Ky. H.), 40
Mataram (Surya), *see* Mangkunagara II
Matesih, Java, 184–5, 198, 308
  map, 341
Mecca
  'Abd al-Samad al-Palimbani in, 258
  dating systems, xi
  Ingalaga in, 379

Java and, 145, 147
pilgrimage to, *see* pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*)
Medina, xi
Meiden, G.W. van der, 356, 360, 364–6, 389
Menang, Java, 175, 178, 192
map, 341
Měngkubuwana (name), 212
Merapi, Mount, 23, 93, 145, 162
maps, 340–1
Merbabu, Mount (also Prababu), 212
maps, 340–1
merchants, *see* trade and commerce
Merden, *see* Pamarden, Java (also Merden)
Middle East, 153, 297, 328–9
miji, *piji*, 199
mantri miji, 127
pangeran miji, 199, 213, 259–60, 266, 294
Mijlendonk (secretary?), 138, 159
military technology and weapons; *see also krisses* (daggers)
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7–9, 28, 35
history (1743–46): civil war, 48–50
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 64, 68
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 115–6, 121, 140
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 154, 165
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 179, 187, 190, 195–8
history (1757–95): MN's later years, 203, 214, 273, 280, 294–5, 299, 302, 317
Mina, Saudi Arabia, 325
Minangkabau, 328
Mintaraga, 275
modernity, 286, 327, 329–32, 334
Mohammedans, *see* Islam
momong, 175, 186, 265, 336
Mondokan, Java, 368
Mossel, Jacob (Governor General, 1750–61), 31, 135, 146–8, 200, 360–2, 372
Mount …, *see the name of the Mount*
Muamat Likan (also Lekin or Leken) (Ottoman Sultan?), 362–4, 367
Muhammad al-Samman, 258
Muhammad Idris, 258–9
Muhammad Likan (also Lekin or Leken) (Ottoman Sultan?), 362–4, 367
Muhammad, Prophet
dating systems, xi
descendants (*sayyid*, *Sharif*), 47, 142, 144, 146, 360–1, 364–7, 380
Garĕbĕg Mulud, 29, 91, 155, 270, 295, 311–2, 379
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 18–9, 23, 29, 37
history (1743–46): civil war, 47
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 101, 142, 144, 146, 152, 155, 360, 364, 367
history (1768–78), 241, 246
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 273–4
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 286, 296, 319
history (1796–1899), 326–7
Muhammad (Seh), 258
Muhammadiya (Modernist Islamic organisation), 332
Mundri (M.)
genealogy, 342–3
Munnik, Hermanus, 226–9, 356–7

Muntilan, Java, 135
murwa, *murwani*, *purwa*, 207, 209, 350
musicians, 113, 267–8; *see also* *gamĕlan* orchestras
Muslims, *see* Islam
Mustafa II (Ottoman Sultan, r. 1695–1703) (d. 1703), 363–4, 367
Mustafa Pasha, Çorlulu Köse Bahir (Ottoman Grand Vizier, 1752–55), 144, 363–4, 367
Mustapa Rumi (Ottoman Sultan?), 362–4, 367
Mutamakin, Ahmad (Ky. H.), 21–2, 24
Mystic Synthesis (Islamic style)
  definition, 210
  history (1726–95): MN's life, 26, 210–1, 272–81, 283, 319
  later history (from 1796), 325, 327–8, 330, 332, 336, 338
mysticism; *see also* Mystic Synthesis (Islamic style)
  20th century, 334
  dhikr, 274, 378
  Hamĕngkubuwana II, 241–2, 245
  Mangkunagara I, 41, 133, 210, 274
  Pakubuwana II, 34
  Pakubuwana (Ratu), 17, 19–21
  songs (*suluk*), 282–3
  Sufi, 19–21, 297–8, 380; *see also* Sufism
  Surakarta, 288, 297–8, 303

Nahdlatul Ulama, 332
Napoleon, 322, 347
Naqshabandiyya (Sufi order), 22, 284, 328
Natakusuma (Png. Ar.), *see* Jayaningrat (Ad.) of Pekalongan
Natakusuma (Png.), brother of Mangkubumi, his *patih* (1752–55), 99, 152, 162–3, 168, 230
Natakusuma (R. Ad.), Kartasura *patih* 1733–42, exiled 1742–58, renamed Png. Juru, 25–6, 36–7, 40, 132–3, 218–9, 225
nationalism, 331–3, 336
Nawangsih, 247
Netherlands; *see also* VOC
  Calvinism, *see* Calvinists
  Kareta in, 286
  primary sources
    abbreviations, xvi
    bibliography, 284–385
    history (1726–42): MN's early life, 16
      VOC reports to Amsterdam, 8, 25, 35, 44, 48, 52
    history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 82, 108
      VOC reports to Amsterdam, 105, 108
    history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 167
      VOC reports to Amsterdam, 120, 138–9, 142
    history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 188, 368, 372
      VOC reports to Amsterdam, 150, 161, 163
    history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase:

VOC reports to Amsterdam, 173, 177–8, 180–5, 187–8, 196–7, 200
history (1757–95): MN's later years, 260, 284, 301, 306, 314, 372
VOC reports to Amsterdam, 221, 223, 231, 240, 242, 262, 264, 285–6
history (from 1796), 334
overview, 2, 344, 346–7, 349, 351–2, 355–9, 372
Ngabdulah, 246
Ngabdullah (Ky.) (*pĕngulu*), *see* Dipaningrat
Ngabdurahman, Sayyid, 87, 106, 113
Ngabei (Png.), x, 141, 249
Ngara-ara, Java, 368
Ngasem, Java, 218
Ngastina (mythical kingdom), 145
Ngawi, Java, 156
maps, 340–1
Ngayogyakarta Adiningrat, *see* Yogya[karta], Java
Ngoro-Oro, Java, 52
map, 341
Nitikan, Java, 85
Niwata[kawaca], 275–6
nobility and elites
19th and 20th centuries, 326–7, 329–30
battle standards, 98
bisexuality, 26
Buminata, 66–7
child raising, 16, 270
civil war, 84
decline in status with generations, 15, 268
exiled, 37–8
Mangkunagara, 205, 259
Mangkunagara the Elder, 24
Mystic Synthesis, 210
names and titles, x, xv–xviii, 144, 212, 379–80
priyayi, 327, 329–30, 332, 335–6
prophecies, 146
scribes, 348
Seh Ibrahim, 142, 364
sexual relations, 292
Sufism, 20
support for princes, 71–3
Surakarta, 265–6, 271, 299
Yogyakarta Sultanate, 218, 265–6, 271, 304
Nogosaren, *see* Nogosari, Java (now Nogosaren)
Nogosari, Java (now Nogosaren), 56
map, 341
north coast (Java)
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 13, 21, 34–5
history (1743–46): civil war, 46
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 63–4, 70–2, 80
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110–5
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 148, 151, 153, 169
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 179, 187, 192
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 218
history (1768–78), 242, 250, 262
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 268
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 308
history (1796–1899), 328

northeast coast (Java); *see also* Semarang, Java
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 10
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 71, 86, 89, 120, 136, 148–9, 356–7
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 213, 219, 228, 231
history (1768–78), 239, 259
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 268
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 288–90, 308–11, 315
history (1796–1899), 322
list of governors, 372–3
sources, 356–8
Nurasa, 247
Nurcaya, 247
Nurkadim (Ky.), 233
Nursaleh (Ky.), 296

occult knowledge, 10, 17, 23, 94; *see also* supernatural realm
Old Javanese literature, 22–4, 276
Onggadĕrpa (converted Dutchman), 105
Onggaima (converted Dutchman), 139
Ongganaya (musician), 113
Onggaprayitna (musician), 113
Onggaswara (musician), 113
Opak River, 46, 55, 117
maps, 340–1
opium, 180, 296
Orientalism, 336
Ossenberch, Willem Hendrik van (Maj.) (governor of northeast coast, 1761–65), 75, 79, 89, 102, 219–20, 222–5, 228–31, 235, 356, 372
Osterhammel, Jürgen, 329, 389
Ottomans, 142, 144–7, 155–6, 192, 360–7; *see also* Ibrahim (Seh)
Overstraten, Pieter Gerard van (governor of northeast coast, 1791–96), 315, 373

Pabrĕgan, *see* Pabrĕkan, Java (also Pabrĕgan)
Pabrĕkan, Java (also Pabrĕgan), 117–9, 121
Pacitan, Java, 167, 183, 192–3, 199
maps, 340–1
Padang (Sumatra), 321
map, 339
Padmanagara (Png. Ar.), earlier name R. Suryakusuma, 285, 308–9
genealogy, 342–3
Padmasusastra, *Sajarah-dalĕm*
bibliography, 392
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 12
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 67, 81, 119, 127, 158
history (1757–95): MN's later years, 216, 223, 232, 252, 262, 271, 284, 319
Padri War (1821–38), 328
Pagĕlen, *see* Bagelen, Java (earlier, Pagĕlen)
Pajagalan, Java, 129
Pajajaran, Java, 247
Pajang, Java, 151, 170, 185, 237, 304
maps, 340–1
Pajok, Java (now Pojok), 163, 368
maps, 163, 341
Pakualam (name), 212
Pakualam VIII (r. 1938–98), 335
Pakualaman Legion, 327

Pakualaman principality, 324, 333
Pakubuwana I (earlier, Pugĕr) of Surakarta (r. 1704–19), 10, 17, 194, 221, 233, 243, 248
genealogy, 342–3
Pakubuwana II of Surakarta (r. 1726–49)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 8, 10–4, 16–26, 31–2, 35–40
history (1743–46): civil war, 43–4, 46–9, 51–3, 56–7, 59
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61–5, 74–5, 82, 84–8
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 132
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 175–6, 186, 194, 197
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 218, 220
history (1768–78), 248–50
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 319
Pakubuwana III of Surakarta (also R.M. Suret) (r. 1749–88)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 37
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 86–9, 95, 109
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 113–4, 117, 120, 126, 131–2, 134–6
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143, 150–1, 153, 161–2, 168–72, 365
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173–8, 180–2, 186–7, 191–7, 199–200
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 205, 213, 216–7, 219, 222–32, 234–5
history (1768–78), 236, 239–40, 245–6, 250–7, 259–63
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265–7, 269–70, 336, 370
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282–93
Pakubuwana IV of Surakarta (r. 1788–1820)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 96
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 232
history (1768–78), 252–3, 263
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 263, 270
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282, 289, 291–313, 315, 336–7, 370–1
Pakubuwana V of Surakarta (r. 1820–23), 283
Pakubuwana VII (r. 1944–2004), 335
Pakubuwana IX of Surakarta (fl. 1879), 282
Pakubuwana line, 20, 323, 333
Pakubuwana (name), 212; *see also* Haměngkubuwana; Mangkubumi (name)

Pakubuwana (Ratu, b. c. 1657, d. 1732), grandmother of Pakubuwana II, 10–1, 13, 16–21, 24, 39, 206
genealogy, 342–3
Pakunagara (name), 212–3; *see also* Mangkunagara; Pakubuwana
Pakuningrat (Png.), *see* Mangkuningrat (Png.)
Palembang (Sumatra), 258
map, 339
Palm, Willem Adriaan (Resident at Surakarta, 1784–88), 270–1, 284, 286–9, 294, 373
Palmerston (Viscount), 49, 266
Pamalon, Java (also Malon, Kamalon), 103
Pamanahan (Ky.), *see* Mataram (Ki Agĕng)
Pamarden, Java (also Merden), 260
Pamĕrden, *see* Pamarden, Java (also Merden)
Pamijahan, *see* Saparwadi, Java (now Pamijahan)
Pamot (Png.), earlier Ambiya (d. 1749)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 14, 33, 38, 132
history (1743–46): civil war, 44, 46, 50–1, 54, 56, 58
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 65, 72–3, 76, 83–5
sources, 346
Panawangang, Java, 120
Pancoran, *see* Pancuran (Batavia district) (also Pancoran)
Pancuran (Batavia district) (also Pancoran), 132
Pancuran (Png.), *see* Tirtakusuma (Png.)
Pandhansari (Ratu)
genealogy, 342–3
Panĕmbahan, *see* Martapura (Tg., Png.)
Panĕngah (Png.), 296
pangeran miji, *see miji*
pangirtya, *see kirtya*, *mangirtya*, *pangirtya*
Pangulu (R.), 43–5
Panjĕr, Java, 260
Panji, 247
Panular (Png.) (c. 1772–1826), 85, 89, 95, 118, 125, 345
papan, 207–9
Papringan, Java, 68, 78, 280
Parikĕsit, 247
Parra, Petrus Albertus van der (Governor General, 1761–75), 372
Paseban(?), Java, 368
Pasuruan, Java, 57
map, 340
Patahati (Mas Ayu), *see* Kusumapatahati
Pati, Java, 46, 71–2, 78, 181, 218, 262
maps, 340–1
Patras, Abraham (Governor General, 1735–37), 32, 372
Peace, Law on Disturbing the, *see Angger Arubiru*
Pĕdagangan, Java, 151, 153, 161, 172, 373
map, 341
Pekalongan, Java
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 64, 111–2, 114, 119, 127
history (1768–78), 254, 261
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 309
history (1796–1899), 328
map, 340
Pemalang, Java, 111–2
map, 340

pĕngulu (chief religious officer), 21, 87, 106, 127, 137, 229, 279, 379
Pepe River, 205
Persia, 145; *see also* Iran
pĕsantren (religious schools), 153, 211, 328, 330, 379
physiognomy, 150
Pidesko, Mount, 68
  maps, 340–1
piety, *see* Islam
Pigeaud, Th. G. Th. (1899–1988), 2, 272, 353, 355, 392
piji, *see miji*
Piji, Java, 93
pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*)
  Garĕbĕg Bĕsar, 29, 97, 124, 154, 255, 379
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 19, 29
  history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 74, 363–5
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 210–1
  history (1768–78), 247–8, 257
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 273
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 287, 297
  history (1796–1899), 325, 328–9
  pilgrims (*haji*), xvi, 22, 36, 101, 257–8, 287, 297, 329, 362, 379
Plered, Java, 65, 238, 243, 247–8
Poensen, Carel, 328, 331
poisons, 8, 24, 218, 288–9
Pojok, *see* Pajok, Java (now Pojok)
Poll, Gerrit van der (VOC, Surabaya 1744), 57
Poll, van de (Capt.) (d. 1755), 182, 186
Ponorogo, Java (earlier, Pranaraga)
  history (1726–46), 38, 43
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 81
  history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 116, 121–3, 126–8, 130–1, 138–40
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 153, 156, 167
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 175–6
  history (1757–95), 285, 308
  maps, 340–1
  orthography, x
Pontjowolo, Hilmiah Darmawan (R. Ay.), 325
population, *see* Java
ports and shipping, 61, 328
Portuguese language, 148, 361
Prababu, *see* Merbabu
Prabu Amijaya (Png. Ar.), earlier R.M. Sura (d. 1789), 101, 127, 225, 232, 234, 252, 262–3, 267–8, 299–300
  genealogy, 342–3
Prabu Prangwadana (Png.), *see* Mangkunagara II
Prabu Prangwĕdana (Png.), *see* Mangkunagara II
Prabujaka, *see* Singasari (Png.)
prajurit estri, *see* female soldiers
Prambanan, Java, 39, 113–4, 116–7, 133, 159–60, 189–90
  map, 341
Pranaraga, *see* Ponorogo, Java (earlier, Pranaraga)
Prangwadana (name), 290

Prangwadana, Prince, *see* Mangkunagara II
Prangwadana, Prince Aria, *see* Mangkunagara I
Prawoto, Java, 223
  map, 341
pre-Islamic literature, *see* Old Javanese literature
pre-Islamic times, *see* Java
Prembun, Java, 260
primary sources, 2–4, 70, 344–59, 381–5
Pringgalaya (*patih*) (d. 1755), 63, 65, 74, 79, 85, 126, 148, 171, 176–8, 180
Pringgalaya (R. Ayu), sister of Mangkubumi, 79
  genealogy, 342–3
Progo River, 89, 93–4
  maps, 340–1
Prophet, *see* Muhammad (Prophet)
Proudfoot, Ian, 274, 393
Pugĕr (name), x; *see also* Martapura (Png.); Pakubuwana I
Pugĕr (Png.), *see* Martapura (Tg., Png.)
puppet theatre, *see wayang* (puppet or dance theatre)
Pura Mangkunagaran, *see* Mangkunagaran principality
Purbanagara (Png. Ar.), 308–9
  genealogy, 342–3
Purbaya line, 16, 250
Purbaya (name), x
Purbaya (Png.), brother of Mangkubumi, 127, 130, 165, 352
Purbaya (Png.), rebel (d. 1726), 11, 16, 22, 248, 250
  genealogy, 342–3
Purbaya (Png.), son of Png. Purbaya, d. 1726; earlier, R. Dm. Urawan (exiled 1738), 22–4, 26, 132
  family of, 132–3
  genealogy, 342–3
Purbaya (Png.), uncle of Pakubuwana IV, 312
Purwacarita (mythical kingdom), 145
Purwanagara (governor), 139
Purwodadi, Java, 162
  map, 341

Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya (Sufi order), 329
Qur'an
  alcohol ban, 273, 299
  Buminata, 67
  Dutch becoming Javanese, 113
  five pillars, 211
  homosexuality denounced, 26
  Javanese carrying book in wartime, 44
  Mangkubumi, 23
  Mangkunagara writing out, 175, 178, 209, 276, 279, 319, 348
  Modernist Islam, 332
  Natakusuma (*patih*), 162
  Pakubuwana (Ratu), 18–20
  punishments, 289
  quotation inscribed on mosque, 326
  recitation and reading, 133, 242, 274–5, 280, 283, 296, 316–7
  Suranatan corps, 105
  swearing oaths of allegiance to VOC on, 112

Raden Said, *see* Mangkunagara I
Rambut, *see* Subĕr, Java (also Sumbĕr, Rambut)
Rana Asmara (R. Ay.)
  genealogy, 342–3
Ranadipura (R. Tg.), 126–8, 156, 166–7, 177
Randhulawang, Java (now Randugunting?), 39–40, 103
  map, 341

Randugunting, Java, *see* Randhulawang, Java (now Randugunting?)
Rawana, King, *Sĕrat Rama*, 75, 219
Rawi, *see* Ambarawa, Java (also Bahrawa, Rawi or Sitiwari)
rebellions, *see* Java (history)
Red Fire-Arrows (*Saragĕni Abang*), 83, 275
Reede tot de Parkeler, J. Fr. Baron van (Resident at Surakarta, 1790–96; governor of the northeast coast, 1796–1801), 305, 309–12, 322, 373
reference works, 392–3
reform, *see* Islam
Rĕksanagara (*bupati*), 262
Rembang, Java, 35, 78–9, 181, 187
  maps, 340–1
Republic of Indonesia, *see* Indonesia
Residents
  British, 350
  VOC, *see* VOC
Rhijn, Jan Mathijs van (Resident at Yogyakarta, 1773–86), 268, 373
rice
  carriers, 66–7
  diseases, 23
  dues (VOC), 25
  farming, 111
  fields, 58, 107, 205, 287
  harvests, 126, 182, 316
  hoarded, 292
  meals, 97, 274
  planting, 55
  purchasers, 90
  stamping troughs, 110
  steamers, 122
  warehouses, 78
Riemsdijk, Jeremias van (Governor General, 1775–77), 372
Robson, Stuart, 325
Roma, Java, 89
Rongga (Png.), 85, 89, 92, 95, 118, 125
  genealogy, 342–3
Rongga Prawiradirja (earlier, Mas Rongga Wirasantika), 98, 127, 138, 182, 195–6, 261
Rongga Wirasantika (Mas), *see* Rongga Prawiradirja
Ronggawarsita, 145, 325
Roodenhuijs (Cornet), 107
royal dress, 20, 32
Rubiyah, *see* Kusumapatahati
Rum, Sultan, *see* Ottomans

Sabar (R.), *see* Mangkuningrat (Png.)
Sadat (R.M.), *see* Mangkunagara II
Safavid empire, 364
Safi'i school (Sunni Islam), 332
Said, R.M., *see* Mangkunagara I
sajarah ing tĕdhak-tumĕdhak ing para Nata ing Tanah Jawa sadaya, 247–52, 279
Sala, Java (also Solo), 59; *see also* Surakarta, Java
Salakarta, 59, 208, 253; *see also* Surakarta
Salatiga, Java
  history (1743–46): civil war, 53
  history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 64, 115, 197–8, 200, 357
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 213, 216, 353
  history (1768–78), 252
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 311
  maps, 340–1
Samakaton, Java, 68–9, 116
Samangka River, 368
Samangko, Java, 138
Samběr Nyawa, *see* Mangkunagara I

Samongko River, 368
Sampang, Madura
map, 340
Sampĕt (Pun) (*bĕdhaya* dancer), *see* Marioneng
Santri (R.), 296–7, 300
Saparwadi, Java (now Pamijahan), 20
map, 339
Saragĕni Abang, *see* Red Fire-Arrows
Saragĕni Cĕmĕng, *see* Black Fire-Arrows (*Saragĕni Cĕmĕng*)
Sarekat Islam, 333
sarengat, *see* Sufism
Saribit, Java, 93–4
Sarip Bĕsar, *see* Ibrahim (Seh, *shaikh*)
Saripi (Pun) (*bĕdhaya* dancer), 123
Sasradiningrat (R. Ad.) (*patih* 1770–82), 258
Sastrarĕjana (R. Ng.) (also "Sastroredjono"), 233
"Sastroredjono", *see* Sastrarĕjana (R. Ng.)
Satariyah, 234
Sawi (R. Aj.), 217
Sawunggaling (Tg.), also Dipati Cĕbolang, Sĕcanagara, 120, 124, 131
SBPn, *see* Mangkunagara I
Scots, *see* Hamilton, Alexander
scribes, 18, 190, 207, 348, 350; *see also* female soldiers
scriptorium, *see* female soldiers (*prajurit estri*)
Sears, Laurie J., 334, 391
Sĕcanagara, *see* Sawunggaling (Tg.)
secondary sources, 385–91
Sedayu, Java, *see* Sidayu, Java
Sĕjarah wiwit Nabi Adam dumugi ratu-ratu tanah Jawi, 246–7, 279, 382
Sela (Ki Agĕng), 162–3, 179, 247
Selo, Java (also Sĕsela), 162–3, 179, 368
maps, 340–1
Semarang, Java
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7, 10, 25, 34–7
VOC correspondence, 14
history (1743–46): civil war: VOC correspondence, 46–9, 53, 55
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 64–5, 71, 75
VOC correspondence, 66, 73–4, 76, 79–80, 82, 84, 86, 88–9, 91, 95, 103, 105, 107
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 116, 129, 134
VOC correspondence, 110, 112, 114–5, 118, 120, 125–6, 131–3, 135–6, 138
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 148–9, 151, 360
VOC correspondence, 147, 157–9, 161, 163, 167, 172
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 195, 197
VOC correspondence, 179–81, 183, 185–7, 193, 200
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217–8, 221–2, 235
VOC correspondence, 215, 223–31, 356–7
history (1768–78), 239
VOC correspondence, 240, 254–7, 259, 261–3
history (1779–88): MN's later years: VOC correspondence, 268–72

history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 284, 287, 297, 304, 306–7, 316–7
VOC correspondence, 285–6, 288–91, 293–6, 300–13, 315
history (from 1796), 328, 331
list of governors of northeast coast, 372–3
maps, 339–41
Sĕmbuyan, Java, 54–5, 166, 179
maps, 340–1
Sendang, Mount, 116
map, 341
seos, *seyos*, 207–9
Sĕpuh/Kulon (R. Ay.), MN's grandmother, 180
genealogy, 342–3
Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran, *see* Mangkunagara I
Sĕrat Babad Panambangan, 296, 299
sĕrat, *nĕrat*, 207–8, 354
Sĕrat Wahanabrata, 232–4, 383
Sĕsela, *see* Selo, Java (also Sĕsela)
Sĕtrawijaya (scribe), 350
Shafi'i school (Sunni Islam), 332
shari'a, *see* Sufism
Shattariyya (Sufi order), 20–2, 210, 212, 284, 297, 329
Siberg, Johannes (governor of northeast coast, 1780–87), 161, 268–72, 284–8, 292, 373
Sidakarsa, Java (also Sidoharjo), 166, 178, 369
map, 341
Sidayu, Java (also Sedayu), 46–51
map, 341
Sidoharjo, *see* Sidakarsa, Java (also Sidoharjo)
Silarong (Png. Ar.) (d. 1748), 81
genealogy, 342–3
Simo, Java, 151, 182, 188
map, 341
Sinduréja (R. Ad.), formerly Tg. Tirtawiguna (d. 1751), 16, 24, 33, 36, 63, 114
Sindusastra (Tg.), 190
Singasari (Png. Ar.), also Prabujaka (d. 1768)
genealogy, 342–3
history (1743–46): civil war, 46, 52, 57
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 66, 72, 81–2, 84, 91–2, 95, 103
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 118
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 161, 167
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 174, 178, 313
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 234
singing, 24, 26–7, 56, 117, 282
singings
mystical songs (*suluk*), 282–3
Sipat ing manusya, 252–3
Sitiwari, *see* Ambarawa, Java (also Bahrawa, Rawi or Sitiwari)
Sluijs, Jacob Cornelis van der (Resident at Yogyakarta, 1761–64), 228, 373
Soblém (R. Aj.), 262
Sobro, *see* Sombro (R. Aj.)
Solo, Java, *see* Surakarta, Java
Solo River, 46, 50, 54, 57–9, 195, 368–9
maps, 340–1
Solo (village), *see* Sala, Java (also Solo)
Sombro (R. Aj.) (b. c. 1745)
genealogy, 342–3

Sombro (R. Aj.) (*continued*)
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 69, 157–8, 185
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217, 221–3, 234
history (1768–78), 255
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 280
Soul Catcher, *see* Mangkunagara I
sources
primary, 295, 307–8, 344–59, 381–5
secondary, 385–91
South Africa, *see* Cape of Good Hope
Southeast Asia, 367
southern mountains, Java, 109, 198, 304, 306, 308; *see also* Gunung Kidul
Southern Ocean, Goddess of the, *see* Kidul (Ratu)
Spanish *reals*, 250, 261, 263, 322–4
Speelman (Admiral), 107
Sragen, Java, 163, 368–9
maps, 340–1
Srěnděl (R. Aj.), 262
Sri Lanka (earlier, Ceylon)
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 11, 15, 25–6, 37, 40
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 73, 95, 132–3, 135, 161
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 217, 220–1, 225
history (1768–78), 249–50
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 285, 287
Steenmulder (Capt.), 159, 166, 176, 178–9, 197, 199–200, 216
Steinmetz, Nathanael, 38
Sterrenberg, Elzo, 48–9, 53, 55, 66, 73
Straalendorff, Frederick Christoffel van (Resident at Surakarta, 1767–84), 239, 254–9, 261, 269, 300, 373
Subadya (R.M.), 267
Suběr, Java (also Sumběr, Rambut), 70
succession
female line, 217
Mangkunagaran, 262, 268–9, 293–4, 300, 304, 308–10, 315, 319, 322, 337
Surakarta, 220, 231–2, 239–40, 262, 264, 291–2, 334–5
Yogyakarta Sultanate, 218, 231–2, 239–40, 262, 264, 295, 301–3, 315, 334–5
Sufism; *see also* Naqshabandiyya (Sufi order); Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya (Sufi order); Shattariyya (Sufi order)
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 10, 16, 19–23, 25
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 62
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 210
history (1768–78), 246, 252, 254, 258, 264
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 274
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 284, 297
history (1796–1899), 329
history (from 1900 CE), 332
sarengat, *shari'a*, 20, 22, 93, 380
sugar, 98, 111, 324, 333
Sukawati, Java
history (1743–46): civil war, 45–7, 49–50, 58

history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 62–3, 71, 78, 82–3, 89, 91, 95, 105
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 118, 126, 138–9, 141
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 154, 156–7, 163, 368
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 178–80, 187
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 308
maps, 340–1
Sukoharjo, Java, 57
map, 341
Sumanagara (R.), 158, 185
Sumarĕja, *see* Kusumarĕja, Java (also Sumarĕja, Sumarĕjadimulya)
Sumarĕjadimulya, *see* Kusumarĕja, Java (also Sumarĕja, Sumarĕjadimulya)
Sumatra, 20, 258, 297, 328, 365–6; *see also* Aceh; Minangkabau; Palembang
maps, 339, 341
Sumbĕr, *see* Subĕr, Java (also Sumbĕr, Rambut)
Sunan, *see* Surakarta, Java
Sundara (R.M.), *see* Hamĕngkubuwana II
Sunni schools, 328, 332; *see also* Shafi'i school
supernatural realm; *see also* Javanese myths and traditions; occult knowledge
babads, 349
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 17, 27, 29–30, 32, 39, 41
history (1743–46): civil war, 43–4, 59
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 69, 116, 146, 162
history (1757–95): MN's later years, 233, 237–8, 241–3, 245, 254, 267, 277, 287, 298
Supiyah (R. Aj.), 119, 216, 285
Supraba (nymph), 184
Sura (R.M.), son of MN, *see* Prabu Amijaya (Png. Ar.)
Surabaya, Java
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 35
history (1743–46): civil war, 46, 57
history (1746–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 80, 121, 124–5, 131, 161, 177–9
history (1757–95): MN's later years, 211, 328
history (from 1900 CE), 331
map, 340
troops, 80, 177–8
Surabaya War (1717–23), 116
Suradi, son of Mangkunagara the Elder, 14
Suradigdaya (Tg.), 46
Suradimĕnggala (Tg.), 124, 137
Suradiningrat (Ad.), 121–2, 139
Surakarta Adiningrat, *see* Surakarta, Java
Surakarta, Java; *see also* Karta[sura], Java; *Salakarta*
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 21
history (1743–46): civil war, 43, 59
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61–4, 69–70, 72–7, 79–83, 85–91, 93, 95, 99, 103, 105–9

Surakarta, Java (*continued*)
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 111, 113–5, 117, 119, 126, 131–2, 135, 141–2
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 151, 153–4, 156, 159–61, 167–71
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173–4, 176–80, 184–6, 191–7, 199–200
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 4, 203–5, 209–10, 213–4, 216–7, 219–29, 232, 234–5, 336
history (1768–78), 236–40, 244–6, 249–59, 262–4
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265–6, 269–70, 273, 276–7, 280–1
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282, 284–96, 298–318
history (1796–1899), 322–4, 330–1
history (from 1900 CE), 334–7
maps, 339–41
Residents, *see* VOC
sources, 4, 21, 345, 350, 352–3
Susuhunan, Susunana, Sunan, 380
troops, *see* troops
VOC correspondence, *see* VOC
Surakarta Major *Babad* (*Babad Tanah Jawi* [Bale Pustaka]; *BTJ[BP]*)
abbreviation, xvi
history (c. 1601), 233
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 10, 12–3, 15–6, 24–6, 32, 35, 37
history (1743–46): civil war, 43–4, 52
primary source, 3
Suranatan corps, 65, 101, 105, 194, 277
Surapati (d. 1706), 47, 125, 131, 234, 292
Suraprameya (R.), 119
Surawiguna (Ng.), son of Tirtawiguna, 33
Surya Mataram, *see* Mangkunagara II
Surya Prangwadana (Png.), *see* Mangkunagara II
Surya Prangwĕdana (Png.), *see* Mangkunagara II
Surya Raja, 207, 241–2, 245, 383
Suryadi (Png.) (or Suryadikusuma), 76, 95
Suryadikusuma, *see* Suryadi (Png.)
Suryadimurta (also Soerio Dimorto), 271
Suryakusuma (R.), *see* Mangkunagara I; Padmanagara (Png.), earlier name R. Suryakusuma
Susuhunan, *see* Surakarta, Java
Susunan, *see* Surakarta, Java
Susuruh (R.), 247

Tambar, Java, 137
Tangkisan, Java
maps, 50, 58, 341
Tanjung Anom (or Wringin Anom), 288–9, 371
Tanjung, Java, 76, 111, 179, 181
map, 340
Tapa (Ky.), 125
Tarub (Ki Agĕng), 247
Tarub (Ngai Agung), 247
technology, military, *see* military technology and weapons
tĕdhak, 207
Tegal, Java, 64, 108, 110–2, 115, 262
map, 340

Tegalsari, Java, 153
Tĕgalwangi, Java, 247
Tejawati (M. Ayu), mother of Mangkubumi, 47, 67, 70–1, 79, 87, 91, 116
genealogy, 342–3
Tembayat, Java, 44, 64, 87
maps, 340–1
Tĕpasana (Png.) (d. 1741), 221–2
genealogy, 342–3
Ternate, 44, 64
map, 339
Terong (Buta, demon), 149–50, 198, 215
Thedens, Johannes (Governor General, 1741–43), 372
Theosophy, 328, 334
Thomas, Keith, 116, 391
Tidar, Mount, 89–90
map, 341
Timur (Png.), *see* Mangkuningrat (Png.)
Timur (R.M.), *see* Haměngkubuwana II
Timuran (*kelurahan*, Surakarta), 205
Tirem, Java, 167, 174
map, 341
Tirtakusuma (Png.) (also Pancuran) (d. 1757), 40, 53–4, 132–6, 217
genealogy, 342–3
Tirtawiguna (Tg.), *see* Sindurĕja (R. Ad.)
titles; *see also* Javanese titles
Islamic, 287
Tlogowono, Java, 103–4
Tolstoy, Leo, 164, 347, 391
Toutlemonde, Balthasar (Resident at Surakarta, 1748–52), 37, 88, 103, 373
trade and commerce; *see also* finance
Javanese middle class and Arabs, 328
Mangkunagaran principality, 324
Seh Ibrahim, 144, 146, 192–3, 361–2, 364–7
VOC, 32, 34, 214, 296
Trayem, Java, 135
treaties
1743 (November), 40, 168
1749 (December), 86
1755, *see* Giyanti, Java
troops; *see also* Suranatan corps
Balinese, *see* Balinese troops
Bugis, 107
Buminata, 56, 160
Chinese community, 39
European, 36, 57, 64, 78, 104, 107, 118, 311
female, *see* female soldiers
French, 321
Guntur, 181, 222–3
Indian, 311
Indonesian, 36, 50, 57, 64, 90, 96, 98, 107, 173
Javanese
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 32, 36–7
history (1743–46): civil war, 43–4, 57
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 64–8, 71–2, 75, 78–85, 89–92, 95–8, 102–4
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 118, 138
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 163, 165
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173, 193

troops (*continued*)
Javanese (*continued*)
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 203, 234
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 311
Madurese, 35–6, 45–6, 58–9, 89, 93–4, 138, 177–8, 184
Mangkubumi
history (1743–46): civil war, 49
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 64, 67, 72–3, 79–80, 82, 89–91, 93–4, 97–8, 100–1, 104, 106–8
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110–2, 117–8, 121–3, 131, 138–42
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143, 154, 156–7, 160–1, 165, 167, 368–9
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173, 176–8, 181–2, 188, 190–1, 195–6
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 218–9, 222–3, 228
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265, 270, 280
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 294, 302–3, 306, 311
Mangkunagara I
history (1743–46): civil war, 38, 44, 46–7, 49–52, 54–6, 58–9
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 63, 68, 76–7, 79, 82–4, 89, 92, 95–101, 103
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 112–4, 116, 118, 121–3, 126, 133–6, 138–40
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 154–9, 161–7, 368–9
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173, 178–9, 181–2, 185–6, 188–91, 195–6
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 205
history (1768–78), 247, 261
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265, 275–6, 280
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 291, 298, 302–4, 306, 310–3, 316
Mangkunagara's relations with, 337
Mangkunagara II, *see* Mangkunagaran Legion
Mangkuningrat, 57
Martapura, 48
Pamot, 76
Surabayan, 80, 177–8

Surakartan
history (1743–46): civil war, 43, 50
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 69, 73, 75, 80–1, 100, 106, 109
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 117
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 174, 176, 178, 196
history (1757–95): MN's later life, 223, 296, 302, 311–2
Ternaten, 44
VOC
companies, 50
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 35–9
history (1743–46): civil war, 44–6, 49–52, 56–7
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 63–4, 71, 73–5, 77–8, 80–1, 85–6, 88–91, 93–4, 96–7, 101–9
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110–2, 115, 117, 125, 130, 138, 141
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 144, 155–6, 159–61, 163, 165–7, 368–9
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173, 176–9, 181–2, 186–8, 190, 194, 197
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 203, 218, 234
history (1768–78), 256, 263
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265, 270, 273, 291
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 291, 298, 301, 303–4, 311–3, 336
Trunajaya (Madurese Prince), 54, 96, 248, 287
Tuban, Java, 73
map, 340
Tugu, Java, 163–6, 249, 368–9
maps, 340–1
Tunggon, Java, 195–6, 250–1
map, 341
Turkish language, 362
Turks, *see* Ottomans
turun, *nurun*, *anurun*, 207, 354
Tuwan Sayid, 47
Tuwan Sayid Bĕsar, *see* Ibrahim (Seh, *shaikh*)

Udayana, 247
Umar (R.M.), son of Mangkunagara the Elder, 14, 33, 132
Ungaran, Java, 64, 311
maps, 340–1
Urawan (R. Dm.), *see* Purbaya (Png.), son of Png. Purbaya

Valckenier, Adriaan (Governor General, 1737–41), 372
van, *For Dutch names including* van, *see the following word*
Van Neil, Robert, 322, 391

Velsen, Johannes van (Capt.), 35, 105
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, *see* VOC
Vergennes, Charles de, 365
Vidal, Gore, 347, 391
Vishnu, *see* Wisnu (Vishnu)
Visscher, Bartholomaeus, 34–5
VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Dutch East India Company)
  abbreviations, xvi–xviii
  dating, 238
  decline, 214–5, 231, 265–6, 285, 299, 316, 321, 336
  finance, *see* finance
  history (1726–42): MN's early life, 7–8, 10–1, 13–6, 24–5, 27, 31–40
  history (1743–46): civil war, 42, 44–54, 56–9
  history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 63–5, 67–8, 71–8, 80–2, 84–90, 92–6, 100–9
  history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110–8, 120–2, 124–6, 129–36, 138, 141–2
  history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 143–61, 163–72, 360–9
  history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 173, 176–200
  history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 203, 213–31, 234–5
  history (1768–78), 239–40, 242–3, 250, 252–64
  history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265–6, 268–73, 280
  history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 284–5, 287–316, 336
  history (from 1796), *see* Netherlands
  Java, 32–3
  list of senior officers, 372–3
  Netherlands, *see* Netherlands
  Residents
    Gresik, 211
    Juwana, 78
    list, 373
    Surabaya, 177
    Surakarta
      1741–48, *see* Hohendorff
      1748–52, *see* Toutlemonde, Balthasar
      1752–57, *see* Abrahams, J.H.
      1757–61, *see* Duurveldt
      1761–67, *see* Beuman, Jan Christoffel
      1767–84, *see* Straalendorff, Frederick Christoffel van
      1784–88, *see* Palm, Willem Adriaan
      1788–90, *see* Hartsinck, Andries
      1790–96, *see* Reede tot de Parkeler, J. Fr. Baron van
      list, 373
      19th century, 324
    Yogyakarta, 228, 239, 256, 292, 306, 350, 373
  sources, 1, 4, 284, 295, 297, 342–3, 346, 353, 355–9
  troops, *see* troops
volcanic eruptions, 108, 114–6, 277
Vos, Johannes (governor of northeast coast, 1766–71), 215, 373

wayang (puppet or dance theatre)
Balinese, 156
glossary, 380
history (1726–46): MN's early life, 28–30, 56
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 71, 74, 82, 89, 103
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 117, 121
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 145, 148–50, 156
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 184, 187, 198
history (1757–95): MN's later years, 209, 215, 247, 267, 274, 279, 316–7
history (from 1900 CE), 334
primary sources, 348
weapons, *see* military technology and weapons
Wedi, Java, 85, 87, 308
map, 341
Weiler, Frederik de, 366
Wĕning (Sang Yyang), 247
Wĕrdiningsih (M. Ay.)
genealogy, 342–3
West Java, 20, 158, 297
West Madura, *see* Madura
Wicara Kĕras, 297–8, 383
Wijil, Mount, 157, 159, 232, 280–1
map, 341
Wijil (Png.), 87
Wilde, E.A. de, 289
William V, Prince of Orange, 321
Wingka (Kaji, Haji), 101
Winter, C.F., Sr. (1799–1859), 352
Wiradesa, Java, 111–2
map, 340
Wiradigda (R.), 296–7
Wiraguna of Kedu, 177
Wirakusuma (Tg.), 286–7, 296, 300
Wiramĕnggala (Png.) (d. 1741), 221
genealogy, 342–3
Wiranagara line, 56
Wiranata (Tg.), 114, 126
Wirasaba, Java, 221–2
map, 340
Wiratmĕja (R.M.) (d. 1741), 221–2
genealogy, 342–3
Wisnu (Vishnu), 145
women and girls
aristocratic and courtly, 16, 20, 37, 70–1, 79–80, 205, 225, 265–6
child marriages, *see* child marriages ("hung" marriages)
concubines, *see* concubines
dancing girls, *see* dancing girls
following troops
history (1743–46): civil war, 52
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 68, 91
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 110, 116, 118
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 160
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 178, 182, 184, 188, 190, 195–6
MN's generalship, 337
scribes, *see* female soldiers
sexual relations
Buminata, 126
cross-cultural, 105
kingship, 20

women and girls (*continued*)
sexual relations (*continued*)
Mangkunagara I, 56, 123, 140, 209, 224
Mangkunagara the Elder, 13, 15
Pakubuwana III, 225
prophecies, 146
Pun Sampĕt, 123–4
punishments, 289
Reede, 322
Siberg, 292
Surakarta aristocrats, 265
singers, 26
traders, 192–3
wives (principal, secondary and concubines)
Amangkurat IV, 11, 66, 81, 249
Guntur, 217
Haměngkubuwana II, 227, 232
Jayengrana, 157
Mangkubumi, 128
Mangkunagara I, 68, 71, 157, 159, 232, 279–81, 288, 291–2, 319, 338
Mangkunagara the Elder, 14
Pakubuwana III, 219, 224–5, 232
Pakubuwana IV, 284
Panot, 85
Prabu Amijaya, 232
Wongsaniti (M. Ng.), 193–4
Wonogiri, Java, 14, 66, 76, 157, 232, 280
map, 341
World War I, 333
World War II, 334; *see also* Japanese occupation (1942–45)
Wouthier (Capt.), 107–8
Wringin Anom, *see* Tanjung Anom (or Wringin Anom)
Wulan (R. Ay.) (d. 1727), mother of Mangkunagara I, 11–4, 76, 197, 220, 222, 249
genealogy, 342–3

Yanas, 247
yasa, *ayasa*, *ingkang ayasa*, 206
Yasadipura I (Ng.) (1729–1803), 21, 276, 347, 370–1
Yasadipura II, 297, 370
yaws, 166, 227, 261, 271, 315–7
Yemen, 22, 155
Yogya, *see* Yogya[karta], Java
Yogya[karta], Java
Babad Kraton, *see Babad Kraton*
Crown Prince (1749?–58), *see* Ĕntho
Crown Prince (1758–92), *see* Haměngkubuwana II
culture, 26–31
history (1726–42): MN's early life, 8, 12, 17, 20, 26, 36, 39
history (1743–46): civil war, 43–4, 46, 52, 54, 56
history (1746–51): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 1st Phase, 61, 63, 82–5, 87–91, 93, 98, 103–4, 106
history (1752–53): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 2nd Phase, 113, 142
history (1753–55): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, 3rd Phase, 145, 151, 158, 167, 169–71
history (1755–57): 3rd Javanese War of Succession, Final Phase, 177–8, 184–5, 189–93, 197, 200
history (1757–68): MN's establishment in Surakarta and marriage diplomacy, 207, 211–2, 215, 218–9, 225–9, 231–2, 234–5

history (1768–78), 236–45, 250–1, 256, 259, 261, 263–4
history (1779–88): MN's later years, 265, 267–70, 277
history (1787–95): MN's final victory, 282, 284, 287, 290, 292–5, 298, 300–4, 306, 308–12, 315
history (1796–1899), 322–4
history (from 1900 CE), 331, 333–5, 337
maps, 339–41
Residents, *see* VOC
sources, 1, 3, 345, 350
VOC correspondence, *see* VOC
Yudanagara (R. Tg.) the elder, *see* Danuréja I
Yudanagara (R. Tg.) the younger, of Banyumas, son of Danuréja I, 158, 168, 223, 255
Yusuf (Joseph) (Prophet), 18
Yusup (*sayyid*), 106

Zain al-Yamani (Shaikh), 22
Zelle (Lt. Commander), 159
Zoetmulder, P.J., 283, 391

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